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THE

HISTORY

OF

GREECE.

By WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

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CHAPTER XLI.

Affairs of Greece, from the Acquisition of the Situation of First Minister of Athens by Demosthenes, to the Election of the King of Macedonia to the Office of General of the Amphictyonic Confederacy.

SECTION I.

Character of the Office of First Minister of Athens. Ability and Diligence of Demosthenes. Negotiation with Persia. New Coalition with Phocion's Party. Embassy of Demosthenes to the Hellespontine Cities.

SECT. I.

The situation of first minister, or vicegerent of the soverein assembly, for the direction of the executive government, was less connected with a particular office, in Athens, than in any other Grecian commonwealth, whose constitution has been unfolded to us. In Lacedæmon, the ephor of the year was the principal minister; at Thebes, the polemarc

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or the Bœotarc. Under Solon's constitution, the archon of the year seems to have been the proper first minister of Athens. But when the commonwealth became much implicated in wars, it was found convenient that the strategus, the first general, should have a discretionary power to call extraordinary assemblies of the people, which was analogous to demanding an audience of the soverein. The general commonly acquired his situation by his abilities; the archon, at least in the constitution of Cleisthenes, if the business was legally conducted, always by lot; the communications of the general to the soverein assembly were often most highly interesting; those of the archon seldom. Men of the extraordinary characters then of Themistocles, Aristeides, Cimon, and Pericles, holding successively the office of general, through most critical periods of many years, gave it an importance far above that of any other. But still no political power was constitutionally attached to it, except that of convening the people; and to avail himself of this, the general must be an able speaker. The reäl character of first minister of Athens then seems best marked by Thucydides, in his account of the disgrace and restoration of Pericles, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war: 'None of the orators,' says the historian, 'could satisfy the people. After a short 'interval, therefore, they called for Pericles again 'to mount the bema, and tell them his opinion of 'their affairs, and advise them what measures they 'should sanction with their decrees.' But when afterward the military and civil characters became more separated, than they were in the times of Themistocles and Pericles, if the general was not himself an able orator, it was indispensable for him to seek the assistance of an able orator. Hence

SECT. I.

Iphicrates, tho himself a speaker of not the lowest rank, chose an orator, not a military man, for his associate in military command; and hence what Demosthenes, in his political noviciate, described, an orator commander-in-chief, with the 'general 'under him;' that is, an orator doing that part of the general's business which he was unable to do for himself, speaking to the soverein people for him, and so appearing the principal person. But Demosthenes himself seems to have been the first who ever acquired that leading situation, which he held, of effective first minister of the commonwealth, wholly without military reputation, and without any military office. He became an eminent example of what he had formerly represented as a new portent, an absurd anomaly in government, an orator commander-in-chief, with a general under him.

The Greeks, amid their deficiencies in the science of politics, held very generally, as well as justly, that the military should be subordinate to the civil power; that is, the military, as a branch of the executive, should be subordinate to the legislative. But it farther deserves remark that, in every Grecian republic, where we find any steddy constitution, the executive was modelled upon the plan of regal authority. The same person (at least in times of war, which were almost continual) the chief military man held the chief civil command. Hence Æschines, on an occasion when it was of the utmost importance for him to avoid whatever might offend popular jealousy, did not scruple to arrain Demosthenes of unconstitutional conduct, as well as gross arrogance, in threatening that he would make the generals of the commonwealth feel the superior importance

Æsch. de cor.

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of an orator. But, throughout the Grecian republics, the civil and military character were, in theory, never separated: both equally pervaded the whole people: every man was to be a soldier, and every man a member of the soverein assembly. Citizens however more and more avoiding military service, it became necessary for the commonwealth to entertain an overbearing body of mercenaries, while nowhere, in the constitution, existed any proper provision for such a state of things. Hence the conduct of Demosthenes, in fact irregular, was in principle perhaps good; and the reproof of Æschines, justly founded, as the constitution had been, yet, in the altered state of things, was of pernicious tendency. But again still it deserves observation, that, as far as the Grecian governments are laid open to us, nowhere was the civil power of the military chief magistrate more narrowly limited, nowhere so regularly, as in the Lacedæmonian constitution; where alone hereditary succession and the title of king were preserved, and where the sacredness of the royal person, as of the essence of the constitution, was most strictly sanctioned.

The situation, in which Demosthenes now stood, was arduous, but offered, to a soaring ambition, great and inviting views. As first minister of Athens, he was the leading man of the interest, throughout Greece, hardly to be properly distinguished as the Democratical, because some of the principal republics, warmest in the Macedonian alliance, were highly democratical, but of that which was opposed to the Macedonian; an interest existing, in greater or less amount, in every republic of the nation, and maintained by a disposition, not so much adverse to Macedonian patronage,

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as reddy to oppose, in all circumstances, fellow-citizens of that party which enjoyed Macedonian patronage. This party, in every republic, wanted a patronizing power; and Athens alone, of the Grecian states, was in a situation to afford incouragement. If then Athens could give a general prevalence to the anti-Macedonian party, Athens would be, what we find Demosthenes continually inciting her people to covet, the imperial republic, mistress of Greece, and himself at the head of the empire.

The numerous, and great failures, alreddy and recently experienced, in the pursuit of this object, might have disconcerted the most ambitious politician, unless he possessed the penetration and powers of combination of Demosthenes, to find and form new ground of hope. But speculations on opportunities, some of them perhaps hardly then discernible to any other eye, are shown, by following events, to have ingaged his attention; and the use he made of them marks him for one of the acutest statesmen that ever was at the head of a government. It has been well observed by a modern politician, of great acuteness and extensive experience, speculating on this part of history, that 'haranguing was, at this time, the least part 'of the business of Demosthenes; and eloquence 'neither the sole, nor the principal talent, as the 'style of writers would induce us to believe, on 'which his success depended. He must have 'been master of other arts, subservient to which 'his eloquence was employed; and must have 'had a thorough knowlege of his own state, and 'of the other states of Greece; of their dispo-'sitions, and of their interests, relatively to one-'another and relatively to their neighbors, to the

Lord Bolinbroke on the Spirit of Patriotism.

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'Persians particularly, with whom he had correspondence, not much to his honor. I say, he 'must have been master of many other arts, and 'have possessed an immense fund of knowlege, 'to make his eloquence in every case successful, 'and even pertinent and seasonable in some, as 'well as to direct it and furnish it with matter, 'whenever he thought fit to employ that weapon.' And we find Demosthenes speaking not very differently of himself. He boasts that he was the only one who had ever undertaken singly to carry political business through all its stages: for instance, to show the people the public interest requiring that an embassy should be sent to such a state; to draw the decree, containing the instructions for the ministers to be employed; to defend it against the objections of opposing orators; and then himself to take the office, and execute all the functions of the embassy: 'I applied myself,' he says, 'to every kind of public business[1].'

Demosth. de cor. p. 306. & 308.

From before the first Persian invasion, when the Athenians, pressed by the Lacedæmonians, solicited assistance from the satrap of Sardis, there had perhaps never been a time when some of the republics were not looking for advantage from connection with the Persian court, or its officers. On the other hand, since the victories of Xanthippus and Cimon, but much more since the expedition of the younger Cyrus, and the following successes of Agesilaus, even that distant court, but much more the western satraps, had been accustomed to watch Grecian politics with a jealous eye, to fear any political union of the numerous states of that little country, to interpose in its divisions,

[1] Ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμαυτὸν ἕταττον. Demosth. de cor. p. 302.

SECT. I.

and assist the weaker against the stronger. The prospect therefore, now appearing, of union under such a prince as Philip, whose conquests alreddy approached the Persian provinces, would be more than commonly alarming. It seems reasonably to suppose that a politician, generally so cautious as Isocrates, had knowlege of circumstances not reported by extant writers, which led him to that provocation to Persia, contained in his Oration on Peace, and repeated in the orations to Archidamus and to Philip. Demosthenes himself formerly, opposing, with apparent propriety, needless or interested provocation to Persia, had however declared, that he considered the king of Persia as the common enemy of all the Greeks. With whatever good or ill judgement then Isocrates persevered in urging, as the interest of Greece, to carry war against Persia, Demosthenes did not scruple now to pursue the interest of his party in forming or improving connection with Persia. In the general assembly he contended that alliance with Persia should be cultivated, and pecuniary assistance, for war against Macedonia, solicited. An embassy to the Persian court, on his motion, was decreed, and, under his able direction, was successful. A considerable subsidy was obtained, and he became himself the agent of the Persian court for the disposal of the money.

Demosth. pro Rhod.

Demosth. Philipp. 4. & Or. in ep. Philip.

Æsch. de cor.

The situation of the important iland of Eubœa, distracted still violently by faction, but almost lost to Athens, then ingaged his attention. Large experience had now taught him, that the haughtiness of democratical empire had been carried, by the Athenian government, to a pernicious extreme; not only in the violences of the former leaders of his party, which had produced the misfortunes of

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the Confederate war, but perhaps even in his own speeches and measures, which might have contributed to the loss of Amphipolis and Olynthus. If, in the present situation of Greece, the republic would hold subjects, or support its ambitious purposes by alliances, the tone must be altered. Yet the change could not be perfectly easy: for so were the Athenian people accustomed to be flattered with the ideä of their absolute sovereinty, that to profess an adverse principle, to imitate the king of Macedonia's arts of equity, liberality, and scrupulous regard for the constitution of every little patronized republic, would require great circumspection, and able as well as careful management. To obviate this difficulty, Demosthenes seems, a second time, to have used and abused the liberality of the party of Phocion. They had always recommended a liberal policy, both toward allies and toward enemies; and there were many among the Eubœans disposed to trust them, who would not trust the party of Chares. How any accommodation was brought about, does not appear, but some degree of coälition was again formed.

During the late war between Athens and Macedonia, Callias, founder of the Eubœan general assembly, instituted to support the independency of the iland, had passed to the Macedonian court. The distinction, with which he was treated there, is marked in the observation of the cotemporary orator, that he was favored with the title of 'the 'king's companion;' a principal honor of that court, revived under the Roman empire with the Latin appellation 'comes;' whence the modern title 'count,' so familiar now throughout Europe; and apparently the term 'companions' of the

Æsch. de cor. p. 482.

orders of knighthood has been of the same origin[2]. The peace quickly following between Macedonia and Athens, could hardly fail to produce some disappointment to his hopes. What the circumstances were we are not informed; nor should we perhaps trust Æschines, any more than Demosthenes, for all that his words seem to imply, which he would not venture directly to assert. Callias however ingaged in measures offensive to Philip, whence he was obliged to quit Macedonia. If then there remained a state of any considerable power, whence he could hope for support in his political purposes, it was Thebes, and he went thither. SECT. I.

Before this time, evidently, Demosthenes had opened that communication with a party in Thebes, with which we find Æschines reproaching him, and which he afterward turned to great account. It was a bold ideä to bring the people of all Greece the most inveterately hostile, equally hating the Athenians and hated by them, to close political union with Athens. But, as the party in Thebes, which desired to maintain the connection with Macedonia, would be indisposed to favor Callias, or to receive overtures from Demosthenes, the opposite party would, on that very account, be in some degree prepared for both. Callias however soon quitted Thebes, without having carried any public purpose that has been made known to us; and returning to his own city, Chalcis, where his influence seems to have remained intire, he procured a deputation to be sent by the Chalcidian government to Athens, to treat of a new alliance. Demosthenes not only gave his support to the

[2] Τῶν ἑταίρων εἷς ἀνομάζετο. Æsch. de cor. p. 482.

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liberal system, which Phocion and Isocrates had been continually recommending, but, as in making the peace with Macedonia, so now again in treating with Eubœa, he surprized them with going a great deal farther than they would have ventured. Under his management a treaty was concluded, by which, all claim of dominion of the Athenian people over, not Chalcis only, but Eretria, Oreus, in effect all Eubœa, was surrendered: those cities were no longer to send deputies to the synedrim at Athens, and no more to pay tribute: they were made as completely independent, by this treaty, as Byzantium, and the allied ilands, by the peace concluding the Confederate war.

Æsch. ut ant.

B.C.341. Ol.109.4.

This negotiation, managed by Demosthenes, Phocion so far approved, that he took the military command requisite for carrying it into effect. Under his orders a body of Athenian troops passed into Eubœa. Theban and Macedonian troops are spoken of, as in considerable force in the iland. But among the cotemporary orators, and not less among the later historical writers, we find such terms very loosely applied. It seems very unlikely that any Macedonian, or even Theban, men were among those troops: they seem rather to have been only Eubœans, who desired that support from Macedonia and Thebes which they did not obtain: for Philip, hindered by this war with Thrace and Scythia, had besides no disposition to oppose Phocion; and Thebes was distracted by faction, heightened by the intrigue of Demosthenes. Philisteides of Oreus, and Cleitarchus of Eretria, principal men, called by their opponents tyrants of those cities, withdrew, and the whole iland was brought under subjection (not nominally to Athens, but to the party of Callias, the friend of Demos-

Diod. l.16. c. 74. Æsch. de cor.

thenes) with so little effort, that no account of any contest remains[s]. SECT. L

For surrendering, by the treaty, that sovereinty of Eubœa, with the revenue attached to it, which the Athenian people had, now for ages, claimed and generally held, it might be expected that one day some opposing orator would propose to acquire profit, or credit and power, by calling the authors of the measure to a severe account. It was however much for the security of Demosthenes, that those, generally his political opponents, were, in this business, his collegues. But he used the opportunity, while he treated them yet as political friends, to provide still farther. One of his own party, Aristonicus, moved in the general assembly, that the thanks of the people be given him for his various services, to the republic, and especially for restoring the liberty of the Eubœan cities; and that, as an acknowlegement of them, a crown of gold be presented to him in the theater, at the festival of Bacchus. No opposition seems to have been made; the decree passed, and he received the honor. Æsch. de cor.

Speculations in Thrace next ingaged him. The great object was to gain the important town of Byzantium, commanding the commerce of the Euxine sea. Nor would the advantage be single; for so Athens, alreddy mistress of the Chersonese, would command the two reddiest passes between Europe and Asia; and thus to the Persian court,

[s] Plutarch, as it has been well observed by Wesseling, has omitted all notice of this expedition under Phocion; an expedition, though producing no brilliancy of military atchievement, yet of great political importance. We might well have spared some of his strange tales of Phocion's deeds, afterward in Thrace, for a good account of it.

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and especially to the satraps of Lesser Asia, the importance of her alliance would be greatly increased. Four or five years before, when he delivered the oration on the peace with Macedonia, the party then ruling in Byzantium being adverse to Athens, and especially to the war-party, he spoke of the Byzantine people generally in surly and threatening terms, adverting to the claim of the Athenian people to dominion over them, and tribute from them. He resolved now to use the opportunity, afforded by the implication of the king of Macedonia in war with Scythia, to correct the evil of this imprudence. The new connection with Persia could not but give increased importance to Athens in the eyes of the Byzantines. Demosthenes knew the general indisposition of commercial communities to any implication of policy with a government, in which the landed was the prevailing interest. An opening for political communication was reddy, through the commercial communication, alreddy established; principally with Perinthus, but through that town with Byzantium, and all connected with Byzantium. The objects altogether appeared important enough to induce Demosthenes to leave the Athenian people, for a time, to the impression of the eloquence of others, while he undertook himself an embassy to Thrace. He visited Byzantium, Selymbria, Perinthus, and went on to the courts of the Thracian princes. In proposing his new system of liberal alliance, he seems to have had the concurrence of the party of Phocion. His success evidently was great. In Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium, a preponderance was given to the Athenian party; who quickly carried things far beyond what Phocion is likely to have ap-

Demosth. de cor. ut ant.

proved. With those towns, as with Olynthus formerly, the term was short between alliance with Athens and war with Macedonia. SECT. I.

SECTION II.

War of Macedonia with the Hellespontine Cities. Athenian Decree: Letter of Philip: Fourth Philippic of Demosthenes.

We are without information of the specific provocation which induced Philip, soon after his return from the Scythian war, to lay siege to Perinthus. The historian's expression is general, that Perinthus was hostile to Macedonia[4]. But to Philip's common practice, of employing sedulously and most patiently, against all Grecian towns, peaceful means before he would resort to arms, we have large testimony; and for the incouragement to the Athenian party in Perinthus to give provocation to Macedonia, our information is ample; it was invitation from Athens, and assurance of the powerful and profitable support of Persia. The force which Philip led against a little Grecian colony, indicates that he was aware the contention would be with force beyond its own. The besieging army is said to have been of thirty thousand men. But the town, singularly strong by situation, covering a hill of conic form, nearly surrounded by the sea, was also well fortified. The art of the besiegers soon made a breach in the wall. But no sooner was a point threatened by their machines, than the besieged raised a new defence within, connected, at its extremities, with the uninjured part of the old fortifica- SECT. II.

[4] Πέρινθον, ἐναντιουμένην μὲν αὐτῷ. Diod. l. 16. c. 74.

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tion. This new defence then, tho inferior in strength to the old wall, yet being on higher ground, and flanking the ground without it, possessed great advantage against assault. Meanwhile, the port being open, supplies of every kind were largely furnished to the besieged. The satraps of all the maritime provinces of the Persian empire had received orders to support them; and not only provisions and ammunition were abundantly sent in, but a large body of those Grecian troops, always reddy for hire in any service, was prepared to reïnforce the garrison.

Diod.l.16. c. 75. Pausan.l.1. Diod.l.16. c. 52.

Philip now perceived that a fleet, powerful enough to command the sea, was absolutely necessary to the success of his enterprize. Such a fleet accordingly he assembled. Meanwhile observing that supplies reached Perinthus principally through the Selymbrians, whom he had not before treated as enemies, he sent a body of troops to blockade their town. These measures were efficacious and threatening enough to excite new and extraordinary exertion from Demosthenes. The war-party had long been imputing to Macedonia hostile conduct against Athens: they had incited and committed hostile acts against Macedonia: yet war was not avowed between the two governments; and in the connection, which they seem to have yet maintained in some degree with the party of Phocion, it could not conveniently be proposed. But the naval commander on the Hellespontine station, Leodamas, being a man for their purpose, they sent him instructions, at their own risk, without authority from the soverein assembly, to carry troops and provisions into Selymbria, conveying them in merchant-ships, under pretence of supplying the iland of Lemnos. The commander of the Macedonian fleet, however, Amyntas, took all the ships, and

Ep. Philip. ap. Demos. de cor. p. 251.

sent them, with their commander Leodamus, into a port of Macedonia. SECT. II.

This event produced, as was likely, much agitation in Athens. The war-party were sedulous to excite indignation among the Many against Philip. Demosthenes, as we learn from himself, took a leading part[5]. A moderate decree however, moved by Eubulus, one of the most eminent of Phocion's party, was adopted, which may deserve to be seen complete, in a litteral translation. It ran thus: Demoath. de cor. p. 249.

'In the archonship of Neocles, in the month 'Boëdromion, the generals having called an ex-'traordinary assembly, Eubulus son of Mnesitheus, 'of the Cyprian ward, moved—" Whereas the " generals have reported to the assembly, that the " naval commander Leodamas, with twenty ships " of burthen, passing under his orders to the Hel-" lespont[6] for corn, have been taken by Amyntas, " commanding in the service of Philip, and carried " into the ports of Macedonia, and there detained " under guard; therefore the prytanes and the " generals shall provide that the council be as-" sembled, and proceed to the appointment of am-" bassadors to Philip; who shall confer with him " for the release of the admiral, the ships and " the soldiers; and if it shall appear that the " proceedings of Amyntas have been the result " of ignorance or mistake, the people will impute " no blame to him; if Philip detected their officer

[5] Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐπολιτευόμην τότ' ἐγώ.——Ἠναντιούμην, καὶ προλέγων, καὶ διδάσκων, μὴ προίεσθαι ταῦτα Φιλίππῳ διεκέλουν. Demosth. de cor. p. 249. The first phrase seems to contain an acknowlegement that the irregular orders to Leodamas were from himself.

[6] Here and elsewhere the Hellespont includes evidently the Propontis. See also Philip's letter, p. 339.

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" exceeding his instructions, the Athenians will " take connizance of the matter, and reprove or " punish, as the fault or inadvertency may deserve; " if it be neither of these, but either he who gave " or he who executed the commission has commit- " ted wilful outrage, be it reported, that the people, " on just information, may consider what ought " to be done[7]."

An embassy was accordingly sent to the king of Macedonia, who returned by it a written answer, preserved also by the orator, apparently at length; thus: 'The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to 'the Athenian council and people, greeting: 'Your ambassadors have communicated with me 'concerning the capture of the ships commanded 'by Leodamas[8]. Altogether you seem very easy 'to be imposed upon, if you think I can be igno- 'rant that those ships, under pretence of carrying 'corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, were sent 'to succor the Selymbrians, besieged by me, 'and not intitled, under the provisions of the 'existing treaty, to be considered as your allies. 'The instructions moreover to the commander 'I know were not authorized by the Athenian

[7] Demosthenes, in reporting this decree and that which followed it, appointing ambassadors, has shown his dissatisfaction with them in the language of ill temper. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ψήφισμα, he says, Εὔβουλος ἔγραψεν, οὐκ ἐγώ. Τὸ δ' ἑφεξῆς Ἀριστοφῶν, εἶθ' Ἡγήσιππος, εἶτ' Ἀριστοφῶν πάλιν, εἶτα Φιλοκράτης, εἶτα Κηφισοφῶν, εἶτα πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι· ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν περὶ τούτων· λέγε τὸ ψήφισμα. The repetition of the name Aristophon, and the introduction of that of Philocrates, who was an exile, are rather curious characteristics of temper or artifice.

[8] It seems not easy to account for the variation of names, in the copies extant of Demosthenes, between the decree and the letter.

'people: they were but hazarded by some men 'in office, and some now in private station, who 'desire, by any means, to urge the people to 'prefer war with me to the friendship actually 'existing; men who have their private advantages 'much more in view than any benefit to the 'Selymbrians. I am however of opinion that this 'would be beneficial neither to you nor to me. 'I will therefore release the ships; and, for the 'future, if you will not allow those at the head 'of your affairs to manage them dishonestly and 'injuriously, but will duly reprove and restrain 'them, I also will endevor to preserve the peace.' SECT. II.

This letter, like all those preserved from Philip to the Athenians, bearing nothing of that character of cunning, which has, more indeed by modern than antient writers, been imputed to him, but on the contrary dignified rather than conciliatory, yet indicates moderation in purpose as well as openness in conduct. The ships' crews were released: complaint of the indefensible measure of the commander was dropped: but the return was not of corresponding character. Wherever an opening could be found for negotiation, Demosthenes and the war-party were indefatigable in exciting hostility against Macedonia. Incouraged by them the Byzantines were sedulous in furnishing support to the Perinthians: the best part of their military force was actually serving in Perinthus. When therefore the siege had alreddy been continued through the autumn and winter, and no prospect of speedy success appeared, Philip, leaving a force sufficient only to blockade the place, marched suddenly with the greater part of his army against Byzantium itself.

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The Byzantines, unable to defend their lands, were distressed; but their town was too strong to be suddenly taken.

In these circumstances Demosthenes pronounced that called the Fourth of his celebrated Philippic Orations[9]. It has been observed by the litterary critics that this oration is principally a repetition of former topics, but for the political observer it has important characteristics of its own. Throughout, the orator shows an increased confidence in the power of his party, and in the revival of his own favor with a majority of the people: he resumes the discussion of the question of the theoric revenue, with again a change of sentiments professed on that subject; apparently the price of his revived favor with the Many, for whose gratification he now again vindicates the accustomed application of that revenue, which he had before demanded for public service. The purpose of alliance with Persia is openly avowed; and in proof of a disposition in the Persian government favorable to Athens, it is mentioned that a Macedonian minister, apparently commissioned to the court, had been arrested on his way, by one of the satraps. Among those great officers, however, we have alreddy had occasion to observe conduct sometimes very adverse to the purposes of the court, and in some of them rays of the liberality of the great Cyrus and the first Darius, in others all the barbarism of the modern east. But finally, what will be not least important to remark, the orator, in consequence apparently of the improved prospect of the affairs of the war-party altogether, again holds out the

Phil. 4. p. 139.

p. 143.

[9] Φιλίππου—νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον παρόντος. Phil. 4. p. 149.

claim of the empire of Greece for the Athenian people, and indicates the probability of attaining it. Lacedæmon, he observes, was unable to raise her head; and Argos, Thebes, Corinth, and Arcadia, formerly accustomed to arrange themselves under the lead of either Lacedæmon or Athens, now concurred only in a general competition with them and with oneanother. This miserably divided and consequently weak state of the nation, he then asserts to be the fortunate crisis, whence the Athenian people should profit to establish their authority over the whole. SECT. II. Philipp. 4. p. 145.

SECTION III.

Philip's Letter to the Athenian People: Oration of Demosthenes on the Letter.

The threats in this celebrated oration, baffled as the Macedonian arms had been in Thrace, were alarming to Macedonia; but still more perhaps to every republic of Greece, which desired to avoid subjection to the war-party of Athens. Toward Macedonia however the tenor was so hostile, that, coming from one who possessed a commanding influence in the soverein assembly to which it was addressed, and who was effectually first minister of the commonwealth, it might be considered as hardly short of a declaration of war. Nevertheless Philip, knowing that a party still of great weight, whose leaders he highly esteemed and respected, was very differently disposed, resolved once more to address remonstrance to the good sense and justice of the Athenian people. He sent SECT. III.

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it in the form, then usual, of a letter; which, tho of considerable length, has been fortunately preserved with the works of Demosthenes. Apparently with reason it has been generally supposed his own composition, since Demosthenes informs us that, on important occasions, he was his own secretary, and Æschines that he was as capable of the business as Python of Byzantium, or any other of the ablest Greeks in his service; and the supposition receives confirmation from the striking conformity, in style and character, between this and two shorter letters from Philip to the Athenian people, preserved in the Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown, which have alreddy occurred for notice. In the original it has been universally admired as one of the most perfect models of a state paper ever published, singularly combining dignity with simplicity, perspicuity with conciseness, civility of expression with force of representation, moderation of phrase with triumph of argument. As a historical document, it is perhaps the most curious, and certainly among the most valuable, remaining from antiquity; its value in that view being greatly increased by the preservation of the oration of Demosthenes in reply to it, which, avoiding to contest, most effectually confirms the exactness of its statements; insomuch that there is hardly such another series of important facts, throughout antient history, established by evidence so unquestionable[10]. In any translation it must

Demosth. de cor.

[10] Some modern writers, in vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes, have not scrupled, what Demosthenes dared not venture, to impute falsehood to Philip's statements in this letter. Thus the translator Auger, in what he calls his 'Summary' of the letter: 'Dans cette lettre, 'mélant adroitement le vrai avec le faux, il tire de l'un tout 'le parti possible, donne à l'autre l'air de la verité presente

suffer much; yet, in justice to this part of the subject, the reader should see it intire, in words the nearest to the original that may be. It runs thus:

'Philip, to the Athenian council and people, 'greeting: Having endevored repeatedly, by my 'ambassadors, to induce you to adhere to your 'ingagements solemnly sworn to, and those en- 'devors having proved fruitless, I have thought 'it best now myself to lay before you the matters 'in which I reckon I am aggrieved. Be not sur- 'prized at the length of my letter; my complaints 'are numerous, and it appears necessary to explain 'all distinctly.

'I will begin with mentioning that, when Nicias 'my herald was carried off by violence from my ter- 'ritory, you did not call the perpetrators of that out- 'rage to account, but you imprisoned the injured 'person ten months; and my letters, of which he 'was the bearer, you caused to be red in your ge- 'neral assembly[11].

'avec art des faits constants ou douteux, dont il deduit à son 'avantage les consequences les plus justes & les plus précises,' &c. He has done himself and the writer credit then in noticing 'le style simple, noble, & precis de cette lettre, la 'marche facile & l'enchainement naturel des idées qui la com- 'posent.' In his 'summary' afterward of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, he says, 'Sans s'amuser à répondre à tous 'les articles de la lettre, il (Demosthene) prend le ton affir- 'matif.'—So equally Auger himself, and all other writers, admirers of the politics of Demosthenes, as far as my reading among them has gone, have avoided to 's'amuser' with answering any one of the articles of the letter; and all, after the great orator's example, have taken 'le ton affirmatif.'

[11] Later writers have eulogized the politeness of the Athenians, on this occasion, in returning the letters of the queen Olympias unopened. They have however avoided notice of the violation of the law of nations in stopping the herald; and their eulogy is a little farther weakened by the failure of the authority of Demosthenes for the matter of politeness. It is indeed observable that Philip himself seems to have known nothing of the letters for the queen.

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'Then when the Thasians, your subjects, admitted into their port the ships of war of the Byzantines, my enemies, and all privateers and pirates, besides cruizing against my subjects, that would come there, tho the treaty between us declares such conduct an act of hostility, you would take no measures to prevent it.

'It was about the same time that Diopeithes invaded the country under my protection, carried off the free inhabitants of Crobylë and Tiristasis, and sold them to slavery, plundered and wasted the bordering lands of Thrace, and at length proceeded to that excess of lawless violence, as to arrest my minister, Amphilochus, sent to negotiate the release of the prisoners, and, by treating him with extreme severity, forced him to pay nine talents (near eighteen hundred pounds) for his ransom. And this conduct received absolutely the approbation of the people in assembly; tho among all nations to violate heralds and ambassadors is held nefarious, and most among you. When your herald, Anthemocritus, was put to death by the Megareans, you marked your sense of the crime by excluding the Megarean people from participation in the mysteries, and by erecting a monumental statue before your city-gate. What then is to be said of a crime committed by yourselves, which you, when committed against you, have so resented?

'To proceed then; your general, Callias, took possession of all the towns on the Pagasæan bay, connected by close alliance with me, and intitled, by treaty, to peace from you: he seized all ships bound to Macedonia, and condemning all found aboard as enemies, sold them to slavery. And for these violences your decrees rewarded him with

'applause. I am really not aware what you could 'do more contrary to habits of peace, if you were at 'declared war with me. When there was open war 'between us, you did so and no otherwise; you sent 'out your ships, you sold those whom you took 'sailing to my kingdom, you assisted my enemies, 'you did all the ill you could to my people. But 'now, you have proceeded to such an extreme of 'unjustifiable malevolence, as to send an embassy to 'the Persian king, to persuade him to make war 'against me. Surely this is conduct most extraor-'dinary. Before that monarch had recovered Egypt 'and Phenicia, in apprehension of attack from him, 'you passed decrees, proposing a confederacy against 'him, and inviting me, with all other Greeks, to ac-'cede to it. Now, on the contrary, such is the ex-'travagance of your rancor toward me, you are 'treating with him for an alliance against me. Your 'forefathers, as I am informed, held it a foul reproach 'to the family of Peisistratus, that they led the Per-'sians against the Greeks; yet you are not asham-'ed to do those very things which, in those you 'call tyrants, you condemn. SECT. III.

'Among other extraordinary matters then you 'require, in your decrees, that I should allow Teres 'and Kersobleptes to command undisturbed in 'Thrace, because they are Athenian citizens. But 'I know they were not comprized in the treaty of 'peace, made by me with you; their names are not 'to be found in the ingraved copies of the treaty, 'and they have been disowned by you as Athenian 'citizens: farther I know that Teres has borne arms 'with me against you, and that Kersobleptes, de-'siring to take the oaths to the treaty before my 'ambassadors, was prevented by your generals, re-'presenting him as an enemy to the Athenian people.

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'How then is this fair or just; to declare him an 'enemy to your state, if so your interest in the mo- 'ment requires; to claim him as your citizen, if 'you want to institute a calumnious charge against 'me? Sitalces,' (the prince alreddy so often occurring for mention by the name of Cotys) 'it is known 'was admitted to the rights of your city: yet when 'he was assassinated, his murderer immediately 'found favor with you; and nevertheless you would 'go to war with me in the cause of Kersobleptes; 'knowing perfectly that none of those foreiners, on 'whom you have bestowed the present of citizen- 'ship, care in the least for either your laws or your 'decrees. But, omitting much that might be said 'on this subject, to come to a point, you gave the 'rights of your city to Evagoras the Cyprian, and 'Dionysius the Syracusan, and their posterity. If 'you will persuade those who expelled these, to 'restore them to the authority they held when you 'made them Athenian citizens, you shall command 'from me that part of Thrace over which Teres 'and Kersobleptes reigned. But if you take no 'measure of any kind in favor of those your fellow- 'citizens, and yet would give me trouble on a simi- 'lar account, how am I not justified in resisting 'you?

'Much more, which might be reasonably insisted 'upon, occurs on these matters, but I will omit it, 'and proceed to speak of the Cardians. I must 'maintain then that I am bound to support them; 'having formed alliance with them before the peace 'made with you; while you have constantly refused 'the arbitration, to which I over and over, and they 'not seldom, have ernestly urged a desire to have 'it referred. Should I not deserve to be esteemed 'even profligate, if I deserted my allies, and showed

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'more regard for you, who have been, with unremitted assiduity, exciting trouble for me, than for 'those who have been my good and steddy friends?

'With regard to the Thracian princes and the 'Cardians, however, you have confined yourselves 'to remonstrances; but in a recent affair, you have 'begun with serious violence; for upon simple 'complaint of the Peparethians that they had been 'injuriously treated, you immediately commanded 'your general to make reprisals against me. Now 'the truth was that my measures against that peo-'ple were less severe than they deserved. In full 'peace they seized Halonesus; and, on repeated 'application from me, refused to restore either the 'iland or my troops, whom they had made prisoners. 'Of the injury done me by the Peparethians, you 'would take no account; you would look only to 'the measures I took, in justice to myself, against 'them. But you well know that I acquired the 'iland, by taking it, not from them, not from you, 'but from the pirate Sostratus. If then you say 'you gave it to Sostratus, you acknowlege your-'selves patrons of pirates. If he established him-'self there by violence, against your consent, what 'injury have you suffered from my taking it, and 'making the navigation of that sea safe? Ne-'vertheless having taken it, I showed so much 'regard for your state as to offer to give it to you. 'But your orators would not allow you to accept it 'as a gift; they insisted upon your reclaiming it as 'your right; that so, if I obeyed their requisition, 'I might incur the disgrace of acknowleging that 'I had taken what I had no right to take, or, by 'refusing to surrender the place, I might become 'obnoxious to the Athenian Many. Aware of their 'purpose, I proposed to refer the matter to arbitra-

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'tion, upon the conditions that, should the iland be 'decided to be mine, it should pass to you as a 'gift from me; should it be decided to be yours, 'then it should pass as a restitution. Frequently 'as I urged this, you would not consent; and 'meanwhile the Peparethians took the iland. What 'became me then to do? Not to require justice of 'those who, in violation of their oaths, did me that 'wrong? Not to make reprisals against those who 'were so insultingly injurious? If the iland be-'longed to the Peparethians, how can the Athe-'nians reclaim it? If it belonged to you, how was 'it that you did not demand it of the Peparethians?

'But so far has the hostile temper now carried 'you, that, by your decree, passed on the motion 'of Polycrates, you have warranted your colonists 'in the Chersonese to consider themselves as in a 'state of war with me; and your general on that 'station has sent formal notice to the Byzantines, 'and others in those parts, that you have authorized 'him to commence hostilities against me, whenever 'fair opportunity may offer, and that you require 'their coöperation. Hence, wanting to send a fleet 'into the Hellespont[13], I was obliged to order an 'army for its escort through the strait by the Cher-'sonese[14].

'Nevertheless I have abstained from reprisals 'against your towns, your ships, and your territo-'ries, tho it has been enough in my power to 'make myself master of all or most of them; and 'I have not ceased to solicit you to come to an 'amicable arbitration about all matters in question

[13] Εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον, p. 163, evidently meaning that afterward distinguished as the Propontis.

[14] Ἠναγκάσθην αὐτὰς παραπέμψαι διὰ Χερρονήσου τῇ στρατιᾷ. Ep. Phil. p. 163. I am not wholly without doubt about the sense of this passage, which I submit to those who have given their attention to the naval and military affairs of the antients.

'between us. And I still desire you to consider 'whether the trial of arms is preferable to the trial 'of reason, and whether it is reälly fittest that you 'should assume judgement in your own cause, or 'commit it to others; I desire you to reflect how 'utterly unreasonable it must appear, to all the 'world, that the Athenians, who compelled the 'Thasians and Maronites to abstain from arms, in 'their dispute for the possession of Smyrna, and 'commit the matter to arbitration, should themselves 'refuse a similar equitable discussion of their claims 'against me; with this addition to the inconsis- 'tency, that, if judgement goes against you, no loss 'of what you now possess will insue, and, if in your 'favor, you will gain what I now possess. SECT. III.

'But there remains yet to mention what appears 'to me more extraordinary than all the rest. When 'I proposed last to treat with you of the common 'interests of Greece, with a view to an accommo- 'dation, upon equitable terms, of common advan- 'tage, to obviate jealousy I procured embassies 'from all the Grecian states of my alliance to at- 'tend, as witnesses to all transactions; interested 'to oppose whatever might involve common danger, 'and able to convict me of being the unworthiest of 'mankind, if I proposed any deception. You re- 'fused my ministers audience. Nor is the ground 'of this conduct difficult to discover: for whatever 'benefit might have resulted to the people, the 'proposed accommodation would not have suited 'the purposes of some of your orators; those traders 'in politics among you[15], who hold that war is for 'them peace, and peace war. If generals are em- 'ployed, employment for the orators also is certain;

[15] Οἱ τὴν πολιτείας τῆς παρ' ὑμῖν ἔμποροι.

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'for either promoting measures or opposing them; 'defending and applauding conduct, or arraining 'it, their profits are sure. At the same time calum- 'niating, from the bema, the most respectable of 'your citizens, those most known in other states 'and most esteemed, they acquire, among the 'Many, the credit of being friends of the people.

'It would be easy for me, at small expence, to 'stop their invective, and set them upon panegyric 'of us. But I should be ashamed of appearing to 'purchase from such men your goodwill; men who 'have had the assurance to bring into question even 'my right to Amphipolis. I trust I can maintain 'that right on much juster grounds than any can 'dispute it with me. If first possession is to estab- 'lish the claim, the evidence of the golden statue 'at Delphi, dedicated by my ancestor Alexander 'from the spoils, when he conquered the country 'from the Persians, what Grecian state can contest? 'Should the right thus acquired be considered as 'invalidated by later possession, the latest claim 'that can be asserted also is mine; for I took the 'place by siege in open war, against the colonists 'established there by the Lacedæmonians, who had 'taken it, in fair and open war, from you. We 'all hold our respective countries, either by inheri- 'tance from our ancestors, or by conquest. Of 'Amphipolis then, you neither were the first Gre- 'cian possessors, nor are the present possessors; 'but having held it for a very short time only, you 'claim it from me against your own most solemn 'pledge of faith in treaty made with me. Fre- 'quently I have mentioned it to you; and, on the 'other hand, your acknowlegement of my right has 'been fully confirmed by the treaty of peace be- 'tween us, leaving me in possession, and it has

'been farther corroborated by the treaty of alliance 'which followed. How then can any right be 'more strongly established? It was originally con- 'quered by my ancestors: it became again mine 'by the acknowleged laws of war: and finally my 'right has been solemnly admitted by you, who are 'so much accustomed to claim what you have no 'pretension to. SECT. III.

'These are the matters of which I complain; 'and my past forbearance, it is evident, has pro- 'duced only incouragement for you to be more 'forward in such injurious conduct, and to prose- 'cute it unceasingly to the utmost of your power. 'You then being the aggressors, with justice on 'my side, and calling the gods to witness it, I 'will resist your aggression, and put to the trial 'of arms the right you deny me.'

This letter having been red, in accustomed form to the Athenian people, Demosthenes ascended the bema. His speech on the occasion, fortunately preserved, is, even among his speeches, of singular boldness and extraordinary ingenuity. Evidently he felt the letter a refutation of all his Philippics, not to be answered by reason and argument. He came therefore prepared with another kind of artillery. Beginning with a bold assertion, adapted to excite attention, he proceeded directly to the mention of transactions forein to the purpose of the letter, but adapted to introduce the invective and instigation composing the rest of the speech, in which not the least notice is taken of any one of the king's complaints, or of any one of the facts stated by him as the ground of them. But the speech, tho, like the letter, it must suffer in any change of language,

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will deserve to be seen intire, and in words following the original the nearest that may be.

'Athenians,' said Demosthenes, 'that Philip 'made no peace with you, but only postponed the 'war, is evident to you all. For after he had given 'Halus to the Pharsalians, and disposed of the 'Phocians, and subdued all Thrace, feigning 'grounds which had no existence, and finding 'pretences founded on no justice, he immediately, 'in fact, made war against the republic, and now, 'in the letter which you have just heard, acknow-'leges it. That we ought not then either to fear 'his power, or set ourselves with any ordinary 'exertion to oppose it, but that with our bodies 'and our fortunes, with our ships, and in short 'with all we have, we should proceed unsparingly 'to vigorous war, I will endevor to show.

'In the first place then, Athenians, it may be 'trusted that the greatest of the gods will be our 'allies and assistants, whom he has dishonored, 'unjustly violating the peace, sworn to in their 'names. Next it is to be observed, that the arts, 'by which he has hitherto prospered, continually 'deceiving some people or other with promises of 'great benefits from his friendship, have now lost 'all their effect. The Perinthians, the Byzantines, 'and all connected with them, are aware that his 'purpose is to treat them as he has treated the 'Olynthians. Even the Thessalians now see that 'he means to hold authority among his allies, 'not at their choice, but by his own power. The 'Thebans are alreddy highly jealous of him: his 'garrison in Nicæa, and his surreptitiously ac-'quired seat among the Amphictyons, are enough 'to hold them in alarm. The Peloponnesians he 'requires to attend him by their embassies, and

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'to make their alliance with him exclusive. Thus, 'of those formerly his confederates, some are now 'at open war with him, and others are lukewarm 'in alliance; all suspect and complain. But there 'is another thing, of great importance: the satraps 'of Asia have compelled him, by the force of 'mercenaries thrown into Perinthus, to raise the 'siege of that town. Hostility being thus actually 'begun, the consideration of the danger threaten-'ing the Persian provinces, should he possess 'himself of Byzantium, not only will make the 'satraps our reddy allies, but will induce the king 'of Persia himself to supply us with money. His 'power to do this, it is well known, exceeds that 'of all others; and such altogether are his means 'to interfere in all the affairs of Greece, that, for-'merly, in the wars between us and the Lace-'dæmonians, his alliance gave the superiority 'to either side at his pleasure. Becoming then 'now our ally, he will easily overbear Philip's 'power.

'Nevertheless I will not say that Philip has 'not, during peace, possessed himself of many 'towns and harbors, and various advantages of 'no small importance for war. But I observe 'that, when power is founded on goodwill, and 'all the states combined for war have one interest, 'such power is lasting. On the contrary, when 'it is held by intrigue, and ambition, and deceit 'and violence, as now by him, a little appearance 'of a turn of fortune, the smallest failure of suc-'cess, suffices to shake and overthrow it. And, 'considering often these matters, Athenians, I am 'persuaded, that, not only among Philip's allies 'there is much mistrust and ill-will toward him, 'but that, even within his own kingdom, there is

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'not quite that harmony and that attachment to 'him, which some suppose. The Macedonian 'power is become considerable by accretion. Of 'itself it is weak, and utterly unproportioned to 'support the authority which must ultimately rest 'on it. Philip, by his wars and his expeditions, 'and everything by which any might suppose he 'is become great, has made it only more precarious. For you must not imagine, Athenians, 'that the same things delight Philip and his subjects. You must recollect that he is ardent for 'glory; their wish is for safety: he cannot acquire 'glory without danger; and they do not desire, 'while they have children and parents and wives 'at home, to perish or meet daily dangers for him. 'From these considerations anyone may gather 'how the greater part of the Macedonians stand 'disposed toward him. Those then called his 'companions, and the principal officers of his 'mercenaries, injoy indeed distinction in some 'proportion to their merit; but they live in more 'apprehension than those less distinguished. For 'those of lower degree fear only the enemy; but 'the man injoying high rank has more to apprehend from flatterers and calumniators than from 'battles. In the perils of war, high and low partake; but the dread of the king's temper is peculiar to the great. Moreover, those of the lower 'ranks are punished only if they deserve punishment; but those of the higher often incur mortification and humiliation by merit too conspicuous. 'Nor is this to be doubted by any man of sense 'and information; for Philip is so greedy of glory, 'as those who have lived with him affirm, that he 'shows more dissatisfaction with his generals, 'when they do anything highly praiseworthy,

'than when they wholly fail in a business com- SECT. III.
'mitted to them. How then is it, if things are so,
'that he has been so well served so long? Be-
'cause, Athenians, prosperity throws a veil over
'such things. Success is powerful to overshadow
'and hide the faults of men. Should he once fail,
'then all will be brought into clear daylight. For,
'as in our bodies, while general health prevails,
'ailments in particular parts are little regarded,
'but in sickness every sore is disturbed, old frac-
'tures, old strains, and whatever is not perfectly
'sound; so in kingdoms and all governments,
'while they are successful in war, defects are little
'observed; but, when failure begins, such as may
'be expected for him, in projects beyond his
'strength, everything that has gone wrong will
'become evident to everybody.

'Nevertheless, Athenians, if any of you, seeing
'Philip successful, reckon him therefore formida-
'ble, I think he judges well: for, in all the affairs
'of men, fortune is much, or rather everything.
'And yet, in a comparison of his fortune with ours,
'the advantage will be found, in many ways, with
'us. For we have inherited from our ancestors
'our superiority and command, transmitted from
'times, not only before this man, but before any
'reigned in Macedonia. They formerly paid
'tribute to the Athenians, but our commonwealth
'never to any. We have many reasons then to
'expect superior favor from the gods, inasmuch as
'our conduct has been more consonant to piety
'and justice. But why then was he so successful
'against us in the former war? Because, Athenians,
'for I must be open with you, he is always present
'with his army, bears all fatigue and every priva-
'tion, faces every danger, and, regardless of seasons

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'throughout the year, never misses an opportunity. 'On the contrary we, for the truth must be spoken, 'sit here idling, procrastinating, decreeing, and 'inquiring for news. For news! what can be 'stranger news than that a Macedonian man, hold-'ing the Athenians in contempt, should dare to 'send them such a letter as you have just heard? 'But he has an army of mercenaries in his pay,— 'and, the gods know, some of our orators besides; 'who are not ashamed to live for Philip, and seem 'hardly aware that they are selling the common-'wealth, and themselves with it, for a little pelf. 'But we neither stir to excite elsewhere opposition 'to his designs, nor will furnish the expence of a 'mercenary army, nor have courage to serve our-'selves. It is not therefore wonderful that he 'obtained successes against us in the late war; but 'rather that we, doing nothing that in war ought 'to be done, expect to prevail against him, who 'does everything that can promote his superiority.

'These, Athenians, are the matters you have to 'consider; and so to consider, as becomes those 'who cannot say they are injoying peace; for 'now, after open acts of hostility, he has declared 'war. It becomes you therefore to spare neither 'public nor private wealth; it becomes all to 'dedicate their persons zealously to the service, 'when occasion may be. Better generals than 'formerly should be appointed. For let it not be 'imagined that those, through whom the affairs 'of the commonwealth from better have become 'worse, are those who from worse will make them 'better again. Nor have the weakness to suppose 'that, if you are yourselves inactive as formerly, 'others will be zealous to fight your battles for 'you. But, on the contrary, consider how dis-

'graceful it is for you, whose fathers bore so many labors and such extraordinary dangers, in war with Lacedæmon, to refuse the exertion necessary for maintaining what they, honorably and justly acquiring, have transmitted to you; that a man of Macedonia should be so reddy for danger, in his ambitious pursuits, as to have been wounded in battle in every part of his body, and Athenians, whose inheritance is independency and victory, should, through softness and idleness, surrender the acquisitions of their forefathers, and the interests of their country. SECT. III.

'Not however to make many words, I insist that we should all prepare for war; that we should animate the other Greeks to join in alliance with us, not with words but with deeds: for all argument, unsupported by actions, is vain, and so much the more from our government, as we are known to have reddier means for acting against him than any other Greeks.'

SECTION IV.

Defeat of Philip's Measures against the Hellespontine Cities. Difficulties remaining for Demosthenes. Measures of Demosthenes for an extensive Confederacy against Macedonia. Reversion of superior Influence to Phocion's Party, and Tranquillity ensuing.

As it must have been assurance of a strong party among the Many that incouraged Demosthenes to answer such a letter with such a speech, so it appears to have been good assurance of a strong combination against Macedonia, which was gathering on the eastern side of the Ægean, that incou- SECT. IV. B. C. 340. Ol. 110. 1.

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raged him and his party in the line of politics which they followed. The Chians, and Rhodians and Coans, whose political connection with Byzantium had not ceased with the Confederate war, took a warm interest in the danger of their ally, and they were strong in marine. But, what was still more important, orders were sent from the Persian court for all the maritime satraps to use their utmost exertions for preventing the progress of the Macedonian arms, and the injury that might insue to the Persian interest. Under direction of the Athenian government, a powerful fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, and Chares took the command. Whether Demosthenes reälly considered him as the fittest instrument still of the purposes of the party, or, taking himself the lead in political business, he was unable to deny the first military situation to Chares, neither his own speeches nor any other memorials furnish satisfactory information. Chares, however, was defeated, near Byzantium, by the Macedonian fleet, under the orders of Amyntas. While his insufficiency thus against the enemies of his country made him contemptible, his rapacity against its friends, of which experience was old, made him odious; insomuch that it became necessary to recall him, and Phocion was sent to supersede him in the command.

Diod. l. 6. c. 77.

Plut. v. Phoc.

Ibid.

It were highly desirable to elicit all possible light from the narrative of Plutarch, far more copious than any other extant, of the circumstances of the transactions of this time, which were among the most critical of the age; but he has so painted his hero Phocion in glaring colors without comprehensible form, and so thrown Philip into smoke and darkness, also without distinguishable lines, and altogether so wants support from the historian, the

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readers, the Roman biographer, and probability, that, amid much obvious romance, it is difficult to say to what, among all his tales, reason should allow belief. The issue however was, that Philip, abandoning the hope of reducing any of the adverse towns of the Thracian shore, came to a composition with his enemies. The historian, writing near three hundred years after, and willing that Greeks only should be believed the defenders of Grecian cities, imputes the principal effect to the interference of the Chians and Lesbians: but what Demosthenes indicates, in his speech at the time, on the king of Macedonia's letter, was then probably too notorious to be concealed, and in his opinion perhaps matter rather to boast of, as the advantageous result of his negotiation, that the wealth of Persia, paying and plentifully supplying Grecian troops, principally gave the strength from which Philip thought it prudent to withdraw. It is possible also, and not wholly improbable, that something of that credit may have been due to Phocion, which Plutarch gives, but of which Demosthenes would avoid an account. Phocion having the command of the Athenian armament on the Hellespontine station, Philip would respect him, and be ready for accommodation with him. But, in an oration of many years after, Demosthenes assumed the merit for the Athenian people, tho more particularly for himself, as the director of their measures: and, altho so he flattered the Athenian people much, and may have omitted what was owing to Phocion and others, yet perhaps he arrogated little more to himself than he might justly claim: the combination and direction of force, and the success insuing, may have been principally owing to his able management.

Diod. l. 16. c. 77.

Demosth. de cor. p. 257. 5.

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The triumph thus might appear great for Demosthenes, as the disappointment certainly must have been great for Philip; who since his defeat by Onomarchus, and insuing distress and danger in Thessaly, soon repaired by a splendid victory, had been accustomed to see all the measures of his enemies turned to their own confusion and his advantage; and, having earned the estimation of being the most fortunate, formidable, and glorious potentate of the age[16], was now completely foiled in enterprize, successively against three little commercial states, which had before solicited his protection. But the success of Demosthenes, tho much had been done, was yet so far from complete, that he and his whole party remained as on the verge of a precipice. He had been, in his public speeches, continually and vehemently urging the republic to war against Macedonia, procuring measures of positive hostility to be taken, and after great forbearance and repeated remonstrances from Philip, contemptuously asserting the falsehood of his pretence to desire peace, and the actual existence of war. In these circumstances he and his party could not undertake conciliation with Macedonia. If conciliation were proper or necessary, they must yield the lead to their opponents of the party of Phocion, who had always desired peace, and with whom, it was well known, Philip was disposed to friendship. Nothing therefore remained for them, if they would even hold the lead in Athens, but still more, if they would prosecute still those ambitious purposes of extensive empire, which we have seen Demosthenes so frequently avowing, but to persevere in urging

[16] Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ πολλῶν κύριος γέγονεν. Demosth. Philipp. 4. p. 143, and again, p. 149. Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς ἦν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ Βαρβάροις.

war against Macedonia, and in effort to form a confederacy able to support it. Of the terms of the treaty concluded, when the Macedonian arms were withdrawn from Byzantium, we have no information: but the pressure upon Macedonia was relieved; the hope of farther coöperation from the Chians and Rhodians, in the views of the war-party, was ended; and active hostility, even from the Persian satraps, perhaps in necessary consequence, ceased.

Such appear to have been the disadvantageous and discouraging circumstances remaining for Demosthenes, after his success in procuring so important a check to the Macedonian arms, the first given since his acquisition of any share in the administration. He had however yet before him advantages, which talents like his might use, and ambition like his would not abandon. He retained still the agency for the Persian court, the means afforded by which are not to be calculated. In Eubœa, his new system of liberality had been highly successful. The able conduct of the brothers, Callias and Taurosthenes, his agents, had made their party preponderant in all the towns of the iland. In western Greece the Acarnanians were much disposed to connection with the war-party of Athens, through enmity to the Epirots on their northern, and the Ætolians on their southern border, favored against them by Macedonia. In Peloponnesus the Achaians, instigated like the Acarnanians, by enmity to the Ætolians, desired Athenian patronage for their support against those who injoyed Macedonian patronage. Corinth also remained under the lead of those who held friendly connection with the war-party in Athens. But the important speculation was in Thebes; and the interest there, adverse to

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Macedonia, not only maintained itself, but was advancing in weight.

Beyond Greece the Chersonese was now the only dominion of Athens; but the neighboring cities of Byzantium, Selymbria and Perinthus, commanding the coast nearly from the Chersonese to the Euxine, were restored to her alliance. Among arrangements, made there by Phocion, would be a restoration of some liberal participation in civil power to the party adverse to war with Macedonia. It would then be an object for Demosthenes, on the first opportunity, to reverse this, and restore complete preponderance to the other party; whose leaders, formerly connected with him, would not fail in zealous concurrence. How successful he was in this pursuit, following circumstances show.

In Byzantium, as in Athens, political measures were, in regular course, proposed in a select council, and, after discussion there, brought before the assembled people. A bill, regularly carried through the council, was transmitted to the general assembly, and there passed into a law, declaring the gratitude of the Byzantine to the Athenian people, for their support in the recent war with Macedonia. It moreover directed that, in perpetual memory of the benefit, three statues, each sixteen cubits high, representing the Byzantine people and the Perinthian crowning the Athenian, should be placed in a public part of Byzantium. The decree for this purpose has been preserved by Demosthenes, in its original Doric dialect. The temper and the policy, of those who led in the business, are clearly marked by the preämble; which contains a direct libel upon those Byzantine patriots who, through the Confederate war, had emancipated their commonwealth from its former oppressive and degrading

Demosth. de cor. p. 255.

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subjection under the sovereinty of the Athenian people. It states, as the ground of the decree, 'that the Athenian people, in former times, had 'been always friendly to the Byzantines and their 'allies and kinsmen the Perinthians; and that re- 'cently, when Philip the Macedonian made war 'with the purpose of exterminating them, they had 'done many and great services, assisting them with 'a hundred and twenty vessels, bringing corn and 'arms and heavy-armed troops, and thus delivered 'them from great dangers, and restored their antient 'form of government, their laws, and the tombs of 'their foreſathers.' An extensive purpose is indicated in what follows: to the whole Athenian people are given freedom of both cities, right of marriage with citizens, right of holding lands and houses in the Byzantine and Perinthian territories, and with these common rights of citizens, the extraordinary privileges of precedence at religious ceremonies and public spectacles, and immunity from those burdensome offices which were, in all the republics, connected with the rights of citizens. After this the statues are directed, and then follows the concluding clause, which is not the least remarkable, inacting that embassies shall be sent to all the great national meetings, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympic, and Pythian, to make there solemn proclamation of the crowns, 'with which,' says the decree, 'the 'Athenian people are crowned by us; that all the 'Greeks may be informed of the merit of the Athe- 'nians, and of the gratitude of the Byzantines and 'Perinthians.'

The tenor of this decree fully shows that the highspirited and successful assertors of independency, who had directed the measures of Byzantium and Perinthus in the Confederate war, no

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longer held the lead, and that the connection, of those who had superseded them in power, was not with the party of Phocion, to whom their cities owed recent relief from a ruinous war, but with the Athenian war-party, whose instruments they submitted to be, in offering such grossly false flattery to the Athenian people, and in promoting a new breach with Macedonia. The influence then of that party thus prevailing there, their authority would not be likely to fail among the subjects of Athens in the neighboring territory of the Chersonese. Accordingly, from that country, a decree was procured in these remarkable terms: 'The 'Chersonesites inhabiting Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, 'and Alopeconnesus, crown the council and people 'of Athens with a golden crown of sixty talents; 'and they erect an altar to gratitude, and to the 'Athenian people, who have done the greatest of 'all benefits to the Chersonesites, rescuing them 'from Philip, and restoring their country, their 'laws, their freedom, and their religious rites: 'wherefore they will not cease henceforth forever 'to be grateful, and to return the greatest good in 'their power. So it is in common council decreed.' This extortion of sixty talents from the Chersonesites, gratifying to the Athenian Many, and therefore what Demosthenes would boast of before them, was not what would gain favor to the war-party cause among the other Greeks, and so was not proclaimed at the national meetings, like the decree of the Byzantines[17].

Demosth. de cor. p. 256.

[17] Sixty talents, if talent was taken in its ordinary sense, denoting a sum of money, would be between eleven and twelve thousand pounds sterling; if meaning weight of gold, it would be many times more; but the former probably has been intended.

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The restoration of the war-party interest in Byzantium was an important step toward the completion of the political system of Demosthenes, which had two great points, to surround Attica with allies, and Macedonia with enemies. To prosecute this he devoted himself, according to his own boast, to every kind of business. He was elected an Amphictyon, or representative of Athens in the office of pylagore in the Amphictyonic assembly, and he went to Delphi. It seems to have been a principal advantage of that situation and office, that they concurred to give great opportunity for communication with Thebes. He used moreover the opportunity of residence in Phocis for taking the duty of ambassador to the neighboring people of Acarnania, and he went in the same capacity into Peloponnesus. But he would not allow himself long absence from the debates and intrigues of Athens. The prosecution therefore of negotiation, begun in Peloponnesus and Acarnania, he committed to Callias of Chalcis, whose abilities had been so advantageously proved in Eubœa.

Demosth. de cor.

Æsch. de cor.

Callias, returning to Athens, was introduced by Demosthenes to the assembled people, to report matters of important public concern. He had succeeded, he said, in negotiating a confederacy for war against Macedonia: the Achaians and Megareans had ingaged for sixty talents annually; the Eubœans would furnish forty, and many other Grecian republics would concur. He must however desire to be excused for withholding report of some very advantageous circumstances procured by his mission, as they required secrecy; but they were known to some Athenians, who would vouch for them, and he named Demosthenes. To this Demosthenes assented, adding that, of his own knowlege, the force

p. 486.

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ingaged for, by the Peloponnesians and Acarnanians together, was a hundred ships of war and ten thousand mercenary troops, beside native forces, two thousand from each country: that the command-in-chief, it was agreed, should be conceded to the Athenians, and that a congress of deputies from all the confederacy should meet, at Athens, on a day not distant, which he named[18].

Æschin. de cor. p. 488.

Possibly Callias was deceived by those he trusted as leading men of the democratical party, in the governments with which he communicated; or possibly, deceiving themselves, they undertook for what they were unable to accomplish. There was however a general failure of the promises: neither fleet nor army was assembled, no congress met, and, whatever may have been agreed in secret, no confederacy for war with Macedonia was acknowleged. To prosecute war then, as Demosthenes had proposed, was impossible, and to maintain peace was what he least of anybody could undertake. Thence evidently arose the necessity for what, it appears, followed; he conceded the lead in public business to those who could consistently propose to maintain friendly connection with Macedonia, and with whom the Macedonian government might be not indisposed to friendly communication. Under such circumstances, that he could quietly withdraw himself from the leading situation, and still hold the weight that inabled him to interfere as a speaker in the general assembly, marks either very extraordinary influence, which he possessed among the Many, or very extraordinary moderation in the opposite party, or rather both. The tranquillity insuing

Demost. de cor. p. 275. Æsch. de cor.

[18] For all these particulars Æschines refers to a decree of the Athenian people, passed on the occasion, which, on his motion, was red before the assembly.

from his retirement, during the year following that of the Hellespontine war, is marked by the historian by a complete omission of notice of both Grecian affairs and Macedonian.

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B.C.339. Ol.110.2. Diod. l.16. c. 82, 83.

SECTION V.

New Importance of the Office of Amphictyon. Sacrilege of the Amphissians. Opposition of Æschines to the Measures of Demosthenes. New Sacred War. Second Epistle of Isocrates to Philip. Election of Philip to the Office of General of the Amphictyons.

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In this season of comparative tranquillity, when nothing occurred strikingly affecting the principal republics, a political leven was working in a corner of the country, which quickly produced a fermentation deeply interesting the whole. Formerly the office of Amphictyon was of so little importance, that hardly, among all extant memorials, is to be found the name of any who held it, as representative of any Amphictyonic state, before Demosthenes. But the acceptance of it by one of his eminence, his character, and actually holding the power of first minister of the Athenian republic, not lightly indicates that it was become an office affording, in existing circumstances, great opportunities. Accordingly, when his opponents acquired the administration, Æschines was elected to the office. Athens, it appears, now sent four representatives to the Amphictyonic council; three pylagores, among whom was Æschines, but still only one hieromnemon. What had been foreseen, of importance enough to detach a man of the

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powers of Æschines from the controversies of oratory at Athens, does not appear, but matter requiring his talents and experience in business soon showed itself.

In the Sacred war, lately concluded, the Ozolian Locrians, the most zealous and active allies of Thebes, had been the greatest sufferers; and the final success of their friends had meerly relieved them from injury and danger, without bringing any compensation. Their principal town, Amphissa, hardly seven miles from Delphi, overlooked, nearly as Delphi, the rich Cirrhæan plain; and its territory bordered on the devoted land, forbidden to the use of man. The Thebans, powerful among the Amphictyons, would be likely to desire gratification for the Locrians, if it might be had without expence to themselves; but allowance for what was coveted could be only by connivance. The Amphissians however not only used the devoted land, both for pasture and tillage, but ventured to occupy and even fortify the accursed port; and, incouraged by permission of so much, they advanced in assurance, so far as to exact duties for goods and persons passing to and from Delphi.

Æsch. de cor. p. 505.

Æschines, from whom we have the account, in a speech of many years after, asserted, before the Athenian people, that the Amphissians tampered with the Amphictyons, and especially Demosthenes; who took from them a present of between sixty and seventy pounds sterling, as a fee for his interest immediately in the Amphictyonic council, with a promise of a yearly sum nearly equal, for his regular support to their cause at Athens: and Demosthenes seems to have confirmed this, by avoiding, in his reply, to contradict it. Indeed it appears unquestionable that the Athenian orators generally,

not less than the naval commanders, to whom we have seen Demosthenes himself imputing it, were in the habit of taking such fees or benevolences. It was so they made their fortunes; as afterward the orators in the Roman republic: so the great Cicero acquired his immense fortune. But the purpose of Æschines, in that speech, was not to explain freely and fully the politics of the times, but meerly to inculpate Demosthenes. What he said of his rival might be true; but the purpose of that extraordinary statesman certainly went far beyond a little private lucre. Nor will it appear wonderful, all the little that is laid open to us considered, that, from Demosthenes, in his reply, scarcely any facts can be gathered: the splendid coloring, which he could give to anything, he has given with almost only vapor: the tangible matter, that has reached us, we owe mostly to Æschines. SECT. V.

Soon after Æschines had taken his seat in the Amphictyonic council (for so Demosthenes has shown) he noticed the profanation of the Amphissians. Why this was not immediately followed by proceedings against them does not appear. The crisis at length arose thus. There was a temple newly built, probably to supply one destroyed in the late troubles; and, before it was regularly consecrated, some golden shields, which had been dedicated by the Athenian people, after the battle of Platæa, were placed in it, as if it was duly prepared to receive such oblations. The shields bore an inscription reproachful to Thebes, in these words: 'The Athenians, from the Medes 'and Thebans, when they fought against the 'Greeks.' This seems to have been done imprudently, rather than with any purpose of offence;

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for had there been any view to disturb by it the intrigue of Demosthenes, for a connection between the Athenian and Theban governments, which following circumstances show to have been at this time prosecuting at Thebes, more care would probably have been taken to avoid objectionable irregularity[19]. Not the Thebans then, but the Amphissian members of the council came forward to notice the irregularity. They said it was impious; and they claimed damages against the Athenian people, for the fault of their representatives, to the amount of fifty talents, near ten thousand pounds sterling. Æschines rose to speak in defence of himself, and his collegues, and his constituents. An Amphissian member interrupted him, and went to the length of insisting, that the Athenian people, as implicated in all the guilt of the Phocians, by alliance with them in the Sacred war, ought to be excluded from the temple, and deprived of Amphictyonic rights. Æschines however, obtaining at last a hearing, defended the suspension of the shields, and then proceeded to urge against the Amphissians their sacrilegious profanation, in using the devoted land and the accursed port.

Probably enough the Amphissian member, as Æschines says of him, and perhaps others of the Amphictyons, representatives of the smaller states, were men of no advantageous education. It is

[19] Æschines has avoided to say whether the Athenian accusation against the Amphissians, or the Amphissian accusation against the Athenians, was first instituted, and of course credit will be due to the assertion of Demosthenes, in his reply, that no accusation had been brought against Athens, by the Locrians, when Æschines first brought their profanation into question.

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however evident that, for the new or revived importance, to which the council was raised, there was a great deficiency of established and suitable forms of proceeding; necessary, in every assembly, for insuring just deliberation, and dignified conduct. The arguments of Æschines, or the weight of the Athenian interest, prevailing, the council came so rapidly to a decisive decree, on so difficult and delicate a subject, that on the same evening, proclamation was made by the herald, for 'all Delphians, 'of two years and upward above boyhood, free and 'slaves, to meet on the morrow at daybreak, at a 'place named, with hooks and spades; the hieromnemons and pylagores to attend; every state, 'whose representatives failed, to be excluded from 'the temple, as implicated in the profanation.' Æsch. de cor. p.514.

This hasty communication produced its effect, so far that all met as the decree required. Under command of the Amphictyons the crowd descended into the plain, destroyed the port, burned the houses, and returned. But the Amphissians, admonished of course by their members in the council, had assembled in arms; and whether urged more by inconsiderate passion, or incouraged by promise of powerful support, tho too late to prevent, would revenge the injury to their possessions. The unarmed Delphians fled from their menacing approach, but many were wounded, and some, even of the hieromnemons, were seized and stripped. Æsch. de cor. p.515. Demost. de cor. p.277. & 279.

Such disgraceful irregularities abundantly mark the deficiency and weakness of this national assembly. Nor were the following measures at all becoming the dignity which it ought to have main-

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tained. Next day the president, Cottyphus[20], summoned what was called a general assembly of the Amphictyons. In such a general assembly custom had established that all Greeks, at the time at Delphi, intitled to admission to the common sacrifices, and to consultation of the god, should have votes with the hieromnemons and pylagores. The very resource of summoning such an assembly seems to mark deficiency in the Amphictyons; and the result of its deliberations enough indicates that they felt their dignity committed by their former hasty measures. The necessary forms of justice, apparently not less than a just consideration of their own means, would have required notice to the Amphissians with a formal requisition to quit the lands they had improperly occupied, before violence was used for ejection. Now measures were taken, which should rather have preceded those through which their dignity and authority had been subjected to insult. It was decreed, that the hieromnemons should meet, on a day named, before the regular time for the next session of the Amphictyons (which in course was to be held not at Delphi, but at Thermopylæ) prepared with a bill for bringing the Amphissians to justice, for their offences against the god, the consecrated land, and the Amphictyons.

With this decree the Amphictyons concluded their session. The Athenian members, returning home, prepared a bill, as the decree required; which, whether as a matter of duty, or only of supposed prudence and expediency, they offered for the approbation of their own government;

[20] Κόττυφος, ὁ τὰς γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζων. Æsch.

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presenting it first to the council of Fivehundred, and then, warranted by their sanction, to the assembled people. Demosthenes opposed in vain, and the decree of the people gave it the force of a law.

But Demosthenes, superior to his opponents in diligence, not less than in acuteness, talking over the members of the council of Fivehundred, procured a decree there, commanding, that the hieromnemon and pylagores of Athens should go to Thermopylæ and to Delphi at the times appointed by their forefathers; thus virtually forbidding their going at the previous time appointed by the Amphictyons. Chusing then dexterously his moment in an assembly of the people, when the business appointed for the day was over, and Æschines, with the other principal men of his party were gone away, he brought this decree forward there; and uncontroled by the salutary forms, which check insidious party-measures in the British parliament, he procured at once the complete ratification of it. Nor did he stop thus. Finding the soverein assembly at his devotion, he added a clause, commanding 'that the hieromnemon and 'pylagores of Athens should not communicate 'with those of the other Grecian states, in words, 'or deeds, or votes, or act of any kind[21].' The account of Æschines, imputing sinister manage-

[21] Τὸν ἱερομνήμονα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τοὺς πυλαγόρας τοὺς ἀεὶ πυλαγοροῦντας, μὴ μετέχειν τοῖς ἐκεῖ συλλεγομένοις, μὴ λόγων, μήτε ἔργων, μήτε δογμάτων, μήτε πράξεως μηδεμιᾶς. Æsch. de cor. p. 518. 'Sycophantice prætermittit quarum rerum non debeant 'esse participes, belli Phocensis scilicet.' There is something extremely curious in the disposition to democratical barking, so extensively shown among the critics of the continent, from the revival of letters onward, to the French revolution; and more especially when compared with the greater moderation of those of our own country, where reäl freedom, and

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ment to Demosthenes in this business, does no credit to himself or his party for diligence or vigilance.

The decree, thus carried, seems to have been effectual for its purpose; which evidently was to render any attendance of the Athenian members in the council either nugatory, or embarrassing. Had the Athenian Amphictyons been of the war-party they would probably have attended purposely to embarrass. But they avoided to go. The Theban members also staid away. All the others however were present, when the resolution was taken, that war be made against the Amphissians, and the command committed to Cottyphus. An army accordingly was collected; the Amphissians were brought to submission; and, as Æschines seems truly to say, all things considered, they were not severely treated. A fine was imposed on the Amphissian state, to be paid in a limited time, to the god. Some of those who had taken a leading part in the late violence against the Amphictyons, were banished, and some Amphissian citizens, who had been condemned to exile for opposition to the little politics of their state, were restored. Thus, what had been very irregular and highly disgraceful, was put into as regular course as, according to all appearance could be, and in a manner as little objectionable.

Æsch. de cor. p. 518.

p. 519.

the constitution that should insure it, was so much better understood. Taylor, accordingly, says indignantly to this: 'Nihil prætermittitur.' In what he adds I cannot equally agree with him: 'Decrevit Demosthenes eos non participare cum consiliis vel actis senatus Amphictyonici, qui *extra ordinem cogebatur*.' The additional clause of Demosthenes had surely a further purview; for the use of an inactment forbidding to the Athenian members concurrence in counsels and deeds with the previous meeting, which they were, by the former part of the decree, forbidden to attend, is not obvious.

SECT. V.

But no sooner was the force which had compelled submission withdrawn, than the Amphissians returned to their former temper, and proceeded to corresponding measures. They refused payment of the fine, they recalled those whom the Amphictyons had banished, and drove into banishment again those whom they had recalled. Upon this, war was again decreed against them. But troops were not duly furnished by the states called upon and the measures taken were of little effect.

Æsch. de cor. p. 519. Demost. de cor. p. 477.

Such successful resistance of the people of the little town of Amphissa to the Amphictyons, the general council of the Greek nation, would appear strange indeed, if it was not fully indicated in remaining accounts, that their resistance was incouraged, and supported, by the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens, in concert with a powerful party in Thebes. Nor was the matter of light moment. It involved the question, whether the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens should command the Greek nation. In the fourth Philippic Oration of Demosthenes we have seen Corinth, Arcadia, Argos, Thebes, and even Lacedæmon, threatened to be reduced under Athenian empire. Perhaps this boldness, which may appear improvident, was necessary for instigation to the Athenian people. Could Demosthenes have carried his purposes more secretly, he might have succeeded in them.

At the next meeting of the Amphictyons, held at Thermopylæ, and thence called the Pylæan meeting, the circumstances of Greece were taken into serious consideration. How the people of the little town of Amphissa should be reduced to order, would have been even a ridiculous question for such a body, if the Amphissians were not alreddy noto-

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riously secure of that support, which soon after was openly given them. It was evidently the notoriety of the divided state of Greece (which Demosthenes himself has described as so inviting for Athens) and the apprehension of being brought under the rule of the conqueror of Sestus and his party, that induced a majority of the members to turn their view to the king of Macedonia.

Demosth. de cor. p. 279.

p. 276.

Demosthenes, in a speech many years after, told the Athenian people that the whole business of this little Amphissian war arose from the intrigue of Æschines; the ultimate object being to procure the election of Philip to the command. Philip was all the time making war against that powerful Scythian hord, occupying the coast of the Euxine sea, from the Borysthenes to the Danube or beyond it, and he was actually in their country. Agents indeed might nevertheless be busy for him in Greece. But, on the contrary, if Isocrates is to be credited, Philip was as backward to interfere among the republics, even on their invitation, as Demosthenes desired to have him believed eager, indefatigable and profuse. That however the little people of Amphissa would venture first to attack the Amphictyons, and afterward to resume and persevere in war against them, without assurance of support from some more powerful state, is evidently improbable; and the disposition of a powerful party in Thebes and of the war-party in Athens to favor them, is abundantly testified by Demosthenes himself. Toward an estimate of Philip's politics, then, this may deserve consideration. At the conclusion of the Sacred war, a partnership in the presidency of the Pythian festival had been committed to him and his successors forever. When that great politician, Jason of Thessaly, proposed to

Æsch. de cor. p. 519.

make himself soverein of Greece, it was with him a great point to preside in person at the Pythian festival; insomuch that he proposed to assume the situation by force, should it not quietly be conceded to him. But Philip avoided the invidious honor, when alreddy his own, and sent his deputy. The ingenuity of Demosthenes converted this into matter of reproach for him. Philip would not condescend, the orator told the Many of Athens, to attend himself, but sent his servant. Had Philip, on the contrary, used the opportunity open to him, as he was well capable of using it; had he displayed at Delphi the elegant magnificence which had been so admired at his Olympic festival in Macedonia; had he there, with advantageous opportunity for communicating personally with principal men, especially young men, from every city of Greece, exerted his singular talent for conviviality and pleasant conversation, to extend personal attachment to him in all parts, the ingenuity of Demosthenes, tho he might have feared the consequences, would not have wanted ground of invective to oppose them, or diligence in making the utmost use of it. SECT. V.

The second of the extant epistles of Isocrates to Philip shows itself to have been written about this time; for it mentions Philip as recently returned from the war with the northern people, in whose country he yet was when the Amphictyons were deliberating about his election to the command in the Amphissian war. It marks a strong feeling in the old patriot for Philip's safety; it reproves him for risking his person improvidently in battle, exhorts him to friendship with the Athenians, admonishes him not to regard those who, informing him of all the invectives and calumnies vented against B.C.339. Ol.110.2. Æsch. de cor.

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him by a party in Athens, would persuade him that the people generally were ill-disposed toward him, and concludes with urging him 'to connect 'his kingdom and his good fortune with the happi-'ness and concord of the Greek nation[22].' The Amphictyons then, concurring in sentiment with Isocrates and the party of Phocion, how far communicating with them we know not, the Amphictyons came to the resolution of inviting the king of Macedonia to take upon himself the office of their general, and they decreed that Cottyphus, their president, should go to him, as their ambassador, to request his acceptance of the appointment.

Demosth. de cor. p. 279.

22 Ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑμῖν παραλαταβεῖν τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ εὐνοίᾳ.

It seems to have been in meer idleness that the editor, Auger, has assigned the same date to the oration to Philip and all the three letters of Isocrates: probably desiring not to be understood to mean the same day, but only time within which was no material change of circumstances. We have seen the oration marks its own date very exactly. There seems little hazard in affirming that the first epistle was sent before it, because it would have been absurdly nugatory after it. The second and third epistles clearly mark themselves for dates very considerably differing, to those who will take the trouble, which Auger has desired to avoid, of adverting duly to the matter stated in them.

CHAPTER XLII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Election of PHILIP King of MACEDONIA to be General of the AMPHICTYONS, till his Death.

SECTION I.

Extraordinary Policy of Demosthenes. Confederacy of Grecian States under the Influence of the Athenian War-party. Hostilities against Macedonia, without declared War. Requisition of Forces for the new Sacred, or Amphissian War. Conclusion of the new Sacred War.

SECT. I.

THE election of the king of Macedonia to the office of general of the Amphictyons, making him the constitutional head of a great confederacy of Grecian republics, almost in the moment of failure of the avowed project of the Athenian war-party for a great confederacy against him and his Grecian allies, again placed that party in circumstances most discouraging. Opportunity thus was so opened for establishing the prevalence of the peaceful, and for consolidating that friendly connection, of Athens especially, but of all Greece, with Macedonia, which the peaceful party, as the writings of Isocrates show, ernestly desired, that ground of hope for the war-party again to obtain the lead might seem hardly discernible. But as quicksightedness,

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dexterity, and boldness, were never yet so wanted in the cause, so never before were they equally shown. The very conception of the ideä, which Demosthenes next carried into practice, appears extraordinary. Having reached his actual eminence by vehement and persevering assertion of the most unlimited democratical despotism, yet, unable, in the moment, to command by the democratical, he applied himself to cultivate, not an aristocratical party, but a depressed relic of the aristocratical branch of the constitution. A few years ago, Isocrates had proposed restoration of authority to the once powerful and venerable court of Areiopagus, but he proposed in vain. Demosthenes now formed an interest in that court, such that he might use it as his instrument for controling the soverein Many; and, under his direction, it assumed power to be an efficacious instrument.

Demosth. de cor. p. 271.

In the way which appears to have been, of late at least, usual, and esteemed regular, Æschines had been elected, by the people, to the office of syndic of the temple of Delos; an office of high honor, and apparently lucrative. The court of Areiopagus, perhaps reviving some old claim to interfere in the appointment to offices connected with the religion of the state, not only annulled the election, but took upon itself to substitute Hyperides, an orator of eminence, zealous in the party of Chares and Demosthenes. Whether Phocion and his friends thought this might be a salutary precedent for checking popular despotism, or why otherwise they did not or could not excite the soverein assembly, generally so jealous of its authority, to support its own act, we have no information.

SECT. I.

The appointment to the syndicship, however, was, by itself, of small consideration; its importance arose from its connection with other matters. A man of eminence, Antiphon, respected for his quality, formidable by his talents, adverse to the war-party, and, as far as appears, without other crime, had been banished by a decree of the people. Whether hoping for protection, and a reversal of the decree, from the recovered influence of his friends, or under whatever of the various inducements that might present themselves, he returned illegally, and was living in concealment in Peiræus. The vigilance of Demosthenes obtaining notice of this, he judged that, at any hazard, the utmost should be made of the opportunity. Unable to gain such information of Antiphon's residence that the officers of justice might be directed in regular course to apprehend him, he assumed to himself authority, with sufficient attendants, to search private houses; and, having at length discovered the delinquent, took him into custody and carried him to the city.

Demosth. de cor. p. 271.

The people then being assembled, the prisoner was brought before them. The notorious fact of his illegal return from banishment, tho subjecting him to capital punishment, would not warrant the violation of private rights in apprehending him. It behooved Demosthenes therefore to be prepared with means to obviate accusation against himself, or his own ruin might take place of Antiphon's. The mention of a plot to overthrow the democracy would at at any time fire the multitude. Of such a plot Demosthenes accused Antiphon; with the addition that it was concerted with the king of Macedonia. The first measure, he affirmed, was to have been to burn the naval arsenal, with all the

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shipping there, and for this purpose it was that the prisoner was lurking in Peiræus. The peace-party came forward, anxious to defend Antiphon; but, aware of the inflammable temper of the despotic soverein, they seem to have rested less on the total deficiency of evidence to the charge, than on the opportunity open for directing the popular passion to the notorious violation of the constitution and the rights of citizens, in the act of apprehending the prisoner. Whether however argument or influence or passion availed most, the charge was voted groundless, and, as illegally arrested, Antiphon was set at liberty.

Defeat, in such a measure, could not but involve in great danger those engaged in it. Demosthenes therefore, as little averse to aristocratical despotism, if it might serve his purpose, as to democratical, proceeded again to make the court of Areiopagus his weapon, for defence and offence. The security of an Englishman, in the immemorial rule of the common law, that no man shall be tried twice on the same charge, was given neither by the principles of democracy, nor of aristocracy at Athens. Antiphon, dismissed in pursuance of the sentence of the soverein people, was arrested again, at the instigation of Demosthenes, by order of the court of Areiopagus; and not convicted by evidence, but, under the pressure of torture, confessing, or uttering what his tormentors asserted to amount to confession, of the purpose of burning the arsenal, he was, by that court, so renowned of old for the equity of its decisions, sent to the executioner. It might be difficult to give credit to these facts, if they came reported on less unsuspicious authority than that of the great orator, the principal agent. It may however, it should seem, be presumed, that

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the proceedings, so disgusting, even as he has related them, were not warranted by the celebrated constitution of Solon, nor would have been allowed under that court of Areiopagus which Isocrates desired to restore; for it were difficult to say what just freedom, what security for individuals, could exist under a constitution that would tolerate the practice of Demosthenes[1].

But a measure of such violence, tho carried by the authority of the court of Areiopagus, against the declared will of the soverein multitude, could be supported only by a recovery of prevalence among that multitude; and this was evidently never out of the view of Demosthenes. The ebb and flow of command, among the assembled Athenian people, was not always produced by any change of popular favor. At this very time, when the war-party failed of the votes wanted to carry one important purpose, the maritime department appears to have been decidedly under their influence: the fleets were actively, and probably lucratively, employed in preying on the Macedonian commerce, while the orators at home, and especially Demosthenes, were asserting, in the assembly, that Athens maintained faithfully the peace, which Philip, they exclaimed, had broken. While the nautic multitude were so employed, the strength of the party might sometimes fail in the general assembly, for want of their voices; and yet, to hold their favor, it would be necessary to allow them so to be employed. The inconvenience then of a temporary defeat, resulting from

Demosth. de cor. p.275,276. Demosth. Philipp.

[1] Even Plutarch has observed, of this affair, that it was σφόδρα δημοκρατικὸν πολίτευμα (v. Demosth. p. 852.) It is obvious that he used the word δημοκρατικὸν widely otherwise than with the very creditable meaning which it bore in the age of Plato and Isocrates.

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their absence in an unforeseen crisis, would be to be repaired by their zeal for the patrons of their vocation, when they returned; and it was apparently in reasonable confidence that he could call in sufficient support, that Demosthenes ventured, in the absence of a large proportion of his friends, to use the authority of the court of Areiopagus against the authority of the general assembly, and proceed to that extravagance of despotism and cruelty, in the case of Antiphon, which surprized even Plutarch.

Thus, under the conduct of Demosthenes, most ably adapted to his own purposes and those of his party, that party recovered the ascendancy in the general assembly, and the administration of the affairs of the commonwealth. Their views then were directed, with not less ability or diligence, nor without large success, to establish and extend its influence in other parts of Greece. In Eubœa, divided through all its towns, between factions long vehemently hostile to oneanother, yet with the war-party generally overborne, the business must have been of great nicety and difficulty. Nevertheless Demosthenes, attaching able agents to his interest by their interest, and favored by the scrupulous moderation of the party of Phocion, succeeded so, that nearly the whole iland was brought under his command. In Megara he had equally procured prevalence for the party there under his patronage. Corinth, formerly the steddy friend of Lacedæmon, the vehement enemy of Athens, was fallen much from her antient importance among the Grecian states; her constitution altered, and the people oppressed, after a long series of good administration, through that growth of violent faction, of which an account has been

formerly given after the authentic narrative of Xenophon. In the following age, Diodorus has noticed Corinth only for her connection with Sicilian affairs, through the expedition of Timoleon. For her antient fame her political state now would be an object of curiosity; but Demosthenes has simply shown that, when he was the minister, she was the ally of Athens. From a late writer, the jocular Lucian, we have the character of her government and people ludicrously exhibited: yet, being in consonance with the other more serious testimonies, the picture is probably not wholly unfaithful. The famous cynic philosopher Diogenes, at this time, it is said, was inhabiting his tub at Corinth. There, as at Athens, to infuse apprehension of attack from Macedonia, and to excite, if possible, passion enough among the people to lead them to approve and be active in offensive war, was the object of the leaders. All therefore was set in motion: fortifications were repaired, arms fabricated, provisions collected. The whole city thus being in a bustle of military preparation, the philosopher began to roll about his tub in various directions. Being asked Why? he answered, 'he would avoid, for once, the im-'putation of affecting singularity, and so would 'not be the only person in Corinth not absurdly 'employed.' Corinth however was no unimportant addition to the Athenian confederacy. Not only her situation was commanding, but her alliance carried with it, or assisted much toward obtaining, that of Corcyra and Leucadia, which accordingly were among the allies of Athens. Achaia and Acarnania were also in the same interest; decided to it much by their hostility to neighboring states, allies of Macedonia. Lacedæmon, under treaty

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Lucian, de conscrib. hist.

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still subsisting, was an ally of the republic, ill-disposed toward Macedonia, for the support which Macedonia gave to the Argians and Messenians; but there was no friendship between the Lacedæmonian government and the war-party in Athens; and the great speculation of Demosthenes, at this time, alliance with Thebes, was incompatible with any friendly connection with Lacedæmon. The effectual confederacy of Athens, under the administration of the war-party, consisted then of Megara, Corinth, with Leucadia and Corcyra, Achaia, and Acarnania.

The acquisition of Thebes, for which Demosthenes appears to have been perfectly willing to forego any advantage to be derived from the connection with Lacedæmon, might seem, on a transient view, so to abound with difficulty, and indeed so to be out of all ordinary course of policy, that the purpose might appear even preposterous; yet, as we proceed with the course of events, we find the keensighted politician had discovered no inconsiderable ground for it. A party once formed in Thebes in direct opposition to the party desirous of maintaining the connection with Macedonia, however aversion to Athens generally might be a popular passion, was in the best manner prepared for connection with the war-party in Athens. According to the probable imputation of Æschines, Demosthenes held communication with this party in Thebes, when it might have subjected any man to the charge of high treason. Yet so ably the intrigue was managed, that a powerful party there was prepared with zeal for connection with Athens, while not only the two republics were in a state of actual war, but the general prejudices among the people of both were very hostile toward each other.

Æsch. de cor. p. 532, 533. Demos. de cor. p. 299.

SECT. I.

Meanwhile nominal peace and nominal alliance remaining between Athens and Macedonia, the war-party orators continued their complaints that Philip had broken the peace, and the Athenian navy was busy in maritime depredation, as if war had been declared. It is precisely of this time Demosthenes is speaking, where he says, 'Philip was without 'prospect of relief from the hostilities he was suffering from Athens, unless he could excite the 'Thebans and Thessalians to be active in measures 'against us: for notwithstanding the deficient exertion of our military commanders, he was suffering a thousand evils from the depredations on the 'maritime trade of his country. Nothing could be 'exported, nothing imported, for the activity of our 'cruizers[3].' Demosth. de legat. p.275,276.

Such was the state of things, when Philip, invited by the embassy of the Amphictyons, came to their meeting at Thermopylæ, where alone they appear to have held their sittings, since Delphi was become insecure, through the open hostility of the Locrians, on one side, and the uncertain disposition of Thebes, on the other. In pursuance then of the duties of the office to which he had been elected, he issued requisitions for the Amphictyonic states to send their contingents of troops, for war to be waged under his command. The form of the requisition, sent to the Peloponnesians, is given by Demosthenes, thus: 'The king of the Macedonians, Philip, 'to the magistrates of the Peloponnesians of the con-

[3] Λῃστῶν. This word appears to have been used by the Greeks equally to signify a pirate, and a ship of war regularly commissioned; whence it is often difficult to know which has been intended.

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'federacy, and to all the confederates, greeting[8]: 'Whereas the Locrians, called Ozolian, inhabiting 'Amphissa, are acting offensively against the tem- 'ple, and, coming with arms, have plundered the 'sacred land; it is my purpose, with your support, 'to assert the cause of the god, and oppose those 'who violate what is held sacred among men. I 'require you therefore to meet me, in Phocis, duly 'armed, and bringing provisions for forty days, 'within the present month, called by us Loüs, by 'the Athenians Boëdromion, by the Corinthians 'Panemus. Those who attend will be intitled to 'communication in council; those who fail of con- 'forming to the decrees of the confederacy will be 'fined. Farewell.'

It does not appear that any requisition was sent to Athens; where acknowlegement of the election of Philip, not only to be commander-in-chief, but to be an Amphictyon, had been denied. To Thebes it was not omitted; but so the Athenian party had advanced in power there, that obedience to it was refused: Yet among those fluctuations, to which democratical government was so liable, the Macedonian party, afterward preponderating, at least for that question, the Theban contingent, under the command of Proxenus, joined the Amphictyonic army.

Demosth. de cor. p. 275.

Dinarch. or. in Demosth.

Meanwhile, in Athens, between parties stimulated, one by ambition, the other by fear of oppression, and of strength nearly balancing, the contest of oratory was vehement. The war-party however prevailing, a measure was taken, of the most decided hostility toward all that part of the Greek nation,

Demos. de cor. p. 275.

[8] Πελοποννησίων τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις πᾶσι. What the distinctions were between these descriptions of people we seem to fail of means for ascertaining. P. 280.

which acknowleged the Amphictyonic authority, and was disposed to abide by the peace, which had ended the Phocian war. The Athenian republic had now in its pay mercenary troops, to the amount, according to Æschines, of ten thousand men. All, including apparently those which had been serving in the Hellespont, were sent, by a decree of the people, to assist the Amphissians, in their rebellion against the authority of the Amphictyons. What states or what party in those states, had incouraged the obnoxious conduct of the Amphissians, could then no longer be doubtful. SECT. I. Æsch. de cor. p. 536.

Of the war which followed, no particulars have been transmitted. The remaining information shows only the general result. The Amphictyonic army, directed by the talents of Philip, quickly rendered all the support furnished to the Amphissians vain, and reduced them to unconditional submission. The power then being more in Philip's hands, than when the Phocian war was concluded, severity against the vanquished, notwithstanding the imputation of sacrilege, was so avoided, that even the adverse orator has been at a loss for ground on which he could venture to specify any complaint.

SECTION II.

Critical Situation of the Athenian War-party: Political State of Thebes: Exertions of Demosthenes to gain the Alliance of Thebes: Contest of Parties at Athens: Hostile Decree against Macedonia: Letters of Philip to the Athenians and Thebans: Elateia garrisoned by Philip.

THIS new failure, in a cause so generally uncreditable, throughout Greece, as that of the Amphissians, brought the war-party, practised in critical SECT. II.

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situations, into a situation perhaps more critical than any wherein they had yet stood. Weakened by the double defeat, military and political, yet to retreat or retract would now, more than in any former circumstances, be to surrender all their importance, and give the government of the republic to their opponents. Nor could they hope to hold their ground without advancing: enterprize was, more than ever, necessary to them. Neither were means yet wrested from their hands, or opportunities such as able and keensighted politicians might use, failing before them. On the contrary, the confederacy under their influence remained, apparently undiminished. To the party which, through the dexterous management of Demosthenes and his agents, prevailed throughout Eubœa, the patronage of his party in Athens was necessary, perhaps not less than the command of the iland was, for them, desirable. Similar party interests and local interests continued to hold Megara, Achaia, and Acarnania, in their connection; and Corinth, carrying with her Corcyra and Leucadia, adhered to it. Nowhere their cause appears to have felt the shock of the defeat in the Amphissian war so much as in Thebes. The Theban people indeed had never yet been of their confederacy; but the progress toward the acquisition had been large. Without Thebes, then, the support of all the rest would hardly inable them to maintain their ground; but could Thebes yet be gained, hope might again soar high. The very name of Thebes, added to the catalogue of their allies, for the recent renown of that state, would be a great acquisition. But the military force of Bœotia for its numbers, as well as for its reputation, was very considerable in the scale of the Grecian republics. There was moreover

another consideration of no small importance. Could Thebes be gained, the rampart of friendly states around Attica would be completed. The Athenian people would be relieved from apprehension of a powerful enemy on their border, under which they had been long uneasy. Attica would be no longer to be approached by hostile armies, but across the territories of allies, who must bear the first brunt of any war. This circumstance, blazoned by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, appears to have weighed much with a large portion of the Athenian people, little capable of estimating what might be, in the existing circumstances, the probable efficacy of such a rampart. But perhaps the orator himself depended more on another view, which would have been disappointed by a premature declaration of it. Were Thebes gained, the force of the confederacy at hand would be such, that Philip might be blockaded in Phocis, or even attacked there with overbearing numbers, and compelled to seek personal safety, if so he could find it, by flight over the mountains. SECT. II.

The alliance of Thebes, thus a great object for the war-party at Athens to gain, was of course also a great object for Macedonia to preserve. In Thebes, meanwhile, with a weak government, the opposition of parties was violent. The party generally ruling was that which, in pursuit of empire, had put forward the Phocian war. In distress produced by that war, it had sought the Macedonian alliance. Relieved, through the advantages of that alliance, from immediate danger, it resumed its purposes of ambition: but upon these that alliance was a check. The same party then, which had been most forward to form that alliance, became most ernest to be relieved from

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the intanglement. But another party, less desiring empire than just government and domestic security, and fearing oppression to themselves from success in the ambitious purposes of their fellow-citizens, cherished the newly formed connection with Macedonia, as the best stay of the peace, and even of the constitution of the commonwealth.

Between these two parties the Theban Many floated. But there were circumstances tending to turn the flood rather in favor of the leaders adverse to the Macedonian connection. The Many were very extensively disposed to participate in the ambition of that party, but especially in the ambition to command, as a soverein people, the people of all the other towns of Bœotia. Indignation was thus reddy among them, when the king of Macedonia, with a liberal policy at least, tho among the antients he had extensive credit for a nobler motive, humanity, desired mercy for those whom the Thebans called their revolted subjects, the Orchomenians and others, who had ingaged in confederacy with the Phocians. Even after he had consented to the expulsion of those unfortunate people from Bœotia, the charity be extended to them within his own dominions, where he provided many with settlements, was, in the eyes of the Thebans, suspicious and offensive. On the other hand that party in the Bœotian towns, consisting mostly of the wealthier, who desired emancipation from the sovereinty of the Theban people, or relief against its occasional pressure, looked, in common with most other Greeks in uneasy circumstances, to the king of Macedonia, as a general protector; and this was a second, and a stronger cause of jealousy for the Theban Many. But

among the numerous states of Greece, where, for their smallness, alliances must be numerous, a kindness could hardly be done to one ally, such was the jealousy among them, without offence to some other. Had Philip's purpose been, like Jason's formerly, to hold Greece in subjection by force, Nicæa, placed in his hands by the Phocian general Phalæcus, would have been, for its commanding situation against the strait of Thermopylæ, a possession to be carefully held. Had he kept it by a Macedonian garrison, he would perhaps less have offended the Thebans; but he gave it to their old allies the Thessalians, and thus he excited much their envy and indignation. SECT. II. Æsch. de cor.

These were all circumstances of advantage for Demosthenes, in his purpose of detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance, and bringing it to close connection with Athens. Still, however, such was the inveterately hostile disposition of the Theban and Athenian people toward each other, and such the strength of the party in Thebes, not only in the highest degree adverse to such a connection, but ernest to maintain the existing connection with Thessaly and Macedonia, that the project abounded with difficulty. The necessities of the war-party however being urgent, and the object great, they were willing to hazard much for it, and bid high. The liberality of a system resembling the Olynthian, which had succeeded as a lure with the Eubœans and Byzantines, would not suit the Thebans, who affected, not equality, but sovereinty. To ingage to support the sovereinty of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, of whose freedom it had been formerly the boast of Athens to be the patroness, would be indispensable toward any hope of success. But, beyond this, Demosthenes flatter-

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ed the ambition of the Thebans, leaders and people, with the intimation that Athens would promote their decayed hopes of extensive empire, and consent to hold a second place, at least in military command, under Theban leaders.

Æsch. de cor. Demosth. de cor. p. 285.

That it was the promising success of secret negotiation in Thebes, which incouraged the war-party to persevere in vehement opposition to any accommodation with Macedonia, the contest of rival orators afterward gave to public knowlege. Meanwhile the party of Phocion, perhaps suspecting the intrigue but little informed of it, and at any rate not desiring the Theban connection for the purposes proposed by their opponents, strenuously contended for abiding by existing treaties, and maintaining peace. A decree, first debated in the council and at the board of generals, and by them offered to the assembled people, appears to mark, by its inconsistant tenor, the struggle with which it was carried. It runs thus: 'Whereas Philip has taken cities in 'our neighborhood, some of which he has laid 'waste, and now setting at nought the treaty, and 'proposing to violate faith, publicly plighted, 'he is preparing to invade Attica; it is therefore 'resolved, by the council and the people, that a 'herald be sent with an embassy to confer with 'him, and especially exhort him to preserve the 'harmony established between us, and abide by 'the treaty; or, at least, to allow time for the state 'to deliberate, and, for that purpose, agree to a 'truce till the month Thargelion.'

We owe the preservation of this curious document to Demosthenes; but Philip's answer, to so strange a mixture of invective and solicitation, the orator has evidently thought it not for his purpose to bring forward. What however might be, at

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least in part, the answer, may even now be gathered. He had taken no cities of their neighborhood, and laid waste none. The Phocians had surrendered their cities to him rather than to Grecian republics, under whose power they would otherwise have fallen; and some had been laid waste, not by him, but by the oldest and most venerable judicature known to the Greek nation. He was not preparing to invade Attica, nor had any such purpose; but he was alreddy prepared, and well resolved, to defend himself and his allies, against a party in Athens, adverse to the peace and freedom of Greece.

But whether this decree passed with or against the consent of the war-party, or rather partly with and partly against their wishes, their negotiation with Thebes, as the concurring testimonies of the rival orators show, did not cease, but was rather prosecuted with increased sedulity. This being not to be intirely concealed from Philip, and communication with Thebes being yet open for him, as a state, however showing a disposition to change, still formally his ally, he endevored to obviate the mischief by counter-negotiation. Nor was his success, it appears, inconsiderable; for the Thebans, by a solemn act, renewed their former peace and friendship with him.

Ep. Phil. ad Theb. ap. Demos. de cor. p. 283.

Such proof of the prevalence of the party in Thebes, adverse to connection with Athens, alarmed Demosthenes and his friends; and, five weeks after the former decree for the embassy to Philip, another was brought forward, for a second embassy, in these terms: 'Whereas Philip endevors to excite 'the Thebans against us, and is preparing to come 'with his whole army to the places nearest Attica, 'in breach of the treaty subsisting between us, it

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'is resolved, by the council and people, that a he-
'rald and an embassy be sent to him, to propose
'and solicit a truce, that the people may duly deli-
'berate on the existing circumstances, not having
'yet taken, on their part, any hostile measure.'

To this decree, and the representations of the embassy, Philip returned a written answer, which remains reported by Demosthenes, thus; 'Philip
'king of the Macedonians, to the Athenian coun-
'cil and people, greeting: What your disposition
'toward us has been, from the beginning, I am not
'ignorant, nor with what ernestness you have en-
'devored to gain the Thessalians, the Thebans,
'and the rest of the Bœotians to your party. But
'now you find them too wise to submit their inte-
'rests to your direction, you change your course
'and send ministers with a herald to me to admo-
'nish me of the treaty, and demand a truce; having
'in truth been injured by us in nothing. Never-
'theless I have heard your ambassadors, and I con-
'sent to all your desires, nor shall I take any step
'against you, if, dismissing those who advise you
'ill, you consign them to their deserved ignominy.
'So may you prosper[4].'

At the same time he judged it expedient to address the Thebans, in a letter reported also by Demosthenes, thus: 'The king of the Macedo-
'nians, Philip, to the Theban council and people,

[4] Ἂν περὶ τοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς συμβουλεύοντας ὑμῖν παρατέμψαντες, τὴν προσηκούσης ἀτιμίας ἀξιώσητε. Ἐρρῶσθε. This passage and another similar to it, in a former communication, seem the foundation on which has been built the story of Philip's demanding ten orators; the ingenious authors of which would surely have us believe Demosthenes either so uninformed or so modest that he either did not know, or among his numerous published orations would not tell, such a fact: which certainly would have been often to his purpose, could he have obtained credit for it.

'greeting: I received your letter, by which you 'renew your friendship and peace with me. I 'understand however that the Athenians are urging 'everything that could induce you to concur in 'their purposes; and indeed I did apprehend that 'you had some disposition to yield to their hopes, 'and follow their lead; but now I am assured 'that you prefer the preservation of peace, with 'me, to such submission of yourselves to the 'guidance of strangers, and I rejoice in it. I 'commend your conduct on many accounts; but, 'especially, as it places you in security, and as it 'evinces goodwill toward me. I trust the advan- 'tage to you will be not small, if you persevere 'in it. May you prosper.' SECT. II.

Demosthenes, in the whole tenor of his orations of this period shows, and all that has been transmitted by Isocrates, Æschines, and the historian, confirms it, that he had no view to peace: his purpose, and that of his principal associates in politics, was only to gain time for establishing the superiority of their party in Thebes. Were that accomplished, Philip's situation in Phocis might be highly critical. The force of Bœotia might blockade him among the mountains there. The Athenian navy commanded the sea; and his return into Macedonia might be precluded. In Phocis the critical situation of a principal town, Elateia, has been alreddy noticed: it commanded the pass, almost the only way practicable for an army, between Delphi and Bœotia, and also between Delphi and that part of Phocis itself which stretched toward Thermopylæ. These interesting circumstances of the place, not likely to escape so able a soldier and politician as Philip, had certainly not escaped the war-party in Athens, nor

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Demosth. Phil. 2. p. 69.

even public notice. Demosthenes, so long ago as when he delivered the oration called the Second Philippic, told the Athenian people that, the disposition of the Thebans toward the Macedonian alliance being alreddy become doubtful, public rumor went that Philip had in view to fortify Elateia. The orator added that he did not think the pressure then such that the measure would be immediately taken. But things were now altered. Phocis and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy were in danger from the growing connection of Thebes with Athens. Philip therefore occupied Elateia with a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, and set about restoring the fortifications, which had been demolished at the conclusion of the Phocian war. That this was at all beyond his constitutional power, or even his duty, as general of the Amphictyonic army, bound by many obligations to protect Phocis and give security to the Amphictyonic confederacy, seems no way to appear; yet whether he was more than just in time to prevent the Athenian party in Thebes from seizing, beyond all limit of any legal claim of theirs, the same important place, following events make utterly doubtful.

SECTION III.

Singular Decree of the Athenian People: Embassy to Thebes: Alliance of Thebes with Athens. Power of Demosthenes: Operations against the King of Macedonia and the Amphictyonic Army.

Little as the occupying of Elateia with a garrison could be a surprize upon the war-party at Athens, who had so long not only foreseen but

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publicly spoken of it, and evidently as it appears to have been a measure of just precaution, injurious to none, they nevertheless found means to use it, in argument among the Athenian people, as if it was an actual beginning of hostilities, and to found public measures on it accordingly. The curious detail remains to us from Demosthenes himself. 'It was evening,' he says, 'when intelli- Demost.de cor. p.284. 'gence came to the prytanes, then at supper, that 'Elateia was occupied. Instantly rising from table, 'some of them went to the agora, dismissed the 'waresellers, and burned their stalls: others sent 'to the generals and called the trumpeter: the 'whole city was filled with tumult.' To what purpose these hasty and violent measures were but to excite the tumult, is not in any degree indicated by the orator; and as Elateia, a Phocian town within the proper district of the Amphictyonic general's command, was separated by the width of all Bœotia, from the Attic border, by the whole of the orator's brazen wall untouched, no other seems within the bounds of reasonable conjecture.

The following steps then were consonant to this outset. Next morning the prytanes convened the council at daybreak. Meanwhile the people, alarmed by the proceedings of the past evening, and uncertain of the cause, so hastened to their usual place of assembly, that the council had not had time to come to any resolution, when much Demosth. de cor. p. 285. impatience was expressed for communication from it. Whatever then might be the impossibility of making regular and proper communication, the soverein, it appears, was not to be irritated. The council, unprepared with propositions, attended the

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assembly. The herald proclaimed, in the usual form, that any who would advise the people might speak. Nobody offered himself, tho all the generals and all the orators (such is the phrase of Demosthenes) were present. Phocion and his friends, of course, would wait to learn, from those who could tell, what all the disturbance meant; while Chares and his friends left the field open for Demosthenes, who at length gratified the universal impatience by mounting the speaker's stand.

The theatrical effect, as it remains described by the orator himself, must have been great. His speech, of which we have only a short abstract, appears to have been full of art, directed chiefly to reconcile the multitude to the hazardous proposal of a close political union with the Thebans, long feared and hated as their hereditary and most determined and injurious enemies. Invective against the king of Macedonia was a principal instrument. 'Slavery,' he told the people, 'was 'the best lot they could hope for, if Philip succeeded in his ambitious purposes. But if they 'would form alliance with Thebes, there would 'no longer be anything to fear from Macedonia; 'and the Thebans, notwithstanding past differences, had now every disposition to meet them, 'as in a common cause. To obtain so great an 'advantage, however, it was absolutely necessary 'that their ministers should be unfettered by limitations and instructions: they must have free 'scope for making such conditions with the Thebans, as, under the actual urgency of circumstances, they might see most beneficial for the 'commonwealth.'

The speech being concluded, there was a pause. Councillors, generals, archons, all whose official

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situations most intitled and required them to offer propositions for public measures, were unprepared. Information and time had been totally wanting, unless for those in the secret with Demosthenes, who came himself everyway reddy. He presently offered a decree, very remarkable both for tenor and style, and preserved to us by himself, as follows: 'Whereas it appears that Philip king of 'Macedonia has in past time transgressed the 'treaty of peace, concluded with the Athenian peo- 'ple, disregarding the oaths and whatever else 'among all Grecian people is esteemed just, and 'has possessed himself of towns of no right be- 'longing to him, and has even by force of arms 'taken some belonging to the Athenian people, 'without any provocation of prior injury from 'them; and whereas he has recently proceeded to 'greater extremes in violence and cruelty, placing 'garrisons in some Grecian cities, overthrowing the 'constitutions of some, even destroying some to 'the foundation, and reducing their inhabitants to 'the condition of slaves, in some establishing bar- 'barians in the room of Greeks, introducing them 'into the temples and among the tombs, thus 'doing nothing contrary to the character of his 'country and his own manners, but using extrava- 'gantly his present fortune, and forgetful that, 'from a small and low beginning, he has risen to 'an unhoped-for greatness: And whereas, while the 'Athenian people saw him possessing himself of 'towns belonging to them in the barbarian country, 'they judged it less necessary to proceed to extre- 'mities against him; but now they see states in 'Greece itself, some grossly injured, some annihi- 'lated, they think it unjustifiable, and unworthy of

Demost. de cor. p. 288.

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'the glory of their forefathers to look on while 'Greece is inslaved:

'Therefore it is decreed by the Athenian coun-'cil and people, praying and sacrificing to the 'gods and heroes protectors of the city and country, 'and bearing in mind the virtue of their forefathers, 'who were more ernest for the defence of the free-'dom of Greece than for the separate welfare of 'their own state, That two hundred ships shall 'put to sea, and that the admiral's station shall 'extend to Thermopylæ; that the commander-in-'chief, and the commander of the cavalry, shall lead 'the forces, foot and horse, to Eleusis; that ambas-'sadors be sent to the other Greeks, and first of all 'to the Thebans, because Philip's present position 'is on the verge of their country, to exhort them 'not to be dismayed by Philip, but to defend their 'own and the common liberty of the Greeks; to 'assure them that the Athenian people, dismissing 'all consideration of past differences, will assist 'them with their strength, their wealth, and their 'weapons, esteeming it honorable for Greeks to 'contend for military and political supremacy 'among oneanother; but to be commanded by a 'man of alien blood, and allow the supremacy to 'pass wholly away from themselves, would be un-'worthy of the glory of the Greeks and the virtue 'of their ancestors; that they do not esteem the 'Thebans alien either in blood or race; that they 'bear in mind the good deeds of their forefathers 'to the forefathers of the Thebans, who restored 'the descendants of Hercules to their paternal 'dominion, of which the Peloponnesians had de-'prived them, and, conquering in the field those 'who opposed them, gave refuge to Œdipus and 'those expelled with him; and in many other

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'instances, enough known to fame, have shown 'their friendship toward the Thebans: Wherefore 'the Athenian people will not now be wanting 'toward the Thebans and other Greeks, but will 'form connection with them, by alliance of the 'states, by allowance for intermarriage among in- 'dividuals, and by the full admission of reciprocity 'of oaths for all purposes[5].'

The decree concludes with naming five ambassadors, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Mnesitheides, Democrates, and Callæschrus[6].

The proposal of such a Philippic, to be adopted as a decree of the soverein assembly, seems to have been very contrary to the practice of former times, when simplicity and precision characterized their language, and argumentative and extraneous matter were utterly rejected. But the purpose, being to overthrow the former system of Athenian policy, and in a great degree new-model the government, associating the Theban people with the Athenian, however carrying, to the modern eye,

[5] In translating always I have adhered to my original plan, of being as close to the letter as might be; and especially in this curious piece, in his version of which Leland has outranted the original far more than Auger, whose translation is perhaps generally as close as his language, and its critics, would reddily allow. He has however here, as elsewhere, unwarrantably rendered ἀλλόφυλος *barbare*, which Leland has translated, as nearly perhaps as any modern language can, *forcisner*. Æolian Greeks and Ionian were to each other, in ordinary Grecian speech, ἀλλόφυλοι, and hence evidently the anxiety of Demosthenes to assure the Thebans that they were not considered by the Athenians as such.

[6] The French, who, in their late revolutions have been quick and ingenious imitators, but original scarcely in anything, have set an example, which it is to be hoped, will not be followed, of depraving the simplicity and decency and dignity, formerly characterizing European state writing, by adopting, and pushing to greater extravagance, the manner of this libellous decree of Demosthenes.

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the appearance of liberality, was so adverse to established and hereditary prejudices among the Athenian people, that it would be likely to need the machinery with which it was introduced, to excite popular passion suited to the occasion, the impatience especially, which had prevented the usual previous discussion in the council. The reference to fabulous antiquity, times before a republic was heard of, and the introduction of Hercules and Œdipus, might appear to the modern reader even ridiculous; yet the frequent occurrence of such references among the orators, and especially Isocrates, show that they were found suiting the public taste of the age. The management of Demosthenes accordingly was successful: Phocion and Æschines opposed in vain: the offered decree was carried, and the embassy hastened to Thebes.

Plut. vit. Phocion. Æsch. de cor. p. 536.

Meanwhile Philip, having provided some security for himself and his allies, by fortifying Elateia, neither took any hostile measures, nor made any preparation for offensive war. Informed of what had passed at Athens, he resolved to send also his embassy to Thebes, to obviate the effect of the Athenian negotiation; and he employed again the ministry of the eloquent Byzantine, Python[7]. The Theban people then were the soverein to be courted; and, in the agora of Thebes, Python on one side, Demosthenes on the other (Python, for his talents, as Demosthenes himself has indicated, a rival worthy of Demosthenes) exerted their utmost powers. The reddy topics for Python were the

[7] The narrative of Diodorus (b. 16, c. 85,) implies that, before the meeting of the embassies at Thebes, the Athenian army had alreddy advanced as far as Chæroneia, within a few miles of Elateia; but the orators show completely that it was otherwise.

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advantages of peace, generally, and the especial inducements to preserve peace and alliance with a prince of the king of Macedonia's character, such as it stood proved by his conduct, from the beginning of his reign; the respect he had shown for the religion and the general constitution of Greece; his deference for the particular constitution of every state, among the Many in which he had an interest; the fidelity and honor with which he had always observed his ingagements; and the proof of all this in the zealous attachment of so many republics, his actual allies. On the other hand Demosthenes, flattering the Theban war-party, and reproaching the peaceful, inveyed against the king of Macedonia, and all who adhered to him, with his usual fire and his usual art. His speech appears to have been celebrated in its day, even among the speeches of Demosthenes; perhaps for its effect; for it seems not to have been extant in the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; and very likely it had passages adapted to the time and place, but not adapted to answer the orator's purpose in a more extensive publication, so that it never was edited.

But eloquence was not a weapon to which alone Demosthenes trusted; he came provided with authority from the Athenian people to offer, at his discretion, whatever Athens could give; and he was bold in his prodigal use of their confidence. If promises and treaties could bind states, Athens was bound to continue its old patronage and protection to the Bœotians generally, but especially to the Platæans and Thespians, against the sovereinty over them, claimed by the Theban people. If democracy, of which Athens boasted to be the patroness, and Demosthenes the most zealous advocate, meant equal rule for all under its influence, and not

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a most reäl tyranny in the hands of one set of people over another set of people, and if the recent liberality to the Eubœans and Hellespontines was not a meer time-serving policy, Athens, even unbound by treaties and special promises, should have contended for the equal freedom of all the Bœotians against the claimed sovereinty of the Thebans, and Demosthenes should have exerted his eloquence and his interest in support of it. But Demosthenes, as if a preliminary step in his continually pretended assertion of the freedom of Greece, now ingaged that the Athenian people not only should allow the subjection of the Platæans and Thespians, together with all other Bœotians, to the Thebans, but that they should exert their utmost strength to assist the Thebans in establishing that subjection. This carried with it to Athens loss of honor only. But Demosthenes ventured upon concessions likely to be more felt. Allowing to Thebes an equal vote in directing, not the military alone, but the naval measures of the confederacy, he ingaged that Athens should furnish the whole expence of the fleet, and two thirds of that of the army, and yet that a Theban general should command in chief. Even for the political business he seemed to give a decisive advantage to Thebes; for he stipulated that all the measures of the confederacy should be concerted with the Bœotarcs in the Cadmeia[8]. In opposition to such liberality, recommended by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, the talents of Python were vain. The majority of votes of the Theban people was in favor of the proposed new aliance with Athens.

Æsch. de cor. p. 533.

p.534,535.

[8] These matters, asserted by Æschines, being uncontradicted by Demosthenes in his reply, must be considered as admitted by him.

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The importance which Demosthenes, in this negotiation, yielded for the state he represented, he gained, and even more, for himself. His success, gratifying at least his own party, promoted and confirmed his power in Athens. But what was perhaps still more, through the intimacy of the connection formed with the leading Thebans, and the constant need wherein they stood, of countenance from their new ally, to support them against the opposition at home, he became reälly prime minister of Thebes; and, through the greater irregularity of the democratical constitution there, he found scope for a bold and ingenious policy to exercise even a more despotic authority. Thenceforward, accordingly, measures in Thebes corresponded with, and were adapted to promote, his purposes in Athens; and through the means acquired for playing one state against the other, it was a wonderful authority he acquired in both.

The object of the moment was to lead both republics to open war with Macedonia, before the forces which Philip had about him, for the little war with Amphissa should be increased, or while he retained only those deemed requisite for securing the order established by his success against the Locrians. Thebes then was made to be the first mover in the business. Solicitation was addressed to the Athenian people, in the name of the Theban people, for an Athenian force to be sent into Bœotia, to support the Thebans in the war against the king of Macedonia; no war at that time having been acknowleged by either party. The Athenian citizens nevertheless were called to arms; the desired support was voted, and a body of horse and foot marched. Meanwhile, zeal in the cause was

Demosth. de cor. p. 299.

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so excited among the Thebans, that, on the approach of the Athenian forces, a large body, horse and foot, marched out of the town, and incamped, to leave commodious quarters in their houses for their new allies.

B. C. 338. Ol. 110. 3. It was already late in autumn. No troops were yet collected from Eubœa, Corinth, or other more distant members of the Athenian confederacy; but the force of Bœotia alone, added to that of Athens, would probably be much beyond what Philip had about him in Phocis. Moreover on account of the strength and earnestness of the peace-parties, both in Thebes and Athens, and the weight of their leading characters, at least in the latter city, and the necessary prevalence of their arguments with the sober part of both communities, it was much an object to have measures taken that should make war unavoidable. The united forces therefore of Athens and Thebes marched to the frontier of Bœotia, against Phocis, and took their station at Chæroneia, a few miles only from Elateia.

Of what followed we have information only from the orator's cursory notice of it. By his very silence however it is enough indicated that offensive measures were not begun by the king of Macedonia. Nevertheless two battles were fought; the latter not till winter was already set in. Neither had any important consequences, or however none favorable to Athens: yet Demosthenes, unable to boast of a trophy, did not fail of the utmost use that united eloquence and policy could make of the incidents. The Bœotian troops held still considerable reputation in Greece, and were considered as formidable for their discipline as well as their valor: but Athenian citizens, accustomed for generations now, to avoid actual service, and usually finding from.

Demos. de cor. p. 300.

party-leaders, or commanding for themselves, indulgence for neglect of discipline and practice of arms, had lost much of their antient estimation. To infuse therefore among them a confidence in themselves, and restore, if possible, somewhat of former opinion of them among others, he assured the assembled people, anxious for information, that their troops had gained high credit among their allies, both for discipline and valor. The people were gratified with the flattery; and, so the influence of the party prevailed, the meritorious deeds which apparently would not bear a detailed report, were celebrated by public processions, and thanksgiving sacrifices. Of this prostitution of honors the party of Phocion showed their opinion by avoiding to attend the ceremonies. The war-party revenged themselves by imputing such conduct to disaffection toward the commonwealth, and especially, where possibly the imputation might not be wholly ungrounded, toward the democracy. SECT. III.

SECTION IV.

Repetition of Proposal from the King of Macedonia for Peace. Authority of Demosthenes at Athens and at Thebes: Final Determination for War. Preparations during Winter: Battle of Chæroneia.

It does not appear that Demosthenes himself could state any preparation made, even now, by Philip, for that offensive war against Athens, on which he had been so long declaiming as that prince's purpose. On the contrary, considering the open violence of the war-party, there may seem to have SECT. IV.

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been forbearance even beyond prudence; unless Philip, reälly desirous of maintaining the peace of Greece, hoped to succeed through recovered prevalence of the party of Phocion and Isocrates at Athens. Had Isocrates been his adviser and principal minister, his conduct could scarcely more have corresponded with that venerable patriot's published admonition. As general of the Amphictyonic confederacy, it was his especial business, in the spirit of the Amphictyonic institution, to be the peace-maker of Greece. Accordingly, notwithstanding all provocations received, he did not let the season of military rest pass without renewing assurances, to the Athenian and Theban people, of his desire still to avoid extremities. Nor did his proposals fail of exciting much interest among both. The contest of oratory, insuing at Athens, was vehement. The principal opponent of Demosthenes, according to Plutarch, was Phocion. But every popular passion, desire of gain, desire of power, love of adventure, all was in favor of the war-party cause, except fear. To obviate fear, therefore, and to excite desire, Demosthenes exerted all his powers. 'Apprehension,' he told the people, 'on their 'part was groundless; for all Philip's peaceful 'professions only proved his fears. On the con-'trary, with them hope might reasonably soar high; 'for, while provision had been made for the secu-'rity of Attica, such that any apprehension was 'even absurd, a combination of force had been 'prepared, sufficient to give promise of success the 'most beneficial and glorious.'

Plut. vit. Phoc. p. 748.

Demosth. de cor. p. 301.

The superiority obtained by Demosthenes, in this contest, placed him in a situation very flattering for an ambitious mind. With the eyes of all Greece upon him, he was at the head of one of

the causes which divided that unhappy country; the cause (whether properly of democracy, the sanction given to the bondage of the Bœotians under the Theban people, should perhaps make doubtful, but) of democratical empire. In Athens, through the circumstances in which he had involved his party, his abilities were so necessary to the other chiefs, that they hardly dared refuse him their support for anything. Æschines seems, not unaptly, to have called it 'a dynasty that he had 'formed for himself.' 'Such was his power,' said that orator, speaking, some years after, to the Athenian people, 'that here upon the bema, he 'ventured to tell even you, that he would go 'whither he pleased on embassy, tho you should 'not appoint him; and he threatened the generals, 'that, if any of them opposed his measures, he 'would move a decree for giving rank and au-'thority to the orators on the bema above the 'board of generals.' Demosthenes, in his reply, rather gloried in these imputations than denied them.

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Æsch. de cor. p. 536.

Demos. de cor. p. 301.

The Athenian Many, then, bold behind the brazen rampart of allies which Demosthenes boasted of having raised around Attica, refused all treaty with the king of Macedonia. But the Thebans, exposed to the first attack, and sore still from the evils of the Sacred war, so shrunk from a renewal of similar sufferings, that a decree passed their assembly for taking the proposals into consideration. Demosthenes was alarmed; if the Thebans yielded, all was lost; and he was reduced to the condition of a simple orator of Athens; probably in opposition to those who would hold the government. He hastened therefore to Thebes. The recent compact authorizing him to use his

Æsch. de cor.

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eloquence there, nearly as at Athens, the Theban people were summoned, and he addressed them. Flattering the war-party, he did not scruple violently to threaten the pacific, swearing 'by Minerva, that if any should dare to say peace ought 'to be made with Philip, he would himself seize 'him by the hair, and drag him for a traitor to 'prison.' Little as we know of the Theban constitution, the small addition to former information, which may be gathered from the implication of its government, in this crisis, with the Athenian, will certainly not tell in his favor. The violent arrogance of Demosthenes, forbidding freedom of speech to the Thebans in their own assembly, was successful: the Theban people voted as he required.

Æsch. de cor. p. 538.

This was a great triumph, but not a decisive victory. To complete the immediate purpose of the party, in addition to the refusal of negotiation for peace, measures must be taken for actual war. It was already the season for military action, and the energy of Demosthenes had provided that a body of Athenian troops was at Thebes, or in the neighborhood. Orders for its farther movements, while within Bœotia, should regularly come from the Bœotarcs, heads of the executive government of Bœotia, especially chiefs of the military department, and by the compact with Athens, managed under the direction of Demosthenes himself, to be consulted on all measures of the confederacy. Nevertheless Demosthenes, whether against their consent, or without communication with them, procured that the Athenians should march for the Phocian border. The Bœotarcs, surprized and offended, countermanded them. Consulting then at their own board, where neither popular elo-

quence could dazzle, nor popular passion interrupt them, they concurred, or at least a majority of them concurred, in dissatisfaction with the present state of things. Whether indeed comparing the immediate evils, and the final hazard, of the war they were provoking, with the advantages of the proposals for peace, to which the people had been persuaded to refuse consideration; whether the breach with their antient allies of Thessaly, with any advantages reasonably to be expected from their new alliance with their old enemies of Athens; whether the general moderation of the king of Macedonia, and the respect he had shown for the constitution and for the people of every state within his sphere of communication, with the arrogance of the Athenian orator, who assumed to himself to control their assemblies and supersede their own authority as first magistrates, there would appear much reason at least to pause, and look about them. Accordingly they came to a resolution, that the people should be again assembled, and the king of Macedonia's proposals again submitted to their consideration. SECT. IV.

A very extraordinary contest insued between the proper supreme magistrates of Thebes and the forein orator. It was evidently apprehended that a majority among the Theban Many, brought to a juster sense of their interest, and of what was due to the dignity of their government, would support their own first magistrates. Demosthenes was driven to extremity. Venturing so far as to call the Bœotarcs traitors to Greece, he concluded a most violent speech with declaring, that, 'if the 'Thebans, deceived by their leaders, so shrunk 'from the common cause, he would return imme-'diately to Athens, and move for an embassy to

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'Thebes, to demand a passage through Bœotia for 'the Athenian army, which would go alone against 'the common enemy.' Whether the Bœotarcs were, as Æschines says, frightened with the charge, or in whatever way induced or overborne, they yielded, and the resolution was decidedly and finally taken for war[9].

The war, thus now impending, was not properly of Macedonia against Greece, but of Greece divided within itself; nearly as in the Peloponnesian and Theban wars formerly, and recently the Phocian. The proper contingent of troops from Macedonia, as a Grecian state of the Amphictyonic league, it may be supposed had joined the Amphictyonic army; tho so much is not said by any antient writer. But it is strongly implied, among the orations of Demosthenes himself, that, beyond this, no Macedonian force had passed Thermopylæ. It was not Philip's way, the orator says, to bring his phalanx; he came attended with an escort of horse, and perhaps some light-armed foot, and he found other troops as he wanted them. The greater part of Greece, averse to the dominion of the Athenian and Theban people, or of Demosthenes, ruling in their name, had ingaged in that alliance with Macedonia, of which the Thessalians had given the first example; and Philip was chosen general-autocrator of the confederacy[10]. It was his business then,

Demosth. Philipp. 3. p. 123.

Diod. l. 16. c. 84.

Demosth. de cor. p. 295.

[9] The conduct of Demosthenes, as here related, having been stated by Æschines, in his presence, before the Athenian people, and not denied by him in his reply, stands on evidence far more certain than is often found for such matters in antient history.

[10] Ἀκούστε δὲ Φίλιππον, οὐχὶ τῷ φάλαγγας ὁπλιτῶν ἄγειν, βαδέζοντ' ἴσως βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ ψιλούς, ἱππέας, τοξότας, ξένους, τοιοῦτον ἐξηρτῆσθαι στρατόπεδον. Demosth. Phil. 3. p. 123. Ἡγεμὼν δὲ καὶ κύριος ἡρέθη Φίλιππος ἁπάντων. Demosth de cor. p. 295. Philip

during the winter, to assemble, from the confederated states a force sufficient for the support of their common cause. SECT. IV.

Meanwhile the exertions of Demosthenes, as prime minister of Athens and of Thebes, and principal director of the measures of their confederacy, appear to have been very great and very able. From the Eubœans, Megareans, Corinthians, Achaians, Corcyræans, Leucadians, and Acarnanians, he collected a mercenary force of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, exclusively of their civic troops, whose number is not stated. From the same people he obtained subsidies, the amount unknown, but probably not great, toward the expences of the war. In addition to these were the Bœotian civic heavy-armed, commonly reckoned about fourteen thousand, and the Athenian. In what numbers the Athenians were prepared for the field, or whether, since the defeat of their mercenaries in the Amphissian war, they had maintained any force of that description, is not said. Gathering however as we best may from the cotemporary writers (for the round statements of those of later ages are little to be trusted) the force at the disposal of Demosthenes, in the great contest for the empire of Greece, was of hardly less than fifty thousand men. According to Æschines, there was besides a large force of Arcadians reddy under willing leaders, if only nine talents, less than eighteen hundred pounds, which they either demanded

Demosth. de cor. p. 306.

Æsch. de cor. p. 633.

was elected commander-in-chief of the Greeks, but no mention is made of a Macedonian force. It seems to have sufficed him that he had, according to the historian, ingaged the friendship of so large a proportion of the Greek nation: Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς φιλίαν προηγμένος. Diod. l. 16. c. 84.

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as a bounty, or wanted to inable them to take the field, might have been advanced to them out of the Persian subsidy. This Demosthenes refused, while he appropriated to himself not less than seventy talents. Possibly however Demosthenes doubted the influence of the Arcadian leaders to secure the services of the Many, whom he might believe disposed rather to the Amphictyonic cause; and if the troops under Philip were only, as the historian says, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, he might think the forces, of surer fidelity, so ample for the occasion, that an addition of troops of less certain disposition, at any expence, might not be desirable[11].

Diod. l. 16. c. 84.

Demosthenes appears to have failed most in the choice of generals, to command the great army he had assembled. But very probably, with all the extravagance of power he sometimes assumed, he

[11] Æschines attributes the loss of another advantage also to the parsimony or corruption of Demosthenes: Οὐ δὶ ἔνδειαν μὲν χρημάτων; ἔστιν ὅτε πέντε ταλάντων, οἱ ξένοι τοῖς Θηβαίοις τὴν ἄκραν οὐ παρέδοσαν. De cor. p. 633. The learned annotator Wolf says to this, τὴν Καδμείαν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων κατεχομένην. (Note on Æsch. de cor. p. 633.) The learned annotator seems to have forgotten what he must have red in a preceding passage of this very oration, that the Cadmeia, so far from being held by the Macedonians was the very place in which Demosthenes himself principally held council with the Thebans, the place to which, in the phrase of his adversary, he had transferred the powers of the democracy of Athens, καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἅρδην ἔλαθεν ὑφελόμενος, καὶ μετήνεγκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, κοινωνίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Βοιωτάρχοις συνθέμενος. Æsch. de cor. p. 535. To such mistakes the most learned may be liable, if they will undertake historical explanation without the previous trouble of historical investigation. For myself, I can hardly venture to say what ἄκρα may not have been intended by the orator, except the Cadmeia: but circumstances, as far as they have been transmitted to us, would rather lead conjecture to some fortified height of the Phocian border, the possession of which might have led to better success in the autumnal campain under Stratocles.

could not wholly put aside Chares, the patron who had principally opened the way for him to his actual eminence, and the beneficial patron also of so many others, that, with all his vices and failings, he was perhaps yet the most popular man in Athens. It was however provided that the command in chief should not rest wholly with one whose unfitness had alreddy produced so many misfortunes. In the preceding autumnal campain, Stratocles had commanded the Athenian troops. Lysicles now was joined in the command with Chares. But there was likely to be, among the Theban officers, who had served through the long war with Phocis, far more experience of the warfare of heavy-armed in the field, than among the Athenian; and it seems not improbable that a juster consideration of the great interests of the cause of his party, than Æschines would suggest, a view of the general deficiency of the principal Athenian officers, and of the particular impossibility of denying high command to Chares, assisted at least to induce Demosthenes to desire that, if a Theban did not actually hold the situation of commander-in-chief, yet in the council of war the Theban scale should preponderate. The nine talents also, saved by the denial of them to the Arcadians, might not be unwanted for the purposes of the campain.

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Diod. l. 16. c. 85.

Such a force, as Demosthenes had now assembled, the scanty funds of the Grecian republics could not long maintain: it must proceed to quick decision. Meanwhile Philip, persevering in his purpose of avoiding aggression, remained within Phocis, till the Athenians and Thebans were alreddy marching toward him. Then he advanced into

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the Bœotian plain, and took a station near the hostile garrison of Chæroneia[12].

7 July Ruald. vit. Plutarchi. c. 1.

Of the great and decisive battle that insued, no account remains that can give any satisfaction to the military reader. If any was extant even in the time of Diodorus, it unfortunately escaped that writer. Equally the king of Macedonia and his son Alexander, then a youth of eighteen, whom neither any cotemporary, nor his own historian Arrian, has mentioned to have been present, are described by Diodorus and Plutarch like heroes of the Trojan times, whose personal prowess, rather than the mind of the consummate general, directing the great machine under his command, produced the complete victory which followed. We have formerly observed Thucydides and Xenophon cautious of answering for personal actions in the tumult of battle, and rarely undertaking to report words spoken among individuals. Even how one, about whom universal curiosity would be so interested as Epameinondas, received his mortal wound, or what was his behaviour and conversation in the awful interval till his death,

[12] The narrative of Diodorus seems to imply that, before the contention of oratory between Python and Demosthenes at Thebes, the army of the Athenian confederacy had taken that station, near Chæroneia, which it occupied to the time of the decisive battle. But Diodorus, abridging greatly, and perhaps often writing from memory, not unfrequently manages narration so that it is difficult to guess whether he intends the reader should take what precedes or what follows as prior in time; and he still oftener omits, as here, to notice intervening transactions, necessary to connect the parts of his story. It is clearly indicated, by both Æschines and Demosthenes, that in the autumnal campaign, the Athenian and Theban forces were at Chæroneia, and as clearly that they were withdrawn before the meeting of Python and Demosthenes at Thebes. The Latin translator of Diodorus seems to have been aware of this, venturing to correct his author by giving, for ἐξήγαγον, the preterpluperfect *miserat*.

Xenophon, tho he must have conversed with many present in the field of Mantineia, has not presumed to say. But public orders, marches previous to a battle, ground occupied, what part of a line was first ingaged, what broken, what pursued, and what protected a retreat, we find them frequently reporting. On the contrary, concerning the battle of Chæroneia, writers of centuries after have undertaken to give, of the former sort much; of the latter, almost nothing. It is only generally said, and seems probable, that the contest was sharp. But of the result we have full assurance so far, that the victory of the Amphictyonic army was most complete. The Athenians acknowleged to have lost more than a thousand slain, and two thousand taken. Nevertheless the principal brunt of the action is said, and not improbably, to have been maintained by the Thebans. If then these, and the other allies, suffered only in equal proportion with the Athenians, the total loss must have been very great. What was not destroyed or taken was so dispersed, that nothing remained to obstruct the conquerors, whichever way they might direct their march.

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Demad. or. fragm. Diod. l. 16. c. 83.

SECTION V.

Consternation at Athens: Flight of Demosthenes: Condemnation of Lycicles: Generosity of Philip. Arrangement for Beotia. Liberality to Athens.

INFORMATION of the total defeat of the allied forces at Chæroneia produced, at Athens, consternation and tumult, such as might be expected where sovereinty rested with the multitude, and the unin-

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formed and improvident were not to take but to give orders; and this in a moment when great hope among them was suddenly disappointed, security, which they had been taught to believe complete, through the brazen wall of alliances of which Demosthenes had boasted, was wholly overthrown, and dangers, in kind and amount incalculable, were, as by the shifting of a scene, substituted in their view. Waste of Attica, siege of Athens, all the dreadful evils of ordinary Grecian warfare, would be, in their apprehension, but preludes of those unheard-of horrors, which the speeches of the war-party orators had represented as to be expected from Macedonian barbarism and cruelty. This agitation of the popular mind was, for those who had been leading the public measures, far more dreadful than the approach of the victorious enemy. Demosthenes had born arms at Chæroneia; whether, in confidence of success, smitten with ambition to claim military merit, or, after all his exhortations to others, ill able to excuse himself from that common duty of all citizens. Escaping in the general flight, he did not scruple, for safer haste, to disgrace himself by abandoning his shield. Under all circumstances he would not venture to show himself in Athens: he went to Periæus, got aboard a trireme, and, with the authority which he could assume, or, from his friends in office, obtain, he put to sea, under pretence of going on duty, necessary in the urgency of the republic's affairs, to collect, among the islands, tribute or loans for the treasury.

Æsch. de cor. p.545.

Chares remained, apparently the most obvious object for popular indignation. But the whole party were in danger; and, had the party of Phocion come forward with the common temper and

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common views of Grecian party, or of party in general, Chares and his associates could hardly have avoided ruin. But Phocion and his friends, with their usual regard for the general good, and perhaps over-scrupulous fear of appearing to press any separate interest, gave their attention rather to remedy the evil situation of public affairs, than to punish the authors. Yet that the popular anguish would be assuaged, and the resulting anger appeased, without some signal sacrifice, was hardly to be hoped. With admirable policy then, the party of Chares resolved to profit from the apparently extravagant liberality of their adversaries, by hastening to take the invidious business of crimination into their own hands. Thus they gained at once two great points: they could chuse the victim; and they preserved the advantage, which otherwise, for a time at least, they must have wholly forgone, of appearing still to hold a lead in public measures, and even in popular measures.

Lycurgus, an orator of celebrated talents, was famed, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, for virtue generally, but especially for the integrity with which, during twelve years, he administered the business of the treasury. Possibly however it was only some branch of the treasury-business; or otherwise his fame must have rested upon his party; for every older testimony shows the general business of the treasury to have been most scandalously mismanaged. Lycurgus however was certainly, as an oration remaining from him assists to prove, a most zealous advocate for the high democratical cause[13].

Diod. l. 16. c. 88. Plut. v. orat.

[13] Wesseling, after the usual temper of the lettered of the continent, warm in zeal for the honor of so keen an asserter

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Of Lysicles, the collegue of Chares in the momentous command at Chæroneia, mention is found, among antient writers, only in regard to that command and his fate which followed. Probably he had earned reputation as an officer, but was little important to the party, as a man versed in politics, or of any popular interest. It was resolved that Lysicles should be the victim, to be sacrificed for the safety of the rest of the party, and that Lycurgus should conduct the prosecution. Athenian justice, we have seen, was commonly quick, and not always very formal; of which the death of Lycidas, in what are called the virtuous times of the republic, and the massacre of his family, will, among other things, be remembered in proof. No crime appears to have been alleged against Lysicles, but that he had commanded unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, being told by the prosecutor, that 'he ought to be asham-ed to live' (tho why more than Chares, unless as far the less practised sinner, is not at all indicated,) the people condemned him to die, and he was executed. Whatever may be thought of the morality of the party of Chares and Demosthenes, whatever may be thought of their patriotism, their policy must be admired. The death of Lysicles had evidently all the effect proposed from it. The popular rage was quieted, and the way was kept open for the party to come forward still in the ge-

Ch. 9. s. 2. of this History.

Diod. l. 16. c. 88.

of democratical principles, would correct Diodorus from Plutarch; who, in the lives of the orators, gives fifteen years to the ministry of Lycurgus; and he would reckon a decree of the Athenian people, there quoted, complete proof of Lycurgus's high merit. Such a decree, the reader who has followed Grecian history will be well aware, proves the prevalence of the party with which Lycurgus was connected when the decree passed, and his eminence in that party, but nothing more.

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neral assembly on public business as they might see convenient.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia's conduct, after his great victory, was consonant to that high spirit of generosity and humanity, which had shone in him from the beginning of his reign. No pretence was taken, as by the Thebans, when they were at the head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, to mix the cause of religion with that of policy, for extending the purposes of either vengeance or ambition. Even that severity, constantly observed in the practice of the republics, to compel the defeated to the humiliation of a formal acknowlegement of their defeat, by a herald soliciting the bodies of the slain, was studiously avoided. Information, that the bodies were at the disposal of their friends, was forwarded before heralds could arrive. Demades, an orator of the first eminence, was among the Athenian prisoners. Fragments of orations only remain from him; so that the style, as well as the estimation of his eloquence, may best be gathered from what we are told was said in his day, that Demosthenes was the orator made for the actual state of the Athenian republic; Demades was above it. The Athenian people, amid the severest anxiety and apprehension, deputed Æschines, as a person likely to be acceptable to the conqueror, to learn his purposes, and obviate, as far as might be, his just resentment. But, before Æschines could arrive, Demades had not only received his own freedom, but was authorized to assure the Athenian people, that the king of Macedonia had all friendly disposition toward them. As soon after then as conveniently might be, all the Athenian prisoners were released. Some, perhaps most, were deficient in common

Demad. or. fragm.

Demosth. de cor. p. 319, 320.

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clothing; for which the panoply would be an awkward substitute, and prisoners of war would be of course to be deprived of this, as appertaining to their arms, and a portion of them. Philip generously directed a supply of clothing to all.

From the field of battle the victorious army proceeded to Thebes. Bœotia was so powerful among the divisions of the Grecian people, and so critically situated for giving either protection or annoyance, readily and extensively, among other states, that to establish there a sure preponderance of the party friendly to the Amphictyonic confederacy and the peace of Greece, was most especially necessary to the welfare of the whole alliance. The modern reader, especially the English reader, may have difficulty to imagine a worse constitution than that of Athens, in this age, with all its advantage of Solon's laws, has been described; yet it seems probable that the constitution of Thebes was greatly worse. The government of Thebes had been changed, not gradually, as that of Athens, but by a rapid and violent revolution, and without any such intervening advantage as that of the legislation of Solon, from a mixed aristocracy, to nearly a pure democracy. Under this ill-defined government of their own, the people of Thebes claimed a democratical dominion over the people of the other towns of Bœotia, to which their aristocratical government had allowed a more equal participation of rights. Moreover many Theban citizens were in exile. Probably many had found it adviseable to fly in consequence of the victory of Demosthenes, in the contest of eloquence with Python. Yet many less eminent men, friendly, with more or less zeal, to their cause, remained, and many always adverse to the alliance with Athens, and many rendered so by

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the ill success of the measure. These were ready to receive the refugees, who would not be unprepared to profit from the event of the battle of Chæroneia. Altogether the Athenian party in Thebes found themselves so weakened, and their opponents so strong, that no opposition to the reception of Philip was attempted. The government of course passed into the hands of the Macedonian party. Bœotia then was emancipated. The subjection of its people to the dominion of the Theban people, confirmed by the treaty of alliance with Athens, managed by Demosthenes, was abolished, and the more liberal system of the Bœotian confederacy was restored. All the Theban, as well as all other prisoners, made in the battle of Chæroneia, were released without ransom. The common expedient of the Grecian republics to provide tranquillity and safety for the victorious party, driving the disaffected into banishment, sometimes to the amount of nearly half the population, was avoided. That it might not be necessary, the Cadmeia was occupied by a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, probably mercenary, or standing, forces. That any Thebans were banished, that a single individual suffered in person or property, is not said by any writer of better authority than Justin: Plutarch evidently knew nothing of it; nor is anything found to the purpose, among all that remains concerning this critical period, from the hostile pen of Demosthenes.

Bœotia being thus assured to the Amphictyonic confederacy, liberality might be more safely extended to Athens; and Philip proceeded to show a liberality, which, in its day, excited the admiration of Greece, and became, apparently with the greatest reason, a lasting theme of eulogy. Few princes

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have ever had the opportunity to exhibit magnanimity and generosity like that now before Philip, and none known to history ever did equally show it. Punishment against his illiberal revilers, authors of so much trouble and so many dangers to himself, and of so many evils to others his friends, being at his command, he not only demonstrated to the world the falsehood of their continual assertions to his disadvantage, but disappointed even their own expectation, after all their experience, of his forbearance. When they were in power, he had recommended to the Athenian people to dismiss them, and commit the direction of public affairs to better men; that the awful crisis, now so alarming, might be prevented. Fallen as they were, he did not even mention them. As soon as it was known at Athens, from the report of Demades, that favor, beyond hope, might be expected, an embassy was appointed to wait upon him. Meanwhile he had caused the bodies of their slain to be burned, with the accustomed ceremonies of respect for deceased friends, and the bones to be placed on carriages, to be transported to Athens; and he committed the procession to the charge of his principal minister Antipater, whom he also appointed his ambassador to the Athenian people. So far then from proposing any harsh conditions, he freely offered renewal of peace and alliance upon the former terms; but, farther, in manifestation of his disposition, as general of the Amphictyons, while he favored Athens, to maintain the antient order of things, and, as far as depended upon him, to do impartial justice between state and state, he procured the restoration to the Athenian republic of its town and territory of Oropus, which in spite of the solicitude, and in contempt of the power of the Athenian people, had been so long held by the Thebans.

SECTION VI.

Persevering Scrupulousness of the Party of Phocion. Return of Demosthenes. Funeral Oration for the Slain at Chæroneia. Third Letter of Isocrates to Philip.

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To suppose Philip without a political object, in this liberal conduct, were to suppose him unworthy to be king of Macedonia, and still more unworthy to be general-autocrator, supreme head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, or to have the illustrious Athenian patriots, Phocion and Isocrates, for his friends. What his expectations may have been, is not at all indicated in remaining accounts. Among them, however, no doubt, was to increase his popularity in Greece, and in this he did not fail: but if he hoped in any degree to gain the adverse party in Athens, who owed every thing to his liberality, certainly he was most completely disappointed.

We are without information of any particulars of the conduct of Phocion and his friends: but it appears that their moderation and scrupulousness, emulating the king of Macedonia's liberality, were excessive. The party of Chares, in consequence, began presently to look about them with renewed hope. Their defeat at Chæroneia, they saw, was not followed up, as they expected, to the utter extinction of their former prospects: they were not compelled, as so many of their betters had been, in better times of the commonwealth, to seek their safety in flight: they were not reduced to a condition, ordinary in the contentions of party among the republics, below that of any other citizens; none of their former legal rights were denied them. Meanwhile the power of the republic not only remained

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unimpaired, except for the loss of a few lives, which the course of a year or two, bringing boys to manhood, would recruit, but, beyond all hope, increased with the restoration of the town and territory of Oropus. Its comparative importance, among the Grecian states, was even greatly increased, by the depression of the power of Thebes, through the emancipation of the Bœotian towns. But, what was to them far more important, the constitution stood untouched, with all its convenient vices, by which they had risen to power; and nothing seemed to deny them hope, with diligent use of opportunities, again to rise.

Æschin. de cor.

A fortunate occurrence (so, without more explanation, Æschines has described it) afforded opportunity for Demosthenes to return to Athens without meeting popular indignation. It is evident that the large party with which he had been connected, tho there were able and celebrated orators among them, felt now not less, but perhaps even more than before, the want of his various superior talents, to direct their measures, and restore their fallen cause. Shortly after his return he was put forward as candidate, to be elected one of the commissioners of a board, for carrying into execution the terms of the peace. In this he failed. But neither himself nor his party were so discouraged. They presently resolved upon a bold measure, singularly calculated to distress their opponents, and give some new life to their own faded popularity. They proposed, in the general assembly, that those slain at Chæroneia should be honored with a public funeral, as antient custom prescribed for citizens falling in battle for their country. The rigid scrupulousness of Phocion and his friends seems to have afforded such opportunity for incouragement to the multitude,

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formerly at the heels of Chares, and desiring still his profitable patronage, that they were obliged, or thought themselves obliged, to let this motion pass without opposition. An orator was then to be appointed to speak the funeral panegyric. It was not an office for Phocion or his friends, who had totally disapproved the war. Thus Demosthenes was left to be chosen, according to his own boast, in preference to Æschines, Demades, Hegemon, Pythocles, and all others of their party.

Demos. de cor. p. 320.

An oration has been transmitted among his works, as that which he spoke on the occasion. Some doubts about it have been entertained by some eminent critics, not however agreeing in their objections; and whatever partial injuries it may have sustained, in publication and transcription, the admirable ingenuity with which it has been adapted to the difficulties of the orator's actual situation, and to the necessities and purposes of his party, in their depression and difficulties, speak strongly and perhaps unanswerably to its general authenticity. In the outset he soars into fabulous antiquity; with the same view, apparently, as Isocrates has often resorted to the same artifice, to lead away the minds of his hearers from party-distinctions, which now it was as much his business to blend, as formerly to widen. Winding then, rapidly down, through the Persian wars, to the immediate objects of his speech, he connects his subject, by observing how those, whose fall he was to celebrate, resembled the heroes, so universally admired, of whom he had before been speaking. He then checks his course to remark, that he was aware of difference of political sentiments among his auditory; and he would offend none; for, no discourse, he observes, could have the desired effect, without some harmonizing

Demosth. or. funebr. p. 747. ed. Lutet. Morel.

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disposition in the hearer's mind. Nevertheless he affected to consider the numerous citizens, not of antient Attic blood, as those who alone could differ from him. Rushing then again into the midst of his subject, he proceeds, 'It will be said we were 'defeated: but in defeat these departed heroes had 'no share. Those who fall, on either side, are 'conquerors: the honors of victory are equally due 'to both. But look to the effect of these men's 'deeds. We owe to them that our country was 'not invaded. The very circumstances of the 'peace prove this. The lord of our adversaries 'was aware that the kindred of such men would be 'like themselves; and he chose rather to become 'their friend, than put all to hazard by farther con-'test.' Having thus boldly asserted, to the Athenian Many, that they owed nothing to his political opponents for procuring such advantageous terms of peace, and nothing to the conquering prince for granting them, he was aware that some softening was necessary. Eulogy of Philip, which he had not scrupled in some of his most adverse speeches, he would not scruple now; but he managed to put it rather into the mouths of others; and, while he gave praise due to the Macedonian king, he combined with it flattery and instigation to the Athenian people. 'Let those who fought against us,' he says, 'be asked, and there is not one but will avow, 'that not their superior military merit produced 'our defeat, but our incalculable hard fortune, and 'the skill, the daring courage, the superior mind 'of their commander[13]. And this must be evident 'to all, that the liberty of Greece existed in the

Demosth. or. funebr. p. 748. Ed. Paris.

——Τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία καὶ τόλμη καὶ ψυχῇ. 95. Reiske.

'souls of these men: they preferred a glorious 'death to a life of shame; and with them the dig- 'nity of the country has perished.' What next follows, with extraordinary ingenuity imagined and wrought, to win the attention and interest the fancy of the actual auditory, will be felt by the reader of aftertimes, only in proportion as his imagination may place him in the circumstances of the lower classes of Athenian citizens. It is a catalogue of the wards of Attica, and the heroes, their supposed founders, Erechtheus, Cecrops, Ajax, and others; each name accompanied with a panegyrical apostrophë on their merits, most ingeniously varied through the long roll; with a reference to the congenial virtues and merits of those, their successors, in whose honor the actual ceremony was instituted. Hence is drawn, with great advantage, a consolatory exhortation to the parents and other relations of the deceased, with which the speech concludes [14].

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This funeral ceremony, under all its circumstances, appears to have been a triumphant measure for the party, and especially for Demosthenes. He no longer feared now to put himself forward again upon the bema. He proposed decrees to provide for the security of the city, by repairs of the fortifications and arrangements for the garrison, and those decrees were passed. He offered himself for an office, which seems to have been important, that of prividitor of the victualling of the city and he was elected. The effects of the victory of Chæroneia were, as far as the Athenian republic, standing by itself, was concerned, almost done away: the principal powers of government returned into the hands of the party of Demosthenes and Chares.

Demosth. de cor. p. 309, 310.

[14] Some remarks on this oration are, for more convenience, placed at the end of the section.

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The disappointment and disturbance insuing to the peace-party, from this reviviscency of the party of war and troubles, are indicated in the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip. In that letter Isocrates says, he had had much satisfaction in conversing with Antipater, who had been sent as minister to Athens after the battle of Chæroneia; but he proceeds to indicate that he thought the king had afterward rather neglected his friends in Greece. He reminds him that, through the event of that battle, all was in his power: he might, at his pleasure, carry into effect the great purposes of the Amphictyonic institution, compel any refractory republics to the maintenance of peace, and put an effectual check upon that mad ambition, which had produced such destructive contentions among them. He professes to consider Philip still as the only person capable of saving the country; and he urges the expedition to Asia, in which the restless might find employment to their mind, as necessary toward providing for the peace of Greece. So bent was he upon this, his favorite project, now, he observes, for a great number of years, that if extreme age did not absolutely disable him, he would not content himself with writing, but would wait on the king, to exhort him to the measure. The execution, he proceeds to observe, and justly, as events afterward showed, would be far easier, with Philip's present means, than the acquisition of his actual power and glory, with the strength of the distressed kingdom inherited from his ancestors. He concludes with an observation, which will appear extravagant to the modern reader, unless much observant of the ways of antiquity, that nothing greater could then remain for Philip, unless to be made a god. But for those of his age, even for

one of the general wisdom and moral rectitude of Isocrates, such a sentiment must not be estimated by the measure of the juster notions which Christianity, giving them to Mahometanism, has made the common feeling of men, now, so widely over the earth. The popular belief, among the Greeks, that Hercules, and perhaps others, from mortal men, had actually become immortal gods, may warrant the expression of Isocrates; which is modest in comparison of the vanity and flattery, not less absurd than immoral and impious, soon after beginning to prevail among the Greeks, and, after them, carried by the Romans even to greater extravagance [15]. SECT. VI.

[15] I have had occasion formerly to observe that some critics, of very respectable learning, have taken the fancy to slight Xenophon's indication of his own age, and to prefer testimony to it, very indirect, and everyway questionable, from writers living not till some centuries after him. It seems indispensable here to advert to the fancy of some other critics, also of respectable learning, to set aside the testimony of Isocrates to his own existence, and to reckon him certainly dead, at the time to which his letter, commonly intitled his third to Philip, is in the text attributed. In that epistle the name, Chæroneia, indeed does not occur; but the battle of Chæroneia seems as clearly indicated, as if the name had been added. Referring to his oration, formerly sent to Philip, and professing adherence still to the opinions there professed, the writer adds that, what he then proposed and recommended, was now in large proportion accomplished, *through the recent battle, by which the state of Greece was greatly altered.* This could apply to no battle but that of Chæroneia. After that battle then Philip sent Antipater (so Polybius assures us) as his minister to Athens. Isocrates accordingly, in his third epistle, expresses satisfaction at the large opportunity he had had for conferring with Antipater. It may then be added that, before that battle, the hyperbole, with which the epistle concludes, must have appeared extravagant, even to minds tinctured as those of the Greeks mostly were; but, after the battle, it would harmonize with popular notions.

But in the zeal of the schools, in following times, for the cause of Demosthenes and democracy, a story was propagated that Isocrates, oppressed with anguish at the view of the ruin

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brought upon the liberty of Athens and of Greece, by Philip's victory at Chæroneia, destroyed himself by a voluntary abstinence from nourishment. Dionysius of Halicarnassus has noticed the story, as if he desired it should have credit; but in wayfaring phrase only, so little circumstantial, that it might be difficult to report it after him, without help from the more explicit account in Plutarch's lives of the orators. It was however impossible to establish the credit of Demosthenes as a patriot, without invalidating either the character of Isocrates, or the authority of his written opinions, and especially of this letter. Against his character for honesty and true patriotism nothing has been ventured. His character for wisdom Rollin and some other moderns have questioned, on the modest supposition that they understood the interest of Athens and of Greece better than Isocrates and Phocion. But whatever may be thought of the judgement of Isocrates, nothing, among the politics of all antiquity, is clearer than the evidence in his extant writings that, for himself, his friends, his republic and all Greece, what he most dreaded was the success of the party of Chares and Demosthenes in the battle of Chæroneia. The story therefore of his destroying himself on account of the victory of his friend, the king Macedonia, is evidently an absurd fable; and yet it must be allowed, seeing the success it has met with, its propagators calculated well, what might seem not easy to calculate, the reception it would obtain from the understandings of some and the disposition of others, altogether a large portion of what has been called the republic of letters, through many generations, to late posterity.

The learned translator and editor Auger, in a note on the third epistle of Isocrates, makes this remarkable observation: 'De quo prælio hic agatur, non satis liquet: non de illo certe 'quod ad Chæroneiam fuit commissum, et post quod Isocrates 'statim e vitta excessit. Forte loquitur orator de pugna illa 'per quam bellum Phocicum confectum est.' Where the learned critic found an account of any battle by which the Phocian war was ended, he has not said, and I must own I cannot tell.

Concerning the death of Isocrates there remains notice from writers of high authority. The oldest that has fallen within the scope of my observation, is that of Cicero. That very eminent Roman lived near three hundred years after the illustrious Athenian. Writing a treatise upon old age, he mentions the death of Isocrates among instances of placid elderhood, quietly and desirably completed, in his ninety-ninth year: 'Est etiam quiete et pure et eleganter actæ ætatis pla-'cida ac lenis senectus:—qualem Isocratis, qui eum librum, 'qui Panathenaïcus inscribitur, quarto et nonagesimo anno 'scripsisse dicitur, vixitque quinquennium postea.' Cicero evidently either was uninformed of the story of the fatal anguish of Isocrates, or thought it unworthy of attention.

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Next is Dionysius of Halicarnassus, about half a century later, but within which half century a prodigious change had taken place in the situation of the civilized world, through the establishment of the Roman empire on the ruin of the Roman republic. Dionysius says that Isocrates died a few days after the battle of Chæroneia, at the age of full ninety-eight, 'having resolved that his life should end with the good 'days of the republic, while it was yet *uncertain how* Philip 'would use the fortune which placed him at the head of the 'Greeks.' Γνώμη χρησάμενος ἅμα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῆς πόλεως συγκαταλῦσαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον, ἀδήλου ἔτι ὄντος πῶς χρήσεται τῇ τύχῃ Φίλιππος, παραλαβὼν τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀρχήν. The expression of Dionysius here may seem to imply a violent death. How far it necessarily implies so much I leave to the learned to determine.

Philostratus wrote about a century after Dionysius, and he gives an account of the death of Isocrates thus: Ἀπέθανε μὲν οὖν Ἀθήνησιν, ἀμφὶ τὰ ἑκατὸν ἔτη. Ἕνα δὲ αὐτὸν ἡγώμεθα τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων· ἐπεισὶ μετὰ τὰ κατὰ Χαιρώνειαν ἐτελεύτα, μὴ καρτερήσας τὴν ἀκρόασιν τοῦ Ἀθηναίων παίσματος. Philostratus seems to have heard of no violence beyond the meer shock from intelligence of the event.

In the Life of Isocrates, attributed to Plutarch, but rather supposed of some other, not earlier, but rather later author, we find, at length, the story of the death of Isocrates grown into fuller size; the very words he spoke, of which there is no appearance that the earlier writers knew anything, being now reported; tho the whole bears still but an incongruous and uncertain shape. 'Isocrates died,' says that author, 'in 'consequence of intelligence of the battle of Chæronela, 'which was communicated to him in the palæstra of Hippo-'crates. Exclaiming, in the words of three verses from three 'detached passages of Euripides,

Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατὴρ,
Πέλοψ ὁ Ταντάλειος εἰς Πίσαν μολών,
Σιδώνιον ποτ' ἆρε Κάδμος ἐκλιπών.

'He abstained from food four days, and then expired; not 'bearing to see Greece a fourth time subjugated.' Proceeding through various other matters, then the author comes again to his death: 'Some say he died on the ninth day of his 'abstinence from food, others on the fourth, the day of the 'public funeral of those who fell at Chæroneia.'

On a view of this account, the questions occur, Did the learned writer mean to compare the aged orator's case to those of Danaüs, Pelops, and Cadmus, as if he was to expect banishment from the tyranny of the conqueror? or did he mean to compare Philip himself to those antient heroes, who came from afar and acquired honor with dominion in Greece?

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Has the expression, 'Greece the fourth time subjugated,' been intended to imply that, under the prior empire, successively of Lacedæmon, Athens and Thebes, Greece was as effectually subjugated as now under Macedonia? Or what should we take to be the value of that expression?

After all these four writers comes Suidas, who, following some author differing from all, reports that Isocrates reached his hundred and sixth year.

With the revival of learning, in Leo the tenth's age, was revived, and with new violence, the passion of its cultivators for the political principles of Demosthenes, which involved a desire to represent the great orator himself as a model of the purest patriotism, and to scandalize his great opponent, the king of Macedonia. But among denials to these purposes, two were glaring, and might seem insuperable; the constant connection of Demosthenes with a person of character so universally reprobated as Chares; and the opposition to Demosthenes, and connection with Philip, of two persons of characters so universally allowed excellent, as Isocrates and Phocion. Men of learning and ingenuity however had their resources; and among favoring circumstances may be reckoned, what has always been a great hindrance to the extension of Grecian litterature, its inaccessibility but through the medium of another dead language. In treating of the circumstances where the connection of Demosthenes with Chares would come in view, antient authority has been shoved aside or veiled; in treating of those where the opposition of Isocrates and Phocion to Demosthenes is most manifested, a step farther has been ventured, and antient authority has been boldly superseded by modern fancy. The probity and patriotism of Isocrates and Phocion, have, indeed, not been questioned; but, as before observed, it has not been scrupled to impute to them ignorance of the interest of their country, the modern sages modestly undertaking to know it better than they.

Such extravagances, whether resulting from misjudgement or artifice, have not equally obtained among our own fellow-countrymen. A note of Taylor's on a proposed correction of Æschines, by H. Stephens, both for the explanation it affords and the presumption it reproves, has so much merit, that I would not risk injury to it by giving it otherwise than in his own words. The passage speaks of generals συνεργοῦντες, 'acting in concert with,' some of the orators. On the word συνεργοῦντες Taylor says, 'Συνηγορεῦντες habes, mi lector, ex 'divinatione H. Stephani: quod nollem. Facilius enim fuisset 'et expeditius, immo levissimo clinamine a receptis deflexisset, 'proponendo συνεῦντες. *Sed ille genium et statum istius reipub-* 'licæ parum intellexit, cum ista scripserit. In civitate adminis- 'tranda Atheniensium, *Par hominum*, rhetor scilicet et impe- 'rator, quorum hic auctoritate et rebus gestis, ille lingua

'et ore, præcelluit, sibi invicem mutuas semper operas præ- SECT. VI.
'stabant:

Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀρ μύθοισιν, ὁ δ' ἔγχεϊ πολλὸν ἐνίκα.

'Huic rei abunde favet, & receptam Æschinis lectionem 'tuetur, insignissimus Plutarchi locus, de fraterno amore, 'quem exscribo:' Οἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑτέρας ὁδοὺς βαδίζοντες οὐδὲν ἀλλήλους ὠφελοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ βίοις χρώμενοι διαφόροις, τὸν τε φθόνον ἐκτρέπονται, καὶ συνεργοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις μᾶλλον, ὡς Δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρης, καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Εὔβουλος, καὶ Ἡγησίδης καὶ Ἀσωπόδωρος, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γεάφοντες, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοῦντες καὶ πράττοντες. P. 390. Reiske.

Leland has shown that, when he would venture to think for himself, he could sometimes think well; but he has given himself up far too much to his French predecessor in the history of Philip, Olivier, whose authority, quoted in his margin, appears even ridiculous, in company with the names of Thucydides, Xenophon, and the orators; and for the politics of Isocrates and Phocion, he does not risk any opinion of his own, but bows to Rollin, whom he has quoted at great length. It should however be observed, for the credit of the fellowcountryman of Rollin, the learned translator and editor, Auger, that, with his very abundant negligence and wildness, he has sometimes shown great fairness. With the ernest zeal of the continental lettered of his day for democratical principles, he will have Demosthenes a perfect patriot; yet at the same moment, with the spirit of a French gentleman of the old school, he admits, tho with professed regret, in a phrase, quoted in a former note, that the deficient probity of Demosthenes, in his private character, remained too clearly proved.

To return for a moment to Isocrates then, I will own myself satisfied with the testimony in his third epistle, that he outlived some time the battle of Chæroneia, and also with the testimony there, consonant to the whole tenor of his writings, that he rejoiced in the event, as favorable to what had been, for a long course of years, his views for the good of Athens and of Greece. For that then of which he could leave no account, I would give most credit to Cicero, and believe that, after a fortunate, and, as Cicero calls it, a placid elderhood (not without anxiety, the lot of all, but without great misfortune,) he died in the course of nature.

Some remarks on the FUNERAL ORATION of Demosthenes, too long for convenient insertion where the subject occurs in the text, may perhaps best find a place here.

In the epistle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Ammæus, the funeral oration of Demosthenes is twice mentioned; in one place, without any doubt expressed of its authenticity; but, in the other place, as what he desired to consider as spurious. On this the questions occur, Did Dionysius mean to speak of

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the oration, which has been transmitted to us as the funeral oration of Demosthenes, on the first occasion, or on the second, or on both, or on neither? I will venture to own my opinion that he meant it on both. On the first occasion he is considering the kinds, or genera, of orations, among which he reckons the funeral a distinct kind. Giving the names then of illustrious orators who had left examples of such, he mentions Demosthenes among them. It sufficed him, on that occasion, that a funeral oration was extant among the generally allowed works of that orator. But on the second occasion he is discussing the various merits of the extant works of Demosthenes. His particular opinion of the funeral oration would be then of course to be given. There then he says, not positively that the funeral oration is spurious, but that he was unwilling to believe it genuine; adding his reason in three epithets; he could not bring himself to think a composition so φορτικὸς, κενὸς, παιδαριώδης, as the funeral oration, could be the work of Demosthenes.

To appreciate this kind of criticism of such a work, so connected with, and necessarily to be influenced by, the politics of the moment, it may be expedient to consider what Dionysius was, and in what times he lived. Dionysius himself, and all other Greeks, and their fathers and grandfathers, had been living under Roman despotism. Possibly his youth might see the last convulsions of the Roman republic, when it most despotically commanded the civilized world; but no free government was ever within the scope of his conversation. Hence apparently that very limited direction of his mind to politics, which is seen in his judgement on Thucydides, and, still more remarkably, on Polybius. A learned, discerning and elegant litterary critic, he looked on the funeral oration with the eye of a litterary critic only, except as he shared in that theoretical zeal for liberty, and partiality for democracy, which were almost universal among the lettered under the Roman empire. Little allowing therefore for the extraordinarily difficult situation of Demosthenes, when he spoke the funeral oration, he was disappointed not to find the orator's usual torrent of eloquence, for which the subject might seem peculiarly to call. Hence his epithet κενὸς, the torrent's channel appeared to him, comparatively at least, empty. Equally he would allow little consideration for the arts necessary to obviate jealousy, while the orator endevored to conciliate the attention, not of his distressed party only, but of his audience as widely as might be, and convey, as by a fable, the meaning which could not prudently be delivered in plainer terms. Thus that large portion of the composition, which runs into fabulous antiquity, might earn, with Dionysius, the epithet παιδαριώδης. It is true that in no other of the extant orations of Demosthenes, episodical matter of that kind is found; tho with his cotemporary Isocrates it is very ordinary. But it

may deserve observation that in a decree, formerly noticed in the text, a decree on a most momentous occasion, that which immediately led to the battle of Chæroneia, this very artifice has been resorted to by Demosthenes himself. Such references to remote and fabulous times would be surely less generally congruous in a decree than in an oration. But the orator has evidently thought it for his purpose to give to that decree the style and effect of an oration; and with that view has introduced what would be there truly παιδαριώδης, if it was not suited, through the circumstances of the times, to produce an important effect. One part of the oration thus appearing, to the critic of the court of Augustus, childish, and the rest empty, the whole would of course become, with him, intitled to the remaining epithet φορτικός. SECT. VI.

Having ventured so far to declare my opinion of the criticism of Dionysius, on the supposition, which I think probable, that he had in view the oration in question, it will be the less necessary to add anything upon the far less authoritative opinions of Libanius and Photius, because they seem to have had little consideration among modern critics, who have generally avoided notice of any doubt about the authenticity of this oration. The learned John Taylor however is an exception to require some attention. And yet I must own the greater part of his objections, stated in his Lectiones Lysiacæ, appear to me futile. For why was an orator, proposing, with a political purpose, to amuse the Athenian people with a panegyrical catalogue of the several wards of Attica, to confine himself exactly to the order of the crier's roll? His intention evidently required a kind of poëtical freedom. What then is that 'authority of history,' which denies to the daughters of a prince of the fabulous ages, Erechtheus, the title, which the oration has given them, of Hyacinthids? And what is that other unspecified authority, on which the critic would contest, with Homer, the name of the mother of one, whose own name is not very familiar in Grecian history, Acamas? Any sophist between the times of Demosthenes and Dionysius, or even between Dionysius and Photius again, probably might have learnt the order observed by the crier in calling over the Attic wards, and the titles of the daughters of Erechtheus, and the name of the mother of Acamas, as well perhaps as Demosthenes himself, but surely as well as any modern critic; and a sophist, fabricating an oration, with the purpose of passing it for the work of Demosthenes, would be the more scrupulously attentive to such insignificant matters, clearly within his reach, as he must be conscious of his deficiency for many of more importance clearly beyond it. A sophist, also, of aftertimes, would be likely to be less heedful of the art, and caution so remarkable in the oration, and he would be especially desirous to give the torrent all the impetuosity, the failure of which so disappointed Dionysius. But hardly any sophist, of times when

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republics were no more, hardly Demosthenes himself, in a later age, could have so adapted his choice and arrangement of matter, or even his choice and turn of phrase, to those very critical circumstances of the moment, which Demosthenes himself, with Æschines, and Isocrates, and others, have laid open to us.

But Taylor has stated objection of another kind, in which I have found concurrence from some whose opinions on such subjects, as well as Taylor's, I respect highly. 'Multa præterea,' says Taylor, 'contra puritatem Atticam dicta, multa 'invenuste opposita.' Lect. Lysiac. p. 236, ed. Reiske. The first thing that strikes, in regard to these objections, is that they are not found among those of Dionysius: they are described by none of his three epithets. Nevertheless, not desiring that they should not carry all the authority that ought to be allowed to modern criticism on antient language, I will venture to offer some suggestions.

Considering the extraordinary circumstances under which Demosthenes undertook to speak the funeral oration, which he certainly did speak, it seems likely that he would think it not prudent for himself to publish in writing what he did so venture to speak. But an oration on such a subject, delivered under such circumstances, by Demosthenes, would be, in its day, an object of the most extensive curiosity: it would hardly fail to be published by some person, more or less perfectly; nor could such a publication be indifferent to Demosthenes. He would desire that the matter and arrangement should be such as might produce all the effect of his spoken oration; but he might rather chuse that the diction should be what he might deny. The Alexandrine library became afterward the great depository of the litterature of antiquity. Possibly the learned men who superintended that library, in collecting the works of Demosthenes, finding the diction of the funeral oration less perfect than could be satisfactory to them, yet thinking it otherwise fit to be received as a work of the great orator, may have ventured to polish some parts, leaving others untouched; whence might arise ground for Taylor's two objections, the 'contra puritatem Atticam dicta,' and the 'invenuste oppo-'sita.' Nevertheless, let some phrases be less graceful, and some less purely Attic, and even none from the pen of Demosthenes, yet the whole oration may have come from the age of Demosthenes, differing scarcely in substance, scarcely in arrangement, and perhaps little even in diction, from what he spoke.

SECTION VII.

Congress of Grecian States at Corinth. The King of Macedonia elected Autocrator-general of Greece for War against Persia. Preparations for War against Persia. Assassination of the King of Macedonia.

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While things were in this disturbed state at Athens, what was passing elsewhere in Greece we have scarcely any information. Some contention of parties however there would be everywhere. Among those republics, which had begun their connection with Macedonia by voting golden crowns and brazen statues to Philip, and inviting him to hospitality in their cities, and throughout the numerous states in whose forces he had trusted for opposing the armies of the confederacy managed by Demosthenes, there would still exist an anti-Macedonian party. But that party was so depressed by the result of the battle of Chæroneia, and so wanted a head capable of showing itself and openly offering patronage, that the winter passed without any event for the historian's notice. B.C. 337. Ol. 110. 4.

In the next spring, Philip, whether more stimulated by the instances of his Athenian friends, or by the ambition within his own mind, by views coïnciding with those of Isocrates, for the good of Greece, or of any interests of the Macedonian kingdom, or principally of his own power and fame, resolved to give up the glorious ease which, by his able and successful, but laborious and hazardous exertions, during near four-and-twenty years, he had at length brought apparently within his command, and to postpone the improvement of the kingdom which he had alreddy so advanced in ex- B.C. 338. Ol. 110. 4.

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tent and power, to the purpose of conquest in Asia. From the orators, beyond what has been alreddy stated from Isocrates, hardly anything remains to indicate either his purposes or his measures. The historian's account then, resting as we must upon it, will perhaps best be given as nearly as may be in his own words. 'Philip the king,' says Diodorus, 'incouraged by his victory at Chæroneia, by which 'the most renowned of the Grecian states had been 'checked and confounded, was ambitious of becom- 'ing military commander and head of the Greek 'nation. He declared therefore his intention of 'carrying war, in the common cause of the Greeks, 'against the Persians. A disposition to concur in 'his purpose, and to attach themselves to him as 'their chief, pervaded the Grecian people. Com- 'municating then with all, individuals as well as 'communities, in a manner to conciliate favor, he 'expressed his desire of meeting the nation in con- 'gress, to concert measures for the great object in 'view. A congress accordingly was assembled at 'Corinth. His explanation of his intentions excit- 'ed great hopes, and so produced the desired con- 'currence, that at length, the Greeks elected him 'general-autocrator of Greece. Great preparations 'for the Persian war were put forward, and the 'proportion of troops for every state to furnish was 'settled.'

Diod. l. 16. c. 89.

Successful as Philip thus was, in ingaging the Grecian republics to his purpose, it is nevertheless shown, by the same historian, that his power, acquired by the victory of Chæroneia, if reälly sufficient, was not used to prevent free debate in the congress. The measures were not carried without opposition; in which some of the Arcadian mem-

Diod. l. 17. c. 2.

bers distinguished themselves by their warmth[16]. But the majority of the Macedonian party appears to have been great. All was finally settled to Philip's satisfaction, so far that, presently after his return into Macedonia, he took preliminary measures, which were a decisive beginning of war with Persia. He sent his generals Attalus and Parmenio into Asia, in the historian's phrase, 'to give liberty 'to the Greeks;' the obvious meaning of which is, that the force was sent to incourage and support revolt against the Persian dominion. SECT. VII. Diod. l. 16. c. 91.

Scarcely anything remains to us on the very interesting subject of Philip's administration within his own kingdom. Numerous anecdotes of his private and domestic life have been transmitted; but mostly by writers ignorant, or careless of public transactions, which, in their day, were open to the knowlege of all who would observe and inquire, yet bold to relate secret affairs, of which whether they were reäl or not few could tell, and rarely even the few who knew would tell any truth. It seems however too well ascertained that he was not fortunate in his nuptial connection. Tales of private vices, whether of the wife or of the husband, are less objects for the historian than for the anecdote-writer; a description of men beginning to abound in Philip's age, and long continuing under the Roman empire, Plut. vit. Alex. p. 669.

[16] Diodorus says, the Arcadians alone opposed the king of Macedonia's purposes. We learn however from much higher authority, that the Arcadians were much divided, and that a large proportion of them was most zealous in the Macedonian party. Diodorus seems to have followed, in this part of his narrative, an anti-Macedonian writer, who, according to what we have before noticed to have been the common practice of Grecian party-writers, would call the Arcadians of his party 'the Arcadians,' as eminently, and, in his politics, almost exclusively such.

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who, in proportion to the grossness of their imputations against exalted characters, and the confidence with which they asserted what, if none could confirm, few could refute, excited extensive curiosity, and made their business lucrative. It may suffice here that the temper of the queen, Olympias, is, with probability, said to have been irascible, suspicious and vindictive. After long disagreement, Philip repudiated her, and married Cleopatra, daughter of one of the most eminent men of his court and kingdom.

Plut. ut ant.

Olympias, beside one son, Alexander, had borne him one daughter, also named Cleopatra. After his return from Corinth his new queen brought him another son, and soon after that event he gave his daughter in marriage to her uncle, Alexander, king of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was usual as we have formerly observed, among the northern principalities, tho not peculiar to them, among the Greeks, wherever means were not wanting, to be splendid in festive ceremony on such occasions. Philip seems to have proposed to use the opportunity for advancing his alreddy great popularity among the Grecian republics, by uncommon splendor and a magnificent hospitality. He invited from every city some eminent men, omitting none who were personally known to him or to any principal persons of his court. Among the entertainments the theatrical, so especially the delight of the Greeks, were provided with care; the most celebrated actors and musicians being ingaged from all parts. For the ceremony, not Pella, but Edessa, or Ægæ, the antient capital of the kingdom, was chosen. The festivity was very numerously and most respectably attended; not only eminent individuals coming from all parts of Greece, but depu-

Diod. l. 16. c. 91.

tations from the principal cities, even from Athens, bringing congratulations in the name of their communities, accompanied with the present, which was become common on great occasions, of a golden crown. In the midst of this joyful solemnity, as Philip was entering the theater, Pausanias, a young Macedonian of high rank and great connections, stabbed him, and he fell dead. The assassin, flying toward a horse prepared for him, was overtaken while mounting: and by a stroke, whether necessary to prevent his escape, or urged by the ill-judging vengeance of the pursuers, his life was instantly ended. SECT. VII.

The possibility of gathering anything from him who best could tell, being thus precluded, various stories were circulated of the provocation to this atrocious deed; some most disgusting in their tenor, all improbable in many of the asserted circumstances, and altogether confuting oneanother by their disagreement. In one improbable assertion only they mostly concurred, that it was simply the private revenge of the individual; but this was contradicted by the only account of any known authority, which ascribed it to the base policy of the Persian court. In uncertainty thus of the reality, public suspicion of course was busy, and several exalted characters were involved; the divorced queen Olympias especially; and the prince Alexander did not escape the horrid imputation; which he endevored to repel, by asserting he had proof against the agents of the king of Persia.

Plut. vit. Alex. p.669,670: Q. Curt. l. 4. Arrian. l. 2. c. 14.

The always-avowed principles of Demosthenes, combined with his political relations, and his public conduct, seem to have afforded no light ground for supposing that he was, in some degree, privy to the plot. Persia was still the ally of Athens, and

Æsch. de cor. p. 468.

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Demosthenes was the orator principally employed, as agent of the Persian court for public communication with the soverein people, and for the management also, it is said, of the distribution of money. He had, at the Macedonian court, apparently among the visitors at the celebrity, a confidential friend, Charidemus. From this man, by a special messenger, he received information of Philip's death sometime before any others in Athens. The people being assembled, he ventured upon a measure adopted to raise his importance among that numerous description of men on whose favor his power rested; he told them that Jupiter and Minerva, appearing to him in a dream, had given him assurance that Philip was dead; and this assertion he corroborated by an oath. When information of acknowleged authenticity afterward arrived, the people were again assembled. Demosthenes and the orators of his party then did not scruple to propose honor for the memory of the deceased assassin, such as formerly, by a decree of the Athenian people, had rewarded the living assassin of the king of Thrace; and they added a motion for performing the evangelian sacrifice, which, in better times of the republic, was the ceremony of thanksgiving, on receiving news of a great victory. The people decreed both the measures; and Demosthenes, tho he had recently lost his daughter, his only child, and custom, among the Athenians esteemed not only decent but sacred, forbad persons under such circumstances to show themselves but in mourning, put on a festal robe of white, and, with a crown of flowers on his head, made himself conspicuous at the ceremony[17].

Plut. vit. Demosth. p. 855.

Ibid. & v. Phoc. p. 749.

Æsch. de cor. p. 468.

[17] This story of the conduct of Demosthenes altogether might seem extravagant, but that, in his reply to Æschines, he

SECTION VIII.

Anecdotes illustrating the Moral and Political Character of Philip King of Macedonia.

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If ever, after the early age of Agamemnon, there was any fair prospect that the Greeks might become a united and happy nation, secure in person and property against oppression and disturbance from oneanother, and powerful to resist assault from forein nations, it seems to have been when Philip the popular king of a free people, was, by the apparently free and even zealous choice of a large majority among the republics, vested with that supreme military command, and with that superintending civil patronage, which had formerly been conceded to those who had shown themselves abundantly unfit to hold it, the Lacedæmonian, successively, the Athenian, and the Theban people. What was his plan for managing the intricate business, (for such a mind as his would not be without a plan) and equally, in the great undertaking, imposed with it, of war with Persia, what were his views, his premature death, and the deficiency of history, have deprived us even of foundation for conjecture.

But the very silence of antient writers, on some topics, is not wholly without indication of the spirit of his government. It is remarkable that, among

has avoided in any degree to contradict it. Even Plutarch's zeal for democracy and admiration of tyrannicide could not carry him so far as to give his intire approbation to the public measures. An ideä of gratitude due from the Athenian people to Philip, for his generosity after the battle of Chæroneia has struck him. Otherwise he appears to have reckoned all as it should have been

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all the abundant remaining invective against him, injury to the civil rights of the Macedonian people, or the purpose of it, is never imputed. In the few instances then in which we find it asserted that he interfered, with a strong hand, in the government of Grecian states, as, according to the imputation of Demosthenes, among some of the Thessalian cities, on inquiry it becomes evident that the violence has been that of one party of the Thessalians against another, rather than of Philip against any; for, to his lasting popularity, among a large majority of the Thessalians, testimony is ample. In Macedonia, the frequent contentions for the crown, necessarily disturbing individual security at the time, and preventive of public prosperity, nevertheless probably contributed to the preservation and improvement of general freedom. For policy would require competitors to vie in ostentation of regard for the constitution. To Philip, on his accession, such policy would be especially necessary. His three opponents were supported each by a forein power. His own cause rested wholly on the Macedonian people; and their attachment, which finally secured him the throne against a confederacy, otherwise apparently overbearing, appears to have attended him through life. Demosthenes has evidently been aware that it would be too much, even for his ingenious policy, to separate the interest of the Macedonian people from that of their king. Despairing of means to set them against him, he has reviled all together. Once we find him telling the Athenian people that the Macedonians were not reälly so attached to their king as was generally supposed. By this very expression he conveys the most unsuspicious assurance that Philip's general reputation for popu-

Demosth. Or. in epist. Philipp.

larity among his subjects was high. Nor could he, even on this occasion, assign a ground for the dissatisfaction of which he was desirous of impressing a belief, but the frequent calls of Philip upon his people for military service, which would interrupt their domestic injoyments.

Violent as the spirit of party was among the Greeks, it was but in the course of things that a prince highly, and perhaps in some instances extravagantly, the favorite of one party, was the object of the most rancorous libelling for its opponents. Demosthenes, in one of his early speeches, has endevored to obviate the extensively prevailing favorable opinions of Philip, by describing him as even contemptible; a daily drunkard, abandoning himself to amusements, the most frivolous at the same time and vicious, among companions the lowest and most unworthy; envious of superior merit, and driving it equally from his armies, from his councils, and from his society. But the orator seems to have found this bold experiment fail; for we find no instance of his repeating it. He would afterward call Philip faithless, cruel, a barbarian; but never more a drunkard, or the companion of fools: he would represent him as an object of fear and hatred, but never again of contempt. Sometimes he would even propose him as an example for the Athenians to emulate, and sometimes, for his united advantages of regal rank and universal talent, an example beyond their reach. His abilities he acknowleges were extraordinary, and his activity wonderful. He alone could unite in his own person the offices of king and minister, of treasurer and secretary, of general and soldier. Even in that very oration where he ventured to represent him as an object of contempt, he had

Demosth. Olynth. 2. p. 23.

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before been holding him out to admiration. 'The 'love of glory,' he said, 'is Philip's ruling passion. 'For this he yields to no fatigue; for this he will 'face any danger; preferring a great reputation to 'all the gratifications of pleasure, in quiet and secu- 'rity.' What led the orator to such contradiction seems not reddily imaginable. Whether then any occasional excess in the pleasures of the table, any less decorous amusements of the court, or any kind of extravagances of youth in power, may have afforded any degree of just ground for the scandal, alreddy noticed, following in the same speech, all remaining information is too doubtful and imperfect to give foundation even for any fair conjecture.

Demosth. Olynth. p. 22.

Athen. l. 6. c. 17. & l. 14. c. 1.

Among the extant obloquy of Philip, after that of Demosthenes, a story related by Diodorus may principally deserve notice, and perhaps not the less because the honest historian speaks of it as of doubtful authority; for so it marks the fame and popularity, in his time, of tales at which even his judgement revolted; and the probability is the greater that he gives it, as appears to have been sometimes his way, much in the very words of some earlier author. After the battle of Chæroneia, he says, Philip gave a feast, as was usual on occasion of a victory. Not rising from table till he had drunk to inebriety, his fancy led him then to go out among the prisoners, and joke with them insultingly on their misfortune. Among them was the Athenian orator Demades, who did not fear to reprove the victorious king, even while he was drunk. 'The story goes,' says the historian, 'that he said to him, "O king! fortune has put "it in your power to be an Agamemnon: are you "not then ashamed to act the part of a Thersites?" 'Philip, struck with the justness and elegance of

Diod. l. 16. c. 87.

'the reprimand, immediately changed his whole 'conduct. Throwing from his head the chaplet' (usually worn by the antients at their feasts) 'he 'put an end to the revel, applauded the man who 'had used such freedom, and received him ever 'after among the companions he most honored. 'Becoming then, through communication with 'Demades, familiarized with Attic graces, he dis- 'missed all the prisoners without ransom, and, 'wholly laying aside the pride of victory, sent 'ambassadors to Athens, to make peace and 'alliance.' It would hardly be supposed it could be a prince, who, according to accredited report, was bred under Epameinondas, Pelopidas and Plato, who certainly corresponded with Isocrates, entertained Leosthenes in his court, and Aristotle in his family, and having alreddy attained the mature age of forty-six, was acknowleged the man of the most informed understanding and the politest manners of his times, whose acquisition of the Attic graces, and of the humanity which produced (what does not appear to have been an Athenian practice) the free discharge of prisoners of war, is thus attributed to the accidental meeting with an Athenian orator. Had the historian himself been of less remarkable simplicity, it might seem with the purpose of exposing the preposterous vanity of the Attic schoolmen, under the Roman empire, from whom the story apparently originated, that he proceeds immediately from this tale to a more authentic exemplification of the Attic graces, by reporting the speech of the orator Lycurgus, in accusation of Lysicles, and the condemnation and execution of that unfortunate general. But Demades, as we have formerly observed, was of the most eminent orators of the party of Phocion and

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Isocrates, and most decided in opposition to the political principles and projects of the party of Demosthenes and Chares. The same spirit then which led to the fable making the victory of Chæroneia produce the death of Isocrates, seems to have led also to that which put reproof of Philip into the mouth of Demades; the purpose being to gain credit to the cause of Demosthenes and democracy, by infusing the opinion that men of the high characters of Isocrates and Demades were friendly to it.

Plut. vit. Or.

A story is told on the other hand, exemplifying the arrogance and levity of the character of the Athenian Many in that age. When it was announced to the prisoners, made at Chæroneia, that they were all free without ransom, presuming upon Philip's celebrated generosity, they accompanied their thanks with a petition that he would give them clothes to go home in. Philip said to those about him, 'These people seem to think we have 'been fighting for joke:' but he nevertheless gave what they asked for. And whether the account of their presumption be strictly true or no, his generous supply of their wants is satisfactorily confirmed.

Polyb. l. 9. p. 593.

Testimony is ample that, under Philip, the Macedonian court became the greatest resort of the polite equally and of the learned, in that age probably in the world. Aristotle did not refuse his invitation, as it is said Socrates did that of his great predecessor Archelaüs. His letter to that celebrated philosopher has been preserved, in all appearance with fidelity, by Aulus Gellius, whose remarks on the occasion may also deserve notice. 'Philip,' says that writer, 'tho almost continually 'ingaged in the business of wars and victories,

Aul. Gel. l. 9. c. 3. Ælian. l. 8. p. 16.

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'yet never was inattentive to polite learning, and 'the studies that adorn human nature. Many 'of his letters have been published, replete with 'elegance, pleasantry and sound sense. That 'which, on the birth of his son, he wrote to Aris-'totle, I think worth transcribing, because it is so 'adapted to excite parents to care and diligence in 'the education of their children.' Reporting then the letter first in his own language, the Latin, he proceeds to say, 'Philip's own words are these,' and he adds the original Greek, which may be rendered in English thus: 'Philip to Aristotle, 'greeting: I desire you should know I have a 'son born. Greatly I thank the gods for it; and 'yet less for the meer circumstance that I have a 'son, than because it happens in the age wherein 'you are living. I trust that, being put under your 'care and instruction, he will become worthy of 'his birth, and of the inheritance awaiting him.' It is here fully indicated that the king had not then to make his first acquaintance with the philosopher: they were alreddy in habits of communication, and it seems that Aristotle had alreddy ingaged himself to undertake the office proposed for him, of superintending the education of the child, who became afterward the great Alexander. Collateral evidence also is here afforded, tending to confirm the reports transmitted, of Philip's correspondence with Plato, Theophrastus and others, eminent in the philosophical schools of Athens. With Aristotle, as a native of Stageira, a Grecian colony on the Macedonian shore, he is likely to have had previous personal acquaintance. Aristotle however, it is certain, passed many years

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at the Macedonian court, in the office of tutor to the prince, Alexander.

The admiration which we find Cicero expressing of Philip's published letters, must assist to increase the regret that, excepting the one preserved by Gellius, all have been lost[19]. But, in an age when anecdote was in vogue, the words of a prince of such singular talents, and singular fortune, and so especially celebrated for quickness and pleasantry in conversation, would be likely to be observed and recorded. Numerous sayings, ascribed to him, have accordingly been transmitted. From Plutarch we have a collection of them, among those intitled his Morals; where fortunately instigation to go beyond authentic documents did not equally press as in his Lives. Words spoken, however, must always be liable to be incorrectly reported, and to receive different coloring from the interest, the feeling, the fancy or the recollection of different reporters. But, of those attributed to Philip, it is observable that liberality, generosity, gratitude, benignity, good temper, in extraordinary amount, are prominent features. Some are too good and too strongly indicate their origin from the occasion, to be, in any probability, wholly fictitious. Such are his celebrated compliments to his minister, Antipater, and his general, Parmenio. Having made his council wait one day for his coming, he

[19] Extant epistolæ Philippi ad Alexandrum, Antipatri ad Cassandrum, et Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus) quibus præcipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benevolentiam alliciant, militesque blande appellando deliniant.

Præclare, epistola quadam, Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum consectetur, &c. M. T. Cic. de Off. l. 2. c. 14. 15. Ernesti.

apologized on entering: 'I have overslept myself,' he said, 'this morning. But it is no matter; for 'Antipater was awake.' At another time, conversation turning upon the election of generals at Athens, 'The Athenians,' said Philip, 'are a for-'tunate people, who can find ten generals every 'year. For myself, in all my life, I could never 'find but one, Parmenio there.' SECT. VIII.

Plutarch, from whom we have these anecdotes, has shown himself so inclined to the reverse of flattery to Philip, that it can hardly be supposed he meant to report them favorably beyond the truth. But Athenæus, who has preserved some good and many curious things, among much ineptitude and much profligacy, wanting to swell a list of royal and noble drunkards, was fortunate enough, it seems, to find, in the historical memorials published by Carystius, one of Plutarch's anecdotes of Philip otherwise told, and in a way exactly to his purpose. We have alreddy observed it asserted by Demosthenes, to the Athenian people, that Philip was daily drunk. When the hour of revelling came, according to Athenæus, he used to say, 'Come let us drink: it is enough that 'Antipater is sober.'

Among the frequent calls of military business, and the increased variety and magnitude of the political affairs of the Macedonian kingdom, during Philip's reign, it would almost as little be possible, as, according to the better civil theory of modern times, it were little desirable, that the monarch should preside in the principal court of justice. Nevertheless, throughout antiquity, prejudice seems to have obtained in favor of the early system, and the execution of the judicial office by the prince in person. An old woman of Macedonia, it is said,

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having a cause in the king's court, urged Philip's personal attention to it; which he did not refuse, but excused delay, by alleging want of leisure. The woman, who may have been of high rank and large fortune, for antient language does not always distinguish such by title nor antient writers by description, provoked at length, replied, 'If you can-'not find leisure to do justice, cease to be king!' Again, it is said, an old woman pleading her own cause before him, he, with a mind always full, annoyed by the inanity of her lengthened narrative or inept arguments, ingaged in conversation with some one near him; upon which the woman indignantly exclaimed, 'I appeal!' Philip, surprized, said, 'Appeal! to whom?' 'From the king inattentive,' she answered, 'to the king giving just attention.' But this story also has been otherwise told, after the taste of Athenæus. Philip, it is said, went to preside in his court of justice after hard drinking; and, obviously affected by it, decided the cause. The old woman, against whom the judgement was given, in such case more justly indignant, tho in circumstances less likely to profit from her remonstrance, being asked to whom she would appeal? 'From Philip drunk,' she replied, 'to Philip sober.' But it is not said that the united stimulation of reproach and wine at all deranged Philip's temper; nor does there seem to be anywhere imputed to him the purpose of denying justice or stopping the course of law.

Among Plutarch's anecdotes, Philip's expression of gratitude to the memory of Hipparchus of Eubœa, is of a kind not likely to have been invented. Discourse turning upon the death of Hipparchus, some one observed that he died at a mature age. 'Mature for himself,' said Philip, 'but too early for

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'me; for it was before I could make him a just return 'for, the kindnesses he had done me.' Of similar character is the speech reported of him to Philon of Thebes, to whom he had had obligations in his early youth, for which, with the large means afterward within his power, he desired to make grateful recompense. Philon perseveringly refused everything. Philip, vexed at his pertinacity, yet giving him credit for his generosity, exclaimed, 'Why will 'you so mar my reputation for superiority in benefi- 'cence, by keeping me so much your inferior?' At the great Olympian meeting, it seems, amid the amusements, party would show itself; and, whether Philip had horses running, or whatever furnished the opportunity, aversion toward him, in some part of the numerous assembly, was expressed by hisses. The matter being afterward mentioned in his presence, some one observed, 'that it was extraordinary 'behaviour for the Peloponnesians, who were be- 'holden to him for important kindnesses.' 'O,' said Philip, 'we must not mind such things; for what 'would their behaviour have been if I had done 'them ill turns?' The malignant calumnies of the Athenian orators being mentioned before him, 'I 'reckon,' said Philip, 'that I have great obligation 'to the Athenian orators, for so compelling me to 'be careful of all I do and say. It must be my 'business, by my whole conduct, to prove them 'scandalous liars.' After the battle of Chæroneia, when measures were to be taken for profiting from the victory, and giving secure repose to Greece, some of the more violent party-men suggested, that garrisons might be put into the citadels of the adverse states, and so their quiet obedience would be insured. 'Such harsh measures,' said Philip, 'might perhaps be most certainly effectual, but I

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'prefer the reputation of being beneficent to that of 'being powerful.'

Seneca de ira, c. 23.

Consonant to these from Plutarch, is an anecdote related by Seneca, in his treatise on Anger. In the distress of Athens, after the battle of Chæroneia, occasion requiring a mission to the king of Macedonia, Demochares, one of the coarse popular orators, was appointed, with Demades and some others of a different character. What they were instructed to desire was reddily granted; and when they were taking leave, Philip politely asked, 'If there was 'anything more he could do for the Athenian peo-'ple? Democharés abruptly answered: 'Yes, hang 'thyself.' Indignation broke out among those around, and among his collegues mixed with alarm. But Philip calmed them, saying, 'Let him alone; 'and only assure your fellowcountrymen that those 'who use such petulance are far less disposed to 'peace and moderation than he who forgives it.'

The extreme profligacy, among the Grecian republics of his age, to which we have observed Demosthenes himself giving the most direct testimony, is very likely to have furnished occasion for a saying attributed to Philip, which seems to have been a favorite among antient and modern writers; some fortress being spoken of as impregnable, 'Could not 'an ass,' said Philip, 'laden with gold, get into it?'

What he may himself have done by force of gold, must ever remain, as formerly has been observed, utterly uncertain. On the other hand, that Demosthenes was the agent of Persia for the distribution of gold among the Grecian republics, in the cause adverse to that of which Philip became the patron, seems fully ascertained, by his own omission to answer Æschines on that subject; and it may seem likely that he would be occasionally met with his

own weapons. But his assertion simply, obvious as the interest is which would urge him to it, cannot reasonably be allowed more weight than the denial of Philip himself, with expressions of magnanimous scorn, in his celebrated letter to the Athenian people. As far indeed as may be gathered from documents bearing any appearance of impartiality and authenticity, Philip's passions and his policy would both be rather adverse to such a mode of succeeding in his projects. He who, with all his military power, all his military talents, all his personal courage, all his military successes, and all his desire of glory, still professed to prefer conquering by his talent for popularity and persuasion, could surely have no equal gratification in conquering by secret corruption. Nor does it seem easy to discover his want of it. On the contrary, if we should trust his own declaration of his sentiments, as they were expressed and urged, not only in his public letter to the Athenian people, where his own testimony in his own favor will of course be liable to exception, but in written advice to his son Alexander, (and it is to Cicero's approving admiration of them we owe the account) they were very adverse to such a policy. SECT. VIII. M. T. Cic. de Of. l. 2.

Some modern writers, admitting, not only the liberal words, but also the generous deeds ascribed to Philip, have not simply followed the adverse orator, but outgone him, in imputing all to sinister purposes. The policy, for the orator, is obvious; the fairness, or the reasonableness, for his followers, not so; unless they would avow themselves careless of the praise of good, and the reproach of evil deeds, the credit of which such practice goes directly to confound, and indeed to make all virtue among men suspicious and doubtful. Its

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evil tendency, both in morality, and in politics, is glaring.

It has been liberally observed, by some French writers, to the credit of the English character, that, tho nowhere party contentions have been more continual, or civil wars more frequent than in England, yet nowhere has the violence of such contest been equally kept within the bounds of reason and humanity. Nevertheless, even in England, the violence of party divisions led the excellent Addison, not writing with party but with moral and philanthropical purposes, to some observations which, as applicable wherever party rages, and not least to Greece in Philip's age, may well deserve notice here. 'A furious party 'spirit,' he says, 'even when under its greatest 'restraint, breaks out in falsehood, detraction, and 'calumny: it fills a nation with spleen and rancor, 'and extinguishes all seeds of goodnature, com- 'passion and humanity.—A man of merit, holding 'different political principles, is like an object seen 'in two different mediums, that appears crooked 'or broken, however straight and intire it may be 'in itself. For this reason there is scarce a person 'of any figure in England, who does not go by two 'contrary characters, as opposite to oneanother as 'light and darkness.—There is one piece of so- 'phistry practised on both sides; and that is the 'taking any scandalous story, that has ever been 'whispered or invented, for a known undoubted 'truth, and raising suitable speculations upon it. 'Calumnies, that have been never proved or often 'refuted, are the ordinary postulatums of these in- 'famous scribblers, upon which they proceed as 'upon first principles, granted by all men; tho in

Spectator, N° 126.

'their hearts they know they are false, or at best 'very doubtful.' SECT. VIII.

An exemplification occurs in a debate before a congress in Greece, reported by Polybius, in which the character of Philip king of Macedonia is introduced. One orator begins with stating, as a manifest truth, on which he might safely found his reasoning, without danger of contradiction, that Philip, beginning with the Thessalians, reduced Greece to servile subjection. His opponent replies, as confidently, that Philip was notoriously the vindicator of the liberties, of Thessaly especially, but of all Greece. The former, in proceeding with his argument, unable to deny Philip's magnanimous liberality to Athens, after the battle of Chæroneia, nevertheless, with the malignity of party-spirit, so justly reprobated by Addison, denies him all credit for virtuous purposes: the will, he asserts, was bad, tho the deeds were all beneficent and praiseworthy. For better foundation, however, for invective, he hastens from Athens to seek evil deeds elsewhere; and in Laconia, he says, lands were wasted, houses demolished, and even towns and territories taken from Lacedæmon, under Philip's direction. But even here the admission follows, that those towns and territories were not taken by Philip for himself, but given (or, perhaps, rather restored) to the Argians, Tegeans, Megalopolitans, and Messenians; and toward all these, it seems allowed, Philip's purposes, as well as his deeds, were beneficent. The other orator then replies triumphantly thus: 'Granted; Philip 'did send an army into Laconia[20]. But it is Polyb. l. 9. p. 561.

[20] Παρεγένετο μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. p. 566. The import of this phrase has been considered in a note at the end of the fourth section of the thirty-eighth chapter of this History.

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'enough known, the Lacedæmonians here present 'know[21], that it was not his desire to interfere: on 'the contrary, invited, and repeatedly urged, by his 'friends and allies in Peloponnesus, he with difficulty yielded in any degree to their solicitations 'and remonstrances. Nor, when at length he did 'take up the business, was it to use his power, tho 'ample, to subdue or to injure any; but, as a beneficent mediator, to repress the violence of his 'friends, while he struck awe into their enemies, 'and so brought both to submit their controversies 'to a peaceful arbitration. Even then he did not 'assume to himself the decision, but he referred 'it to a congress of all Greece; and such was the 'conduct which it has been proposed to stigmatize, 'as matter for complaint and reproach among the 'Greeks!'

There is a remarkable passage of Cicero, not in the torrent of an oration to the Roman people, but in the sober course of his great moral work, where wanting, for illustration of his argument, a character alike illustrious and worthy, he has chosen the prince who has been now so long here the subject of discourse. 'Philip king of Macedonia,' he says, 'in magnitude of exploits, and splendor 'of glory, was excelled by his son; in affability 'and humanity he was far superior. Hence 'Alexander's conduct was often most shameful, 'but Philip was always great.' By this splendid eulogy, of few words, Cicero certainly meant to refer the recollection of his own son, whom he was addressing, to historical memorials, then extant, tho now unknown.

M. T. Cic. de Off. l. 1.

[21] Τμεῖς ἴστε. The speech was especially addressed to the Lacedæmonian members of the congress.

But the judgement of Polybius, for his double advantage, of having lived among the dying republics of Greece, and conversed afterward in friendship with the greatest men of Rome, may be reckoned even above Cicero's. That, in his report of the controversy about Philip's conduct, his own sentiments went with the argument of the replying orator, seems sufficiently evident; but, might there be doubt, it is obviated in another passage of his history, where, like Cicero, wanting the example of a great and worthy character, he speaks, in his own person, of Philip, thus: 'The victory over the 'Athenians, at Chæroneia, promoted Philip's great- 'ness, and the power and splendor of his kingdom, 'less through the deed of arms, than through the 'humanity and generosity which he displayed after 'it. By the former he overcame those arranged in 'the field against him. By the latter he conquered 'all the Athenians, so that their republic became 'in a manner his own. Not allowing resentment 'to influence his measures, he carried the work of 'war so far only as to command opportunity for 'using clemency and goodness. He released all 'his prisoners without ransom; he clothed most of 'them; he did honor to the slain, sending their 'bones in procession to Athens, with Antipater 'commanding. Altogether he so astonished and 'captivated the minds of the Athenians by his 'generous magnanimity, that, from enemies, they 'became allies, devoted to his service.' The experienced statesman-historian, it is evident, here uses the term 'the Athenians' in the common manner of Grecian writers, calling those 'the Athe- 'nians,' and even 'all the Athenians,' whom he thought most deserving the title, without notice of

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Polyb. l. 5. p. 359.

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the powerful opposition, under the lead of Chares, Lycurgus, and Demosthenes.

Under the shadow then of these splendid testimonies, of such high authority, the humbler word of the annalist, whose assistance, in failure of others, it has been so often necessary to use, not always judicious, but always apparently to the best of his judgement just, may not ill conclude this part of the history. Having related the death of Philip, he proceeds, 'Thus fell the greatest potentate of his 'time in Europe. With very small resources in 'his outset, he acquired the most powerful monar- 'chy that had ever existed among the Greeks. His 'great success arose, less from the force of his arms 'and the greatness of his victories, than from the 'studious exercise of his extraordinary talent for 'communication among men, and his obliging dis- 'position and conduct. He is said to have reckoned 'the valor of the fighting soldier, often as he had 'made it conspicuous in himself, not matter for the 'superior officer to glory in. Military science and 'the power of discourse, the general's skill and the 'talent of discussion, persuasion and conciliation, 'he esteemed together princely. Upon the latter 'he chiefly valued himself; for he used to say, "the merit of success in battles he could only "share with those who fought under him, but his "victories by argument, affability and beneficence, "were all his own."

Diod. l. 16. c. 95.

CHAPTER XLIII.

State of the known World, more especially of MACEDONIA, when ALEXANDER, Son of PHILIP, succeeded to the MACEDONIAN Throne.

SECTION I.

State of Macedonia when Alexander, son of Philip, succeeded to the Throne: Circumstances of surrounding Countries: Aristotle's Treatise on Government: Constitutions of various States: Examples of limited Monarchy in Greece.

SECT. I.

HITHERTO the history of Greece has been that of a small nation, of narrow territory, and, for that narrow territory, a small free population, served by numerous slaves; eminent nevertheless, singularly through successful cultivation of science and arts, especially the military and those called the fine arts; respected thence among surrounding people, and, for an accompanying restlessness of enterprizing spirit feared; yet, through defect of political system, continually turning that spirit, with all its support of art and science, against itself, and thus, unless, as a common disturber, rarely formidable to forein countries. But we approach now the era when, in altered circumstances, conquest in a manner extended Greece over the civilized world, making such impression on human affairs that important consequences, which may be reckoned altogether

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highly beneficial, have affected late posterity, and remain to be transmitted to future ages. To prepare then for the narrative of so great a revolution, it may be advantageous to look, somewhat beyond what the course of the preceding history would conveniently allow, to the actual circumstances of the nation which was to produce it, and of the countries over which it was more immediately to extend.

The Macedonian kingdom, for ages before Alexander, we have observed of territory extensive enough to be rather overbearing among surrounding states; yet, with an uncultivated population, and an often-distracted government, generally weak; more than once nearly overwhelmed; but recently raised to be the most powerful state of the known world; the bordering Persian empire only excepted, unless exception should also be made for distant Carthage. The new dominion acquired, westward, northward and eastward, was over people, not of Grecian blood or language, but whom the Greeks distinguished from themselves by their term barbarian, those of the maritime towns only being Greek. But, southward, the bordering province of Thessaly was esteemed the mother of the Greek nation; in produce it was the richest of Greece; and, bound from of old in political friendship with Macedonia, it was become, through the voluntary accession of the prevailing party among the people, in effect, a member of the Macedonian monarchy. So far also this example had been followed by the rest of Greece, that the late king of Macedonia was, in all constitutional form, elected chief of the Greek nation; succeeding thus to that supremacy which had been previously admitted in the Lacedæmonian and Athenian

governments, and at one time, by a preponderant portion of the nation, in the Theban. Thus, Macedonia was now the seat of empire; and, as formerly under Archelaus, again the refuge and favorite resort of Grecian art and science. SECT. I.

But with these great acquisitions and advantages, seeds of disturbance abounded. In Macedonia itself, claims to the throne against the reigning family, sources, formerly, of ruinous civil wars, had never ceased to be entertained. The recent assassination of the reigning king was suspected to have been promoted by pretenders or their partizans; and certainly on this subject, if ever obtained, never was made public; yet that there were still pretenders, waiting only for opportunity, circumstances afterward made manifest. Thessaly then, the oldest ally of Macedonia, the most important, and, while the party actually prevailing there was uppermost, and the family actually reigning in Macedonia continued to reign, the surest, had been, for ages, even among the ever-troubled republics of Greece, eminent for troubles and revolutions. But throughout the Grecian states, opposition of interests, and hatred between republic and republic, and between parties within every republic, remained in vigor. That large and lately prevailing portion of the nation, whose views to public advantage, or private, or both, had led them to desire the patronage of the late king of Macedonia, Philip, would now of course look toward his successor for continuance of support against adverse republics, or, whom many still more dreaded, their fellowcitizens of an adverse faction; but not with equal hope. Considering his youth, his yet untried character, and the uncertainty whose advice he might follow, the prospect for

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them could not but be most anxious and disheartening; while, on the contrary, for their adversaries, the recent catastrophe would raise fallen hopes, and stimulate to new exertion.

Nor would the various people called barbarians be indifferent on the occasion. Even those brought under the Macedonian dominion, whether having found more oppression or benefit from it, and whether more or less attached to the late popular king, having been universally bred to predatory warfare, would be on the watch for new things. But the most threatening danger, to Macedonia now, as to all Greece always, since the first extension of the Persian empire to the Grecian sea, was from the overbearing weight of that great empire, with which war was actually begun. Should the administration of the prince, who had succeeded to the Persian throne, be as energetic and able as that of a recent predecessor, Ochus, while a large Grecian military force was in his service, and a large party among the republics, under most able leaders, communicating with his court, and looking to it for patronage, means to obviate the danger would not be within reddy calculation.

The countries westward of Greece, sometimes formidable, were so little so now as not to have attracted the notice of historians. The Sicilian Greeks, with all that Timoleon had done for them, apparently had not recovered strength to give trouble beyond the seas which surrounded them; and the days of splendor of the Italian were passed; principally, it seems, through destruction brought upon oneanother. Carthage, more powerful than all, was probably ingaged with the affairs of its extensive acquisitions, deserving indeed the title of an empire, over the rich countries of the north of

Africa, and in Spain. Rome had already made progress toward the dominion of Italy; yet so little was the threatening growth of its power known among the Greeks, that, in the extant political works of the great philosopher of the day, Aristotle, tho he is large on the Carthaginian government, and mentions its connection with the Etruscans, not the name of Rome is found.

In this state of the world, on the verge of a revolution the most rapid, and, excepting the slow rise and fall of the Roman empire, the greatest and most important known in history, what was actually the constitution of the kingdom which was to take the lead in producing it, and what the political circumstances of the numerous connected states, must deserve to be known, as far as, among existing documents, they may be gathered.

The cotemporary philosopher Aristotle's treatise on government cannot then but especially deserve attention. Aristotle was a Macedonian born, so far as his birth-place, Stageira, was on the Macedonian shore; a small town founded, of what right or through what wrong we are uninformed, by Greeks from the iland of Andros. That iland was early subjected to the Athenian people. Possibly the object, in migrating, was to obtain more independency; for, of the severity of the degrading and almost slavish subjection, in which the subordinate Grecian states were held by the imperial democracy of Athens, occasion has occurred to observe large example; and, for the difference of law, in the Athenian judicature, for Andrian citizens and Athenian citizens, probably a well known comedy, transmitted to us in the Latin language, but from an Athenian original, may be trusted. The colonists

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claimed, for the town they founded, the rights of a Grecian republic; but they were obliged to acknowlege the dominion successively of the Athenian people, the Lacedæmonian, and again the Athenian, till the peace of Antalcidas, under the king of Persia's mediation, gave them a short independency, which was ended by the revival of the Athenian maritime power. How far they may have had, at any time, better freedom in connection with the Olynthian confederacy, information fails; but at length, with the other towns which had been of that confederacy, having only to choose between subjection to the Athenian people, and to the Macedonian king, Stageira became, through Philip's successes against the Athenians, reünited to Macedonia. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, is said to have been physician to king Amyntas, Philip's father, and high in his esteem. Aristotle himself, after having studied some years under Plato, at Athens, settled himself at Mitylene in Lesbos, whence, on invitation, he passed to Philip's court, where he lived long, and after his death continued to be highly respected by Alexander, who, during his extraordinary conquering expedition, appears to have corresponded with him attentively. Thus, far beyond any other writer whose works are extant, Aristotle must have possessed means for giving information concerning the state of Macedonia at that period when such information would be most interesting. The deficiency of it therefore, in his extant works, is highly disappointing, tho in his treatise on government the reason is evident. What little notice of Macedonia occurs is however of a very valuable kind; and the treatise will further deserve consideration, for its various information concerning both

the principles of government held by the most informed and scientific speculators, and the practice of numerous states, in, perhaps, the most interesting age of his universally interesting country.

In that treatise, stating some principles as fundamental, and then criticizing some of the more eminent of the ideal systems of republican government, which before him, had been offered for public approbation, especially those of his master, Plato, he proceeds to animadvert on the governments known in practice, which success might most recommend; and, not limiting himself to Grecian, he considers, together with the Cretan, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, the Carthaginian. Observations follow on democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, absolute and limited; abounding with objections to all, especially democracy. This he condemns nearly equal with that usurped monarchy which the Greeks denominated tyranny, which, he says, it most resembled. He then remarks that some had reckoned a combination of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy would make the best government; but the best known example of such a constitution, the Lacedæmonian, was so open to strong objection, that the notion had no general favor. In conclusion then he proposes his own ideä of the best possible constitution, distinguishing it by the title of Polity.

It may seem that Xenophon's large experience in political and military business, whence the mischief of the prevailing passion of the Greeks for the separate independency of their several little states, and the futility of all projects, tried and possible, for giving them reäl independency, would be striking to him, with, perhaps, some particular stimulation from his fellow-scholar Plato's romantic project for a republic, led him to the composition of

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that elegant romance the Cyropædeia; the purpose of which is to show how one able man could govern more than half the known world, more happily for the subjects than any of his own fellowcountrymen, struggling with oneanother for power, could manage their single independent towns, in what, no man being master of his own, they miscalled freedom. As a model to be imitated, he could not propose the Persian government under Cyrus; because, for success in the imitation, a soverein must always be found with the extraordinary union of talents and virtue which he has ascribed to that great prince, and which has rarely, if indeed ever, existed; but, as a model, through observation of which the political principles and practice of his fellowcountrymen might be improved, the consideration of it might be highly useful. It may seem too that, in writing those animadversions on the Lacedæmonian and Athenian governments which remain to us, he may have had in view to propose something better adapted to secure freedom and promote human happiness than either those governments, or the Persian monarchal despotism. But Cicero, reckoning that the better, tho still very imperfect, constitution of Rome might have been improved by a just combination of the three powers, has confessed himself unable to say what the arrangement should be; and so Xenophon at last apparently despaired of improving the tumultuary republican system of Greece.

Nevertheless from Aristotle, who had before him all that Xenophon and Plato had written on the subject, who knew both the Greek republics and the Macedonian kingdom, and who had moreover large opportunity for information concerning the bordering Persian empire, some clear improvement

on all former Grecian schemes of government, found in experience, and in his declared opinion, so defective, might be expected. But his treatise shows, in a surprizing amount, what influence the common Grecian passion for the separate independency of their several cities might hold on Grecian minds, even the most capacious and acute, when bred in their little illiberal republican principles; and it may still be within our subject to remark that, as hence may be estimated the difficulty of executing what Isocrates was so continually and earnestly urging, the union of Greece, hence also may be judged how just was Philip's caution in so long hesitating, tho invited by a large and apparently a preponderant portion of the Greek nation, to undertake it. Aristotle knew how Greece had been, for centuries, lacerated by the contentions of her little republics, and how, by almost a miracle, they had withstood the efforts of the neighboring Persian empire, never failing of assistance within Greece itself, to subdue them: he knew that, nevertheless, far from independent, after very heroïc exertions of many in the common cause, they had been compelled to bow the neck successively to their fellows, the Lacedæmonian people and the Athenian; he knew that they had owed the short period of their most reäl independency to a mandate of the Persian king, confirming the treaty of Antalcidas; he knew what miseries had resulted from the opposition of Thebes to the revived tyranny of Lacedæmon; truly patriotic as it was at first, but, with success, soon breeding ambition: possessed of this knowledge he was living in the Macedonian kingdom, nearly equal in extent to all the republican territory of proper Greece; he had in view the Persian empire, holding numerous Grecian republics its tributaries, and possessing means evidently

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ample, with inclination always ready, wanting only good direction, to overwhelm all. Nevertheless, in his treatise, nothing is found proposed for the common benefit of Greece, nothing for improvement of the constitution of the Macedonian kingdom, become the head of the united nation; and so far from proposing any other union, or approving any, his project, offered for the perfection of government, is as illiberal as those of Minos or Lycurgus, and more contracted. He would have republics equal in population and territory to the smaller only, rather than to the larger, of those actually existing in Greece; and, tho some, he allows, held a different opinion on specious ground, he has contended that slavery, the slave belonging wholly to his master, is reasonable, and necessary, and in the course of nature; and, accordingly, he would have a few freemen, constituting his republic, served by many slaves. When Minos and Lycurgus lived, the state of the world, or of their part of it, appears to have been such that their plans justly earned the praise of wisdom, as adapted to it. When Aristotle wrote, as well might it be proposed, in modern times, that Geneva, Lucca, or Ragusa, should defy surrounding nations with their own force, as his republic; yet alliance and confederacy seem to have been out of his contemplation. It might indeed be supposed that, intent on physics and metaphysics, he had neglected observation of politics, and wrote on them from fancy, did not his work show that he had been diligent in using his large opportunities for collecting facts, among the transactions of the various states around him, on which to ground theory. What he has proposed however seems rather an idea of a colony of philosophers, to be founded among barbarians, than what

Aris. Polit. b. 1. c. 4. & 5.

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could be seriously offered for improving the condition of the whole, or any part of Greece. We are told none of his works were published while he lived. That on government has obvious inconsistencies, which doubtless would have been corrected had he completed it for publication; and, in some parts, it seems meerly a collection of notes for future use. Yet his projected commonwealth, will, among other parts of the work, deserve some further observation.

In the small independent state which he proposes, which, in modern days might rather be called a township, he would have his citizens all sovereins, like the Genoese and Venetian nobles. Were it possible, he says, he would have them served only by slaves; and to these exclusively he would commit mechanical arts, husbandry, and all trade. But, in failure of slaves of sufficient number, or of sufficient ability, he would allow subjects of his citizens, in a condition somewhat above absolute slavery, such as existed in many of the Grecian republics, distinguished from citizens by the name of Periœcians. These might be either Greeks or barbarians. But whether one or the other, he would place them in a more degraded condition than the Laconian, and some other Periœcians; for, to insure their subserviency, he would never admit them to hold the arms or use the discipline of the phalanx, but would limit their military service to that of the light-armed; and as they were to have no participation in civil power, their superiority in condition to the slave would be utterly precarious.

That excellent principle of the British constitution, holding that public good consists in accumulation of private good, he has rejected;

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adopting the contrary principle, which prevailed among the Grecian republics, of an imaginary public wholly distinct from private good; so that the public was a tyrant, warranted by the constitution to be regardless of individuals. In pursuance of this principle then he would, like the Cretan and Lacedæmonian lawgivers, deny to all his noble citizens the natural rights and dignity and injoyments of fathers of families; and, contrary to the maxim of the English law, expressed in the emphatical phrase 'Every man's house is 'his castle,' he would hardly allow a home. As at Lacedæmon, no man was to live at home; all were to eat at public tables; and there (not as at Lacedæmon, every one bringing his own) all were to take the fare publicly provided. As at Lacedæmon, children were to be considered as belonging to the public, and parents were not to interfere in their education. Dignity and civil authority, as at Lacedæmon, were to be the privilege of elderhood only. A legislature he seems to have proposed to make needless by the perfection of his general law, and by the wisdom and virtue which, through education and by his institutions altogether, he would insure to his elders; so that arbitrary decision on new and extraordinary cases would be, in their hands, he reckoned, safe.

With such ideäs of perfection in government, the constitutions of the Grecian republics of his age would not be likely to have much of his approbation. Democracy accordingly, which he had had large opportunity to see, especially at Athens, he condemns vehemently; prone, he says, beyond other governments, to give opportunity for the tyranny of one, and itself the tyranny of an ill-informed, passionate multitude. Proper aris-

tocracy, apparently his favorite government among those known in practice, he asserts hardly to have existed in his time, having degenerated everywhere into either democracy or a tyrannical oligarchy. The Greeks of his age, he adds, were solicitous, less for good government than for the acquisition of power and personal importance; and, among their political struggles, prospect of these failing, they usually gave up contest, and submitted to the dominion of rivals. This indeed is no more than the general character of what has been so often miscalled the ardent spirit of liberty. The reäl spirit of liberty is not an ardent but a sober and reflecting spirit. The ardent, rarely failing among zealots for democracy, is not a spirit of liberty, but, in the leaders, a spirit of ambition, in the multitude, a spirit of envy, of licentiousness, and, as it has been too often seen, in antient and in modern times, of cruelty. SECT. I.

Proceeding to the consideration of monarchy, exclusively of that violence upon former constitutions which the Greeks denominated Tyranny, he reckons five distinct characters of legal kingdoms; one absolute, four limited. The purely absolute, he takes into consideration as ground for useful remark and argument, considering it however as meerly ideäl. For one man, he observes, cannot rule multitudes without the consent of some among them, on whom therefore he is effectually dependent. The power of the most despotic tyrants, known among the Greeks, rested on the support of a party, and generally, he says, a party outrageously democratical. 'Tyranny,' he remarks in another place, 'is a compound of 'democracy and the extremest oligarchy, and 'therefore the most oppressive of all governments, Arist. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

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'partaking of the two worst, and replete with the 'excesses and all the evils of both[1]. Therefore 'those commonly called absolute monarchies, as 'being most nearly so, those of Asia especially, 'whose people have always been reddier for sub- 'serviency than the Europeäns, are not exactly so. 'Among them all a customary system of law, 'transmitted through ages, is strictly maintained; 'and the attachment of the people to the system, 'derived from their forefathers, at the same time 'supports and checks the royal authority. Hence 'those governments have not been subject to 'revolutions.'

Very similar to this was a kind of monarchy of which many instances had been seen among the little states of Greece. The people of a republic, unable otherwise to obviate the evils of civil contest among themselves, agreed upon the resource of electing a king (or tyrant, as they sometimes intitled him) to absolute power, for the purpose of inforcing the constitutional laws. Some had been so elected for life, and some for a limited period; and such monarchy, the philosopher proceeds to observe, differed from the Asiatic only as it was elective, whereas the Asiatic were hereditary. For this difference he reckons it a second kind of legal monarchy.

These we should hardly now call balanced monarchies, or free constitutions; no balancing civil authority seeming to have had regular establishment in them: an efficient limitation appears only in the means of rebellion which the people

[1] Ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑςάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας· διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχουμένοις ἐστὶν, ἅτε ἐκ δυοῖν συγκειμένη κακῶν, καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. Arist. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

possessed, as forming the military of the state. Such apparently was the limitation producing that general respect of the Asiatic princes for the laws and established customs, whence revolutions among them were rare.

The third kind of monarchy, in Aristotle's list, was that more liberal and regularly-balanced constitution, described by Homer as universal in those called the heroïc ages, and which has occurred for notice in an early part of this history. For this Aristotle refers to Homer: the king, he says, commanded in war, and presided in religious ceremonies and judicial proceedings. On Homer's authority it may be added that, in emergencies he assembled the people, and presided in the assembly[2].

Ch. 2. s. 2. of this Hist.

A fourth kind, the most narrowly limited that could consist with any royal dignity, was seen in the Lacedæmonian kingdom. There the kings, tho their persons were esteemed sacred, and their dignity allowed high, had, as kings, no civil authority: they were meerly hereditary commanders-in-chief of the military, and hereditary high-priests; partaking constitutionally of civil power only as hereditary senators.

It is then remarkable that, as for his own imaginary republic Aristotle has proposed no legislature, so, in describing these several kinds of existing monarchy, he has said of none where any power of

[2] Aristotle has inferred, from an expression attributed by Homer to Agamemnon, that personal security against the monarch's power was not duly provided for in this constitution. Probably there were deficiencies and irregularities; yet such an expression, as he has noticed, from a prince commanding, at the time, not in his capital but in his camp in a distant country, and represented as speaking in anger, seems hardly to carry any decisive information on the subject.

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legislation rested; and yet it is fully implied that in none, not even the most absolute of the Asiatic, any more than in the old constitution of the Medes and Persians, was a power admitted in the king alone to add to or alter the law.

But, having indicated five characters of monarchy, graduated from extreme despotism to the smallest extent of power which can any way support the eminence essential to royalty, the philosopher disappoints us with declaring that he proposes to consider the two extremes only; the purely absolute monarchy, which he reckons but ideäl, and the most limited of the kinds known in practice, that in which the king had no civil authority; because, he says, the others differed from these only as they more or less approached either. The ideäl will hardly be an object here; the other, exemplified in the Lacedæmonian constitution, has been in an early part of this history spoken of largely. Incidentally however he is led to some notice of monarchies of the intermediate characters, which will deserve attention.

Arist. Polit. l. 3. c. 14.

Proposing to illustrate and ascertain the characteristical differences between legal monarchy and illegal, or, according to the Greek terms, kingdom and tyranny (meaning by kingdom kingly government regularly established, and by tyranny monarchal power founded on the overthrow of a former constitution) he states, for examples of legal monarchy, the Lacedæmonian constitution, the Athenian, as it stood under the last king, Codrus, the Molossian, and the Macedonian; adding, remarkably enough, the Persian, but only as it stood in the reign of the great Cyrus. In the end then he comes to this extraordinary conclusion; 'At 'this time,' he says, 'proper kingdoms no longer

Arist. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

'exist, all having degenerated nearly into monar- SECT. I.
'chies and tyrannies; because fealty to a proper
'king is simply voluntary; and, in these times
'there is more equality among men, so that none
'have such supereminent merit as to deserve the
'elevation. Where power must be supported by
'fiction or force, it becomes tyranny.' Consonant-
ly with this, he says, in another place, allegiance to
a king may be withdrawn by the people at pleasure.
Nevertheless he requires force to be employed, if
necessary, for the support of his republic, and of l. 7. c. 8.
all republics; but he absolutely denies it, how l. 5. c. 10.
consistently seems not easy to discover, for the
support of monarchal authority, however legally
founded. How then the pleasure of the people
was to be legally declared; what was to be if half
desired to remove the king, whether to elect another
king, or to establish another constitution, and half
to support the actual king and maintain the existing
constitution; or if half the opponents of royalty
desired a democracy and half an aristocracy, he has
omitted to say. Moreover, reckoning election es-
sential to the establishment of proper kingly au-
thority, and voluntary obedience essential to its
continuance, and adding that, in his opinion, hered-
tary succession principally had produced the exten-
sive abolition of monarchy among the Greeks, yet,
of his five examples of legal monarchy, three were,
as far as history traces them, clearly hereditary.
The Athenians are said, in troublesome times be-
yond any very certain memorials, to have elected
Codrus; thus interrupting hereditary succession;
and (so little is known of Persian history) possibly
Cyrus also may have been king by election, though
more generally and probably supposed by inheri-
tance. Homer, to whom Aristotle refers for the

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most authoritative account of that monarchal constitution which he reckoned the best, shows indeed that, in the ages he has described, hereditary succession rested on no very certain ground; but, far from warranting the philosopher's revolutionary doctrine, he places the authority of the king, once legally holding the scepter, under the immediate protection of Jupiter.

Ch. 2. s. 2. of this History.

Beyond doubt the science of government has been greatly improved in modern ages; not through greater talents of either legislators or philosophical speculators, but, principally, through the new and extended opportunities for observing what might be raised on the broader bases of the states into which Europe, on the overthrow of the Roman empire, became divided. It cannot now be hazardous to assert, tho against Aristotle, that the broader, at least to such extent, are the surer and altogether more advantageous bases; nor hardly will any be found now to contend that either elective monarchy, or such a republic as he has proposed, is desirable. For examples of legal kingdoms, naming Lacedæmon, Molossis, and Macedonia, which were all hereditary, yet stating no reason for afterward denying any legal kingdom to exist in his time, except that none were elective, it seems to follow that, unless for the hereditary succession (which tho he reckoned it a great defect, yet experience in the course of ages has shown to be essential to internal peace) the Lacedæmonian, Molossian and Macedonian were, still, in his time and in his opinion, legal limited monarchies.

SECTION II.

HISTORY OF MOLOSSIS.

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THE Athenian government, in its various changes from kingdom to democracy, and the Lacedæmonian, it has been the purpose of the preceding history, as far as remaining documents allow, to unfold. The early Persian seems to have been classed with them, by Aristotle, only as an example (the less to be gainsaid, as in his age and country very little known) of his favorite tenet, of which he could find few examples in practice, that monarchy should be elective, and of that other, of which, if he could find any example, none seemed in his time to remain, that fealty to legal monarchs should be so purely voluntary that it might be withdrawn at pleasure. What gleanings then may be found of the history of the small obscure kingdom of Molossis, as a portion of the proper history of Greece, for which, in prosecuting the history of the republics, a place equally convenient has not before occurred, may here deserve notice; and will more particularly require it for the eulogy which Aristotle, tho with little explanation, has bestowed on its constitution.

Molossis was one, it is said, of fourteen small states within the country known by the general name of Epirus; but it was of the largest. Its extent and boundaries however, even in Strabo's time, were not to be ascertained; the devastation insuing the conquest by those among the most flagitious and cruel, tho, as the most successful, the most renowned of conquerors, the Romans, having

Theopom. ap. Strab. l. 7. p. 469. ed. Ox.

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obliterated indications; and the Grecian geographer's melancholy picture is largely confirmed by the account even of the Roman historian, Livy. To Aristotle's time, with an advantageous constitution, and force sufficing for defence, but not tempting to seek conquest, the Molossian people seem to have been, for ages, in more fortunate circumstances than were common around them. Their territory was, in large proportion, eminently fruitful. The oracle of Dodona, within it, highly revered always, but especially in the earlier ages, gave it a degree of sacred character. Surrounded mostly by lofty mountains, a large invading force might be checked by very inferior numbers; and the temptation for a small one, with predatory purposes, was much obviated by the circumstances which made difficulty for any such to carry off, if it might seize, plunder. The northern part, against Macedonia, and the eastern, against Thessaly, very high land, to which the approach was everywhere steep and rugged, was itself mostly level enough for cultivation; the soil fruitful, water abounding, and the climate altogether advantageous. If Passaron, the capital of Molossis, was not eminent among cities of the day, it seems to have been because the Molossians were not compelled by circumstances, like the republican Greeks, with exception, as we have formerly observed, almost only for the Eleians, to confine themselves, in crowded habitation, within city-walls.

Strab. ibid.

Ch. 3. s. 4. of this History.

Epirus, tho mostly held by people of Grecian speech and lineage, had an intermixture of those called barbarians; Illyrians, and perhaps others. Herodotus, however, among earliest, and Plutarch, among late antient historians, clearly reckon the Molossians a Grecian people. Some expressions

Herod. l. 6. c. 126. Plut. v. Pyrrh. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 80. Strab. l. 7.

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of Thucydides and Strabo may perhaps be construed either way. But, as it has been formerly observed, Herodotus, Thucydides and Strabo concur in showing that all Greece was of mixed population; and how the distinction of Greek and barbarian, unknown to Homer, arose, and what at last it was, always remained uncertain. Strabo however clearly acknowleging the Macedonian for a Greek nation, assures us that the general language of the Epirots was the Macedonian dialect of the Greek; that where another language, probably the Illyric, was in use, the people commonly spoke both, and that, in habits and manners, most of the Epirots hardly differed from the Macedonians.

The governments of the Epirot states were, some republican, with annual chief magistrates, as at Athens, Thebes and Rome; others monarchal. That of Molossis, from earliest tradition, was monarchal; and, whether the people may have been more or less allowed the always questionable dignity of pure Grecian blood, yet the claim of the royal family to the oldest and noblest Grecian origin, resting on tradition, but asserted by Strabo and Plutarch, with Aristotle's assent implied, is not found anywhere controverted. They reckoned themselves direct descendents of Neoptolemus Pyrrhus, son of Achilles; who, it was said, after the Trojan war, migrating from Thessaly, became king of Molossis. Whatever credit may be due to this lofty pretension, that the Molossian scepter remained in one Greek family, from times beyond certain history till after Aristotle's age, appears satisfactorily testified.

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 80. Strab. l. 7.

Strab. l. 7. Plut. v. Pyrrh.

By advantage of situation and constitution, exempt from great troubles, Molossis, had it had historians, probably afforded little for general interest.

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Nevertheless we learn, from the father of Grecian history, that, some generations before his time, it was esteemed respectable among Grecian states. The tale wherein this appears, like many of that writer, somewhat of a romantic cast, nevertheless may have been true in all its parts; and, for the information it affords of an important change of manners and policy among the Greeks, and of the florishing condition of several republics about the age of the Athenian legislator Solon, some destroyed before the historian wrote, others little heard of since, while Molossis apparently remained unshaken, it may be reckoned of considerable historical value.

Herod. l. 6. c. 126.

Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, under whose rule that little state was eminent among those of Peloponnesus, desiring, the historian says, to marry his daughter to a man of the greatest consideration and highest worth of all Greece, opened his house for any who, from personal dignity and the eminence of their countries, might have pretensions; that so he might have opportunity to estimate their merits. Thirteen guests, rivals for his favor, are thus described. There came from the Greek colonies in Italy, then florishing extraordinarily, Smindyrides of Sybaris and Damas of Siris. The former was remarked for going beyond all of his time in the luxury, for which Sybaris was renowned. Damas was son of that Samyris, who was distinguished by the epithet of the Wise. Amphimnestus came from Epidamnus, on the coast of the Ionian gulph. Males was of Ætolia, brother of Titormus, esteemed the strongest man in Greece, but who had withdrawn from the society of men to reside in the farthest part of Ætolia[3]. Leocedes,

[3] Late writers, Athenæus and Ælian, show that Titormus had wide fame for bodily strength; but information of the

was son of Pheidon, tyrant of Argos; that Pheidon, says the historian who, established uniformity of weights and measures throughout Peloponnesus, and, together with his power (so far, it may seem, beneficially exerted) was remarked for an arrogance unequalled among the Greeks; for, depriving the Eleians of the presidency of the Olympian festival, he assumed it himself[4]. Two came from Arcadia, Amiantus of Trapezus, and Laphanes of Pæos. The father of the latter, Euphorion, was celebrated for his extensive hospitality, and had the extraordinary fame of having entertained the gods Castor and Pollux. Lysanias came from Eretria in Eubœa, then greatly florishing; Onomastus from Eleia: Megacles and Hippocleides were of Athens; the latter esteemed the richest Athenian of his time, and the handsomest: Diactorides was of Cranon and Scopadæ in Thessaly; Alcon was of Molossis. This simple description of Alcon, combined with what has preceded, enough marks that the Molossians were esteemed a Grecian people, and Molossis then considerable among the Grecian states. One of the Athenians, Megacles, was the successful

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cause of his avoiding human society, as the early historian reports, might have been more interesting than their extravagant tales of his feats, while he was eminent in it. His retirement probably procured him the title, which Ælian gives him, of the herdman. The company with which his brother associated, in the more authentic account of Herodotus, marks enough that the family was eminent among the Ætolians. Athen. l. 2. c. 2. Æl. l. 12. c. 22.

[4] The disagreement found, among antient writers, concerning that eminent tyrant, has been noticed in the appendix to the fourth chapter of this History. Inclined, when ingaged in that early part of the History to hold to the text of Herodotus, as it stands in our copies, all that has fallen in my way since to observe, including some adverse argument, has tended, I will own, only to strengthen my early opinion.

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suitor. His family was of the most eminent of Athens; his father, Alcmæon, whom we have seen leader of a party there, had, in banishment, been honorably entertained by the great king of Lydia, Crœsus. Megacles succeeding him in eminence with that party, acquired command of the government of Athens; and the great Pericles, who afterward ruled the commonwealth with princely sway, was a descendant of the match with the daughter of Cleisthenes, by his mother, Agaristë, who was her grand-daughter.

Ch. 5. s. 5. of this History.

Ch. 12. s. 2. of this History.

What then among curious matters, in this little detail, especially will deserve notice, is the evidence that the republican jealousy, which, afterward, in the most florishing age of Grecian philosophy, went to the extreme of forbidding intermarriage of Greeks of different states, as a just and even necessary policy of republics, had not yet obtained any such force. Farther then will deserve observation the fallen state of seven of the republics, mentioned by the historian as then among the most eminent of the Greek nation. Alreddy in his own age, less than a century and half later, Argos had wholly lost its preëminence; Siris, Trapezus, Pæos, Cranon, and Scopadæ remained hardly names for history; Sybaris was annihilated. In unceasing strife with oneanother, and within themselves, all the Grecian republics were overborne by Lacedæmon and Athens; powerful chiefly through their constitutions, better adapted for conquest; and Greece was no longer a country in which the road to fame was open to its whole population: political and military eminence, and high consideration, were limited to the cities of Lacedæmon and Athens.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 11.

Ch. 26. s. 2. of this History.

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We have formerly observed Xenophon remarking that, after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, whatever a Lacedæmonian commanded was, throughout Greece, implicitly obeyed. Before that war the concurrence of Athens was requisite to procure such universal obedience. During the short involution of interests of the leading parties in those imperial republics, even distant Molossis found it expedient to obey their joint injunction. The great Athenian, Themistocles, as we have formerly seen, obnoxious to both, banished from Athens, perhaps in regular course of law, and then, by their joint arbitrary commands, driven from republics friendly to him, hoped at length to find security in Molossis from the liberality of its king, Admetus. Thither however he was pursued by ministers who, in the name of the two imperial governments, demanded the surrender of his person. This the Molossian prince refused; not however without apology, which apparently a reasonable policy required: but Themistocles was thus inabled to prosecute his flight to the surer refuge which he found in the Persian empire.

Chap. 23. s. 6. of this History.

Ch. 11. s. 4.

When, not long after, that war broke out which under the lead of the two imperial states, divided the republics, during so many years, against one another, the northern kingdoms Molossis and Macedonia, appear to have avoided immediate implication; neither being mentioned by Thucydides in naming the allies of each party at its beginning. But hostilities, which incidental information shows to have been almost incessant among even the smallest of the republics, even those too insignificant to be noticed by the historians of the nation, unless when any interest of an imperial people was materially implicated, had been previously raging among

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the little states on the southern border of Molossis; and soon this so ingaged the attention of the greater contending powers, that it appears to have become expedient or even necessary for the Molossians to choose their party. Macedonia, divided by Molossis from the scene of actual hostilities, was less immediately threatened; yet its politic king, Perdiccas, was led by apprehension of the consequences to take a part. Not friendly to Lacedæmon, but more fearing the wild ambition of the Athenian people, and their means of affecting the interests of his kingdom through their naval power, and yet anxious to avoid provoking their resentment, he sent a thousand men, not publickly acknowleging them as in his service, to act under the orders of the Lacedæmonian general commanding in those parts. At this time the king of Molossis, Tharyps[5], son of Admetus, was under age, and a regent administered the government. The Molossians, an inland people, had less to fear from the superior navy of Athens, than from the preponderant landforce of Lacedæmon; while, at the same time, the politics of the Athenian democracy, and its ordinary treatment of those whom it styled allies, would be more alarming than any politics yet avowed by Lacedæmon, or any known conduct of its government. The Molos-

Thucyd. l. 3. c. 110.

[5] The name of this prince is found variously written, Tharyps, Tharypus, Tharytas. Thucydides informs us that even the Ætolian dialect of the Greek language, little distant as Ætolia was from Attica, could hardly be understood by an Athenian. (Thucyd. l. 3. c. 95. ch. 15. S. 6. of this History.) Molossis, being considerably more distant, it seems likely that a difficulty for writing a Molossian name might arise from peculiarities in the Molossian pronuntiation; as with us, greatly as the provincial dialects have within the last half century been wearing out, a Somersetshire man might yet have difficulty to write, or even speak, the name of a man of the Yorkshire dales, after that man's own pronuntiation.

sians, in these circumstances, decided openly for the Lacedæmonian alliance, and the regent in person led a body to join the Lacedæmonian commander in Acarnania. SECT. II.

Here two matters deserve notice, with a view to the principal subject before us: first, the accordance, in the Molossian practice, with what we have observed to have been generally held among the Greeks, from Homer's age to Aristotle's, that it was the duty as well as the right of kings, and consequently of regents, to exercise in person military command; and, secondly, what is more important, the steddiness of the Molossian constitution, in maintaining regular succession to the throne: in Molossis, it appears, a minor was not superseded, as formerly in modern Europeän kingdoms (of which, in our own, the reign of our great Alfred is an example) on account of temporary inability from nonage.

In the progress of the war between the two imperial republics, the contest, as we have formerly seen, was so led to other parts as to afford the happy opportunity used by the little states of Acarnania and southern Epirus, with a wise moderation, rare among the Grecian republics for establishing a lasting peace among themselves. As then the fidelity of the regent of Molossis to his trust appears honorable both to himself and to the Molossian constitution, so the conduct of the young king afterward would also reflect honor on both. Tharyps is said to have used the opportunity of peace all around his little dominion for going to Athens, the metropolis of science, to acquire knowlege under the professors of all sciences there; and he has had the credit, among the later Greek writers, of having become eminent

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both for learning, and for able and beneficial conduct in the government of his kingdom. Plutarch's eulogy seems to indicate that much of the advantageous character of the north-western Greeks, which, according to the testimony of Polybius, formerly noticed, they maintained to his age, was owing to the improvements introduced by Tharyps.

Plut. v. Pyrrh. Polyb. l. 4. p. 299. Ch. 15. s. 6. of this Hist.

Thenceforward Molossis appears to have injoyed a fortunate historical obscurity, till the great Philip of Macedonia brought it into notice of Grecian writers, in a way alien to the republican system, by marrying Olympias, sister of its soverein Alexander. Then we get Aristotle's assurance, that the government was a limited monarchy, and of the more strictly limited, nearly resembling the Lacedæmonian; and further, that it was of great antiquity, being among the oldest known to have subsisted to his time without revolution. In treating of the age following that of Aristotle, a very interesting particular of the Molossian constitution is mentioned by Plutarch. According to immemorial custom the Molossians assembled in Passaron, the capital, to swear allegiance to the king; and, among solemn sacrifices, oaths were mutual, the king swearing to maintain the free constitution, and the people not only to support the king in the royal dignity, but also to maintain it in his family.

Arist. Polit. l. 5. c. 10. & 11.

Plut. v. Pyrrh.

The Roman historian's account of the destructive ravage of Molossis by his fellowcountrymen, almost to the extermination of the people, in the next following age, may then deserve some observation here: for, whatever may be thought of the coloring which he has endevored to put upon contests of the Molossians among themselves, concerning the succession to the throne, it is enough evident that

T. Liv. l. 45.

the oppression of Roman republican dominion, under which they had been reduced, drove them to the unavailing exertion, for the recovery of their former freedom, which drew on them the flagitious vengeance of the Roman senate; that body which its own historians, in their grossly-flattering pictures, compared, for its dignity, to a congress of kings, yet by facts, which its historians could not conceal, showed itself alreddy, in that boasted era of the republic, a fit instrument for a future Nero. But on that interesting portion of general history this is not a place for more[6]. SECT. II.

SECTION III.

Constitution of the Kingdom of Macedonia.

Aristotle, classing together the Lacedæmonian kingdom, the Athenian, the Molossian and the Macedonian, as examples of limited monarchy, indi- SECT. III.

[6] Plutarch, in his life of P. Æmilius, has almost exactly copied Livy for these transactions in Molossis. Apparently he has reckoned that, in relating what was so disgraceful to Rome, commanding in his time, with absolute power almost the known world, prudence required that he should appeal to the Roman writer for his justification. The narrative of Polybius, now unfortunately lost, and known only from a short quotation by Livy's cotemporary, Strabo, was, in Livy's age, in all libraries; and probably other accounts were extant, more free than that of Polybius, who could not but be under restraint from his connection with the Cornelian and Æmilian families. Livy has obviously had in view to soften and apologize for what was notoriously flagitious in the conduct of the Roman senate and its renowned general; and yet, even in his account, the arrogance, illiberality, and cruelty of the Roman republican government are strongly marked, and must be to all minds, not of Roman republican temper, highly disgusting.

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cates their general character to have been congenial with that of the constitution described by Homer, the oldest known to the Greeks, and from which he considered all legal kingdoms, existing in his time, to have been derived. The three latter, however, would differ very considerably from the first, whose extraordinay peculiarities nevertheless were ingrafted on the old general system, to which the others, with less deviation, adhered. Probably the Macedonian differed from the Molossian little; perhaps only as, in the course of ages, difference of fortune brought change of circumstances. Of one material difference of this kind we have authentic information. The Molossians maintained themselves within their original limits, or nearly so: the Macedonians, in very early times, extended conquest greatly; so that the territory of the Macedonian monarchy became many times greater than that of Molossis. For the circumstances of these conquests, and the immediate result to the conquered people, information fails; but evidence remains that, in the end, the same, or nearly the same, liberal constitution pervaded the Macedonian kingdom. Not that the union was perfect, or that the system had not great defects. We have observed, in the preceding history, provinces under the dominion of princes owing allegiance to the general government, yet in circumstances to resist it; as formerly, in the modern Europeän kingdoms, districts under the authority of dukes, lords marchers, earls and barons. But as, under the kings of England, conquerors of Cornwall, Wales, and Ireland, the people of those countries were admitted to participate in all the rights of English subjects, so the people of all the countries owing allegiance to the Macedonian crown, participating, we are assured, in the Macedonian name, appear

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also to have held equal rights as Macedonian subjects. Lyncestis, far from the capital, on the western border against Illyria, had long its own hereditary princes, Greeks from Corinth, a kind of feudatories under the Macedonian kings; yet the people are called by Thucydides Lyncestian Macedonians[7]; and in the sequel we shall have occasion to observe that, in the common government, under one sovereign, there was little if any difference of privilege for the subjects of the different provinces; little even for those not of Grecian race, as the Agrians, who were reckoned among the people called barbarians. But, with this extension of the Macedonian name, all the Macedonian people could not assemble for political purposes, like the Molossian, in one place. Those assemblies of the Macedonians therefore, of which we read, apparently must have been several, in the several provinces.

Ch. 34. s. 2. of this History.

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 99.

Of writers, after the age of Aristotle, information concerning the Macedonian constitution might most be looked for from Arrian. But as Aristotle, for cause sufficiently indicated in his treatise, together with what we know of his situation, has avoided it, so Arrian, high in employment, civil and military, under a despotic government, then pervading the civilized world, appears to have judged it necessary to confine himself to a military history of Alexander. Nevertheless, in the course of his narrative, he speaks repeatedly and decisively of the Macedonian as a limited monarchy. In one passage he sets it in direct contrast with the absolute monarchy of

[7] Τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ελειμιῶται, καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη, ἃ ξύμμαχα μέν ἐσι τούτοις καὶ ὑκήκοα· βασιλείας δ'ἔχει καθ' αὐτά. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 99. Αρριβαῖον τὸν Βρομεροῦ, Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων Βασιλέα. l. iv. c. 83.

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Persia. Classing the Macedonians with the republican Greeks, he says, 'they were a high-spirited 'people, whereas the minds of the Persians were 'humbled and debased by their subjection to a despotic authority[8];' and, in the sequel of his narrative, facts are related, perfectly warranting this character of the Macedonian constitution; facts not resting on his single authority, but corroborated by a concurrence of antient testimonies, which will occur for notice in the sequel of this history.

With such assurance that the Macedonian was a limited monarchy, it remains desirable to know what was the extent of the monarch's authority, and what were the constitutional restrictions upon it. Throughout Grecian history, from Homer inclusively downward, equally in regal, aristocratical,

8—Μακεδόνας τε καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Μήδους, ἐκ πάνυ πολλοῦ τρυφῶσιν, αὐλοὺς ἐν τοῖς πότοις τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πάλαι ἡδὺ μετὰ κινδύνων διαπονημένους, ἄλλως τε καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐλευθέρους ἐς χεῖρας ἦξαν. Ὅσοι τε Ἕλληνες Ἕλλησιν, κ. τ. ε. Arr. de exped. Alex. l. 2. c. 7. A curious instance of that malice, observed formerly to have been so common, in modern times, among men of letters of the continent against Philip, in favor of Demosthenes, and against kings, in favor of republics, and thence generally against the Macedonians, is conspicuous in the Latin translation of Vulcanius here. But all his ingenuity has been insufficient to make his Latin hold well together for his purpose of taking the epithet ἐλευθέρους from the Macedonians, to give it exclusively to the republican Greeks serving in each army, so as to force, as he desired, the application of the term δούλοι to the Macedonians equally with the Persians. The learned editor Gronovius, disposed as he was to the same cause, has had too much respect for his author to favor such perversion of the intended meaning. By his pointing, he has made it clear for the reader that the Macedonians are included under the epithet ἐλευθέρους. The words themselves indeed sufficiently mark it. Were confirmation needful, Arrian himself has furnished it in the next sentence, mentioning the Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, and Agrians, as the barbarians of Alexander's army, and thus distinctly marking the Macedonians as, in his estimation, Greeks. The value of the term δοῦλοι has been considered on a former occasion.

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and democratical constitutions, the military character and the civil are seen united in every free subject, insomuch that difference of law for the city and the camp are rarely discernible. In every antient constitution, unless where tyranny, whether exercised by a single person, or an oligarchy, or a democracy, denied to some the privilege, it was equally the right and the duty of every member of the commonwealth to attend in arms at the chief magistrate's call; and, very generally, the chief civil magistrate, so far filling the office of the kings of old, was the chief military commander. The extraordinary constitution of Lacedæmon furnished an exception; the kings, hereditary chiefs, as of old, in military business, being subordinate in civil. At Athens the refinements of democratical sovereinty provided a different exception; the polemarc, chief of the war-department, was only third in rank in the college of chief magistrates called archons. At Athens, nevertheless, experience of the necessities of military business, in the course of frequent wars, produced what effectually overbore the principle of that arrangement: a commander-in-chief was elected, with special power to supersede, in command of the forces, the authority of the polemarc, who was thus reduced to the condition of a civil officer, a kind of secretary at war. But moreover the general was vested with a civil power, that of calling, at his pleasure, an assembly of the people, which gave him means for an effectual superiority over all the proper civil officers. Less subject to control than the kings of Lacedæmon, who were under the separate check of the senate and of the ephors, the general of Athens was dependent on none but the assembly of the people; where the majority, which had raised, was generally

Ch. 5. s. 3. of this History.

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disposed to support him; so that the general was, in effect, for the time, king of Athens.

Arist. Polit. l. 7. c. 14.

It is observed by Aristotle that, among all the nations which, to his time, had acquired celebrity, a state of war had been principally in the legislator's view; and this more with the purpose of conquest, and the command of neighboring people, than of the maintenance of peace and security. Stating examples, he remarkably mixes Greek and barbarian; of the former, noticing only Cretan and Lacedæmonian; of the latter, Scythian, Persian, Thracian and Celtic. In proceeding then he mentions institutions, similar in Carthage and in Macedonia, having for their object to excite and maintain a military disposition among the people. The assurance thus that the Macedonians were a military people, and that their military character was supported by popular institutions similar to those of a republic, is important toward elucidation of the character of the government.

It may seem probable that the entertaining of forein troops for hire, so ordinary among the Grecian republics, originated with tyrants and usurpers. We have observed it remarked by Aristotle, as a criterion for distinguishing kings from tyrants, that kings rested their security on the support of native subjects in arms; tyrants hired foreiners for their guard. Yet how early and how extensively that resource of tyrants was adopted among the republics, insomuch that foreiners, not Greeks only, but barbarians, were entertained by them for hire, and not only to fight their battles in the field, but to defend their walls, and be the protectors of their domestic security, we have also had occasion to remark. Even at Athens we have observed Isocrates complaining of this as a growing evil. But nothing of

Arist. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

Ch. 35, s. 1. of this History.

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the kind do we read of in Macedonia. The Macedonian military, mentioned by Thucydides to have been so greatly improved by the king his cotemporary, Archelaus, was, evidently, the national force. At a following time, when the Macedonian throne was contested by rival branches of the royal family, the leading men of Lacedæmon, as we have remarked Xenophon, who lived among them, relating, admonished the expelled king, Amyntas, father of the great Philip, that he should ingage a mercenary force to recover his kingdom. This remonstrance seems to imply the backwardness of a Macedonian prince to resort to an expedient revolting to the Macedonians, to whom he still looked for support. In the same age nevertheless, and in an adjoining country, Thessaly, where Amyntas had powerful friends, the great tagus Jason afforded example of the acquisition and maintenance of dominion by a hired force. But the sequel of Xenophon's narrative indicates that Amyntas obtained his insuing success by means less likely to excite alarm and offence in Macedonia; his principal assistance, in addition to the native force, whose attachment he preserved, being obtained from that party of the Thessalian people which for ages, had been friendly to his family. After this again, two princes, claiming the throne against the sons of Amyntas, successively came into the country with hired troops; but both failed. The silence then of Demosthenes on the subject is proof, more cogent than the positive assertion of a friendly writer, that Philip's power never rested on a hired force. Aristotle has observed well, that those who compose the military of a state can choose whether the existing constitution shall remain or be overthrown. Where therefore the whole nation has been, for ages, as the Macedonian,

Ch. 27. s. 1. of this History.

Ch. 34. s. 2.

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in the habit of holding and using arms, despotism can hardly be[9].

But this the most powerful of possible checks upon the tyrannical power of a single chief, is that which is most liable to be abused, and become itself tyrannical. Accordingly we have seen its excesses frequent and great among the Grecian republics. Of the Macedonian constitution therefore we want further to know what were the regular popular authorities which, in concurrence with those of the prince, completed the soverein power. For this important matter, remaining information is indeed scanty. Classed by Aristotle with the Lacedæmonian, yet, in the Macedonian constitution, neither a senate is found, as at Lacedæmon, the guardian of aristocratical rights, nor magistrates, like the ephors, armed with authority to maintain the cause of the lower orders. Two writers, however, Diodorus and Curtius, speak in direct terms of popular assemblies; marking decisively, so far as their authority goes, a constitutional share of the sovereinty, held, as in the kingdoms of the heroïc ages, by the people at large; and it is a matter of a kind for which their authority may be least questionable. According to Diodorus, on the death of Perdiccas son of Amyntas, when his brother Philip's claim to the throne was disputed by Argæus, assemblies of the people were held in which Philip's eloquence greatly promoted his cause. On Philip's death he mentions similar assemblies held; and, on Alexander's death, when the question arose, singularly momentous then, and in a case of singular difficulty, who was best intitled to be successor to

Ch. 34. s. 4. of this History.

Ch. 44. s. 1.

[9] Οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν καὶ μὴ μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν κύριοι. Arist. Polit. l. 7. c. 9. p. 582. ed. Paris, 1654.

the newly acquired empire, and, afterward, what measures should follow, all was referred to a general assembly of the Macedonians present, as representatives of the Macedonian people[10]. SECT. III. Diod. l. 18. c. 2, & 4.

The more immediate subject of Curtius has been the criminal law. 'Judgement on life and death, he says, 'by the immemorial law of Macedonia, 'was reserved to the people: the king's authority 'was unavailing but under warrant of the law.' The similarity of the law of our own country, derived from our Anglosaxon forefathers, and formerly common to most of western Europe, will here be striking. Q. Curt. l. 6. c. 8.

Among the antients, very generally, the law for the city and the camp, at home and abroad, were the same. According to the Macedonian constitution then, for decision on life and death, at home the people, abroad the army, was the jury. Strongly distinguished as civil and military law commonly have been in modern times, this may appear to modern minds, among what remains reported, most doubtful, and yet is that to which the most undeniable testimony remains. Among the antients a military power, distinct from the civil, and more arbitrary, seems first observable among the Lacedæmonians, but is first clearly and strongly marked in the history of the Romans. Admitted originally among that great military people, like the tyrannical authority of a dictator, occasionally, on the plea of necessity, the crafty leaders of the Roman councils procured lasting acquiescence under it, by bribing their soldiery with the spoil of the unfortunate people they conquered; and thus, through a union,

[10] Ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων πλῆθος ἀνήνεγκε τὴν περὶ τούτων βουλήν. Diod. l. 18. c. 4.

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then peculiar to themselves, of severe discipline and reddy zeal, they promoted their conquests. In the sequel of this history instances will occur of practice, among the Macedonians, according to the law mentioned by Curtius. A very remarkable one, of an age later than that to which this volume will extend, it may be advantageous, for immediate illustration and assurance, to notice here.

Polybius lived while the Macedonian kingdom yet existed; and not in diminished splendor; for its monarch, conquered and plundered by the Romans within the same age, was, according to their great historian, Livy, one of the richest potentates of the time. Polybius, in his history of what passed in his own country, Peloponnesus, while his father was a leading man there, relates as follows: The commander of a body detached from a Macedonian army, acting under the king in person, was arrested on accusation of high treason. The detachment, alarmed for their commander, of whose crime they were not conscious, sent hastily a deputation to the king, demanding 'that the trial of the 'accused should await their return to head-quarters; 'otherwise they should reckon themselves unwor- 'thily treated, and should highly resent it.' Such free communication with their kings, the historian proceeds to say, the Macedonians always held[11]. The circumstances, being highly critical, for the king's life was threatened, the return of the detachment was not waited for; and indeed the probability that the main body of the army, actually with the king, was legally competent to try the acccus-

Liv. l. 45.

Polyb. l. 5. p. 357. ed. Casaub.

[11] Εἶχον γὰρ ἀεὶ τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς. Polyb. l. 5. p. 357. ed. Casaub. Hardly will any single word in any other language so strongly mark a free constitution as Greek term *ἰσηγορία*, here used by Polybius.

ed, so that nothing was done against the constitution, will be found strengthened by circumstances occurring for notice in the sequel of this history. SECT. III.

With the assurance that the military law of Macedonia gave to the Macedonian people, on forein military service, even upon accusation of high treason, the privilege of being tried by their fellow-soldiers, the information of Curtius, that the Macedonian people at home held equal privilege, appears completely supported. Abuses of authority, found under all governments, and prominent in the conduct of all factions among the Grecian republics, would hardly fail in a country agitated as we have seen Macedonia. But, in any monarchy, for the royal authority, limited by the military, to be unlimited by the civil law, controlled legally in the army, to be, by law or custom, uncontrolled in the state, were an extravagance, not meerly unlikely, but it may be ventured to say, impossible.

Through the circumstances thus authentically reported then, we have assurance, with confirmation yet to come in the course of the history, not only that the royal authority in Macedonia was constitutionally limited, but how it was effectually limited: judgement, in capital cases, being reserved to the people; and the maintenance of this important right being assured by the most powerful warranty, the general possession and practice of arms by the people. Hardly have we equal proof that equal security for individuals was provided by law in any republic of Greece.

It were very desirable to know what was the LEGISLATIVE power in Macedonia. But, as we have observed that Aristotle, neither in criticizing numerous governments existing in his time, has noticed a legislature, nor in his project for a perfect go-

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vernment, has proposed one, and that, excepting the Athenian, hardly any account remains of the legislature of any republic of Greece, it cannot be surprizing if concerning legislation in Macedonia information fails. Aristotle is large on the office of a legislator; meaning one authorized by the popular voice, like Minos, Solon, Lycurgus, and others, to frame a constitution, with a system of law to be complete for all purposes. But he remarks justly the impossibility of adapting the most voluminous system of law to every possible case; whence it was common, among the Grecian republics, he says, to commit much to the magistrate's discretion; so that in fact, power was by the constitution given him to make the law for the occasion. Possibly Aristotle has been urged to adopt so extravagantly hazardous an expedient, in his own system, by observation of the evils of that opposite extravagance at Athens, complained of, as we have formerly seen, by Isocrates; where decrees of the multitude, the unbalanced soverein, at the suggestion of demagogues, favorites of the moment, were so multiplied, with such haste and so little circumspection, that, in many cases, the citizens could not know to which of many laws they were in the moment subject.

Sect. 1. of this chap.

Ch. 35. s. 1. of this History.

In the regal governments of the early ages, legislation, not less than capital condemnation, evidently rested with the people at large. But, even in the smaller states this was inconvenient, and in the larger, for regular practice, impossible; whence appears to have arisen the maxim, so extensively adopted, and so decidedly approved and recommended by Aristotle, that laws, once established, were not to be altered; but the magistrate's discretion, for decision adapted to the

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exigency, rather to be trusted. That the legislative system, throughout the Grecian republics, was very imperfect Aristotle has largely shown. The Roman republican constitution, probably derived from Greece, confessedly improved through diligent inquiry after Grecian models, and altogether better than any Grecian constitution of which any account remains, had yet, among its excellencies, great imperfections. Its legislature was extraordinary. Laws, binding upon the whole people, were made by the people at large; assembled, at the discretion of the magistrate, in two ways, so different that they were, in effect, different assemblies; insomuch that what the people, assembled in one way, would inact, assembled in the other way they would not inact; and laws binding on the whole people were also occasionally inacted by the senate, without the participation of the people. Such conflicting powers of legislation were likely to produce multiplied, and sometimes inconsistent, inactments. But, the Roman democracy being more constitutionally balanced than the Athenian, a discretionary power was allowed to the prætor's court to adapt decisions to the equity of the case. These decisions, recorded, obtained authority as precedents, for future decision in similar cases; and thus that court seems to have furnished the spring-head of systematic equity, as distinguished from law, in our own country, and throughout modern Europe. Such distinction in the legal system is found necessary under all governments, for correction, as our Blackstone expresses it after Grotius, 'of that wherein the law, 'by reason of its universality is deficient.' But in our constitution alone has the advantage grown of a separation of the two powers; limiting the courts of law to decision by the letter, and committing the

Blackst. Com. on Laws of England, introd. §2.

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power of relief, where equity may require it, to courts appropriated to the purpose. These, our learned judge proceeds to say, 'have been established for the benefit of the subject; to detect 'latent frauds, which the process of the courts of 'law is not adapted to reach; to inforce the execution of such matters of trust as are binding in conscience, tho not cognizable in a court of law; 'to deliver from dangers owing to misfortune or 'oversight; and to give a more specific relief, 'and more adapted to the circumstances of the 'case, than can always be obtained by the generality of the rules of the positive or common law. 'This is the business of the courts of equity; 'which however are only conversant in matters of 'property. For the freedom of our constitution 'will not permit that, in criminal cases, a power 'should be lodged in any judge to construe the law 'otherwise than according to the letter. This 'caution, while it admirably protects the public 'liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals: a 'man cannot suffer more punishment than the law 'assigns; but he may suffer less; the law cannot 'be strained, by partiality, to inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but in cases 'where the letter induces any apparent hardship, 'the crown has the power to pardon.'

Blackst. Com. on laws of England, intro. § 3.

This excellence of legal system, not found among the republics of Greece, nor in Rome, nor in modern Europe beyond our own country, will hardly be looked for in Macedonia. There nevertheless the criminal law assured a large degree of freedom for the subject, of which hereafter proof will be seen in authentic accounts of the practice. The popular power, indeed, under that law, appears to have been most rudely exercised, yet perhaps

not more so than in many or perhaps most of the Grecian republics; and the course of proceeding resembled very nearly what we find related, on highest authority, of the Jews; who seem also, conformably to Aristotle's system, to have been without a legislative power, limited to the Mosaïc law*. In Macedonia, the king, as of old, still executed the office of chief justice of his kingdom, if the authority of the later antient writers should be admitted, who, in consonance with Homer, have reckoned this not the privilege more than the duty of kings. Thus, like the judges of many Grecian republics, and those proposed by Aristotle for his own imaginary state, the kings of Macedonia would have a hazardous extent of power. But that they had alone authority to make laws binding on their people, any more than the kings of Homer's age, nowhere appears.

Ch. 42. s. 8. of this History.

Among the Grecian republics we have observed many REPRESENTATIVE assemblies; the Amphictyonic, representing nearly the whole nation; the Calaurian, the Panionian, the Phocian, and others, representing portions of the nation; and, beside these, frequent occasional assemblies of the representatives of several confederated states. But no mention occurs of a representative assembly in Macedonia; and a general assembly of all the Macedonian people, as alreddy observed, the extent of the country denied. Apparently therefore the Macedonian assemblies, of which we read, must have been several, in the several cities and provinces; which, possibly, and even probably, differ-

* "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, "neither shall ye diminish from it, that ye may keep the "commandments of the Lord your God, which I command "you."—Deuteronomy, c. iv. v. 2.

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ed in constitution and laws; and yet perhaps less than those of the modern kingdoms of France and Spain. The Macedonian cities, under their king, as the Thessalian, under their tagus, evidently held their several municipal governments in a considerable degree of independency. The revolt of Pydna, under Archelaus, and the measure resorted to afterward for insuring its future allegiance; the reddiness with which, in the earlier part of the reign of Amyntas, so many towns followed their choice to secede from the Macedonian kingdom and become members of the Olynthian confederacy; the revolt again of Pydna, under Philip, managed by one party, and its restoration to the Macedonian kingdom by another; that fact, of such anomalous aspect, yet so fully ascertained, Philip's gratuitous resignation of his sovereinty over the Macedonian town of Anthemus, for the purpose of its becoming a member of the republican confederacy of Olynthus, and finally his popularity among the republics of the Chalcidic peninsulas, and their general disposition to become members of the Macedonian monarchy, in preference to being subject-allies of the Athenian commonwealth, matters all resting on the best authorities, concur to indicate principles in the Macedonian government favorable to liberty. All information indeed makes it probable that the municipal constitutions of the Macedonian towns were nearly analogous to those of the towns of Thessaly, on one side, and of the Chalcidic peninsulas on another, and less liable to be overborne by the power of the Macedonian crown than the Thessalian by a tagus, or the Chalcidic by the imperial democracy of Athens; yet better united, through their common attachment to one royal family, hereditary chiefs of the state.

Ch. 34. s. 2. of this History.

Ch. 35. s. 3. & ch. 36. s. 1.

Ch. 39. s. 2.

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As of the cities, so we find, of the extensive provinces of Macedonia, indication of power constitutionally resting in the hands of the people; little differing in amount or quality, but as the nature of things commanded; the people of the cities being in large proportion traders and handicraftmen, those of the country husbandmen, herdmen, and hunters. In the course of the previous history of Macedonia, we have observed great vassals of the crown holding extensive lordships, in the inland country, with a princely authority; bearing evident analogy, in office and dignity, to the lords marchers formerly, of England, and over the continent of Europe. Inferior landholders would not be likely to ingage the notice of historians of the Greek republics, who have transmitted these circumstances. But the assurance that the Macedonians all held arms, that the popular institutions promoted a military spirit, and in peace incouraged the chace, as advantageous preparation for the toils of service in war, institutions marked as resting on the customary law of the land, and not depending on the pleasure or immediate needs of the monarch, implies the farther assurance that the landholders held civil rights, inabling them to assert a dignified freedom; and that these civil rights extended throughout the provinces of the Macedonian kingdom, is indicated by what presently we shall have occasion to observe. It seems thus altogether probable that each province and each city made regulations for itself, under some superintending control of the king's acknowleged prerogative. Looking backward then to Homer, and forward to Alexander's history, it seems farther probable that, if laws were made for the whole nation, it was, as formerly in modern Europe, by the nation assembled in arms; its defenders be-

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ing considered as its representatives. Nor is an instance of this wanting; recorded indeed only by a writer not always to be trusted, yet carrying marks of just authority. Alexander, in the midst of his conquests, having in hunting exposed himself to great danger in contest with a lion, the Macedonians of his army, according to national custom, the historian says, taking the matter into consideration, decreed, 'That the king should not hunt 'afoot, 'nor without attendants of a quality to be answera-'ble for his safety*.'

Q. Curt. l. 8. c. 1. s. 15.

A constitution capable of assuring freedom to a people, with good government and means for defence (both indispensable toward maintenance of freedom) is of necessity a very complex machine; insomuch that how it may best be constructed has been a question for many ages, not yet decided. Hence it may be the less matter for wonder, if, in looking to the construction of constitutions found, in practice and effect, most providing those benefits, parts of great importance have escaped the observation of very acute inquirers; so far at least as to have failed of due estimation. But especially those most familiar with things are apt to undervalue them. Thus it remained for the foreiner Delolme to show the just importance of some matters in the

* The passage in Curtius is altogether, I think, among those of value in the work of that able but licentious writer. It accounts reasonably for a story among the most extravagant, of the many extravagant that were circulated concerning Alexander; and all that it asserts carries all appearance of having been derived from authority cotemporary with the transactions. 'Fabulam quæ objectum leoni a rege Lysimachum te-'mere evulgavit, ab eo casu, quam supra diximus, ortam cre-'diderim. Cæterum Macedones, quanquam prospero eventu 'defunctus erat, tamen *scivere*, *gentis suæ more*, ne pedes ve-'naretur, aut sine delectis principum amicorumque.' Q. Curt. l. 8. c. 1. § 17, 18.

English constitution, overlooked by the many able English writers who had previously written on it. Still, such is the complexity of a free government, very important points remained for circumstances to bring forward into just notice. The French minister of state Calonne, whom civil discord forced to seek refuge in a forein land, was led, in his residence in England, to remark the amalgamation of ranks here as a singularity among Europeän nations, and of a most advantageous character; producing a community of interest among the millions composing the population, whence resulted a harmony, a mutual security, and a national strength, unseen elsewhere. Nevertheless, tho intimately connected with this, another matter, of vital importance, remained for another foreiner duly to remark. Local administration in the hands of the people, in divisions and subdivisions, is necessary for the very foundation of freedom in an extensive country. Among ourselves, to whom this is familiar, its peculiarity is apt to escape observation: the supposition that it is, or may be, ordinary elsewhere reddily offers itself. But, to the acute forein observer Divernois, the peculiarity has been striking. Many thousand important offices, very far the greater part of those necessary for local administration, he has observed, are in constant course of performance without salary; and, these being for all ranks, from the peer, through the high sheriff and the juryman, down to the tithing man, and in large proportion taken in rotation, some hundreds of thousands of men thus, each in his degree, partake in the energies of government. Such is the broad basis on which the English constitution rests, and on which legislation by parliament (too generally considered, even at home, but still more by foreiners, as all in all) de-

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pends for assurance of its value, and even of its existence. Promotion then being denied to none, but, on the contrary, the ascent easy and ordinary from the condition of the workman for daily pay to that which qualifies for bearing the burthen of tithing and parish offices, and thence to higher, and by degrees to the highest, the English government thus is the completest commonwealth (its ordinary title in queen Elizabeth's days) known in history.

In the Athenian, and probably other Grecian republics, attendance on civil business was required, of the lower people, only in the general assembly and in the courts of justice; and for attendance there a small pay was given. For the higher public offices no pay was allowed; they were imposed as honorable, but often severe, burthens on the wealthy. It was therefore esteemed a valuable reward, for eminent services, to receive a grant of immunity from such burthens. The mention then, by Arrian, of such immunity granted to Macedonians, concurs with various other indications to imply that the provincial administration in Macedonia was not, as in the modern kingdoms of the continent, wholly directed by officers of the monarch's nomination; but, as in the Grecian republics formerly, and the English commonwealth now, imposed principally on those subjects who were of substance to bear the burthen of offices without salary, and to be responsible for the due execution of them.

Arr. de exp. Alex. l. 7. c. 10.

How far Aristotle ever avowed to the princes his patrons those political principles, adverse to monarchy, which he has asserted in his political treatise, which, not till after his death, it is said, was published, we do not learn: but, as it is obvious that they could not be agreeable to any princes, so it is not less clear that, not only they were incon-

sistent with the existence of a government for a country of the extent of the Macedonian kingdom, but also that they were highly tyrannical toward a larger portion of mankind than that for which they proposed assurance of freedom. Thus the admission of them would be not more adverse to the inclination of those princes, than inconsistent with their duty toward that large portion of the population of their kingdom which had supported them in their inherited claims, and which was evidently attached to the constitution, as, for ages, it had stood.

Altogether the Macedonian constitution appears to have borne a very near resemblance to that of the modern Europeän kingdoms in early times; when the combined civil and military powers were divided among lordships, similar in essence tho various in denomination, dukedoms, marches, earldoms, baronies; all of limited monarchal character; intermingled among which the corporate towns had constitutions truly republican. Lordships and townships together acknowleged the sovereinty of one king; especially his right to command their service in arms for common defence. Slavery existed among them, as among the antient republics, but apparently a less numerous and more mitigated slavery. The people, of all ranks, above slavery, in cities and throughout the country, held the important right of judgement on life and death; and of bearing arms for common defence against forein or domestic disturbers of the common peace.

The perfection of civil polity in our own country, raised, in the course of more than ten centuries, within historical information, on foundation formed in times beyond knowlege, has led some

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eminent men, viewing the improvements at the Revolution and since, and seeing, as in all human institutions ever must be, imperfections yet remaining, to reckon themselves warranted in asserting that, before the Revolution, there was no true liberty here. Surely enough there can be no perfect liberty here, or anywhere on earth: for wherever there is government, the natural liberties of individuals must be subject to control. But without government they are subject to far severer control; the weak being without resource against the strong, and the few against the many. Question therefore about true, or reasonable, or sufficient liberty may be endless. But, compared with most other nations, with necessary exception always for war within the country, or its immediate results, overbearing, for a time, civil establishments, the English nation, it may be fairly said, was always free. Justice is wanting among historians, on that score, even to the Norman reigns. The debt of all posterity to the first of the Plantagenets, the second Henry, is incalculable. With institutions of less value than those of our great Alfred, the Macedonians might be reckoned a free people; yet we know not that their institutions were inferior. Such improvements as those of our second Henry, and Edward intitled first, not to bring the refinements of the Restoration, the Revolution, and aftertimes, into question, are hardly to be found anywhere else, and therefore not reasonably expected in a country in the circumstances of Macedonia. If then the general deficiency of legislative system in antient governments appear surprizing, it may be well to look at those of modern Europe. In France itself, the wiser and honester of the movers of the late revolution there, anxiously exerting their

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diligence, with ample powers for searching, to find precedent of revered antiquity for the forms of the free constitution which they desired for their country, were unable to discover, not only the manner of passing a law in the old French assembly of the Three Estates, but any law that could with certainty be referred to that authority. Even for our own country, tho its history is perhaps altogether more perfect than that of any other nation, antient or modern, yet many important circumstances remain in much darkness; especially in that highly interesting period, the contest for the crown between the houses of York and Lancaster. Even the character of the constitution, under the Plantagenets, has been found to have been not only imperfectly known but greatly misrepresented. The search among the records of the two houses of Parliament, for precedents for the regency, proposed to be established in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, has produced most important addition to all previous history, and correction for misrepresentations, to which historians, eminent for diligence and ability, in want of it, had been led; those records demonstrating what none suspected, that in the reigns of the fourth and sixth Henries, the constitution, however less firmly established, was as well understood, and, in critical and difficult circumstances, in both reigns, as completely acted upon as it could be at this day.

Toward the character of a monarchy, whence the ROYAL REVENUE arises, and what may be its amount, are important questions. Thucydides shows that, in his time, the kings of Macedonia held very extensive landed property; and we find no other source of royal revenue intimated, till the customs of some seaports were conceded by the

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Thessalians to Philip. Yet his predecessor Archelaus, to execute all that has been attributed to him, must have been wealthy. Probably, among the troubles which followed his reign, the royal domains had been injured and diminished. Demosthenes, as formerly we have observed, seems to have thought that to impute to a king of Macedonia bribery with gold would be too extravagant to gain belief: but with timber, oxen, horses, sheep, he did not scruple to insinuate that Philip purchased the treasonable assistance of the ministers of his enemies. At a later period of that prince's reign Demosthenes reckoned him rich, not by his land but by his seaports, where duties were taken on importation and exportation. Those duties seem to have been the only taxes known in the Macedonian kingdom. The kings thus were not dependent upon their subjects for a necessary or perhaps an ample revenue in peace. But they had not what would maintain armies, and were therefore dependent upon their subjects for service in arms, whenever their safety or their ambition, or even the good of the country required it. This formed the great security of Macedonian freedom.

Ch. 36. s. 2. of this History.

Ch. 24. s. 1.

Ch. 39. s. 2.

Under such a constitution, however inferior to the British, the Macedonian people, in comparison of others, not excepting any Greek republic of which any information remains, might be happy as well as free; tho, for internal improvement, such a constitution was evidently ill calculated, and, even for exertion against forein enemies, highly defective. Its deficiences were nearly analogous to those of the French and Spanish monarchies, while yet the kings were unpossessed of despotic power. The Macedonians, under their early princes, we have seen, were conquerors; as with us the Anglosaxons

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of Wessex. England, becoming under Egbert one kingdom, became only by degrees afterward one state, under one law; the advantageous business, begun by the great Alfred, being completed, not till three centuries after, by the second Henry. But in Macedonia such advantageous yet difficult combination failing, the extension of dominion, as formerly in France, Spain and Germany, unless under a prince of rare abilities, producing distraction, produced weakness. Hence the opportunities for those contests for the crown, which have furnished matter for the larger portion of Macedonian history till Philip's reign. Through the deficiency of combination in the government, opportunity was continually open for the interference of forein influence. Throughout the reign of Perdiccas son of Alexander, tho a prince of considerable talents, the intrigues of Lacedæmon and Athens, sometimes alternately, sometimes together, troubled the country. Under still abler princes, the important seaport of Pydna was withdrawn from it at least twice; and probably was among those, the best towns of the kingdom, which, at another time, seceded from it to become members of another state. But, except in that remarkable instance, occurring in extraordinary circumstances, the very inconveniences and defects of the Macedonian government assisted to deny opportunity for any party, not headed by a popular claimant of the crown, to give any great extent to revolutionary intrigue. Generally, if portions of the people might be gained, yet antipathy of portion to portion obviated extensive seduction. But as formerly France, when neither the king was absolute, nor a good government, with one legislature and one jurisprudence, held the country to-

Ch. 13. s. 4. & ch. 16. s. 4. of this History.

Ch. 34. s. 1.

Ch. 26. s. 2. & ch. 34. s. 2.

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gether, was wounded through a duke of Burgundy or a town of Rochelle, so Macedonia was assailed through a prince Argæus, or a town of Pydna.

SECTION IV.

Comparative view of the Constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome. Indications of the Thracian Constitution. Despotic Government unknown in Europe before the rise of Republican Government in Greece.

In proceeding to the states most connected with Macedonia, Thessaly stands foremost for attention. Alreddy occasion has occurred to observe some remarkable particularities of the political division and political union of that eminently fruitful and wealthy country, called the mother of Greece; and also of the old and intimate connection of a powerful party, among its many republics, with the Macedonian kingdom. That connection indicates a similarity of manners and character in the people of the two countries; at least in those of higher rank; and this we find also marked in accounts of antient authors. Neither Macedonians nor Thessalians were given, like the men of leisure in so many of the republics, to science, the fine arts, and all that the Greeks included under their term Philosophy. Neither had public buildings, especially temples, equal to some even of the smaller and more obscure of the Grecian cities. Both delighted in personal magnificence; and especially, like Cleisthenes of Sicyon and Laphanes of Arcadia, recently noticed, in a splendid hospitality. But, though their public buildings were inferior, their private dwellings are likely to have been superior to those of the other

Ch. 34. s. 2. of this History.

Greeks; which, in the florishing ages of the republican system, appear to have been generally very mean. What little remains from antiquity concerning the palace and court of the great king of Macedonia, Archelaus, cotemporary of Pericles and Thucydides, and patron of Euripides and Zeuxis, indicates even splendor in his palace and court. SECT. IV.

Ch. 34. s. 1. of this Hist.

A striking general analogy between the constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome, with some important differences, may here deserve notice; for the Roman constitution, derived from Greece, being more completely laid open to us than any of Greece, will assist toward an investigation of the character of Grecian governments.

The Thessalian constitution, the Lacedæmonian, and the Roman, it is observable, originally all acknowleged one hereditary chief. Afterward Lacedæmon had two chiefs, both hereditary; Thessaly one, not hereditary, but appointed for life; Rome generally two, but at times more, sometimes ten, elected annually. All these chiefs, or boards of chiefs, were supreme military commanders; the Roman especially exercising a despotic authority. The lives of Roman citizens, on military service, were not guarded by law against the power of consuls, or military tribunes, as those of the Macedonians against that of their kings. The spoil of conquered neighbors bribing the Roman people to allow despotism, even to their ordinary chief magistrates, in military command, prepared them for tolerating that extraordinary magistracy the dictatorship, which put the whole state under military law, subject to no rule but the supreme magistrate's will. The kings of Lacedæmon had no such authority over the Lacedæmonian people,

Ch. 20. s. 4.

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tho Lacedæmonian military commanders would assume it over those whom they called allies. The proper powers of the tagus of Thessaly are little defined by antient writers. But all the three constitutions acknowleged a division of the free population into a higher order, arrogating to itself exclusively the magistracy; and a lower, which participated always nominally in the soverein power, and sometimes exercised it effectually and almost exclusively. Both orders, in all three, were served by slaves. All three held dominion over subdued neighbors. The sovereinty of the Lacedæmonians we have seen most severe: the Helots and Messenians, tho not only Greeks, but, if they were distinguished, the Messenians at least, being of the same Dorian origin as the Lacedæmonians, all were in a state of absolute slavery: those even of the Lacedæmonians called Periœcians, inhabitants of the country, associated indeed in the Lacedæmonian name, were however denied the Spartan; and, tho not slaves, were yet held in a degrading subordination. The dominion of the Thessalians over the Penestians was less harsh than that of the Lacedæmonians over the Messenians. The character of that of the Romans over the conquered people of Italy, whom they flattered, as the Athenians flattered their subjects, with the title of allies, tho avoided by their historians, becomes, in large amount, known from effects, of which memorials remain. The old free population, by drafts for service in unceasing wars, and in other ways less indicated, was nearly annihilated. Its place, for cultivation of the land, was supplied by slaves; the cruel treatment of whom, mostly born to better hopes, produced those called the servile wars, which brought Rome, more than once, to the brink of ruin.

Ch. 24. s. 3. of this History.

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In the Lacedæmonian and Roman states then, the citizens of the capital arrogated to themselves the powers of government exclusively; those of the other towns, or provinces, with whatever privileges, here more, there less, being reälly but their subjects. In Thessaly the citizens of no one town appear to have held any acknowleged preëminence: but, from their separate rights, or claims, evils the most monstrous resulted. So unable was the general assembly of the Thessalian people to maintain its proper soverein authority that, unless when the one first magistrate, the tagus, could command all, either by popularity supporting military force, as the great Jason, or by a hired military, as the tyrants his successors, the towns would often severally choose their own political as well as civil measures, and make their own wars and their own alliances, with forein powers or with oneanother. A feeling of the enormous mischief of this laxity of their executive government would doubtless contribute to direct that attachment of the higher orders and principal landholders, all who had the clearest interest in the establishment of civil order, and the least hope from its disturbance, to their kinsman (as, from a claimed common descent from Hercules, many of them reckoned him) the king of Macedonia.

The constitution of Lacedæmon (how far as established by Lycurgus is not known) acknowleged in later times two soverein assemblies, one composed of those of commanding rank, another of wider admission for the population; but, for what were the common and what the several powers and privileges of these different assemblies, information fails. It appears however that, in later times at least, only when public misfortune and

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danger pressed on the few who held the lead, the more numerous assembly was admitted to any participation of counsel. Two different assemblies, each severally soverein within the same state, might seem, in speculation, too strange an anomaly to hold in any government, had we not full assurance of the actual exercise of sovereinty, in the Roman, through ages, by three; two, as before mentioned, differently constituted, of the people at large, and one, a select and comparatively small body, the senate. Yet, judging from consequences, the evil of this strange competition of bodies for the same authority over the whole state, in the Lacedæmonian and Roman governments, appears to have been hardly equal to that of the division of powers in the Thessalian, each holding authority too independent over different portions of the state.

But there was another monster in the Lacedæmonian government, which the Roman adopted, without any known parallel in the Thessalian. More tyrannical magistracies can hardly be imagined than the ephoralty of Lacedæmon[9] and the tribunate of Rome; tho the purpose of both was to obviate tyranny. Nevertheless, such was altogether the deficiency of the antient republican system that, on comparing the histories of the three governments, a resource so extravagant may seem to have been rather beneficial. This considered, and combined with what we learn of the distractions of Thessaly under its soverein assembly, and the oppression under single tyrants, the line of policy adopted by the Thessalian nobles, in cherishing, for so many

[9] Thus Aristotle, Οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα (λέγουσι) Polit. l. 2. c. 6, and again Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως, ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτὴ τῶν μεγίστων αἰτοῖς ἐστί, κ. τ. ε. c. 9.

generations, as it appears they did, their connection with the kings of Macedonia, and at length making their country in a manner a portion of the Macedonian kingdom, may seem to have been not only necessary for their own welfare, but, for the body of the Thessalian people, wise, liberal and patriotic.

In the course of this history, we have seen, among the Grecian republics, various forms of soverein assemblies, with the legislative and executive powers in no known instance accurately separated. Thus also it was, we know, at Rome, with a constitution improved upon the Greek, whence it was derived. Ordinary public business, indeed, was necessarily intrusted to magistrates; king, tagus, consul, archon, Bœotarc, whatever might be their title. But, in the democratical states the people always claimed the right to control and even direct, whenever they chose to interfere, every measure of executive government; and often, as any popular orator's view to his own ambitious purposes led him to persuade, they did interfere. Nevertheless, with the extravagance peculiar to that constitution, when the popular mind was strongly pointed to a particular object, they would, under similar stimulation, commit absolute power, with the title of general-autocrator, to one man, a popular favorite of the moment. In the aristocratical states, as distinguished from the oligarchal, a few directing the ordinary business, all were called together for legislation; and, in difficult cases, even for authorizing the measures of executive government. This, indeed, whether with one or more persons of supereminent dignity at the head of all, appears to have been, from before Homer's time, very generally looked to as the principle of regular and legal government.

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But the assembling of all, being, in small states inconvenient, in large impossible, representative government arose among the Greeks, and became even familiar. We have seen, in the Amphictyonic council, an example of antiquity beyond history. The Calaurean and the Panionian, later yet very early, were of similar character. Not till after-times we find notice of the several congresses of Thessaly, Bœotia, Phocis, Achaia, Elis, and Arcadia. We have observed formerly that the Amphictyonic, originally proposed as a general council of the Greek nation, lost much of that valuable character through the great early revolution, called the return of the Heracleids. Not till some ages after, the alarm, occasioned by the expectation of invasion from the overbearing power of Persia, produced a substitute for it, in the assembly of deputies from the several republics, held at Corinth. But the immediate general danger being, beyond hope, soon overborne, the purpose of a general congress was considered as fulfilled, and no such meeting ever acquired regular and permanent establishment. A partial congress was produced by the circumstances which led to the Peloponnesian war; and the eagerness of the Corinthians for ingaging the Lacedæmonians in league against Athens, made Sparta, instead of their own town, which, in the general danger, appears to have been reasonably preferred (a sense of general danger often inforcing general prudence) as most commodious for the meeting of deputies from within and without the peninsula. During that long war frequent occasion occurring for the states, associated under the lead of Lacedæmon, to communicate by their representatives, something of form and order seems to have been settled by custom

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for the composition and proceedings of those congresses; but it does not appear that they ever obtained establishment as constitutional assemblies.

The Athenian democracy ruled those states which had ingaged in its alliance, with more avowed despotism than, as far as may be learnt from history, any other of the republics which ever acquired imperial sway over states to which the title of republic continued to be allowed. The attendance of their deputies was commanded constantly at Athens: the congress of the Athenian confederacy thus was a permanent assembly. Its power and privileges however went little beyond representing grievances, and offering petitions, from the subject states; its further office being only to communicate to those states the commands of the imperial people. When, afterward, the revolting tyrannies of Athens and Lacedæmon produced opportunity for Thebes to rise to empire, under the lead of men singularly deserving popularity, those states which desired to form confederacy with the Theban government sent their deputies to Thebes.

Conformably to Aristotle's observation on the antient governments in general, the objects of all the representative assemblies of Greece appear to have been military rather than civil, defence or conquest more than domestic regulation or peaceful prosperity. Such indeed was the general partiality of the Greeks for the independent sovereinty of their several towns, and such the occasions of animosity between them, that none, even of the constitutional provincial congresses appear to have been provided with power to prevent occasional war between town and town, or even to prevent

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some municipalities within their proper jurisdiction from avowedly taking part with external enemies. Numerous and striking examples of this will have been observed in the histories of Thessaly and Phocis.

Excepting the council of Amphictyons, little information has reached us of the constitution or proceedings of any of the constitutional assemblies. Of that of Bœotia most might be expected; no part of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, having equally ingaged the notice of historians and orators. Yet it remains uncertain, concerning that eminent confederacy, even what was the number of the great presiding officers, the Bœotarcs; whether ten, or only five, or sometimes one number, sometimes the other. Their office, we find, was elective, but who were the electors nowhere appears. Clearly it was annual; and of its character this important matter is fully authenticated, that, for all the cities of the Bœotian league, the Bœotarcs filled the office of the kings of the early ages, presiding in the general council, and commanding in the field; those cities being nevertheless qualified each as a separate republic, having its own legislature and its own administration. In Thessaly a similar authority was vested in one great officer, the Tagus; who so far more nearly approached the condition of the kings of old, as his office, tho elective, was for life. Indeed, no first magistrate of any other government of Greece, not even the kings of Lacedæmon, except as their dignity was hereditary, seems to have held so exactly the place of the kings of Homer's age as the tagus of Thessaly.

The state of the Grecian republics southward of Thessaly, and of their connection with the Macedonian kingdom, for which we have fuller informa-

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tion, it has been the purpose of the preceding narrative to explain. Some remarks on the people called barbarous, whom Philip's arms or policy either united with Macedonia, or brought to subordination, may yet be requisite.

The extensive, and, at one time, very powerful nation of the Thracians, through intercourse with the Greeks for ages, in war and in peace, especially with the Athenians, came of course under notice of the three great historians, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, and, after them, of the great orator Demosthenes. In the accounts of all these writers, who all had superior opportunities for information, the barbarian character is strongly marked in the manners and institutions of the Thracian people; but with that most remarkable temperament, formerly occurring for notice, so recorded by Demosthenes as to leave no reasonable doubt of its existence, or of its efficiency. Living in arms, deïfying and worshipping war, illiberal and destructive in warfare, merciless to strangers, tho unresisting, and delighting in bloodshed even of women and children, (such anomalies are sometimes found in individuals, as here in a nation) capital punishment, for whatsoever crime, was denied by their institutions absolutely and effectually. Well then may it deserve observation, that throughout modern Europe, in its early age, in our own not less than in other countries, the same principle was carried into practice, so far that, tho private war was largely tolerated, no capital punishment was, for any crime, warranted by law. Among Europeäns the inference is naturally ready, that people with property and arms and courage must be free; that they will not submit to despotism, and that it cannot be forced upon them. This however, in an extended

Ch. 14. s. 2. Ch. 18. s. 6. & Ch. 36. s. 4. of this History.

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view of the world, is seen not completely founded; Asia, through all ages, and the greater part of Africa, have abounded with contradicting examples. But, in Asia and Africa, despotism has been maintained through the arbitrary use of the cimiter and bowstring by the sovereins; habitually tolerated, authenticated, and even venerated by the people. Securely it may be affirmed that, where capital punishment is forbidden, despotism cannot be. Monarchy however prevailed in Thrace; limited by that power which a people, holding arms, possess to maintain established law. At one time we have seen the nation united under one chief, the most powerful of any of his day known to us, except the king of Persia. When afterward divided, submission to one hereditary chief seems to have remained a general principle of the several governments; and hardly more of their policy is known.

The country north of Thrace and Macedonia as far as the Danube, was occupied by the Triballians; of whose political institutions our information goes no farther than that they acknowleged one hereditary military chief, by Grecian writers intitled king. Westward, the Illyrians, holding the country bordering on the Adriatic, were more known to the Greeks, who had settlements on their shores. Their government was a hereditary monarchy, with the regal authority liable to restriction, as in Homer's days, by popular power, supported by the universal use of arms. In the sequel of Grecian history an instance will occur of a very ill-judged use of this power by the Illyrian people, when the regal authority failed of its just efficacy; and of great public calamity insuing. Had we more of Illyrian history, instances probably might be found of abuses of the regal power, for want of a steddier

balance, more numerous, and, to individuals, injurious, but less producing great public misfortune. SECT. IV.

It has been observed by Aristotle, and, after him by other antient writers, that the people of Asia have always been more disposed to bear despotism, those of Europe to assert freedom. In looking through history, to earliest times, indeed it seems evident that, as a principle of government, despotism has been of Asiatic growth; first introduced into Europe, as far as accounts show, by the thoughtless violence of democracy, giving to a favorite party-leader autocratical powers, either for opposing an adverse party at home, or conducting a favorite enterprize abroad. It must have been by a deep policy, with extraordinary able management, that the Roman senate gained that resource against popular leaders, the dictatorship; which popular leaders afterward turned against the senate and the whole free constitution. The republican temporary despotism was the germ of the imperial permanent despotism, which extinguished the republic. But till after the general abolition of the antient monarchies of Greece, and the general establishment of republics, that any Europeän people ever acknowleged an absolute soverein, no warrant appears among antient writers.

SECTION V.

Causes of Deficiency of Information concerning the Politics and Constitutions of Greece in Philip's age. Indications in Letters of Isocrates; in a Speech reported by Arrian: Measures of Philip, for improving the Constitution of Macedonia and of the Grecian Confederacy.

In the extant speeches of Demosthenes the reserve and caution, becoming a great politician, are not SECT. V.

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less remarkable than the fire and energy, for which he has been so justly admired as an orator. To those who seek information or illustration of historical matter it must be disappointing, and may seem surprizing, to find how little can be gathered from him, not of the constitution only, but of the state of parties; not in Macedonia alone, but throughout Greece; especially of the governments with which he had the closest political connection, the Arcadian, Eleian, Ætolian, Acarnanian, and, more particularly, the Bœotian. Even for Macedonia, where cause is less obvious, his reserve is remarkable; especially in those speeches in which he has not scrupled to express his exultation at the revolt of Pydna, and the change of politics of Olynthus and Byzantium. On the other hand the still greater reserve of the opponents of Demosthenes, friends of the Macedonian alliance, might appear still more surprizing, had we not the assurance of Isocrates, with confirmation from Xenophon and from the whole tenor of Grecian history, that democracy denied freedom of speech. And this, strange as it may appear to those who have had no experience of a democratical mixture in government, cannot appear strange among ourselves, where county-meetings, too frequently, and the common-hall of London, continually, exhibit perfect examples of that tyranny of a multitude. Hence the extraordinary fact, that more eulogy of Philip is found in the speeches of his great enemy, Demosthenes, than in those of Æschines, certainly his political friend, and accused of being his pensioner. For it was little less dangerous at Athens to speak well of the Macedonian king and his government, than, under either the late republic of France, or the following usurpation, to apologize

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for the mild despotism of the unfortunate sixteenth Lewis. Such then having been the reserve of orators; of one party from policy, of the other from fear; and the authorities, whence Cicero gathered his judgement of men of that age in Greece, and found ground for his splendid eulogy of Philip, having perished, any authenticated circumstances that may afford light on the general character of the political state of the country, at the important crisis of Alexander's accession, must deserve consideration.

Ch. 42. s. 8. of this History.

The inability of Plato, Xenophon, and, after them Aristotle, to propose any mode of government for Greece united, which could, even in theory, satisfy even themselves, we have already observed. Isocrates appears to have had no less difficulty: tho decided in regard to one point, on which, differing from the first and last of those eminent philosophers, he agreed with the second, inasmuch as he thought it desirable to have one man of superior dignity for president of the nation. The opinion, in which he persevered, that thus most reddily, and surely, and even only, the continually convulsed state of the nation could be ameliorated, it appears he entertained long before Philip of Macedonia had acquired the power, or established the character, which at length drew toward him the regard of so large a portion of the Grecian people as their best protector, and the hatred of the rest, as the most formidable obstacle to their purposes. Beside the tract purporting to be a speech of Archidamus son of Agesilaus to the Lacedæmonian people, which has been formerly under our observation, there is extant a letter of Isocrates to the same prince, bearing all appearance of authenticity. This letter marks, within itself, that it was written

Ch. 28. s. 9.

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after that prince's accession to the throne, but several years before any of the extant letters of the same writer to Philip. The purpose, the same as afterward to the king of Macedonia, was to excite the king of Lacedæmon to interfere as a mediator in the quarrels of the republics with oneanother, and of each within itself; and, having established peace throughout Greece, to proceed, after the example of his father, Agesilaus, to direct the united arms of the nation against Persia.

The passages in that letter principally to our present purpose are these: 'I wonder,' Isocrates says, 'that, among men of influence, or of elo-'quence, the general state of the Greek nation, 'altogether so wretched and so disgraceful, has 'never appeared an object for their consideration 'and regard. There is not, in all Greece, a place 'which is not suffering under the miseries of war, 'sedition, massacre, evils unnumbered. Perhaps the 'largest share falls to the Greeks of Asia, whom, 'by our treaties, we have surrendered; not simply 'to the barbarians, but also to others, Greeks by 'origin and language, but barbarians in principle 'and manners. If we considered rightly what ma-'terially concerns us, we should not allow armed 'bodies to be collected under leaders of no respon-'sibility; herds of outcasts and vagabonds, yet 'forming reälly more powerful armies than are 'maintained by all the Grecian states. Ingaged 'under pretence of war against Persia, they plun-'der a small part of the king's territory; but, by 'force or otherwise, entering Grecian cities, they 'have overthrown them wholly; killing some citi-'zens, expelling others, plundering property, and 'committing all sorts of enormities, even against 'women and children.

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'Farther then it seems surprizing that these 'enormities appear not at all to have ingaged the 'care of any of those states which have affected to 'take the lead in Greece. Your father Agesilaus, 'indeed, as an individual in a situation of power, 'is an exception; but he stands alone. His er- 'nestness to give freedom to the Greeks, and re- 'press the barbarians, was constant. But even he 'erred in one material point. Wonder not if, ad- 'dressing you, I say where I think he erred in 'judgement; for I am accustomed always to declare 'my mind freely; and I should prefer incurring ill- 'will so, to gaining favor by praising what is not 'praiseworthy. So much with regard to myself. 'With regard to him then, superior in all other 'matters, most temperate, most righteous, a most 'able statesman, he was bent eagerly upon two 'objects, each separately good, but, for execution 'together, impossible: he would at the same time 'make war with Persia, and restore, in the Grecian 'states, his banished friends; which, without also 'providing for them preponderant power in their 'several republics, could not be. Thus, through 'his zeal in favor of those concurring with him in 'political sentiment, evils and dangers arose for all 'Greece; and, from insuing troubles, means for 'war against the barbarians were lost.

'Through this error it is now become evident, 'that, to make war successfully upon Persia, it is 'necessary first to reconcile the Greeks with one- 'another, and put an end to our madness of strife 'among ourselves. Formerly I have urged advice 'on this subject, which I cannot yet forego. I put 'it now for consideration to you, of birth illustrious, 'as I have before observed, of the race of Hercu- 'les, the acknowleged hereditary military chief of

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'the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, bearing the 'title and dignity of king, and holding besides the 'highest personal reputation of any individual in 'Greece, whether you should yield to my per- 'suasion; or, in any opinion that worthier matters 'may ingage your attention, you should neglect it. 'My opinion however I will freely urge, that you 'should direct your mind especially to two things; 'first, to put an end to wars and civil contentions, 'now raging among the Greeks with oneanother, 'and then to check the barbarians in their inju- 'rious conduct, and deprive them of their over 'great share of advantages[10].' The consonance of the picture here given of the state of the Greek nation, in its settlements in Europe and in Asia, with that of Xenophon, formerly noticed, who wrote nearly about the same time, or not long before, will be obvious.

[10] The learned French editor of Isocrates, Auger, has given the following account of this letter: 'Hæc epistola in nullis 'extat Isocratis editionibus. In Photii bibliothecam transtulit 'Hœschelius, ab Andrea Schotto allatam ex Italia. Ego huc 'induxi, ratus eam esse Isocrateam, vel saltem in stylo Isocra- 'teo. Vide Phot. bibl. p. 330. Hanc eandem reperi in duo- 'bus codicibus bibliothecæ regiæ.' Of a letter admitted by former editors, as addressed by Isocrates to Dionysius of Syracuse, Auger speaks thus: 'Extat hæc epistola in editionibus 'Vossii, Stephani, et Aldi 1514, sed non arbitror eam esse Iso- 'cratis; cujus nempe dictio longe abhorret a dictione Isocra- 'tea. Mihi videtur scripta fuisse a rhetore aliquo, vel sophis- 'ta, ad principem virum, vel ad aliquem, quem favor in emi- 'nenti loco posuerat.'

Much as I desire to avoid ingaging in questions on such subjects, I reckon I ought not to avoid declaring that I think the learned editor is right in his opinion of both these letters; unless that the latter seems far more likely to have been a meer play of fancy, under the Roman empire, than to have been really addressed to either Dionysius of Syracuse, or to any man in the situation of those to whom any party in the Greek republics would have given the title of tyrant. The whole manner corresponds with the diction to mark it for spurious, and of that later age, and probably never really ad-

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In another extant letter, written some years before that to the king of Lacedæmon, Isocrates has described his feeling of his own situation, as an Athenian citizen, which may also be to our purpose here. He had among his pupils, as formerly has been observed, the sons of the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason. These young men, after their return to their father's court, sent an invitation to him to visit and make some stay with them there. He excused himself thus: 'For the sake of the 'society of Jason and Polydamas[11], I should most 'willingly accept your invitation. Indeed I think 'familiar communication between us might be ad- 'vantageous for all. But many hindrances occur. 'I am little equal to the journey; and wandering 'from one's own country ill becomes those of my 'age; especially one, who, in earlier years, never 'left it. Moreover I fear the people; for I must 'speak the truth. Alliances made by us with other

dressed to any one. The letter to Archidamus, on the contrary, not only is in diction, as the learned editor says, Isocrateian, but also shows a knowlege of Grecian politics of his age, which the following rhetors and sophists, judging from their surviving works, appear to have been neither solicitous to acquire, nor to have supposed, for readers of their age, at all important for them to regard. But I know nothing of its kind, I will venture to own, carrying within itself evidence of authenticity more satisfactory, to my mind, than the letter to the king of Lacedæmon.

[11] Instead of the name Polydamas, hazarded in the text, all the known copies of the works of Isocrates, it seems, give Polyaces. Jason, as Auger has justly observed, is a name well known: of Polyaces, he says, 'in historia nullibi apparet.' I cannot myself doubt but the same eminent person, first the opponent, afterward the associate of Jason, has been intended, whose name, in our copies of Xenophon, is repeatedly given Polydamas. Thus this letter of Isocrates would afford a pleasing testimony to Jason's fair observance of faith and friendship, with a man of character represented, by Xenophon, as so excellent that it might be desired to have more account of him. Ch. 27, s. 1, of this Hist.

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'states I see presently broken. If that should happen with your government, how could I escape 'dangerous accusation? It is here difficult.'

Those conversant with the antient historians, and knowing the deficiency of cotemporary testimony to historical matter from Xenophon's time to that of Polybius, will value such effusions of sentiment and scraps of information as these, from one ingaged in the public affairs of the intervening age. In the sequel of this letter Isocrates shows himself an honest monitor, and no friend to absolute monarchy, or to a government, however well administered, supported by a military force of interest distinct from that of the nation. Its purpose, far from being of a flattering tenor, is to dissuade the youths from aiming to succeed their father in his invidious eminence. When, in the most promising state of that eminence, he shortly after lost his life, they were probably too young to take a leading part in such a crisis. What may have been their fate among the following crimes and troubles of their country, among which their uncles, successively attaining their father's dignity, were assassinated, and the worthy Polydamas also perished, we have no information.

To form then a just estimate of Philip's policy toward the Grecian republics, it will be expedient to recollect that, when the confederacy under the lead of Lacedæmon had brought Athens to submission nearly unconditional, the Athenian government was, according to the common Lacedæmonian custom, totally altered, with the view to its being held in complete subserviency; half the population or more was driven into banishment, and a Lacedæmonian governor commanded a garrison in the citadel. But when Athens was reduc-

ed to beg the king of Macedonia's mercy, nothing of the kind followed. On the contrary such was Philip's magnanimous forbearance toward his most virulent enemies, that shortly his Athenian friends found themselves in danger from it. So far had he been from arbitrarily commanding, as the Athenians were wont, the banishment of citizens from Grecian republics within their power, so far from denying, like the Lacedæmonians, the resort of any to his own kingdom, that his capital and even his court were open to those of all descriptions. An extant letter from Isocrates to his son, afterward the great Alexander, is valuable for large information comprized in few words. This letter was sent at the same time with one to Philip himself; and Isocrates appears to have intended it as a vehicle for unasked advice, which might, with least hazard of offence, and perhaps with best effect, be conveyed in the form of commendation of the young prince's judgement and conduct. Of the numbers professing philosophy, who flocked to Pella, and who were admitted even to Alexander's conversation, Isocrates thought many were objectionable: of some he disliked the mode of exercising the talents of their pupils, as unsuitable for one who was to be a statesman; but moreover, the principles, the doctrines, and even the manners, of many he disapproved highly. Possibly Philip may have had a view beyond the philosopher. Hazardous as the admission of exceptionable characters might be, yet to deny means for acquiring a general knowlege of mankind to one who, as a statesman, would have necessarily to communicate with men of all characters, were also hazardous. Possibly moreover Philip might depend on his own power in advice and observation, together with the prince's

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talents for discrimination, to obviate the evil which Isocrates had apprehended.

After these valuable cotemporary notices of the state of Philip's court, a description of the earlier circumstances of Macedonia, in a speech reported by Arrian, as having been delivered by Alexander to the Macedonians of his army in Persia, may deserve some attention. Contrary indeed to what that writer has usually admitted, it is not wholly without rhetorical extravagance. This may mark it as not derived from the generals, whose authority he preferred whenever he could have their guidance. They, on account of their situations, would be likely to avoid the matter in question; which nevertheless, as clearly interesting, has been, in Arrian's judgement, proper to be given on the best authority he could find for it, and which he thought not unworthy of credit.

Arr. l. 7. c. 9.

'The Macedonians,' Alexander is stated to have said, 'were poor and wandering herdmen, clothed 'in skins, living among mountains, and fearing 'residence in the better parts of their country, for 'the frequent inroads of neighboring people, Illy- 'rians, Triballians, and Thracians, with some or 'other of whom they had almost continually to 'defend, in bloody contest, their scanty herds and 'flocks. Philip introduced that order, civil and 'military, which gave them such superiority over 'the barbarians, that they no longer wanted safety 'from situation, but could provide it by their valor. 'Towns then arose, garments of leather were 'changed for cloth, and wholesome laws, and im- 'proved manners made the people respectable; 'so that the barbarians, whom they had been ac- 'customed to fear, were compelled to acknowlege 'their dominion. The greater part of Thrace was

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'united with Macedonia; and, the towns of the 'coast, being recovered to the Macedonian do- 'minion, the people had again, at their own 'command, the advantage of importation and ex- 'portation by sea, for which before they were 'dependent on others. Those who obtained com- 'mand in Thessaly had been often their terror: 'Philip so altered things that the Thessalians and 'Macedonians now are united nearly as one peo- 'ple[12]. Communication with the southern states 'of Greece commonly was difficult, sometimes 'shut: success in the war with Phocis made it, for 'following times, sure and easy. Both the Athe- 'nians and the Thebans had aimed at the conquest 'of Macedonia. Philip so humbled both, that 'instead of paying tribute to Athens, and obeying 'the mandates of Thebes, those states owed their 'safety to Macedonian generosity. Finally, settling 'the affairs of Peloponnesus, and establishing peace 'throughout Greece, Philip was elected general in 'chief of the whole nation for war against Persia, 'not more to his own honor than that of the Mace- 'donian people.'

It is obvious that the description of the Macedonians here, as wandering herdmen, would not apply to the inhabitants of Pella, Edessa, Anthemus, and some other towns, but only to that, far however the greater part of the country, where were no towns. What were the new laws we should be glad to know, and still more how they

12 Ἀσύφηνε. What I have hazarded, as a paraphrase of this word, is warranted by Arrian, as to the matter of fact, in speaking elsewhere of the connection of Thessaly and Macedonia. The word itself, unwarrantably rendered by Vulcanius, and unnoticed by Gronovius, sometimes severe in criticism on the translator, may deserve the notice of future editors, and perhaps of lexicographers.

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were inacted; tho, that no unpopularity insued, from any assumption of unwarranted power by the prince, is implied in all antient history. Those laws probably were directed to the regulation of military as well as civil matters, and mostly in the wilder parts of the kingdom; first established where, according to the cotemporary testimony formerly noticed, Philip held command before he succeeded to the throne. The tribute to Athens, which is found also mentioned by Demosthenes, was no acknowlegement of superiority in the Athenian people over the king or people of Macedonia, but simply a composition for allowance to import and export goods at the towns on the Macedonian shore, held by Athenian garrisons, or by people whom the maritime force of Athens compelled to acknowlege the Athenian dominion of the sea; precisely such a tribute as, in modern times, many Europeän states have been in the habit of paying to the pirates of Barbary.

Ch. 34. s. 4. of this History.

All information considered, it seems not likely that, through any improvements in the peaceful latter years of Amyntas, or in the two short reigns of his elder sons, both turbulently ended, the state of Macedonia was altogether better at Philip's accession than at the death of Archelaus; whose reign, eminently beneficial, had been followed by violent and lasting troubles. Among the institutions of Archelaus, we have seen, was the Macedonian Olympic festival. It is unlikely that a man of the great and just purposes eminently demonstrated in the measures of that prince, attested by his cotemporary Thucydides, would, in such an institution, be without a view beyond a passing amusement for himself, and the little popularity to be gained by furnishing such for the

Ch. 34. s. 1. & Ch. 39. s. 2. of this History.

many. The respect in which the whole Greek nation held its four great festivals, the Olympic, Delphic, Nemean and Isthmian, a respect such as to be of power to stop war for a time, when most raging among the republics, could not have failed to ingage his attention. Macedonia, as a portion of Greece, we find, was not excluded from an interest in those festivals, nor from a claim upon its princes and people to respect their sacred character, the benefit of which of course they were intitled to injoy; yet from situation and circumstances the Macedonians could little conveniently attend the celebration, and but imperfectly profit from the temporary peace which it produced. Macedonia wanted, for its civil government, not equally with the republican Greece, yet materially, an improved union of its towns and provinces. Archelaus, we are assured, cultivated peace; but how far his views, in any of his institutions may have extended, his untimely death has left for uncertain conjecture only. SECT. V.

The immediately following troubles of the country would effectually prevent any early repetition of the festival, and deny all attention to what are likely to have been his objects in the institution. Accordingly no further account of the Macedonian Olympiad is found till it was revived by Philip, on the conclusion of the Olynthian war. When all the towns of the Macedonian, and many of the Thracian coast, previously claiming each to be an independent soverein republic, tho mostly in vassalage under the Athenian people, were united to the Macedonian kingdom, then was the season which Philip saw advantageous for reviving an institution which would bring his new subjects, before often warring with oneanother, to friendly

Ch. 39. s. 2. of this Hist.

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association among themselves and with his old subjects; joining in the ceremonies of an amusing religion, and partaking together in the entertainment of theatrical exhibitions. These, which had originated in religious ceremony, seem to have been considered as a regular part of the Macedonian festival.

Ch. 42. s. 7. of this History.

The next occasion on which the Macedonian Olympiad is found mentioned was when Philip, elected military commander-in-chief of Greece, became, through the union, ordinary in the republics, of civil with military office, the civil as well as military head of the whole nation, stateholder as well as captain-general. Then it was no longer meerly an object of policy, but a pressing duty, to devise means for allaying the immoderate jealousies of the Grecian people among themselves, the offspring of their republican system, which denied social intercourse between those of the several towns of one nation, forbad intermarriage, rendered them more violently and inveterately hostile toward oneanother than toward the most dreaded forein enemy, and always kept numbers of every state, sometimes half the population, in banishment. Experience of the result of his previous experiment, on a smaller scale, is likely to have been favorable toward trying it on a larger. Bringing eminent men, from all the many republics, to associate at the same time with oneanother, and with those of his kingdom, in religious ceremony and in festival, might do much. But the Peloponnesian Olympiad had often afforded example for more. Not only treaties of peace between the republics often, by mutual agreement, were proclaimed there, but the discussion of interests in question between them had been sometimes refer-

red to that meeting. Altogether it seems obvious that this institution of Philip was of a kind to do more toward harmonizing Greece than his venerable Athenian friend's project of war with Persia; from which alone it does not appear how the desired civil advantages should so result as to have a chance for permanency, tho it might promote opportunity for originating them. SECT. V.

Analogy between the political circumstances of the kingdoms of northern Greece, including Macedonia, and of the feudal governments in modern Europe, having been previously observed, the opposite policy of Philip and of some princes at the head of those governments, may also deserve notice. The French constitution formerly acknowleged a general assembly of representatives of the whole kingdom, as alone competent to make laws binding on all, and to impose taxes. The court avoided to allow its meeting. The Spanish court, at the head of a constitution perhaps more perfect in most of its parts, yet more defective in union of its parts, used a similar policy. To maintain separation and division, even to incourage and foment jealousies and antipathies between the people of the different provinces, and, holding all subjects under strict restraint, to allow freedom least to the high nobility and great landowners, were prime maxims of state. The success of this policy is too well known: the imperfect liberties of the French and Spaniards were, with little struggle, overborne, and in France a milder and more liberal, in Spain a more oppressive and degrading despotism was established. But the final result we have seen most unfortunate for the royal families of both countries. In one a combination of demagogues finding means to establish their own communication, and spred their influence among all the disjointed millions,

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who were without means to communicate among oneanother, subverted the monarchy; over the other, by extent and natural advantages singularly favored with means to defend itself against forein aggression, a forein tyrant's command sufficed to bring the royal family to his prison, and the nation very nearly to his obedience. The king of Macedonia's premature death, and circumstances following, prevented the perfection of his scheme. But its policy, bringing together, and blending in friendly union the numberless portions of the nation, habituated for ages to multiplied division, with resulting jealousies, antipathies, and bloody contests, was clearly the very reverse of that which established despotism in France and Spain. The tendency was to give importance to the combined and inlightened people, to afford scope for display of talents in extensive free communication, and to found the security of the throne on a general sense of common interest in the maintenance of the constitution.

After the endevor to illustrate the civil circumstances of the Grecian states, both republics and kingdoms, what memorials remain concerning Philip's court may deserve some consideration, not only for more complete illustration of his policy, but also to prepare for the history to come.

Perhaps deriving admonition from the error of his immediate predecessor, his brother Perdiccas, who is said to have devoted himself too exclusively to philosophy and the society of speculative men, Philip, not neglecting these, directed his attention diligently to what a kingdom in the circumstances of Macedonia farther urgently required. That the Macedonians, even of rank and large property, were unlettered, and many of them little practised in that communication among men which produces

advantageous manners, is strongly indicated by the observation imputed to Alexander, if it may be trusted, that among the republican Greeks in his court, formed in the schools of philosophy, they appeared like wild beasts among men. It is however obvious that the purport and force of such speeches depend much upon occasion and circumstances; and it must always be doubtful whether the words, on which the force rests, are very exactly reported. Nevertheless it appears probable that the best manners of the Macedonians differed from those of the republican philosophers; possibly better in some respects, worse in others; resembling rather those of our forefathers in the feudal ages, whose time was divided between feats of arms, field-sports, and revelling. Some establishments calculated to improve those manners, and to form men for political business and extensive communication with mankind, were either instituted, or extended and improved by Philip. Advantage for this purpose had been prepared for him by his brother's conduct, tho accused of extravagance. Many republican Greeks, eminent for acquirements in the most eminent schools, and recommended by manners formed in various communication among men of business and men of leisure in the republics, especially Athens, frequented Philip's court; and with some, in absence, he communicated by letter. A chosen number, together with some principal Macedonians, were associated under the title of the King's Companions, or the King's Friends. The Athenian orator Æschines we have formerly observed among those admitted to this honor. Accounts remaining are very defective, but it seems rather indicated that, originally one, this body was afterward divided;

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the title of the king's friends being limited to those admitted to his society and table, while the companions became considerable military bodies of horse and foot; analogous to the royal guards of modern kingdoms. Republican Greeks appear to have been numerous in both.

Whether then anything of the kind before existed in the Macedonian court, or the ideä was borrowed from Asia, or originated with himself, a small number of Philip's most confidential friends formed a body, whose office more nearly resembled that of lords of the bedchamber than of any other with us. Their title was somatophylakes, litterally body-wardens; or, for a more modern courtly phrase, it might perhaps be rendered lords of the body-guard. Arrian has given us the names and descriptions of seven at one time composing this body; which seems to have been their limited number, till, on a particular occasion, Alexander added an eighth. To this highly-confidential office only Macedonians, and of the highest rank, were admitted. But among Macedonians, it is observable in Arrian's account, there was no distinction for those of the original kingdom and those of the afterward acquired provinces: all appear to have been esteemed equally competent for this, or indeed for any high office. A prince even of a people esteemed barbarian, tho their territory was reckoned within Macedonia, was among those, as occasion will occur hereafter more particularly to observe, most honored in Philip's court, and most attached in mutual friendship to his successor. Possibly indeed this prince may have been acknowleged of Grecian race, tho his people were not; but in the sequel we shall find his people also distinguished by their soverein's attention and esteem.

SECT. V.

Philip's care of his son's education has been eulogized by antient writers. His attention to extend to the rising generation of Macedonian nobility advantages of litterature and science, not otherwise easily open to them, tho it has not equally met deserved praise, remains yet satisfactorily attested. It is well known that in our own, and other modern European kingdoms, formerly, it was customary, and esteemed advantageous, for boys of good birth and liberal fortune to attend, not only princes, but great subjects, especially those in high civil employments, as pages. Philip formed a large establishment of pages, sons of the first men of his kingdom, and to these he afforded the utmost opportunity for litterary instruction, under the philosophers who attended his court. But, in giving them the benefits of Grecian scholarship, he desired to obviate the illiberality and coarse insolence, which he had often had occasion to observe in democratical manners, by introducing, as a corrective, something of the polish of Asiatic courts. Constantly therefore they were by turns about his person, keeping guard, at night, in his antechamber. When he rode, one of them was to take his horse from the groom, Arrian says after the Persian custom, and hold it while he mounted. When he hunted, in attendance on him, they partook of the sport. When he was employed with his ministers, they studied under philosophers; of whom some, together with the boys, followed him even on military expeditions. Thus military education and civil proceeded together. Nor does it appear that Philip's purpose of improving the polish of the Macedonian court was at all threatening to the freedom of the constitution; balanced as it was by the free allowance, and even large incouragement, for the resort of

Arr. de exped. Alex. l. 4. c. 12.

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republican Greeks. Tho Aristotle's principles of policy could not be approved, yet no restraint upon discussion of political topics has been noticed by historians: on the contrary, even Arrian's cautious accounts of conversations show that great freedom on such subjects was usual, even at the king's table and in his presence. Whatever Philip's desire of power may have been, it is evident that he found it greater through his talent for cultivating popularity than it could have been by his military force. How small this reälly was, and how unequal his revenue to either the maintenance of a large standing army, or to the political corruption which interested malignity imputed to him, becomes, in all accounts of his son's reign, abundantly manifest.

Such then, as far as information remains, was the state of the Macedonian government and court, at the time of Philip's death.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Affairs of GREECE from the Accession of ALEXANDER Son of PHILIP, to the MACEDONIAN Throne, till the Conclusion of the War with the Northern Nations, and the Restoration of disturbed Union among the GRECIAN Republics.

SECTION I.

Authorities for the ensuing History. Alexander's Boyhood: First Measures after his Accession to the Macedonian Throne: Election to the supreme Dignity in Thessaly: Admission to his Seat in the Council of Amphictyons: Election to the Office of Statcholder and Captain-general of the Grecian Republics.

SECT. I.

THE extraordinary splendor of fortune and celebrity attained by Alexander son of Philip, and the interest of a large portion of the world, through following ages, even to the present day, in the consequences of his achievements, so ingaged the attention of writers and the curiosity of readers, that more histories of him have been published, more by cotemporaries, and more by writers of after times, than are known of any other person. Letters and all sciences being in his age highly cultivated among the Greeks, men qualified to record great transactions would be numerous. But among

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many and rival authors, inducements to the undertaking would be various, and interests opposite; and some would have better, and others inferior, means of information. And, tho litterary works abounded, copies of them, in failure of the advantages of printing, were few and dear. Thence public reading was a profession: companies assembled to hear; and a library, or sometimes a single work unpublished, was a fortune to the possessor. Few could study in the closet; few could compare, otherwise than by memory, one account with another. Thus great opportunity was open for ingenious writers, if unscrupulous, to put forward any report, especially of transactions in parts so remote and little known as those into which Alexander penetrated. Hence, while we lament the loss of all the many histories written by his cotemporaries, we find the most judicious of the later antient authors, who compiled from them, complaining of difficulty, often found, for satisfactory selection, among extravagancies and contradictions.

Nevertheless, to the modern inquirer, entering upon investigation of the events of Alexander's reign, it must be gratifying to find that materials were given from authorities higher, and more various, than, as far as accounts of such matters remain, for any other portion of antient history. Narratives of his campains were written by two men of the highest rank in the army under him, Aristobulus and Ptolemy; and published, not while he lived, when freedom, which might have been restrained by unworthy, must have been by just considerations; nor so long after his death but that numerous witnesses to most of the transactions related were yet alive. The narratives of Nearchus, and Onesicritus, who commanded his fleet in

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the extraordinary voyage along the shore of the Indian ocean, for some extravagances admitted in them, were less respected by antiquity; and yet are found quoted, for some important matters, by highly respectable antient writers. A report of his marches and incampments by the two principal engineers of the army, Diognetus and Beton, was published. The royal daybook, as it was called, being a register of the daily transactions of the king himself, noted, it is said, by Eumenes of Cardia, his principal secretary[1], and Diodotus of Erythræ, probably assistant secretary, would have been of the highest value, had it been transmitted complete. Being however but a dry register of facts, little inviting for the audiences at public readings, copies of it probably were little multiplied, and it remains quoted only for the last days of Alexander's life, of which however it gives a very interesting detail.

Athen. Deipnos. l. 10. c. 10.

Nor has the history of Alexander, like that of the Roman republic, rested on those partial to him. Party-spirit remained high among the Grecian republics, in his day, and one party held constant connection with the Persian court while it existed; so that partiality on one side was combated by partiality on the other. Of nine authors his cotemporaries, whose names and characters are transmitted to us, the five alreddy mentioned included, some were warmly adverse to him, and the works of all were before those later antient writers on whom we now depend for the history. These are Diodorus and Strabo, of the Augustan age; Curtius of date unascertained; Plutarch and Arrian, cotemporary with Trajan and Adrian; to whom may be added Justin, the abbreviator of Trogus Pompeius, beside

[1] Ἀρχιγραμματεύς. Plut. v. Eum. init.

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other writers who afford occasional assistance. Dissatisfaction with numerous preceding accounts induced Arrian, as he has expressly declared, to compile and publish his own; and, tho of the latest age, being yet, by situation in life, and practice in business, military and political, far the most qualified for a historian of Alexander, he has always held the highest estimation. His method, indeed, is most satisfactory. He has professed to rely principally on the accounts of the generals Ptolemy and Aristobulus. But those officers, often employed on different services, appear each rather to have proposed to publish his own memorials than a complete history of their king. Their joint testimony Arrian has admitted as decisive; where they have differed he has stated their differences; and where one has omitted, apparently as not having been within his observation, what the other has related, he has named the one whom he followed. For matters derived from neither he has noticed the failure of their authority. In all that remains from antiquity no example is found of equal care to examine differing accounts, and avoid to mislead the reader's opinion. The annals of Diodorus, then, and several works of Plutarch, are valuable for light they afford on the affairs of the Grecian republics of the age, of which Arrian, unfortunately for posterity, has furnished little. Strabo elucidates and confirms much through his geographical researches, which led him occasionally to notice historical circumstances. Curtius had talent, as well as materials, for better things than he has done; whence, among his theatrical matter, adapted to the public fancy of his age, but misplaced in history, and therefore offensive to sober judgement even when amusing by its ingenuity and eloquence, some in-

formation, not given by others, but still more, some illustration and confirmation of matters reported by others, may be gathered. Altogether thus, whatsoever the fanciful or the interested ingenuity of many able antient writers, using opportunities offered by remoteness of scene, and scantiness of means for comparing accounts, may have been tempted to add or alter concerning events in the plainest narrative singularly interesting, it may be affirmed that, for the more public, and all the more important matters, no part of antient profane history has been transmitted more authenticated than that of Alexander[2].

[2] The singular state and the interesting character of the history of Alexander led the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Polite Litterature at Paris to propose, as the subject for its prize, in the year 1770, a Critical Examination of the antient Historians who have written on it. Of the works offered that year none satisfying the Society, they repeated the proposal of the subject in the year 1772, when the prize was adjudged to the baron of Sainte Croix. His Treatise, tho composed at a very early age, has been much noticed by the learned, and always with such high approbation, that there can be no hazard in referring those to it who may desire information on a subject of criticism, as extensively interesting as perhaps any relating to antient history.

It may perhaps be due from me to acknowlege obligations of more than one kind to the baron of Sainte Croix. Through introduction from my very learned friend, then also a very young man, for one who had alreddy acquired so much litterary fame, Mr. Villoison, I was kindly entertained by him in November 1776, and again in March 1777, in his house at Mourmoiron, in the county of Avignon, which he made his residence when, after the death of his uncle the general Sainte Croix, who commanded at Belleisle when taken by our army under general Hodgson, and gained the esteem of that army, he quitted the military service. His conversation was among the stimulants to me, in recollection afterward, to apply myself to the work which has been my most gratifying amusement for now above forty years. He had had an ideä of undertaking such a work himself, which I endevored to incourage; but he said, adverting to the restrictions upon the press in France, and the advantage which familiar acquaintance with a free

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The extraordinary fame acquired by that prince in early manhood would of course excite curiosity for the circumstances of his earlier years. Many accordingly remain reported. Elegance of form he is said to have inherited from both father and mother; not large, yet with more than ordinary power of limb; and the many portraits of him, in coins yet extant, so agree in advantageous representation of his features as to give assurance that his countenance was of the best models of masculine beauty. The anecdotes regarding his mind are mostly consonant enough to the character he afterward so splendidly exhibited; indicating, together with that bold and enterprizing spirit which directed his brilliant course, the inheritance of a large share, conspicuous even in boyhood, of his father's uncommon reddiness of judgement, and superiority of talent for communication among men. These however are unsupported by any claim of cotemporary authority, nor has Arrian noticed them; one important matter only excepted, which is fully warranted, that he had the advantage of education under Aristotle, the man, perhaps, of the most acute and capacious mind of all the Greek philosophers from whom any writings remain, superintended by a statesman and military commander, perhaps excelled in no age anywhere, his father.

constitution, through association in its energies, offered in England, 'Only an Englishman could write a history of Greece.' A letter from him, marking, by its conciseness, his apprehension of dilating, and obscurely indicating that his family had suffered in the recent revolution, reached me in the year 1801, when the First Consul's view of his interest led him to desire present peace with this country. The much to be lamented death of Mr. Villoison has since been announced in the news-papers. Farther of the baron of Sainte Croix my inquiries have gained me no intelligence.

SECT. I.

The splendid festival, which had been ingaging the numerous concourse attracted by Philip's politic magnificence to the Macedonian court, ended of course abruptly on his death. Tumult, immediately insuing, appears however to have subsided on the quickly following death of the assassin. Alexander's friends assembled about him. Arming themselves they conducted him, according to the custom, growing out of the frequently convulsed state of the government, and extensively the custom of early times, in military procession, to the throne, and without opposition seated him there.

Ol. 110. B. C. 336.

Arrian, l. 1. c. 26.

In the complicated, new, and variously difficult circumstances in which Philip's tragical and wholly unexpected death left the government, Alexander's conduct, at his early age, displayed most advantageously the result of his excellent education; being indeed rather what might most be wished for than what ordinary experience among mankind would warrant to expect. What credit should be given to tales of violent preceding differences between Alexander and his father, disgraceful, if true, certainly, to both, and possibly current in report in their age, though coming to us only from writers of centuries after, must be left to the judgement of their readers. But toward the justness of such judgement the combined consideration is necessary, of the state of parties in Macedonia at the time; of the common violence of faction throughout Greece; of the inducements to propagate scandal in the Grecian cities, not only as a political engine, but as a profitable merchandise, which even idleness found highly alluring; of the talents of those, both politicians, and traders in scandal, who had a pressing interest in spreding such tales; and of the opposite indication of

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Alexander's public measures, on succeeding to the throne, as they remain concurrently reported by antient authors.

Arrian, l. 3. c. 6.

We have Arrian's assurance that the repudiation of Alexander's mother, and Philip's second marriage, produced, as was likely, some degree of breach between father and son; insomuch that five of Alexander's most intimate friends either were banished, or thought it prudent to withdraw from the court. Hence however it is the more to Alexander's credit that, on his father's death, no animosity appears to have influenced his measures. His father's friends and principal counsellors remained his friends and principal counsellors. Not the philosopher Aristotle only, is preceptor, but all the able statesmen and military men, whom Philip's penetration had selected, in the course of his busy reign, for his ministers, his generals, and, in all departments, his immediate assistants, were retained and principally trusted by Alexander. His young friends, who had fled from Philip's anger or suspicions, namely Harpalus, Erigyius, Laomedon, Nearchus, and Ptolemy son of Lagus, were recalled, and we shall find all becoming afterward eminent under him; but no new man, no favorite peculiar to himself, appears to have been immediately raised to any of the first offices civil, or military[2]. Ac-

[2] The scandal against the mother of Ptolemy, distinguished from others of that name as son of Lagus, that he was reälly son of king Philip, has no countenance from Arrian. Ptolemy, Warlike, appears to have been a favorite name among the Macedonians, and another Ptolemy son of another Philip, we shall, in the sequel find of high rank in Alexander's army, whence possibly the careless or impudent storymongers of antiquity may have taken their ground. A third Ptolemy, not less eminent, is distinguished as son of Seleucus. Gronovius has given a note on these several cotemporary Ptolemies, altogether good, but stating a difficulty about the time of the appointment of Ptolemy son of Lagus to the confidential office

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cording to custom he was to address the Macedonian people; how assembled, unfortunately we fail to learn; but his father's popularity, and his claim to succeed to it, we are assured were his theme. 'The king's name,' he told the anxious many, 'is 'changed; but the king, you shall find, remains the 'same.' A more powerful testimony to Philip's popularity in Macedonia, or to Alexander's respect for him, can hardly be imagined; and tho reported only by Diodorus, yet by the concurrently warranted fact, that the king's confidential assistants, Philip reigning, remained the king's confidential assistants, Alexander reigning, affords it a basis on which it well may rest. Diod. l. 17. c. 2.

Funeral obsequies were of course an immediate care of the new court, and they were celebrated with just magnificence. Inquiry concerning the crime which produced the catastrophë was also immediately instituted. That a plot for a revolution had been formed seems fully indicated. Amyntas, son of Antiochus, of a branch of the royal family which had formerly claimed the throne, fled, and took his residence at Ephesus, then ruled by an aristocratical party, under patronage of the Persian court. Heromenes, Arrhabæus, and Alexander, sons of Aëropus, of another branch, had been ingaged in the plot, according to Arrian, notoriously. Nevertheless, whatever information the inquiry produced, severities appear to have been Diod. ibid. Arrian, l. 1. c. 18.

of σωματοφύλαξ, lord body-warden, the solution of which appears to me obvious. Arrian has meant, in the sixth chapter of his third book, where he mentions the recall of Alexander's five fugitive friends, to speak only generally of the dignities to which they were afterward raised: in the twenty-sixth chapter of the same book he mentions the occasion on which Ptolemy son of Lagus was appointed lord body-warden, as he had also mentioned the promotion of Harpalus and the others, as they occurred.

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avoided. Even the retreat of Amyntas from Macedonia was, the historian says, the result rather of disgust than apprehension. Alexander, son of Aëropus, had been among the foremost, on Philip's death, to attend his son in procession to the throne; and this the young king magnanimously accepted as atonement, insomuch that he not only forgave the discovered treason, but continued to receive his kinsman and namesake as a friend, and even distinguished him with favors.

Quiet being preserved in Macedonia, which, according to Plutarch, not without large confirmation from Arrian, had been formidably threatened[s], Alexander and his able council could direct their views abroad. Among the people of the Grecian republics the news of Philip's death could not but make great impression; exciting great fears in

[s]—Προδοσίαι—Πᾶσα δὲ ὕπουλος ἡ Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμυνίαν ἀποθλίπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας. Plut. de sort. Alex. p. 327. Diodorus relates that Attalus, commanding jointly with Parmenio in lesser Asia, ingaged in treasonable practices, of which information was given to Alexander; that Hecatæus was sent with a considerable body of troops to arrest, or, if that could not be, to dispatch Attalus by assassination, δολοφονῆσαι, and that in consequence Attalus was assassinated. Here it may be observed that the march of troops into Asia under Hecatæus, if reäl, would be notorious, and the death of a man of Attalus's eminence would be notorious. But conspiracy and assassination are commonly secret matters, which nevertheless Diodorus has had the habit of reporting with as much assurance as if he were himself an accomplice. Neither Arrian, nor even Plutarch, tho mentioning other conspirators, have a word about the conspiracy or assassination of Attalus, which Arrian, had he given any credit to it, would the less have omitted to notice, on account of that eminent person's situation in military command. Further reasons might be adduced for discrediting Diodorus's tale, for which however among the various and contradictory histories of Alexander which disgusted Arrian, he may, probably enough, have found what he thought authority to be followed. But as, even in his account, the circumstances had no consequences, tho perhaps requiring this notice, they seemed no object for the text.

one party, and great hopes in the other. The party depressed by the event of the battle of Chæroneia, still held through the liberality of the conqueror, and the vigor of the Grecian institutions and character, almost all its former means; and it was still headed by the most renowned orator and politician the world had known: this party would of course look eagerly for opportunity to recover its lost eminence. The other party which had been relieved by the prevalence which that battle gave to the politics of Isocrates and Phocion, would look with terror toward a return of that democratical oppression which remains exhibited to us, in pictures from the life, by the correct hands of Isocrates himself and of Xenophon. The immediate measures of Demosthenes at Athens, formerly noticed, were then as a signal for his party throughout Greece to rally and prepare for action, and for those who dreaded democratical empire to tremble. SECT. 1. Ch. 42. s. 7. of this History.

The attention of Alexander's council was first directed, as first required, more especially to Thessaly; the oldest, the closest and the most valuable ally of the Macedonian kingdom. There fortunately that attachment to the reigning branch of the Macedonian royal family, which had inabled Alexander's grandfather to recover his lost throne, was found remaining in vigor; and, by election of the general assembly of the states, Alexander succeeded to the honors and power injoyed by his father; nowhere distinctly described by antient writers, but sufficiently marked as including, with the military command in chief, a presidency also in the political administration. Apparently it was the office and dignity to which the title of Tagus, peculiar to the Thessalian constitution, was appropriated; a title familiar with Xenophon, but neg-

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lected by writers under the Roman empire, our principal informants for the history of these times; even the Greeks being then become careless of Thessalian titles and of the long-perished constitution itself to which they belonged. The Thessalian states moreover assured Alexander of their support for his election to the greater office, held also by his father, of commander-in-chief and head of the confederacy of all Greece[4].

This reddy success was of very great importance; not only for the high value of the connection with Thessaly, but as necessary toward the maintenance of the connection formed by Philip with all southern Greece. Alexander could now proceed securely to Thermopylæ, where the Amphictyonic council was assembled, in which, without opposition, as far as we are informed, he took his inherited seat. This again was an important step toward what was next in view, his election to the office of stateholder and military commander-in-chief of the confederacy of the Greek nation. In opposition to this Demosthenes was continuing to exert all his abilities and all his diligence. The moment, highly critical for both king and people of Macedonia, was perhaps yet more awful for every thinking man of every Grecian republic. Vehemently as all who had concurred in politics with Isocrates dreaded the restoration of empire to the Athenian democracy, and miserable as the view was of returning to that state of division, jealousy, fear, trouble, and various wars, which, with the flattering name of universal independency, had fol-

[4] Πρώτους δὲ Θετταλοὺς ὑπομνήσας τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους συγγενείας, καὶ λόγοις φιλανθρώποις, ἔτι δὲ μεγάλαις ἐπαγγελίαις, μετεωρίσας, ἔπεισε τὴν πατροπαράδοτον ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτῷ συγχωρῆσαι, κοινῷ τῆς Θετταλίας δόγματι. Diod. l. 17. c. 4.

lowed the battle of Mantineia, and much as many might have been hitherto satisfied with the prospect under the Macedonian supremacy, doubts and fears could not but arise, when, for the known talents, the large experience and the tried liberality of the late king, it remained, in the existing most critical circumstances, to see what would be the character and what the conduct of a youth scarcely beyond boyhood. This chance however, notwithstanding every exertion of Demosthenes in opposition, obtained the general suffrage. According to established usage among the Grecian republics, those states which proposed to maintain, with the new king, the treaties of friendship and alliance made with his predecessor, should send embassies to asure him of it, carrying compliments of congratulation on his accession. From the republics which had alreddy profited from the Macedonian alliance to secure them against the dominion of the democratical leaders at Athens, embassies were hastened, and quickly the measure became general. Alexander received all with an ingaging attention, referring always to his father's popularity in Greece, to which he declared his ernest desire to succeed[5]. Athens, omitting to concur in this compliment, might fear to remain alone in a situation indicating hostile purpose. At length therefore it was decreed that an embassy should carry the congratulation of the Athenian people to Alexander, with the profession of desire to maintain the friendly connection formed with the late king his father.

SECT. I.

Athens, having thus concurred in friendly communication, nothing remained to forbid the proposal of a meeting of all the republics, by their

[5] Ταῖς πρεσβείαις χρημασίσας φιλανθρώπως, παρεκάλεσε τοὺς Ἕλληνας τηρεῖν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν παπροπαράδοτον εὔνοιαν. Diod. l. 17. c. 2.

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representatives in congress, conformably to former practice, to consult on common concerns; and the war alreddy begun with Persia pressingly required such consultation in common. According Corinth was named for the place of meeting; preferred, apparently, by Alexander now, as by Philip formerly, not only as, by its situation on the isthmus, most equally convenient for the republics within and without the peninsula of Peloponnesus, but also because, being deep among them, and far from Macedonia, it was, of all convenient places, the least liable to jealousy of the interference of an overawing power that might control freedom of debate. Accordingly, as, in the congress which had appointed Philip to the chief command, the motion for the purpose had been freely and warmly opposed by the deputies of some of the Arcadian towns, so now there was equal freedom of speech and vote. The Lacedæmonian deputies not only declared their dissent to the proposed appointment of a Macedonian king to the chief military command, but asserted a right of superiority in their own state. Not unreasonably indeed it might be expected that the kings of Lacedæmon, successors of those the allowed military chiefs of the Greek nation, and with them all the Spartan elderhood, accustomed, after the example of their predecessors, to claim imperial dignity and power, tho in adverse circumstances they had conceded the point to Philip's approved talents and wide fame in mature manhood, would be indignant at the proposal for a Macedonian youth, hardly beyond boyhood, to be supreme in military command over all Greece. The terms in which their dissent is reported to have been declared are consonant to all we read of the combined pride and coldness

Arrian, l. 1. c. 1.

of the Spartan character: 'It had been the custom 'of the Lacedæmonians,' they said, 'to obey none, 'but on the contrary it was their admitted privi- 'lege to lead others.' Alexander nevertheless was chosen by a great majority; the opposition of Lacedæmon, as far as appears, only making the vote not unanimous. SECT. I.

That opposition, concerning which and its sequel all writers concur, affords most satisfactory evidence of the important historical truth, that Alexander's election was the result of choice in the republics, and that the reports of some antient authors, the favorite authorities of many modern, that a military force attending him left the assembly no freedom of choice, have been meerly the malicious calumnies of a disappointed party. That some votes were decided by fear is not improbable. Fear of oneanother we have continually seen a powerful agent among the Grecian republics; but no account of any value shows it in any degree likely that Alexander had led any army from Macedonia, or had even collected any among the friendly republics. The freedom of the assembly indeed is warranted, not only by what all admit, the declared dissent of the Lacedæmonian deputies, but still more by what followed. The Lacedæmonian government not meerly avowed its approbation of the conduct of its deputies, but refused obedience to the decree of the congress of the nation, denying its contingent of troops for the army to be employed in the common cause against the forein enemy. If blame were imputable to the Macedonian administration, it may seem to be for an over-scrupulous lenity, in refraining from any measures against Lacedæmon for such contumacy.

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What indeed, in the instance immediately before us, should have been the course for the superintending administration to take, might probably have been matter of much question among even the most dispassionate Greeks of that day. The most regular, in theory, apparently, was to refer the matter to the council of Amphictyons. But the revival of this long-disused course by the Thebans, producing the sacred war, would not recommend it; and, the composition of the council of Amphictyons, we have observed, was not such as could make it a satisfactory or fit tribunal for decision of such causes. Looking then for precedent to former times, even those usually called the best times of Greece, we have seen the Lacedæmonian oligarchy taking upon itself, on two occasions, to punish with death the leading men of Thebes, and on a third a large portion of the male population of Platæa; and we have seen the less scrupulous democracy of Athens, in the three instances of Scione, Melos, and Sestus, not only murdering the whole male population, but selling all the women and children to slavery; a fate decreed also for Mitylene, tho not executed. Such conduct would have been perhaps as little prudent for Alexander as fitting in itself. Possibly then the young prince and his council took the wisest and best course, in avoiding any measures against Lacedæmon; not so much as reproach or remonstrance remain reported; and this forbearance appears consonant to the whole conduct of the congress, as far as accounts go; marking, in those who led its counsels, a scrupulous respect for a free constitution, and prudence derived from practice in communication with a free people. On this subject

further light will come from events at intervals following[6]. SECT. I.

For the moment it appears that matters were advantageously composed, and quiet was established throughout Greece. War with Persia remained in the contemplation of all, to be conducted by a youth of twenty, as commander-in-chief. Asia, as we have formerly seen, was always a favorite field for Grecian adventurers in arms; and youths, and possibly some beyond early youth, eager for adventure, might reckon their personal chance of advantage not less for the change of their expected leader from a prince of consummate experience in politics and war for one so new in both. Preparation therefore was zealously put forward among the republics,

[6] Arrian, whose principal object has been a military history of Alexander, is very concise on the business at Corinth, as having nothing of military character. But his account, and equally that of Diodorus, implies that an army was needless, and that any show of military force would have been adverse to his purpose, which evidently was to conciliate the republican Greeks, as his father had conciliated them. Plutarch gives a very different picture, in his too usual way; lively, but without regard either to authority or probability, and without just consideration even of the honor of his fellow-countrymen, which it was his constant purpose to exalt: Alexander, he says, by the suddenness and rapidity with which he led a Macedonian army into Bœotia and onward, deterred opposition. Those who, adverting to the common character of Plutarch's narrative, will consider at the same time what Demosthenes has said about Macedonian troops in Greece, and what even were the probable means of Alexander for leading an overbearing army thither, may estimate for themselves the credit due to him in this instance. But Diodorus, without notice of any military force under Alexander in Thessaly, places him at the head of an army in Bœotia. Apparently here, as the learned Dodwell says of him on another occasion, Diodorus has confounded times and circumstances. On a following occasion we shall find Alexander, in Arrian's account, consistently with all probability, at the head of an army in Bœotia.

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while, in autumn alreddy advanced, Alexander, returning into Macedonia, directed his attention to the same point there.

SECTION II.

Unquiet state of Greece: Macedonia threatened by the Northern Nations: Measures of Demosthenes: War in Thrace; on the Danube; in Illyria.

SMALL as the opposition was, in the congress at Corinth, to the continuance of the Macedonian supremacy in the person of the youthful Alexander, by which those, throughout Greece, joined by interest and concurring in sentiment with Isocrates and Phocion of Athens, were relieved from the alternative of subjection to the rod of democratical empire, or an immediate renewal of contest in arms to avoid it, yet circumstances remained of anxious aspect. War was to be diverted from Greece by being carried into Asia; a wide and alluring field for the range of unquiet spirits; some of whom the quiet perhaps might be glad to spare; and so far the policy of Isocrates was to be followed. But Isocrates was no more, and the prince in whom he had confided and who had respected him, was no more. Thinking men, among the Greeks, might feel somewhat the less, through the habit of untoward prospect; yet, that so much depended on a youth of twenty, however advantageously he might have shewn himself in various communication on arduous and difficult matters, would remain an awful consideration; while the consummate politician

who, in his public speeches, had not scrupled to boast of his connection with the Persian court and of his means to employ Persian wealth to promote the interest of his party, remained the leader of that still powerful party. Should the war be successful, the ultimate result was doubtful; on the other hand, should it be unfortunate, the lot of the now prevailing party could hardly fail to be wretched.

Before the usual season for beginning military operations, however, intelligence reached the Macedonian government, and quickly became public, which imperiously checked the prosecution of purposes previously entertained, and made most serious consideration of new measures necessary. Concert among the nearly surrounding barbarous nations had been so ably managed, that Macedonia was at once threatened on three sides; on the west by the Illyrians, on the north by the Triballians, and those Thracians, whom the Greeks distinguished by the epithet autonomous, or independent, and on the east by men whom Arrian distinguishes only by the title of traders, but whom his phrase, describing their armor, suffices to mark for Greeks[7].

About the Grecian seas we have formerly observed men abounding, in character resembling the pirates of the same seas in modern ages, or buccaneers of the western Indies, and not widely differing from Europeän smugglers, or mixing those characters; all mariners, and many of them traders by profession, but robbers when opportunity offered; originally subjects of various states, but owning allegiance, unless for present profit or present distress, to none. When Athens was allpowerful at sea, it was the interest of the Athenian government

[7] Ὁπλισμένοι.

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Ch. 40. s. 4. of this History.

to hold such people in order. But it was among the deficiences of democratical government, which we find strongly represented by Demosthenes himself, thatit could, less than any other government, restrain the irregularities of those to whom it committed authority; so that pirates and irregular traders were commonly licensed by the Athenian naval commanders, for their own profit, and that of those who served under them. The reduction then of all the little commercial and piratical republics of the northern shores of the Ægean under the superintendence of the Macedonian government, which commanded the land and was also powerful at sea, gave a new check to the opportunities of the piratical and smuggling traders, evidently a powerful set of men. Thus they would be prepared for connection with the anti-Macedonian party in Greece, especially at Athens, to whom their habits of communication, in the way of trade, with the barbarians of the northern continent, would, among other considerations, make them objects to cultivate an interest with[8].

Plut. Demosth. p. 856. Diod. Arrian.

Demosthenes was at this time exerting his utmost diligence to excite troubles for Macedonia. He wrote to the Persian satraps of the western provinces, urging them to use the advantages of the moment, when a boy of contemptible talents was

[8] Difficilior, cogitanti mihi, scopulus est, quid, hoc loco, faciant mercatores. Gronovii annot. in Arr. I like annotators who will not, as too many do, pass difficulties unnoticed, however little they may solve them. I commit my solution of this difficulty to those who will study the history of the Greek republics among the cotemporary writers. But the phrase Ὅσῳ ναυκοίρᾳ τῇ φάλαγγι, the subject of the learned editor's next note, seems, for explanation, only to require attention, which he appears to have omitted, to the order stated by Arrian to have been given by Alexander, λῦσαι τὴν τάξιν.

captain-general of the Greeks[9]. Tho not remaining directly said, it seems largely indicated, that Demosthenes was the politician who brought about the northern confederacy, and that the traders were his agents for the extensive communication among the barbarous nations. Influence failed with the eastern Thracians, who perhaps, both chiefs and people, found the dominion of the Macedonian king not less liberal than either that formerly of their great sovereins, Teres and his successors, of their own nation, or, as far as it was experienced among them, that of the imperial people of Athens. Habitually and perhaps constitutionally impatient of peace, yet they might look toward war in Asia, in fellowship with the Macedonians, as likely to afford gratification in its way, beyond any other. But the traders gained those Thracians of the northern highlands, whom the Greeks styled independent, seemingly not because they had a freer government, or had been more independent of forein powers, but because they had avoided political connection with the great body of the Thracian people. Beyond the independent Thracians, northward and westward, was the country of the Triballians, extending from the northern boundary of Macedonia to the Danube. These had been among the most formidable of the people with whom Philip was ingaged, in his war with the northern nations. They acknowleged monarchal government; and, whether the condition of the many had been worse or better since Philip's victories extended his power among them, the king's ambition would be checked and his importance lessened. From whatever motives however, the negotiation of the traders was

SECT. II.

[9] Παῖδα καὶ μαργίτην ἀποκαλῶν αὐτόν. Plut. Demosth. p. 856.

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successful here, and together with the independent Thracians, the king of the Triballians became their ally for the purpose of war with Macedonia.

In this critical emergency, the defence of Macedonia against the Illyrians, who most threatened immediate inroad, was committed to Parmenio; in the late king's estimation, the ablest general of the age. Alexander himself took the lead of the army for the offensive war which it was judged advisable to hasten against the Grecian enemy, apparently rebelling subjects, the traders. Their purpose seems to have been to seize some strong maritime position, perhaps Amphipolis itself, which might insure their communication with the sea, and with any maritime allies, Athens especially; trusting that the Macedonian arms would be required for defensive war, against the Illyrians and Triballians. But the rapidity with which Alexander assembled an army at Amphipolis so disconcerted them, that they abandoned, not only the coast, but all the rich plain, left Philippi and its goldmines, among the lower hills, behind them, and withdrew to the mountains; where, in a situation singularly strong, they were joined by their barbarian allies.

Alexander resolved upon the bold, perhaps rash, measure of attacking them there; for Arrian attributes both the resolution, and the manner of execution, to himself. In modern times missile weapons, of power beyond the imagination of former ages, give, to the more civilized, a decided superiority over uncultivated nations. In antiquity, on the contrary, a superior defensive armor, and a tactic adapted to close fighting, principally set the Greek above the barbarian. The shield of the Grecian heavy-armed was very large and strong; the Macedonian, improved whether by Archelaus or by

Philip, was superiorly so, and, being rectangular, formed, in close array, a kind of wall. The Macedonian phalanx thus, with its long spears powerful to offend where it could reach, was, on even ground, nearly invulnerable. But it had eminently the defect of unfitness to act on broken ground. There the arrangement of the shields, becoming necessarily disordered, the soldier was exposed to wounds from missile weapons, unable to return them. The traders, were heavy-armed, and formed in phalanx, but too weak in numbers to meet the Macedonians in open field. The Thracians, apparently numerous, were, by the custom of their nation, middle-armed, and excelled in that discipline. Carrying, for defence, a target, or small shield, for offence two javelins, not too weighty to be used as missile weapons, tho utterly incapable of standing the shock of the phalanx, yet they could wound from a distance, when opportunity offered; and when it failed, they could, by their lightness, avoid action with the heavy-armed. Suited thus for highland warfare, they were especially qualified to support the small body of their heavy-armed allies, in guarding the pass. The traders and Thracians having thus together their station on the verge of a quick declivity, where the road was inclosed between precipices, formed there a rampart of waggons; and placed, before these, other waggons, prepared to be set in motion down the steep, so as to act as an artillery against an approaching enemy. SECT. II.

Alexander, informed of all circumstances, in giving orders for assault upon a force so advantageously posted, and in so uncommon a manner prepared, directed that his phalangites, in advancing, should observe carefully the ground and its resources; and that, when the waggons should be

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put in motion, all who could find security from projections of rock, should hasten to such shelter, and that the rest should lie flat on the ground, covering themselves with their compacted shields. Arrian, himself an experienced officer and an eminent tactician, and professing to follow the narratives of generals who served under Alexander, proceeds to say, this was so executed, that the greater part of the road remained clear, while the waggons rolled down the hill, and, of the soldiers reduced to depend upon their shields for protection, none were killed. The momentary danger being over, the phalanx rapidly formed, and advanced, giving the regular military shout, while the bowmen, whose shots far exceeded the cast of the Thracian javelin, discharged their arrows from behind, and from the heights on each side. Alexander's bold and active temper would not allow him to be meerly a spectator of the action, in an age when it was usual for commanding generals to be personally ingaged. He took himself the lead of a body of heavy-armed foot, distinguished by the title of hypaspists, who seem to have been selected for their ability for rapid movement in complete armor, together with the Agrians, who were, like the Thracians, middle-armed. The enemy, disheartened by the failure of effect of their stratagem, galled by missile weapons, unqualified to stand the shock of the phalanx, in front, and attacked by Alexander in flank, took to precipitate flight, and even abandoned their camp, containing their women and children, constant companions of the wild hords in their warfare. These, with the attending slaves, less unhappy in their change of lot, would be probably, the most valuable portion of the booty; the whole of which was presently

Arrian, l. 1. c. 1.

sent off under an escort, to be sold, among the Grecian towns of the coast, for the benefit of the victorious army. SECT. II.

The extensive territory of the Triballians, reaching to the Danube, was now open to the Macedonian arms, and if the chief desired to carry war thither, the recent event might have sufficed to make a shortsighted soldiery willing. But the country was not without inviting circumstances; mostly plain, of highly-fruitful soil; and tho its people were without science, and little versed in arts of luxury, yet they were not without what, with those natural advantages, supported large population; so that, not only subsistence might be gained by the sword, but also booty which the institutions of the Grecian republics made of sure value; men, women and children for the slavemarkets. It appears probable, from the sequel that assurance had been received of the safety of Macedonia under the able management of Parmenio. Thus Alexander's immediate counsellors, with a view to check future attempts against their country, might be led to approve the ambition natural for a youth of Alexander's age, to emulate his father's glory, and like him carry war as far as the Danube. Such an expedition however had been so far provided for, that vessels, adapted to the navigation, had been ordered from Byzantium to proceed up that river. The army then descending from the mountains, the Triballians were so aware of the inferiority of their arms and discipline, for contest in the plains, that, without an attempt to defend their cultivated fields, they fled with what property they could carry, their king Syrmus leading. The ilands of their great boundary river were the first choice for refuge; but these not sufficing for all, the remain- Arrian, l. 1. c. 2.

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der occupied the extensive woods and marshes on the banks of the Lyginus, a tributary stream[11]. Uneasy however there, and in want, they issued to attack the invaders, but were defeated, with much slaughter. Alexander then, in a march of three days, reaching the Danube, made an attempt upon one of the ilands; but his vessels not sufficing to carry a competent force at once, the garrison was too strong for him, and he received a check.

Arrian, l. 1. c. 3.

Beyond the Danube was the country of the Getes or Goths. Degrees of barbarism, were not in those parts, it appears, to be measured by degrees of latitude, or distance from Greece. Circumstances reported by Arrian would indicate the Getes to have been of more settled life, and thence more civilized, than the concurring accounts of the three early historians, all personally acquainted with the Thracians, represent that nation; even the part bordering on the Grecian colonies. Where Alexander reached the Danube, the land beyond was, in Arrian's account, to a great extent, as one field of wheat, of the most luxuriant growth. Skilled therefore apparently not inconsiderably in husbandry, but ignorant of navigation, beyond that of a canoo, the Getes depended upon their great river for complete security against invasion from the southward. But, Alexander had provided means beyond their contemplation. The vessels from the Euxine were capable of carrying horses, and they had never seen such before. Fifteen hundred cavalry were thus put across, apparently by night, while four thousand foot also passed, some in

[11] There is, in our copies of Arrian, an error of transcribers here, for which Gronovius has proposed an ingenious and probably just correction, which has been adopted for the text.

canoos of the country, and the rest on skins, the soldier's ordinary bed, stuffed with straw. Arrived thus on Gothic ground, not far from the capital city, which stood, not on the river, but near it, the corn was found of height to conceal the march of the infantry. The Getes had assembled, according to report, to the number of ten thousand foot and four thousand horse. The phalanx, on emerging from the corn, presently took the closest order. Advancing then with shields hardly admitting any sight of what bore them, and with spears presented in even line, the cavalry at the same time moving with a regularity wholly new to the Getes, previously wondering how such a force could so suddenly cross their great barrier of water, in extreme surprize and alarm they fled. Their capital, unfortified, having been supposed safe, with the river on one side, and an extent of their own country on all others, was abandoned, and so hastily that booty was found there, in kind and amount, highly gratifying to the Macedonians.

Tho provocation to this hazardous enterprize is little intimated by the historian, yet its policy perhaps may be gathered from the result. Gratification to the soldier by booty, we have often had occasion to observe a common and even necessary object in antient warfare; and the attainment of this, in a situation and by means so unlooked for, and with so many apparent obstacles overcome, would promote the notion that nothing was impossible for the army under its bold and fortunate young commander. Yet it may possibly have been less with any direct view to such an enterprize, that his able counsellors procured vessels from the Euxine to be brought, by a laborious and hazardous navigation, so far against the stream, than to insure

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a supply of provisions for the army in a hostile country, so remote and so little known, or means of retreat in case of misfortune. Conquest, to be retained beyond the Danube, was evidently not the purpose. The body of the army quickly recrossed the river, leaving the care of the booty to a detachment, which hastily followed with it.

Advantage from these measures, so largely successful, soon became manifest. The hazardous enterprize beyond the Danube might have afforded hope, for Syrmus and the Triballians, of delivery from an overbearing enemy; but the rapid return of the victorious army produced such despondency, that Syrmus presently sent an embassy to ask respectfully, upon what terms he might have peace for himself and his people; and, shortly after, ministers came from all the surrounding states, professing the purpose of friendship and desiring a return of it. A kind of congress was thus formed, in which the ministers of the Celts, or Gauls, the extent of whose settlements, in this age, eastward of that afterward called Cisalpine Gaul, is unascertained, were noticed for the lofty tone with which they offered friendship, anxious at the same time to obviate hostility[12]. All were so received that treaties of peace and friendship were concluded

Arrian, l. 1. c. 3. Strab. l. 7.

[12] The account of the embassy of the Gauls, in which Arrian and Strabo concur, the latter informs us, was from Ptolemy. It is left uncertain where exactly this branch of the widely-spred nation of the Celts lived; and it seems a little presumptuous in some modern authors, I think the respectable Guischardt among them, on such grounds as moderns can have, to deny a fact so warranted as this embassy. Were Ptolemy's authority not itself sufficient, Strabo and Arrian were likely to be as well qualified to judge of it on the score of probability as any moderns: at least they would have more ground within their reach.

with all, sanctioned, for each nation, by its peculiar religious solemnities. SECT. II.

The confederated powers westward of Macedonia, the Illyrians, under Cleitus son of Bardylis, and the Taulantians under Glaucias, tho foremost to threaten, had still delayed to act; apparently disconcerted by the early and complete overthrow of their allies on the eastern side, the Thracians and traders. After the quickly insuing defeat of the Triballians, they might have expected invasion of their own country to be the next object of the victorious army. But information that Alexander was ingaged in the hazardous project of carrying war beyond the Danube, with perhaps exaggerated intelligence of difficulties and dangers deep in the northern continent, incouraged them in their former purpose of invading Macedonia, and inabled them to induce neighbors, before hesitating, to favor their purpose. From their own mountains they could descend with their light troops into the Macedonian plains; but the Macedonian phalanx could not with any ease or security, enter their country, but through that of the Autariats. These, apparently subjects of the Macedonian crown, but holding their own free constitution, were ingaged to refuse passage for a Macedonian army; and then the confederated princes formally renounced the alliance concluded with the late king of Macedonia, Philip; and, for the losses of power and dominion sustained from him, proposed to revenge themselves on his son.

Alexander had fortunately settled, and mostly concluded, treaties of friendship with all the northern powers, when information of this revived danger for Macedonia reached him. His temper, stimulated by recent success, would want no urging to adopt the advice of able counsellors, that the

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best defence for a country, threatened with invasion, was to give the enemy employment at home. But the contumacy of the Autariats was an obstacle requiring the first attention. Fortunately among the friends about him was one who best could obviate it. Bordering on the country of the Autariats was that of the Agrians; within the Macedonian kingdom, but themselves not of Grecian race. Nevertheless their prince, Langarus, now serving with Alexander, had been his companion from boyhood. Bred in the Macedonian court, Langarus yet was popular in his principality; for, undertaking that the Agrians should so keep the Autariats in awe as to prevent any serious opposition to the Macedonian army in traversing their country, he effected what he promised. Here we find marked, at the same time, something of the liberal constitution of the Macedonian kingdom and of the liberal character of Philip's policy. The hereditary chief of a distant province, which seems to have been much in the circumstances of our counties palatine of old, was so made his own and his son's friend, that, holding power to be a valuable friend, he had the disposition also.

Arr. l. 1. c. 5.

Strab. l. 7.

Thus relieved from a threatening difficulty, Alexander advanced into Illyria so speedily as to reach Pellion, the capital, before the promised assistance of the Taulantians had joined the Illyrian forces. Cleitus therefore, fearing to meet the Macedonians in the field, directed his attention to the protection of the city; and with this view took a position so advantageous, that Alexander, ably advised, rather than attack him there, proceeded to plunder the country around. Thus, while his own army was gratified, the Illyrians, naturally impatient of confinement in a stationary camp, became

so irritated that their prince could no longer restrain them; they would be led to battle. Yielding then to the pressure of the moment, against his opinion of what prudence required, he sought to obtain from the favor of his gods a success, of which, with his human means he had no clear hope. The singular and horrid rite is said to have been of antient custom in the country: Three boys, three girls and three black rams, were, with prescribed ceremonies, killed together at the altars. His army then quitted its advantageous position, confident of divine favor. But no courage, no enthusiasm could enable men, with the Illyrian arms and discipline, to contend with the Macedonian phalanx on ground suited to its action. The Illyrians, overborne, took to profuse flight; and, their camp becoming the prey of the conquerors, the relics of the victims of the abominable sacrifice, found there, assured the Macedonians of the truth of what had been related to them. SECT. II. Arr. l. 1. c. 6.

The arrival of Glaucias however, soon after, with the Taulantian army, gave incouragement and opportunity for the dispersed Illyrians to reassemble under their king. The country abounded with rugged mountains and productive valleys; affording thus choice of strong posts, and abundant subsistence for forces holding them. It was that country which, in a modern age, became famous through the stand made against the Turks, in the fulness of their power, by another Alexander, commonly described by his name in the Turkish corruption, Scanderbeg, and which the exertions of the Turkish empire, surrounding it, have never yet been able completely to subdue. Here the united Illyrians and Taulantians took a position so strong, that the Macedonians again judged attack upon

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them unadvisable. But while they hesitated, scarcity, especially of forage, began to press; for all near had been carried off by the enemy, and opportunity for wide range of cavalry was not open here as among the northern plains: abundance was to be obtained only by going far, and not so without venturing through dangerous passes, among lofty mountains and extensive woods. The arms, and the art of war, of the Illyrians and Taulantians, ill adapted for pitched battle, were excellent for harassing an enemy. The combined kings therefore would not quit their strong position; but so watched opportunities for partial action, that at length it was judged necessary for almost the whole of the Macedonian horse to go out in body for supplies. Its return, so ably the enemy's measures had been concerted, was intercepted. The commanding officer's vigilance avoided a snare prepared for him; but he could not advance without meeting destruction almost certain. He took a position however which he maintained till the whole Macedonian infantry was led to his relief. By an able movement then, tho not without both difficulty and hazard, employment was so found for the enemy, that the cavalry, yet still not without difficulty and hazard, at length joined it, and immediate danger ended.

Want however pressed more than ever, and opportunity for advantageous action the wary enemy as much denied as ever. The resource at length was a feigned flight. The enemy followed; but cautiously, keeping the highlands. Little regularly disciplined, but, taught by severe experience, they had, since their defeat, been obedient to their prudent leaders. But now, supposing victory in their hands, they could no longer be restrained to due observance of order. And here

we find illustration of what was observed in treating of the Thracian constitution, that wherever the people are the army, popular power will insure popular freedom. Irregular and defective as the Illyrian constitution may have been, the monarchy was not absolute. Probably Alexander's able advisers may have reckoned upon the licentious use of popular power by the Illyrians, and possibly they may have hoped for the further advantage which insued. Cleitus and Glaucias, not remitting their caution so as to quit the hills, yet misjudged in chusing a station; or, confidence increasing as they proceeded, in failure of one directly in their course such as they might desire, they ventured to incamp for once upon disadvantageous ground. Alexander, with his forces ably disposed for the purpose, attacking them there, put them completely to rout. Cleitus retreated to his capital; but, whether more doubting the strength of its fortifications, or the fidelity of his people, when the disgrace of defeat had befallen him, and the pressure of a victorious enemy irritated them, he presently fled after his ally, Glaucias, who had withdrawn into his own country.

SECT. II.

Ch. 43. s. 4. of this History.

Whether any treaty of peace, with either princes or people, followed this victory, the historian, attentive principally to military affairs, and now attracted by the importance of what occurred elsewhere, has omitted to say. Intelligence reached Alexander of commotions in Greece; so serious that composition with the Illyrians and their allies was highly desirable. The recent victory afforded facilities, and hard conditions appear not to have been insisted on. It seems likely that Alexander, deferring to able counsellors, was satisfied to have the treaty made with his father, with little variation,

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renewed, and that the Illyrian and Taulantian princes, reckoning it fortunate that their unsuccessful aggression produced no worse consequences, gladly rested on it; for as far as the silence of historians may afford indication, the Macedonian western border remained in peace.

SECTION III.

Combination among the Grecian Republics under Demosthenes: Revolution of Thebes: Greece again divided against itself: Destruction of Thebes: Composition with Athens, Elæa and Ætolia, and Peace restored throughout Greece. Repetition of the Macedonian Olympic Festival.

It was Alexander's fortune now, as in his wars with the northern nations, that the enemies by whom he had been pressed were alreddy brought to terms of accommodation, when new ones required his utmost attention. The disposition of the party in Athens, adverse to the Macedonian alliance, had been so openly demonstrated in the conduct of Demosthenes, its principal leader, and the connection of that party with a party in almost every republic of the nation, was of such notoriety, and its connection also with the Persian court had been so avowed, that Alexander's able council, whether more or less assured of what had produced the formidable confederacy of the northern nations, now so fortunately overborne, could not be wholly unprepared to expect adverse movements among the Grecian republics. The absence of the authority, chosen by the congress of the nation to moderate between discordant republics with contending parties in each, affording opportunities, the

circumstances of the Greek nation were become as uneasy and threatening, for families of property and for domestic life altogether, as in any period described by Xenophon or Isocrates. SECT. III.

At this time, according to Plutarch, in consonance with all other writers, Demosthenes held a complete superiority in the Athenian assembly. Nevertheless the combination that he could form within Greece, appears not so extensive as to have been formidable to the Macedonian confederacy, had it not been supported by powerful connections abroad. According to Plutarch he had such consideration at the Persian court that rescripts had reached the satraps, commanding their attention to him as agent for the affairs of the empire with the Grecian republics, and prescribing the sums of money which they should advance him for the service. Of all the jarring portions of the Greek nation, nowhere was opposition in politics so violent as at Thebes; nowhere, in one party, such vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes; in the other, to the patronage of the king of Macedonia. From earliest history indeed no part of Greece appears to have been the scene of such constant and violent hostilities within itself as Bœotia. In the fabulous ages it afforded principal subjects for the tragic poets: within historical times, nowhere else do we read of the fate of Grecian towns, suffered from Greeks of the same province and political association and claim of common rights and common lineage, like that of Platæa, of Thespiæ, and, even while Pelopidas and Epameinondas were, if not the leaders on the occasion, yet among the leading men, that of Orchomenus. On the conclusion of the sacred war, the interest of Thebes, then the ally of Macedonia,

Plut. Demost. p. 856.

Plut. Demost. p. 855, 856.

Ch. 39. s. 8. of this History.

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prevented, as we have seen, the rebuilding of Thespiæ and Platæa, and the restoration of Orchomenians and others, banished for opposition to Thebes. Through the battle of Chæroneia afterward, these benefits were obtained, and all the Bœotian towns were delivered from the dominion of the Theban people. Philip superintending, a liberality, unusual in Grecian politics, was extended to the defeated party: Few or none were banished: injoyment of civil rights was ingaged for to all. That party however before commanding, now inferior; holding liberty, but not power; would not cease to desire the lost superiority; and if power, in the hands of those who had been its adversaries, were ever exercised illiberally or indiscreetly, little under control, in civil matters, from the military head of the nation in distant Macedonia, they would of course be more eager to regain their lost superiority. Sources of fermentation and disturbance were so reddy, in the population of a republic so composed, that the regular means of a republican constitution could not inable those who desired quiet, to maintain it. This had been so strongly felt that, under a vote, as we have seen, of the Amphictyonic confederacy, and evidently with the approbation, and probably at the desire, of the party in Thebes which favored the Amphictyonic and Macedonian alliance, a garrison from the Amphictyonic army was placed in the Cadmeia, to be reddy to assist in keeping the public peace.

Arr. l. 1. c. 7.

At the time of which we have now to treat, two officers, Amyntas and Timolaus, commanded in the Cadmeia with joint authority. From their names, among other indications, it seems probable that one was a Theban, the other a Macedonian. Such combined command we have seen familiar and

ordinary among the Greeks; and the association of a Macedonian with a Theban may have been here required, less by any ambition or assumed authority of the Macedonian government, than by the habitual jealousy of Thebes entertained among the Bœotian towns, together with their habitual subordination to Thebes; whence, tho averse to the single superiority of a Theban, even of the friendly party, yet they had difficulty to claim, for a citizen of any other state, equality with a Theban. SECT. III.

This resource of maintaining a garrison in the Cadmeia, the mildest perhaps that could be effectual for restraining open turbulence, would not however soften animosities or cheer disappointment. Those Thebans who had been first in their own city and in all Bœotia, some of them looking to be first in Greece, habituated to activity in ambitious pursuits, could not rest in domestic quiet or in civil inferiority, under those they envied or hated. The vigilance, the experience, the talent of gaining the minds of men, in which Philip excelled, might perhaps, in course of time, have introduced more harmony among a population so inheriting hostility within itself, and through life exercised in it. But the ablest ministers, whom Alexander could employ or the Thebans of his party elect, while himself ingaged in distant warfare, could hardly fail to find difficulties insuperable, when, in opposition to them, sometimes in open assembly, but still much more by secret negotiation, the able and indefatigable Demosthenes was exciting and combining insurrection[12].

Banishment, on account of party differences, was so ordinary among the Greeks, that if some emi-

[12] Αἱ δὲ πόλεις, πάλιν τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀναῤῥιπίζοντος αὐτὰς, ἀνίσταντο, κ. τ. ε. Plut. v. Demosth. p. 856.

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nent Thebans left their country, by sentence of exile, or without it, when after the battle of Chæroneia their city yielded to the Amphictyonic army, it may have been thought, by writers of the time, little matter for notice. The defeated party, generally, could not but be uneasy under power in the hands of those to whom they had been violently hostile; and some might dread, possibly not without feeling that they had earned, personal animosity. Finding themselves therefore uneasy, and perhaps unsafe, at home, they may have emigrated; and plots, unmentioned in history, may afterward have given occasion for banishments. Some eminent Thebans, however, we are assured by Arrian, were in banishment, the mass of their party remaining in the city. Yet so the purpose of commotion was concealed, that Amyntas and Timolaus, commanders of the garrison of the Cadmeia, thinking the protection of their fortress needless for themselves, resided in the city below. Possibly indeed their residence in the town rather than in the citadel may have been pursuant to instructions, for dissipating fears, obviating jealousies, cultivating popularity and infusing confidence.

Arr. l. 1. c. 7.

Such appears to have been the state of things, when a rumor was circulated, unknown whence arising, that the young king of Macedonia was dead. Tho this, if credited, could not fail to affect the public mind strongly, to alarm those desirous of resting under the existing order, and to excite hope in the large adverse party, yet the men in power seem to have thought no measures in consequence necessary. In one night both the commanding officers of the Cadmeia were assassinated in the city where they resided. Criers then immediately went round, summoning the people instantly to

Arrian, ibid.

assemble. Alarm was universal. The people meeting, in various expectation, were surprized to find, not the magistrates, but the exiles, with those resident citizens known to be most friendly to them, in possession of the bema. The first speaker began with boldly asserting that the rumor, which all had heard, of Alexander's death, was perfectly authenticated. He proceeded then to urge the expediency of using the opportunity, offered by the gods, for breaking the accursed yoke of Macedonia, and asserting their freedom. The magistrates, meanwhile, uninformed of the catastrophë of the military commanders, and anxious, in such an emergency, for their support, waited hesitating. The bold leaders of the conspiracy, thus alone speakers, presently proposed to the assembly, That the alliance with Macedonia should be renounced, and that the garrison in the citadel should be expelled. Acclamation was reddy from those prepared: others, in fear and uncertainty, were silent; the conspirators assumed that the soverein people had decreed as had been proposed, and proceeded diligently to give efficacy to this mandate of the surprized assembly. All whom they could trust, and as many more as they thought they might restrain, were collected in arms. Siege was laid to the citadel, and works of contravallation and circumvallation, such as are first noticed in extant history to have been used by the Lacedæmonians against Platæa, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, were begun.

Thus, by a principal city, in nearly the middle of Greece, revolt was declared against the general confederacy of the republics. Nearly about the same time, and clearly in concert, the Perrhæbians, subjects of those who assumed to be eminently

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Æsch. de cor. p.546.

Thessalians, nearly as, in modern times, the Grisons and other Alpine people were subjects of the Swiss, rose in revolt. The Thessalian general assembly, inquiring into the business, and informed of the revolution at Thebes, were so satisfied that the new Theban government was connected with the party of Demosthenes, now prevailing in the Athenian assembly, and that from them had come the instigation for their subjects to revolt, that they declared war against both Athens and Thebes.

These circumstances, reported to Alexander in his camp in Illyria, left no room for deliberation but about the manner in which the rebellion, so effectually begun against the general confederacy of Greece, and the war so immediately threatening Macedonia itself from Thessaly, should be most advantageously met. Alexander's temper, not less than the antient principles of monarchy, and the most accredited examples of former times, decided that he should himself go where danger in the field, and difficulty in council were likely most to occur. Speed was urgently required. With a small chosen body therefore he took the shortest road, but of singular difficulty, over a country of rocky and wooded mountains, at this day the least known of all Europe, from either antient description, or modern examination: the provinces of Eordæa and Elymiotis, and the craggy summits of Tymphæa and Paravæa, are the names, and all the description that Arrian gives. The distance was, comparatively, not great, yet the historian mentions it as an extraordinary march, that, in seven days, he reached Pellenë in Thessaly; and that, having crossed that plainer country, and passed the strait of Thermopylæ, he was, on the sixth after, in Bœotia.

SECT. III.

The revolution at Thebes appears, in all accounts, to have been ably conducted; hardly less than that, more celebrated, by which formerly the same city had been delivered from subjection to Lacedæmon. The narrative of Diodorus, valuable here for what has not fallen within Arrian's purpose of a military history, marks it to have been planned at Athens; Demosthenes, he says, furnished a large quantity of arms, for which no payment was required. Apparently, and further indication will insue, Persia was the paymaster. At the instance of Demosthenes the Athenian people voted assistance in arms to the Thebans; who, however, perhaps jealous of Demosthenes and the Athenians, desired that events should be waited for before any Athenian force were sent to them, and so none immediately moved. As if aware then that, to contend successfully against the popularity of the Macedonian government, its liberality must be emulated, the able leaders of the revolution seem, against ordinary republican practice, to have checked all violence in their followers: beyond the assassination of the two military commanders, the careful historian who most gives the particulars, mentions neither bloodshed, nor even any banishment[13]. But it was not the same thing to contend now with the established popularity of the Macedonian supremacy, as formerly with the power of Lacedæmon; odious through a conduct certainly very different from that, less described by antient writers, by which it had risen, but most advantageously characterized by

Diod. l. 17. c. 8.

Arrian, l. 1.

[13] Plutarch, in his life of Demosthenes, giving a summary of the revolution and its consequences, as far as Demosthenes was concerned, says many were killed with the arms which Demosthenes furnished; but without specifying on what occasion. In the following war no doubt many were killed.

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that remarkable testimony, in the Persian war, the refusal of the people of the other republics to act, even in naval service, with which the Lacedæmonians were so little conversant, under any but a Lacedæmonian commander. The arrival of Alexander at Onchestus in Bœotia, beyond all expectation, and beyond even supposition of what was possible, as it surprized the Theban leaders, so it greatly alarmed them. Not the force he had brought was formidable, but the effects among the Theban people; the animation arising among those whom terror and necessity only had induced to acquiesce under the late revolution, the fears of its decided friends, and the revived uncertainty of the many, less determined to either cause. Alexander had hoped, so his historian says, by the uncalculated rapidity of his march, to have the satisfaction of composing matters without bloodshed; and he was so near succeeding, such was the evident temper prevailing among the Theban people assembled on the occasion, that the bold leaders carried a vote for opposing him only by an extraordinary fiction. They ventured the hazardous assertion that the Alexander, now with the small force at Onchestus, was not the king, son of Philip, who certainly was dead, but another Alexander, the son of Aëropus; of the royal family, but not even commander of that small force; for Antipater, they said, commanded in chief. Thus, with difficulty, was obtained the rejection of a proposition for negotiation. The able leaders then hastened measures for obviating, as far as might be, proposals from either side. A body of horse, attended with light-armed foot, was sent out to attack the guard of the captain-general of Greece, who had yet committed no hostility against them, but, on the contrary was

Arrian, l. 1. c. 7.

known to be anxious for an accommodation; killed some men, unprepared to expect such hasty overbearing violence, and pushed on so far as to insult the main body with ill language. Arrian, mentioning that provoking language was used, has not specified it. Diodorus relates that Alexander, in serious earnestness to avoid the necessity of using arms, had caused proclamation to be made, inviting all Thebans, without distinction, 'to partake of the 'common peace of Greece.' The reply to this, he says, from the ruling Thebans, was a proclamation by a herald of powerful voice, inviting all those in Alexander's army who would concur with the great king (meaning the king of Persia) and the Thebans, to join them 'in giving liberty to Greece, and 'abating its tyrant.' Diodorus, having drawn this part of his narrative evidently from a writer warm in the Demosthenic, in opposition to the Macedonian interest, with much appearance of his having been an informed cotemporary, the testimony to this open avowal of the patronage of Persia is highly remarkable[14].

SECT. III.

Diod. l. 17. c. 9.

Arrian has not stated the amount of force that Alexander led from Illyria into Bœotia. He has mentioned the Agrians, middle-armed highlanders, peculiarly qualified for such a march. Some caval-

[14] Diodorus's narrative, even of the military transactions attending this revolution of Thebes, is more worthy of attention than his accounts of battles commonly are found. Differing widely as it does from Arrian's, it shows its foundation on the same facts, the differences being hardly other than might be expected between the report of a military man, meaning to represent things as they were, and that of a politician, such as Diodorus appears to have drawn from, ernest to put forward the interest of his party and exalt the fame of those who had suffered in its cause; tho perhaps here and there may be distinguished a dash of the coloring more peculiar to the philosophical Greek writers under the Roman empire.

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ry he would probably take, but perhaps no heavy-armed. Combining what he has indicated with the assurance of Demosthenes, that Philip never led more than a small escort from Macedonia into Greece, and considering the probable means of Alexander to conduct and maintain a Macedonian army there, it seems not likely that the force he led was much greater than had usually attended his father. Among the northern nations, all hostile, he could support his army from what, in success, he could take there. In Greece, on the contrary, his business was not to find enemies, but to support friends, and to conciliate, if it might be, those who were not so; at any rate not to irritate by injuring the country at large. The soundness then of the judgement, probably that of able advisers to whom his good sense led him to defer, which trusted in the popularity of that cause of which the king of Macedonia was the acknowleged head, soon became manifest. Nowhere the consequences of the revolution in Thebes were so dreaded as in Bœotia itself. The new liberality of the leaders, avoiding injury to persons and estates, was mistrusted, or came too late. It does not appear that they gained any effective partizans out of Thebes; while all the principal men and best forces of the north of Greece hastened to join the standard of the general-autocrator of the nation, looked to as their constitutional chief, the legal and willing protector of their common rights. Thus Alexander was soon in circumstances to take offensive measures.

Well informed, then of the disposition of a large portion, even of those within the walls of Thebes, to concur with those who had thus placed themselves under his command without, avoiding hostile measures, he approached the town, passed it, and

incamped on the farther side, near the gate leading to Eleutheræ and Athens. Here he seems to have had a double purpose; to show himself reddy yet for negotiation, and even to invite it; and further, to be in a situation to intercept hostile reïnforcements on the only side on which it was likely any might approach. Desire of negotiation prevailed in Thebes, notwithstanding any ingaging conduct of the new rulers. The unambitious of all descriptions, whose first objects were peace and safety, could not but desire it. Nevertheless the watchful and active and well-judging diligence of the new leaders was so effectual, that all endevors to obtain a popular vote for negotiation failed. SECT. III.

The able men, thus far successful in their hazardous enterprize, had not undertaken it in any vain confidence in even the utmost strength of Thebes, with the utmost assistance that could be hoped for from their party among the other towns of Bœotia: they looked to Athens, and the talents of Demosthenes, now ruling there, and the influence of Demosthenes and his party in other republics, and to the power of Persia, reddy with its wealth, under the direction of Demosthenes, to support all. But Demosthenes, and his principal partizans within Greece, evidently had been disappointed in their expectation of the amount of difficulties to be met by Alexander, from his barbarian enemies on three sides of Macedonia, while they were preparing troubles for him on the fourth. The northern wars being advantageously ended, and Alexander, beyond all expectation, alreddy in Bœotia, and the northern Greeks flocking to his standard, the general hopes of the party fell, and the power of Demosthenes, in the Athenian assembly, was immediately shaken. Anxious to hold still what he could, he

Plut. Demosth. p. 856.

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undertook an embassy to the king of Macedonia, surrounded by his republican Greek allies. But those republicans were the most vehement and determined enemies to the great orator, and his partizans throughout Greece. Going therefore no farther than the Bœotian border, he returned, without executing in any degree his commission. His adversary Æschines, some years after, speaking of this curious fact to the assembled Athenian people, told them that Demosthenes took fright, but without saying at what. Diodorus, relating to the same fact, mentions the supposition entertained, that the connection of Demosthenes with the Persian court, and an apprehension of giving umbrage there, by making himself the instrument of friendly negotiation between the Athenian and Macedonian governments, impelled him to the very irregular step which, apparently, must have been difficult for him to excuse to the people his soverein[15].

Æsch. de cor.

Diod. l. 17. c. 4. Plut. Demosth. p. 856.

[15] We find this extraordinary fact stated by Æschines to the Athenian people, and virtually admitted by Demosthenes through omission of notice of it in replying. Æschines, speaking of what was then in the memory of all present, has not mentioned the time or occasion of the embassy. Diodorus, giving it to Alexander's first coming into Greece, nevertheless mentions, as what occurred at the same time, the removal of goods from Attica into Athens, in fear of immediate invasion from the army under Alexander; which, according to better authority, clearly marks the matter as following the destruction of Thebes, where Plutarch places it.

The connection of Demosthenes with the Persian court, having not only been imputed to him by his personal adversary Æschines, and implied by his respectable cotemporary Isocrates, with the additional testimonies of the latter antients, Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, Arrian and Justin, but avowed and gloried in by himself, as a measure of policy that should do him credit with his fellow-citizens of his party, one cannot but admire the management of some among the antients, and among the moderns Rollin eminently, to put that connection out of sight, for the purpose of maintaining their assertions, that the great orator was a pure Grecian patriot. A passage

SECT. III.

The disappointment to the Theban leaders, at the failure of support from Athens, must have been great and disheartening. Nevertheless contemplating the change to insue to themselves, with even the best terms that could be hoped for from negotiation; that, from chiefs of their city, aspiring to be chiefs, or among the chiefs, of Greece, there could be the choice for them but of emigration, or of living without power under the rule of those who would suspect and perhaps hate them; and possibly still cherishing some hope, founded on their knowlege of the congenial feelings of numbers in different parts of Greece, they so persevered in their exertions to prevent any vote of the assembled Theban people in favor of a capitulation, or any negotiation, that none insued.

Alexander nevertheless persevered in avoiding offensive measures; waiting the result, which time might produce, with a patience indicating a just deference to well-judging counsellors about him. But he had not yet acquired art or authority to infuse or command such patience in all under him. Sol- Arrian, l. 1 c. 7.

of the versified historical anecdotes, by John Tzetzes, of the twelfth century, may deserve notice; not for any confirmation of the imputation against Demosthenes, but for evidence of the effect of the management of his partizans and of his politics. The story, says Tzetzes, was well known to a few, but not generally, and therefore he would tell it:

Φέρεται δὲ λόγος οὐ πολλοῖς, γνώριμος δὲ βραχέσιν,
Ὡς ὁ Δαρεῖος, ὁ Περσῶν ἐκεῖνος αὐλαιράστωρ,
Ἀκηκοὼς Ἀλέξανδρον μέλλειν στρατεύειν Πέρσας,
Χρήμασι δεξιώσασθαι πολλοῖς τὸν Δημοσθένην,
Ὅπως ἂν ἀσχολήσειεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι.
Ὁ δὲ Θηβαίους δυσυχῶς ἐγείρει κατ' ἐκείνου.

Joan. Tzetz. Hist. Chil. VII. 139.

The measure of the verse here is of the kind called στίχοι πολιτικοί, and, with attention to the marked accent, will be familiar to the English reader.

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diers, commonly uneasy in inaction, are especially so when they reckon themselves superior to the enemy. Impatience would naturally arise, and perhaps some indignation, among the Greeks of the Amphictyonic confederacy, at the delay, required by no necessity obvious to them, of measures for relieving their friends and kinsmen blockaded in the Cadmeia. Opportunity was observed, by those nearest the Theban circumvallation, for advantageous assault upon it, and they broke in. Whether Perdiccas (a general bred under Philip, who commanded that part of the army) directed or incouraged the measure or no, he was not so deficient as not to be presently where his duty would require, when his troops were ingaged. His brother officer, Ptolemy, seems, according to Arrian's account, scrupulously to have avoided, in his narrative of the affair, both to accuse and to acquit him; whence irregularity may be suspected. The measure however was clearly rash. Perdiccas was presently overpowered. Amyntas, commanding the division next in the line, hastened to his support; but even their united force was unequal to that presently brought against them.

Arrian, l. 1. c. 8.

Alexander, quickly informed of all circumstances, ordered the bowmen of the army, together with the Agrians, middle-armed, to the relief of his distressed divisions. Middle-armed and bowmen were troops adapted to cover a retreat, but not to meet and overbear the Theban heavy-armed. It may seem that Alexander's experienced and judicious advisers, knowing what difficulties Philip had found in his endevors to restrain the excesses of republican troops, and moderate the violence of republican counsels, feared the consequences of success in arms against the Thebans, and desired, if

possible, still to bring matters to issue by a negotiation. But the light troops did not suffice to inable those first ingaged to effect their retreat. Perdiccas was severely wounded, and Eurylotus, a Cretan, commander of the bowmen, was killed.

The Theban chiefs, on the other hand, holding their leading situations through a policy which necessarily conceded absolute power, nominally, to the rash many, tho with the hope that it might be only nominally, were likely to want authority for restraining zeal within the bounds which prudence would require. Possibly, also, abandoned as they were by those of the other Grecian states, in whose coöperation they had confided for means of ultimate success, and perhaps not without some mixture of despair with their small hope, they thought an unforeseen opportunity, like that now offering, pushed to the utmost, might afford them the best chance for overcoming the hardly superable difficulties before them. Their troops however, led by that contagious influence which directs multitudes reckoning on their power, would not be contented with defeating the attack on their lines; but, with or without orders, would make their success at once complete, by defeating the whole opposing army. They so pressed on the retreating enemy, that it was found advisable for Alexander to lead out the whole of his heavy-armed to oppose them. In their eagerness to profit from victory, supposed alreddy theirs, they had lost much of that good order in which they had met the adverse phalanx. The reverse then was rapid. Presently overborne, they fell back toward their contravallation. The garrison of the Cadmeia, from their lofty situation, anxious observers of all events, seeing their foes approaching in disorder, issued and attacked them in flank. Such

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then was the contagion of alarm and the deficiency of command among the Thebans, that hardly an attempt was made to defend their lines. For all immediately to take regular arrangement there was impossible. Those nearest the city therefore pushed forward toward the gate, opened to receive them. Who should go and who should stay, in the failure of order, being uncertain, all became eager to reach the protection of the city-walls. But before such numbers, in such confusion, could enter, the enemy was upon them, and the gate, to shut it against the pressure being impossible, came into his possession.

In this change, almost instantaneous, from extravagant hope to ruin, for the Theban leaders to restore any order or hold any command, among their dismayed people, even those most attached to them, would be difficult; and the disposition of a large proportion always adverse to them, and confident of favor from their enemies, would make any salutary measures nearly impossible. In this imminent wreck therefore, the greater part of the wealthier men, serving on horse-back, successors of those, who, under Epameinondas, had been the most renowned cavalry of Greece, considerate of their personal safety when all other consideration appeared hopeless, fled by a gate opposite to that by which the enemy had entered. This example was presently followed by most of the infantry who obtained knowlege of it, and could find opportunity. Regular resistance to the enemy was attempted only about the temple of Amphion, and not there long maintained. Then Platæans, Thespians, Orchomenians, Phocians, and others of the conquering army, who, having formerly suffered from Theban tyranny, had dreaded a renewal of it through the recent revolution, gave a loose to the furious passions.

SECT. III.

Ranging the town, careless of commands, which rarely any could hear, they slaughtered equally the resisting and the unresisting; not sparing even women and children; even the sacredness of temples not affording protection. A kind of intoxication of fury urged their destructive course, so that says the historian, the extent of the calamity exceeded, not more all previous apprehension of the sufferers, than all previous purpose of the perpetrators. Arrian, l. 1. c. 9.

Whether by any precaution, within human foresight, or by any exertion, not made in the emergency, Alexander, or any of his generals, could have prevented or lessened these horrors, accounts remaining will not warrant a decision; but, that the temper which produced them sprang from the political constitution of Greece, and was nourished by events and circumstances prior to any Macedonian influence among the republics, is abundantly evident. The slaughter, we are told, was not all from the avowed enemy. Slaves of the Thebans themselves, who through the circumstances and incidents of their servitude, bore ill-will to their masters, in a spirit of vengeance, joined in the work of bloodshed.

As far, however, as any constitutional course was established for matters of common concern among the Grecian republics, what followed these violences appears to have been conducted in a constitutional course, exactly analogous to the proceedings on the conclusion of the sacred war. Representatives of the republics were assembled[16].

[16] Arrian's expression on the occasion rather implies that the representatives only of those republics, whose troops composed the victorious army, formed the congress. Diodorus speaks of it as a regular congress of the nation, wherein representatives of all the republics, at least, might attend. Τῶν

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Diod. l. 17. c. 14. Arrian, c. 9. p. 21.

Alexander, limiting himself to the proper office of stateholder and military commander-in-chief, referred decision on all matters of common interest to the congress. Such is the direct assertion of Diodorus; and Arrian's concise account, and all anecdotes reported by Plutarch and others, concur in marking the character of his interference, as far as he used any; that it was to compose differences, soften animosities, and obviate severities. To reduce Thebes lower than the recent destruction had brought her, could apparently be no more for the interest of the king of Macedonia, than of the Grecian people altogether. But the soverein assembly consisted in large proportion of Thessalians, Phocians, and Bœotians; born hostile to Thebes, and educated in sentiments of animosity; the Bœotians especially, moved, in addition to a sense of past injuries, by recent fear of renewed and worse oppression, and reddy to use the public avowal of Persian patronage, by the Theban rulers, to confirm and aggravate the old accusation, that Thebes was always the reddy tool of Persia to inslave Greece. The assembly proceeding to deliberation with a prevalence of such sentiments, the decree resulting was, that the Theban state should be annihilated; the town utterly destroyed; the surviving women and children sold to slavery, families of proved attachment to the conquering cause only excepted; that the territory should become the property of the conquering allies, including the friendly Thebans, to be duly divided among them; and, for assured execution of these resolutions, that a garrison, from the allied army, should hold the strong fortress of the Cadmeia.

ὸὶ συνέδρους τῶν ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ συναγαγὼν, ἐπέτρεψε (ὁ βασιλεὺς) τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ, πῶς χρηστέον τῇ πόλει τῶν Θηβαίων, κ. τ. ε. l. 17. c. 14.

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Uncreditably severe as this decree was, and unbecoming the character, which the Greeks affected to claim, of general humanity, liberal patriotism, and universal regard and respect for the Grecian name and blood, yet, in the course of Grecian history, we have had occasion to observe example not only furnished but exceeded. Arrian remarks that 'destruction still more severe had 'befallen Grecian states, from Grecian hands 'directed by Grecian minds, especially Platæa, 'Melus, and Scione;' but, he adds, 'those were 'small states: the amount of lives lost, and of 'political importance overthrown, by the destruc-'tion of Thebes, was so much the greatest, ever 'to that time experienced in Greece,' (apparently the historian would limit his observation to times regularly historical, and after the return of the Heracleids) 'that the impression on the general 'mind was the stronger, and the catastrophë be-'came matter for the more extensive and pointed 'remark.'

But, as in the course of human affairs is not uncommon, with works of destruction works of charity went hand in hand. Orchomenus, Platæa and Thespiæ, so often, and sometimes so cruelly oppressed by the Thebans, appear to have been at this time not absolutely desolate, but in a state of great depression, with scanty population, under the jealous rule of the imperial people of Thebes; who, to insure their submission, had destroyed the fortifications, and forbidden the restoration of them. The emigrated families were now invited to return, and houses were built for them. Thus Orchomenus, Platæa and Thespiæ, were restored to the rank of free cities of Bœotia; walls were added for their defence; and the favored Theban

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families, whose residences were destroyed in the general ruin of their town, were settled among them.

That Alexander took any part in these works, either of destruction or restoration, is not said. But anecdotes remain of his interference in favor of objects of the vengeance of his republican friends. Arrian has given credit to the report that his influence preserved the house, which had been Pindar's residence, from demolition, and all persons connected by blood with Pindar, from slavery. Plutarch's purpose, in his life of Alexander, has been, evidently enough, not to favor him, but to exalt his own fellowcountrymen the Bœotians, and, as the most eminent of them, especially the Thebans. Yet his anecdotes, tho some with a contrary object, all reälly tend to Alexander's credit. One, however embarrassed with absurdities, may deserve notice for the favor it has found from some antient, and many modern, writers. A noble lady of Thebes, Timocleia, violated by the commander of the Thracian troops (whether there were Thracian troops in Alexander's army matters little) revenged herself by a stratagem through which she put him to death. He inquired for treasure. She told him much had been thrown into a well in her garden, to which she conducted him. He incautiously looking down, she pushed him in, and overwhelmed him with stones. Taken in the fact by the barbarians under his command, she was not destroyed by them, as many unoffending women and children, we are assured, were by Greeks of the army, but carried immediately before Alexander, as to a civil judge in a peaceful city. Walking up to him, with a firm step and unabashed countenance, he asked who she was? She answered

boldly, 'I am the sister of Theagenes, who fell at 'Chæroneia, fighting at the head of the force he 'commanded, against your father, for the liberty 'of Greece.' This sufficed for the generous prince. Admiring her fortitude, he so interfered in her favor, as to save her and her children from the slavery to which all the women and children of her party, without distinction of rank, had been condemned by the decree of the republican congress[17]. SECT. III.

Plutarch, who has commonly undertaken to know much of the thoughts of those whose lives he has written, avers that the catastrophë of Thebes remained through Alexander's life a sore in his mind. It may indeed well be believed to have grieved him at the time, and to have been always of unpleasant recollection; unless for the acts of generosity, which it put in his way to perform. The antient and the recent fame of that city; the claim of the Macedonian royal family to be descended from the Theban Hercules; the connection of his father with Thebans, the most eminent men of their age; the attachment of a large portion of the citizens to his family and to himself, all must have tended to make him deplore the calamity of which he has by some been accused of being the author, but which, according to all appearance of fair testimony, it is noway likely he could have prevented. The most disgraceful circumstance, the deliberately cruel sale of the women and children, might appear most within his power Plut. v. Alex. p. 671.

[17] In justice to Plutarch it should be recommended to the reader to judge of him from his own words, or those of a faithful translator, and not reckon him answerable for the improvements of this favorite story, found in the narratives of some modern historians.

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to have checked. But, to stem the violence of temper of the republican Greeks, which Philip, with large experience and established influence in aid of very superior talents, could do but very incompletely, it seems hardly reasonable to expect of Alexander, a youth of twenty-one, with whatever support from able advisers. At the head of an army only in small part his subjects, and new in presidency over a confederacy of republics, such as we have seen those of Greece, to prevent a measure on which that army and the republics furnishing it were bent, must have been of difficulty which no rational politician will now undertake to estimate. It may seem fairest to gather his disposition rather from accounts of what he did than of what he failed to do; especially afterward, in matters for which he was completely master. If we may trust Plutarch, not always his friend, throughout his following life he never denied favorable attention to any application from a Theban[18].

Plut. v. Alex. p. 761.

Diod. l. 17. c. 14. Plut. v. Alex.

Arrian has not undertaken to state the numbers killed on either side in this bloody business. Diodorus and Plutarch, less scrupulous, concur in reporting the Thebans slain to have been six thousand; the surviving sold thirty thousand. The slain would hardly be very exactly numbered; but of the sold an account would be taken, and made public in the distribution of prize-money to the conquering army. According to Arrian, hardly any Theban, who did not fly, survived, except the known friends of the conquerors; yet the slaves of both sexes, spared as objects of profit, together with the Theban women and children condemned

[18] Plutarch's expression is stronger, even to some appearance of extravagance; but I think may be fairly enough interpreted as in the text.

for sale, may well have amounted to the number asserted. SECT. III.

Of what passed at Athens, what may have been the contest between the parties of Demosthenes and Phocion, during this, one of the most momentous periods of Grecian history, scarcely any memorials remain. In this deficiency, the concise mention, by Diodorus, of the vote of the Athenian assembly for military support to the Thebans, is important: it shows that the party of Demosthenes had gained an ascendancy. But that vote, it seems evident, was never so acted upon that any military assistance was given to Thebes. Yet when the city was taken, the fugitives mostly directed their course to Athens, as the refuge in which they had best hope; and the result showed that they had ground for depending upon a strong feeling, among the leading Athenians, of an interest in their fate. Information of the catastrophe arrived in the season of the greater Eleusinian mysteries. It produced immediately an order to stop that ceremony, held so awfully sacred. Such then was the apprehension of immediate invasion from a powerful army, adverse to the pretension of the Athenian people to be sovereins of Greece, that those who had property in the country very generally directed their utmost diligence to bring everything portable within the walls. Meanwhile an assembly of the people was held. Demosthenes and the principal men of his party avoided to come forward; perhaps more fearing some passionate vote of the multitude, of which Athenian history affords so many examples, than any vengeance of the young king of Macedonia, or even of the republican Greeks, his allies. The friend of Phocion, Demades, whose talents as a speaker were held by some even

Arr. l. 4. c. 10.

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superior to those of Demosthenes, took the lead. He advised that an embassy should be now, tho late, sent to Alexander, the ally of Athens, the captain-general of Greece, to congratulate him on his safe return from the northern wars, and to apologize, as best might be, for the recent counsels of the government. The embassy accordingly was voted. Demades, known to have been highly esteemed by the late king of Macedonia, Philip, and therefore supposed likely to be more acceptable than most others to Alexander, was appointed its chief[19], and Æschines, as we learn from Demosthenes, was a member.

Arrian, l. 1. c. 11.

Demost. de cor. p. 319. ed. Reiske.

Alexander of course would be apprized of the political contest at Athens, and, aware that one large party was as decidedly friendly to him as the other was vehemently hostile. Continuing however to follow his father's example, he received the embassy, not only with politeness, but with favor. Professing himself gratified by it, he added assurance that notwithstanding the measures which their assembly had lately been persuaded to sanction by its decrees, his esteem for the Athenian people, and friendly disposition toward them, remained unshaken. Yet, whether from himself, or, required by a vote of the general confederacy of the Greeks, he

[19] According to Plutarch, in his life of Phocion, the party of Demosthenes so prevailed in the assembly that the embassy was composed of his friends, and Alexander refused to receive it; but the dismay, and resulting discontent, on its return, were such that the party of Demosthenes was obliged to give way, and Phocion was placed at the head of a second embassy. It must be for the reader to weigh Plutarch's assertion against the omission of all notice of the failing embassy by Arrian and Diodorus. For the rest it is not unlikely that Phocion may have been one of the embassy with Demades, not as an inferior, and yet may have allowed Demades, who, in all accounts, had more the talents both of a courtier and a negotiator, to be, as the other historians say, the leading speaker.

demanded the surrender of ten Athenian citizens, to be dealt with according to the common law of Greece; accused as common enemies; authors formerly of the troubles ended by the battle, so calamitous to Athens, near Chæroneia, and recently of those which had produced the destruction of Thebes. Of the ten, the most known from remaining history were Demosthenes, Chares, Lycurgus, Ephialtes and Charidemus. SECT. III.

This demand was communicated, as we have seen was the custom of the age, in a letter from Alexander to the Athenian people. An assembly was summoned, to consider it. Those demanded, and their friends, were in extreme alarm; and, even among those not of their party, many desired that the humiliation of the republic, and perhaps also the severity expected toward the individuals, might be avoided. But the austere principles of Phocion led him, it is said, to insist that, for the common good, those individuals ought to be surrendered, and even to be forward to surrender themselves. Where party was so violent, as at this time at Athens, and such pressing interests were afloat, reports on light and mistaken grounds would gain currency, and calumnies against eminent men would abound. The fame of Phocion, like that of Isocrates before him, has extraordinarily escaped the spirit of calumny. But imputation went against the two great orators on this occasion. Demosthenes, it was said, and his principal friends, had the meanness to solicit favor from their opponent, Demades, and he had the meanness to sell it; pledging himself, for five talents, about a thousand pounds sterling, to use his utmost interest and diligence to obtain from Alexander, and his allies, a remission of the demand for the surrender of the

Diod. l. 17. c. 15. Plut. vit. Alex. & Phoc.

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ten orators. The currency of such a report tends at least to mark the character of the times at Athens. The character of Demades has not been transmitted pure, yet, considering the common conduct of his party, as well as what a just attention to the dignity of the commonwealth, and perhaps the best interest of his party, would require, it may be believed that a bribe would not be necessary to lead him to the line of conduct he took. In pursuance however of a decree, prepared, it is said, by him, another embassy was sent to Alexander, soliciting that favor for the republic, disposed as it was to concur in everything for the common good of the nation, that its obnoxious citizens might be left to the judgement of its own tribunals. The petition or remonstrance, said to have been very ably drawn, produced its effect; incompletely only so far as it was insisted still that Charidemus should be banished from the territories of the confederacy. Charidemus was that friend of Demosthenes who served him as a spy at the Macedonian court, where he was hospitably entertained at the time of Philip's death, of which he so diligently and dexterously forwarded the intelligence. It has been, consonantly with all likelihood, also supposed that he was the person whom we have seen formerly eminent, with that name, as son-in-law of the king of Thrace, and esteemed, as a military commander, by Iphicrates; and in the sequel we shall again find him eminent in another remarkable situation.

Plut. vit. Phoc.

Chap. 42. s. 7. of this History.

Amid the deficiency of our information concerning this interesting transaction, in which, on one side, the dignity and independency of the Athenian republic, on the other the authority of the general confederacy of Greece, were implicated, the usual moderation of the party of Demades and

Phocion seems indicated, and in the conduct of Alexander his father's liberality is conspicuous. Plutarch, who has preserved some things meriting attention for reasons wide of his views in reporting them, has attributed to Alexander, on this occasion, an observation which deserves notice; that prince, he says, admonished the embassy that, in case of misfortune to him, their commonwealth, conducting its affairs justly, must command Greece. Plutarch's object here, evidently has been to raise his reader's idea of the importance still of the Athenian commonwealth, stripped, as it was, of naval empire and subject republics; and to this the story is justly adapted: but, if true, and there seems no adverse probability, it clearly marks also Alexander's just consideration of the situation he held; that he was, not by violence, but in all legitimate course, the successor to the authority formerly held by the governments of Athens and Lacedæmon, as chiefs of the Greek nation; and that this authority, by being deferred to a king of Macedonia, was not put out of course, but might afterward be committed to any other power, regal, aristocratical, or democratical, as a general assembly of the republics of the Greek nation might decide.

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Plut. v. Alex. p. 749.

The transactions at Athens, quickly known throughout Greece, were admonition for the political leaders everywhere. Among the Arcadians, inland men, depending on agriculture and not on commerce, a bold honesty, with a mistaken policy, has, throughout Grecian history, been occasionally observable. All the other republics, where a disposition to favor Thebes against the Macedonian connection prevailed, had temporized; but some Arcadian towns had gone so far as to declare their

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disposition by public acts, voting succor. The failure however of the party of Chares and Demosthenes to maintain a leading influence at Athens, produced the immediate downfall of the cause of imperial democracy, even among democracies. Those of Arcadia, with the wild despotism peculiar to that species of government, by a vote, condemned the leading men who had persuaded to the Athenian connection, to death, as guilty of treason by misleading the public mind. The Eleians were more moderate. They hoped, and it appears not without reason, to find such liberality in the Macedonian supremacy, that a decree, which they passed, for the restoration of all their fellowcountrymen who had been banished for their attachment to it, or had fled in fear of worse, would be accepted as satisfactory atonement. The Ætolians, generally characterized as almost barbarians among the Greeks, appear, on this occasion, in the account of Arrian, to have held the more dignified conduct. They simply sent an embassy to Alexander, to apologize for measures recently directed by bad advisers, and to declare their desire of future friendship with Macedonia, and of concurrence in that confederacy of Grecian republics, of which the king of Macedonia was the head. No indication appears of any purpose of the Macedonian government, under Alexander, any more than formerly under Philip, to interfere, as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians and Thebans often had done most arbitrarily and violently, in the internal affairs of any republic. All apologies were accepted. The Lacedæmonians persevering in refusing to acknowlege Alexander as captain-general of the nation, and to place their contingent of troops under his orders for war against Persia, no measures of compulsion

were taken. Freedom of decision, for its own affairs, being allowed to every state, and disturbance of the public peace only forbidden, quiet, in uncommon degree, appears to have prevailed throughout Greece. SECT. III.

Alexander returning, under these favorable circumstances, into Macedonia, the occasion was judged proper for a celebration of that festival, called the Macedonian Olympic, interrupted by his father's death. Both Diodorus and Arrian expressly mention it as a regular celebration of the festival instituted by Archelaus. It were highly desirable to know what, in such circumstances especially, passed, of public importance, at a meeting which was so adapted to promote, or afford means for, most important political measures, in a country constituted like Greece. But the historians under the Roman empire, whether treating of Greek or Roman affairs, Tacitus almost alone excepted, have rarely attended to the character of great political measures, and the springs of great revolutions. The insuing expedition against Persia and its consequences, within as well as without Greece, not stopping to consider the mechanism which produced them, seem to have ingrossed the minds of the authors of all extant antient works on this interesting portion of history.

Arr. l. 1. c. 11. Diod. l. 17. c. 16.

CHAPTER XLV.

Summary View of the History of Persia, from the Reign of Darius Nothus to the Accession of Darius Codomannus.

SECTION I.

Circumstances of Persia in the Reigns of Darius Nothus and Artaxerxes Mnemon.

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Before we proceed with Grecian affairs, a view, such as remaining memorials furnish means for, of the recent history and actual circumstances of the vast dominion of the kings of Persia, will be requisite; and, as preparation for the narrative to follow, more advantageously introduced here than in the previous general prospect of the political circumstances of the then known world.

When the victorious progress of the great Cyrus first extended the empire of the east to the verge of the Grecian republics, from which before it had been divided by extensive kingdoms, the Greeks, tho their superiority in the art of war, acquired in contests among themselves, had brought their troops into request as mercenaries, never yet had shown themselves, toward the greater powers of the age, a formidable people; and, small as their states were severally, with clashing interests, they might well appear to the mighty conquerors of little account among nations.

SECT. I.

But, beside skill in arms, the superiority which the Grecian institutions were adapted to give through cultivation of talents and advancement in science, raised individuals so educated to notice and estimation among the new lords of Asia. So early as the reign of the first Darius we have seen a Greek, from the colonies in Italy, principal physician in the distant court of Susa. Wherever indeed we have light on the practice and policy of the Persian government, we find it liberal to persons of the various nations under its dominion; and, as if considering itself intitled to paternal command and owing paternal duties everywhere, scarcely distinguishing between those born its subjects, and those becoming so, whether by conquest, or voluntary submission, or even as suppliants: all were admitted to share its favors who might earn them by services. This policy, certainly adapted to a system of conquest and extensive empire, and ably used by the great Cyrus, did not however originate with him, having long before been practised by the Median and Assyrian governments.

Nevertheless Grecian fame might have remained always limited, as it was afterward under the military despotism of Rome, to excellence in arts and sciences, but for the impulse given by the Persian invasion, and especially that under Xerxes; compelling the ever-jarring republics to submit themselves to a temporary union under men, fortunately then reddy among them, of uncommon talents and energy. The superiority of the arms and tactics, peculiar to the nation, gloriously demonstrated under the conduct of these men, in its defence against the unnumbered armies of Persia, forced the Persian officers, afterward superintending the western pro-

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vinces, to respect them; and produced the policy of ingaging Grecian troops for the Persian service, as they had before been ingaged for the Egyptian, and perhaps others, yet never led to any improvement of the discipline of the native troops of the empire upon the Grecian model. The Persian government, in the habit of considering all nations as made to be its subjects, required the service of the people of its several provinces, armed and trained in their several ways; and appears to have reckoned that, where its force could not compel, its wealth might sufficiently command.

Of the liberality then with which the Persian government would reward Greeks in its service, and maintain faith with them, even in unfortunate circumstances, we have seen eminent examples in the instances of Gongylus, the fugitive from Eretria, Demaratus, the exiled king of Lacedæmon, and the illustrious Athenian, Themistocles. The effect of this policy, highly threatening to Greece, was fortunately checked by the successes of the Grecian arms on the eastern shores of the Ægean; begun under Leotychidas and Xanthippus, and greatly extended under Cimon; which to the spirit of patriotism and self-esteem, excited by the victories over the Persians, in Greece itself and on its shores, added the power of the opinion that it might be not only more honorable but more profitable to take plunder in war against them, than to receive pay in their service.

The insuing divisions, however, of the Greeks, among themselves, afforded great opportunities for the Persian government; which, as we have formerly seen, were not wholly neglected. But, under the first Artaxerxes and the second Darius, the energy of that vast body became so slackened,

that it could no longer control its own limbs: its provinces, under their several governors, became almost as much divided as the Grecian republics; and it was no longer one government commanding a vast and well-compacted empire, with which the Greeks had to contend; for equally wars and negotiations, hostilities and alliances, however the king's name might be used for ostensible authority, were oftener affairs with the several satraps, generally more or less hostile to each other.

The appointment of the younger Cyrus to a superintending command over all the western divisions of Lesser Asia, checking this irregular state of things, made a great and alarming change for the Greeks; then indeed united under the lead of Lacedæmon, but far from disposed to rest in such union. Fortunately however for them, the ambition of Cyrus had a more immediate and greater object than the conquest of Greece; and, toward the attainment of that object it was important for him to conciliate the Greeks. With the failure then of his great enterprize, things returned nearly to their former course; and, the renewed distraction of the western provinces inviting, and the example of the Cyreian Greeks, returned from the center of the empire in defiance of its power, incouraging, Agesilaus, with a very small army, and mostly of Asian Greeks, so succeeded in offensive war against the vast empire of Persia, as to overrun some provinces, and alarm even the distant throne.

At the very time when Cyrus reckoned the Grecian force in his army indispensable toward the success of his attempt against his brother's throne, there were Greeks in confidential situations about his brother's court. Two of these, Deinon

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and Ctesias, published histories of Persia. The latter was physician and surgeon to the king; and, if his word may be taken, sometimes employed in important state affairs. Beyond reasonable doubt however, in his medical office, he was often about the person of Artaxerxes. Fragments of his work, of some extent, remain: of Deinon's, a quotation or two only has been transmitted. But both works were intire before Plutarch, when, among his lives of eminent Greeks and Romans, he fancied to insert that of Artaxerxes Mnemon; alone, of those commemorated in that work, completely a foreiner to both Greece and Rome. Plutarch professed to write lives, not histories. Artaxerxes cannot have been his object either for glory of actions, or for any eminence of character. The variety and importance of events, in a reign of more than common length, over an empire of far more than common extent, population and wealth, were what would make his biography interesting. Plutarch appears to have consulted and compared the works of Deinon and Ctesias; but his life of Artaxerxes, beyond what he has gathered from Xenophon of the expedition of Cyrus and the return of the Greeks, is little more than a tissue of family intrigues, dark plots, private conversations, and private crimes. What it affords principally worthy of historical notice is the assurance, consonant with all other remaining information, that the Persian government had fallen so much into the hands of the eunuchs of the palace, and was so managed by them, that, even to persons with the advantage of approach to the royal person, which Ctesias possessed, its counsels would be hardly known at all, its measures but

Plut. v. Alex. init.

SECT. I.

imperfectly, and even events the most important, in the provinces, often very uncertainly.

But little as came to public knowlege of the counsels of the court, and even of the public transactions of the empire, at any distance from the scene of the business, yet the affairs of the western provinces, on which the Greek colonies bordered, and among which Greeks were employed, became necessarily open to be known among the Greeks, with more or less exactness; and generally with more than to persons in the capital of the empire. Judging then from Plutarch's account of the life of Artaxerxes, the discretion of Diodorus may be commended for confining his narrative generally to transactions in which Grecian interests were implicated, or Grecian officers employed. Those transactions, as they have occurred for notice in the foregoing history, show the administration of Artaxerxes neither able nor fortunate. His contests, or rather those of his satraps, with the Greeks, we have seen far from glorious. His attempts to recover Egypt were wholly and rather disgracefully unsuccessful. It is said to have been about the twentieth year of his reign, and the fifty-second of his life, that he undertook in person an expedition against the Cadusians, inhabiting the country between the Caspian and the Euxine seas, now Circassia and Georgia. So ill was this expedition planned or executed, that after considerable loss, the great king obtained by treaty, with difficulty, through efforts of policy, safety for himself and army, by a dishonorable retreat.

Strab. l. 11. p. 507. 510. Diod. l. 15. c. 8. & 10. Plut. v. Artex. Ol. 98. 4. B.C.385.

For the general mildness of his government, however, according to the concurring assurances of Diodorus and Plutarch, Ataxerxes Mnemon was popular; till, as the latter says, toward the

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end of his reign, finding himself lowered in general esteem by his failures in military enterprizes, he turned, whether from provocation or fear, to a course of cruelty. But as far as particulars stated by those writers indicate, it seems probable that the cruelty of Artaxerxes was not toward his people at large, nor perhaps toward any, in his intention, beyond a just, and even necessary, severity, principally exercised against great men, disturbers of his and the public peace; tho, being after the manner of oriental jurisprudence, hasty, it might often be ill-judged, and thence unjust. Among those disturbers, his sons are said to have been eminent. Of a very numerous acknowleged male progeny, three only were of that legitimate birth which qualified them, according to the laws of the empire, for succession to the throne. But so unfortunately unascertained was the law concerning the course of succession, that each of the three claimed priority of right. The pretensions of the two younger, a preference for primogeniture being admitted by the Persian law, are not apparent in antient accounts; yet they seem to have had in public opinion some speciousness, possibly founded on the decision in favor of Xerxes, son of the first Darius; for the old king, to end a dispute so threatening to the peace, not of the royal family only, but of the empire, resorted to the hazardous expedient of associating his eldest son, Darius, who had alreddy reached his fiftieth year, in the royal dignity and authority.

Ch. 8. s. 1. of this History.

Thus Artaxerxes may seem to have done the office of a parent to the empire, as well as to his son. But of this paternal kindness and not less of the imperial office, Darius is said presently to have shown himself most unworthy. The circumstances,

Plut. Artaxerx.

SECT. III.

as related by Plutarch, for their consonance with the general character of Asiatic history, in the scantiness of our information concerning the great empire in question, may deserve some notice.

It was customary in the Persian, as, we find, in other eastern courts, for the king, in rewarding merit, to promise the favored person, for a present, whatever he would ask; in confidence, no doubt, supported by experience, that abuse of so wide a licence would rarely occur; the fear of future resentment, from a hand unrestrained by law, offering a powerful check. But Darius, no longer in the condition of a subject, equally unrestrained by a sense of fear and of decency, asked one of his father's concubines. If such an abuse of confidence would, in every part of the world be offensive, most especially it would among the southern Asiatics. Nevertheless Artaxerxes, pressed, whether by the rigor of the custom or regard for his promise, conceded the woman demanded. She was a Greek, of superior education and accomplishments; formerly a favorite of Cyrus, the king's brother, taken when he was killed; and of course now of advanced age. Presently however, whether stimulated most by a sense of affront, or whatever other feeling, Artaxerxes, if before wrong in concession, now more so in exertion, took her away again. To do this, and maintain it, as Plutarch says he did, in giving participation in dignity, he must have retained more than an equal share of authority. To prevent then, in all contingencies, the future possession of the woman's person by his son, he caused her to be consecrated a priestess of Aneitis, whom the Greeks considered as the Median Diana.

Darius was thus likely to be exasperated; and about the same time Teribazus, the most powerful

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satrap of the empire, versed in great commands, eminent for important services, and actually holding the situation of first minister, received from the old king an affront, unprovoked, of a kind especially to excite resentment. It was usual, we have seen, for the kings of Persia, then as now, to give their daughters in marriage to the great men of the empire. Artaxerxes, after having promised one of his daughters in marriage to Teribazus, using the power which the magians are said to have warranted to Cambyses son of Cyrus, for the king to dispense even with the moral order held sacred for all Persians, married her himself. Teribazus and Darius ingaged in plot together to assassinate Artaxerxes; but, powerful as they were, to have means for their purpose they reckoned it necessary to gain some of the eunuchs of the palace. One of these betrayed them; and as they were proceeding with a chosen band, to execute the abominable design, they were met by the palace-guard; Teribazus, resisting, was killed on the spot; Darius, with many of his accomplices, being taken, was, in the summary course of Asiatic justice, presently condemned and executed.

The wretched old king, having, by this series of shocking circumstances, lost his eldest son, his chosen associate and successor, might perhaps fear resentment from the two younger, whose claims against their elder brother he had resisted, rather than hope for gratitude through any favor in his power. In a situation thus to feel keenly the want of a friend, in whom he might confide, he brought forward Arsames, one of his illegitimate sons, as his confidential agent and principal minister. Of the legitimate surviving princes, the younger, Ochus, bold and ambitious, is said to have

impressed the weak mind of his elder brother, Ariaspes, with apprehension of a cruel death intended for them by their father, as to have driven him to end his own life by poison. Ochus remaining then alone to claim the legal succession, the power, the talents, the popularity of Arsames, and his favor with their common father, still remained threatening to his right; and, as Asiatic courts have been through all ages constituted, to his safety. Arsames however was assassinated, and his death was attributed to the son of Teribazus, in association with Ochus. SECT. I.

It was when the court was in this state (if Plutarch may be trusted for the more secret horrors, and Diodorus for the more public events and the dates) that the great rebellion of the western provinces broke out, which has been formerly noticed; and among these troubles of his family and his empire, in the next year (eminent among Grecian epochs by the battle of Mantineia) the forty-fourth of his reign, and about the seventy-sixth of his age, Artaxerxes Mnemon died[1]. Ch. 28. s. 8. of this History. B.C.362. Ol.104.3.

SECTION II.

Reign of Artaxerxes Ochus: Fortune of a Grecian Family: Revolt of Phenicia and Cyprus suppressed; Egypt reconquered: Administration of Bagôas in the East and of Mentor in the West of the Persian Empire. Circumstances threatening to Macedonia and all Greece: Death of Ochus, and Troubles ensuing: Accession of Darius Codomannus.

Ochus had so made his party good with the eunuchs of the court that he was immediately master SECT. II.

[1] For these numbers Diodorus, who, tho often inexact, was a chronologer, has justly obtained general credit in preference

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of the palace. Nevertheless, tho clearly legal heir to the throne, he so feared the power or the popularity of his father's spurious progeny, that, to obviate disturbance from them, he kept his death secret; and, among orders in his name, issued a decree associating himself, as his brother Darius had been associated, in the imperial dignity. In the course of ten months, while he maintained this imposture, he managed, on the principle and nearly after the manner of the modern Turkish government, the assassination of all his illegitimate brothers, to the number of eighty. Announcing then his father's decease, he assumed the imperial authority as sole soverein, taking the name of Artaxerxes; to intimate, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, for on them is our dependence for this portion of history, that he proposed to emulate his father's mild virtues, and general cultivation of peace, which had indeared his memory.

What troubles insued, or whether any, in the center, or on the northern, eastern or southern frontier of his extensive empire, tho probably all would not be quiet, the Greeks, our only informants, appear not to have known. Their intelligence was limited to the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, Ægean, and Euxine seas; a wide extent however, where revolt was throughout actual, or reddy.

Ch.36.s.3. & 6. & Ch.37.s.5. of this History.

At the northern point, where the Euxine and Ægean meet, Artabazus, satrap of Lower Phrygia, maintained the opposition in which, with the hired advantage of Grecian troops, we have seen him

to Plutarch; who, for his desultory kind of history coherence of times being unimportant, has not scrupled to give sixty-two years to the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and to his life ninety-four.

formerly successful. At the southern extremity, Egypt, long since asserting independency under native princes, and, notwithstanding divisions within itself, baffling the efforts of the Persian empire against it, continued to baffle them. For the large interval, the early defection of the great satrap Orontes from the confederacy in revolt, afforded great relief to the imperial government; but still, in that important portion of the empire, the adverse disposition remained. SECT. II.

Nevertheless, during the first five years of the reign of Ochus, nothing passed, even in the provinces most within the sphere of Grecian intelligence, of which any report has been transmitted; unless the rebellion said to have been obstinately and ably maintained by Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, but of which account remains only from the Roman biographer Nepos, should be attributed, as seems probable, to that period. In the sixth year, while the Athenians were ingaged in that impolitic and ill-managed war with their subject-allies, in which their great general Chabrias wasted his life, and the profligate Chares acquired the lead, which he so long held, of the councils and armies of the republic, preparations in the Phenician harbors, with undeclared purpose, alarmed all Greece, and especially Athens; where, as formerly it has been observed, the effect sufficed considerably to promote the disadvantageous and disgraceful treaty of peace, which the Athenians then concluded with those who, with the flattering title of allies, had been their subjects. What use was made of the naval preparations, which perhaps did not equal report, we have no information; but it was about this time that, for the reduction of the Lower Phrygia, the great land-force was sent which, with

Ch. 36. s. 6. of this History.

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the assistance of hired Grecian troops, and of the talents of their Theban leader, Pammenes, the friend of Epameinondas, the satrap Artabazus defeated.

Ch. 37. s. 5. of this History.

It is likely to have been a part of the policy of the Persian government to alarm the Greeks, with the view to keep their forces at home; while the object of its armaments, at least the first object, was, evidently, not war with them, but the recovery of its own revolted provinces. It may probably have been at this time that Ochus conducted, in person, as the mention of the business by Isocrates implies, an expedition against Egypt, in which success totally failed him. Nevertheless war was still prosecuted against the revolted satrapy of Lower Phrygia, and, after four years further resistance the satrap's financial means apparently so failed, that he could no longer maintain his Grecian mercenaries. Dismissing them, therefore, to the number of about four thousand, and leaving his satrapy, he had the good fortune to find hospitable refuge in the court of Philip king of Macedonia.

Isocr. Or. ad Phil. p. 374.

The fortune of a Grecian private family, deeply implicated with the great political events of the age, here becomes matter for history. The Lower Phrygian or Bithynian satrapy, situated at the north-western extremity of the Persian empire, was separated from the capital, not by great distance only, but, by circumstances of the intervening provinces, both natural and political, which would make communication always slow, often precarious, and sometimes perhaps nearly impossible. It was a critical command, obviously important and necessarily hazardous. For the great officer therefore succeeding to it, whether by any right of birth, or by pure grace of the crown, it would be a matter of

obvious prudence to advert to that connection with the Grecian republics, which, not only his predecessors in the same command, but all the satraps of the western provinces had been for a long time in the habit of cultivating. It is so gratifying, in the course of eventful history, to meet, beyond expectation, an old acquaintance of pleasant character, that the desire is natural to give credit to the indications that Artabazus, satrap of Lower Phrygia, was son of his predecessor in the same satrapy, Pharnabazus, the associate of the eminent Athenians, Conon, and Iphicrates, and afterward successively the opponent and the friend of Agesilaus. Xenophon's narrative shows that Pharnabazus reckoned on a right to his satrapy, independently of the king's favor. Artabazus, who succeeded him in it, had a son named Pharnabazus. On the highly probable supposition then that Artabazus was son of the elder Pharnabazus, communication with the Greeks would, from early years, be familiar to him; and if he was that son of Pharnabazus who, on occasion of his father's conference with Agesilaus, described by Xenophon, pledged himself in friendship to that prince, and was afterward entertained by him at Lacedæmon, he must have been familiar with Grecian manners, and probably with the Grecian language[2]. What however we

SECT. II.

Ch. 25. s. 1. & 3. of this History.

Ch. 24. s. 5.

Diod. l. 16. c. 2.

[2] I know not that the parentage of Artabazus remains mentioned by any antient writer; an omission which, if he was son of Pharnabazus, who in the preceding command of the same satrapy had so much communication with the Greeks, may seem extraordinary. Nevertheless the circumstances of Pharnabazus son of Artabazus, reported by Arrian, (b. 2. c. 1.) on an occasion which will occur for future notice, combined with the fact of the succession of Artabazus to the Bithynian satrapy, and the sentiments which we find put into the mouth of the elder Pharnabazus by Xenophon, concerning his right to that command, strongly favor the supposition that Artabazus was son of the elder Pharnabazus.

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are assured of is, that he married a Grecian lady of the iland of Rhodes, recommended to his regard, it seems likely, by a superior understanding concurring with beauty. The numerous progeny she bore him, eleven sons, it is said, and ten daughters, indicates the permanence of his attachment; and the eminence to which the connection introduced two of her brothers, afforded them opportunity to show that talents were the inheritance of the family.

Diod. ut ant.

Demosth. in Aristoc. p. 672.

It appears indicated, in mention of Artabazus by Demosthenes, that his revolt, so long maintained, had originated in that kind of contest which we have seen so ordinary among the satraps, amounting to actual war between them; each claiming to be the more loyal subject of the crown. His opponents, with possibly better interest in the court, had reddier means of communication with it. We have seen, in the report of Xenophon, his predecessor Pharnabazus, whose character remains altogether advantageously represented, declaring he should not, in certain cases, scruple decided opposition to the chief of the empire; and to this extreme possibly Artabazus may at length have proceeded. When, in consequence of the vigorous and persevering measures pursued by Ochus, he was at length compelled to fly from his satrapy, one of his wife's brothers, Memnon, accompanied him to the Macedonian court. Another, Mentor, with four thousand Grecian soldiers under his orders, ingaged in the service of Nectanebos king of Egypt.

Ch. 24. s. 5. of this History.

But while one of the most distant provinces was thus recovered to the Persian empire, new revolt was brooding in a quarter where hostility would be far more dangerous, and loss of territory far

more injurious. At this time, hardly twelve years since the suppression of the great rebellion of the west, the cities of Phenicia are represented in a state of riches and prosperity, and even freedom, largely indicating, that the terms granted them, on returning to allegiance, had been favorable, and that, in the administration insuing, the old liberality of the Persian system had not been discontinued under Artaxerxes Ochus: Sidon appears to have been the wealthiest mart then in the known world, unless Carthage might surpass it. Nevertheless, a new rebellion arose, in manner marked by Diodorus concisely but perspicuously, and with all consonance to probability. The governing satrap had his residence at Sidon, in a splendid palace belonging to the crown, with a paradise, as it was called, containing a pleasure-garden, and an adjoining park for beasts of chace. His business appears to have been to receive the regulated tribute; to transmit what was to go to the royal treasury; with the rest to maintain a sufficient military force for keeping the public peace; and to interfere with arbitrary authority wherever that peace might be threatened: but, under this impending control, the country, with a constitution of republican character, was governed by its own magistrates, according to its own laws and customs. Nor Sidon alone, but every Phenician city appears to have had its own municipal government, in a considerable degree of independency; and all were united under a supreme council, composed apparently of deputies from each. It may seem then to have been beyond liberality, rather negligence or weakness in the satrap, which allowed this subordinate government to form for itself a new capital, where the supreme council held its sessions; the purpose apparently having

SECT. II.

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been to withdraw itself from his inspection, and its proceedings from his reddy knowlege. Thus arose the town called Tripolis, Tripletown, from the three cities, Sidon, Tyre and Aradus, having contributed principally to its construction and population. These circumstances considered, it cannot appear wonderful, that the satrap, whether the same, or rather a sucessor, possibly erring as much now in rigor as before in easiness, should earn the imputation from among those who had been so indulged, of acting according to the historian's phrase, injuriously and proudly.

Diod. l. 16. c. 41. Strab. l. 16.

Diod. l. 16. c. 41.

But before the severer course was resorted to by the satrap, the plan of rebellion seems to have been alreddy formed, and great preparation for acting upon it made. The revolters not only were largely provided with arms, but had a considerable fleet at their command; whether gaining to their party that large portion of the royal navy which Phenicia commonly furnished, or using only the means which the maritime commerce of the Phenician ports afforded. But moreover communication had been so held with the king of Egypt, and apparently also with the satrap of Lower Phrygia, that alliances had been formed, or were reddy, with those avowed enemies of Persia. The title of king, with which Tennes, the chief of the Sidonians was qualified, would not mark rebellion against the great king, soverein of the Persian empire, who, we find, allowed many princes, his vassals, to hold it, but it implies combination and order, civil and military, among the revolters, over whom he presided.

Such appears to have been the state of things when one important link in the chain of revolt was broken, by the necessity to which Artabazus was

reduced of abandoning his satrapy. That event, highly threatening to the Phenician revolters, would be alarming also for the king of Egypt, Nectanebos. Egypt could hardly be invaded by a power to which Phenicia was hostile. It was therefore highly important for Nectanebos to support the Phenicians, and, at the request of Tennes, he allowed Mentor, with the Greeks under his command, whom he had ingaged for service in Egypt, to stop at Sidon.

The sequel is very defectively related by the historian. A force being acquired so considerable among Asiatic armies as four thousand Greeks, with a commander of ability before and afterward conspicuous, no military measure is noticed as following. But the king of Persia, Ochus, whether before yielding to indolence, which has been imputed, or rather, as seems probable, embarrassed by circumstances of his wide empire, unknown to the Greeks, had now resolved to take, in person, on the spot, the direction of arms and negotiations in the troubled western parts. In a constitution like that we have observed in Phenicia, party-divisions would rarely fail. Comparing what we are informed of events now with what we have heretofore seen ordinary among the Grecian republics, it may appear even probable that Tennes found himself and all his party needing support against fellowcitizens more than against all other enemies. Whether the first overture went from him, or came from the king of Persia, Mentor was gained. The soverein of the Persian empire and the subordinate prince of Sidon came to terms, and the city of Sidon returned under the Persian dominion. According to the historian numerous executions followed, ending with that of Tennes

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himself, ordered by Ochus in pure wantonness of cruelty and ill faith; the Sidonians destroyed themselves and their families to the number of forty thousand persons, each firing his own house; and immense wealth came to the royal coffers from the sale of ruins, among which the gold and silver of the richest city of the world were melted. The credit due to this part of the story must be left to the judgement of those versed in Asiatic history, and familiar with the manner and character of the writer. It is however ascertained that Mentor, and the Greeks under him, did not fear to enter into the service of a soverein so represented a monster; and, for what may have been fictitious and what exaggerated, in the extant reports of his actions and character, the sequel will at least assist conjecture.

Among the Phenician towns, and probably within each, was a party for, and a party against, the revolt; and not Tennes alone was accused of treachery. In the want of union, therefore, when Sidon was reduced, the other towns, being little capable of resistance, yielded without an effort. But it is remarkable that, tho the Sidonians are said, with their town to have burnt all their ships, yet the Persian king had presently a fleet superior to any of the age; unless the Carthaginian, not likely to come within contact, should be excepted. Either then the report of that destruction was fictitious, or the many other seaports of Phenicia and Syria repaired it; perhaps in the spirit of civil contest, or perhaps through loyalty to Ochus, with reddy zeal; for of his cruelty, through all the sequel of his reign, no specified example is found.

Diod. l. 16. c. 45.

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A commanding fleet, however, inabled him to proceed from the recovery of Phenicia to that of the island of Cyprus. The population there was mostly Grecian; yet, not Mentor only, bred in a satrap's court, but other Greeks, of the highest character among the republics, ingaged in his service. Superior forces of sea and land thus coöperating, the whole island was soon reduced to acknowlege again the sovereinty of the Persian king. Apparently there was little bloodshed, all being quickly settled by a liberal composition. The nine cities of the island, allowed to hold their several municipal governments, were each placed under the superintendency of a chief of a party, answerable for due remittance of the tribute to the supreme government of the empire. These appear to have been mostly Greeks, and they mostly took the title of king[3].

Diod.l.16. c. 46.

[3]—Εἰς τὴν Κύπρον ἐπισήσας στρατηγοὺς Φωκίωνα τὸν Αθηναῖον καὶ Εὐαγόραν. Diod. 16. 42.

Κατὰ τὴν Κύπρον Σαλαμινίων πολιορκουμένων ὑπ' Ευαγόρου καὶ Φωκίωνος, κ. τ. ε. Diod. l. 16. c. 46.

It seems to have been reasonably doubted among the critics whether this mention of the name of Phocion, tho twice occurring in our copies of Diodorus, should be taken for evidence that the great Athenian statesman and patriot, the friend of Isocrates and Philip, lent himself for hire to fight the battles of Persia, for the subjugation of Grecian settlements. Plutarch, who has given that eminent man military fame unnoticed by any other writer, mentions nothing of his commanding in Cyprus. Cornelius Nepos says, that, tho he commanded armies often, yet no account of his military services remained; meaning perhaps no detailed account; for testimony to his ability and success in military command in Eubœa remains to us at this day, as observed in the fifth section of the twenty-eighth chapter of this history, from Æschines. Whether then, in the passages above cited, Diodorus has intended the great opponent of Demosthenes, or some other person of the name of Phocion, or his transcribers have corrupted a name of nearly the same orthography, must be left in doubt.

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The possession of Cyprus, after that of Syria and Phenicia, was principally necessary toward the Persian king's next object, the recovery of Egypt. He could now, without interruption, supply and assist, by sea, his own forces acting there, and preclude such advantages to his enemies. The enterprize nevertheless was of very considerable difficulty; the amount of which may be estimated, in some degree, from the failure of great efforts to accomplish it in former reigns, repeated in the course of above sixty years since the revolt. Grecian troops had been formerly employed for the purpose, under the most eminent Grecian generals; but they had been opposed by Grecian troops in the service of the Egyptian kings, who had also had some of the most eminent Grecian generals in their service; at one time, as we have seen, the king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus.

It seems likely that Ochus, bred in the center of the empire, separated by the great desert from the provinces communicating immediately with the Greeks, would not reddily believe the superiority of the Grecian military, and thence, in his first expedition against Egypt, may have incurred the disgrace noted by Isocrates, who says he earned there the character of being unfit either to preside over an empire, or to command an army. He gained however a lesson from which he showed himself capable of profiting. His resource was certainly not the most honorable for the Persian name, nor without obvious hazard to the empire; but it was perhaps, in the decay of the Persian military system, and in the circumstances altogether in which the empire had devolved to him, what alone could afford any reasonable hope of success. The season was favorable for ingaging Grecian troops of

Isocr. Or. ad Phil.

SECT. II.

the best quality of those who could be expected to go out for hire; that remission of the sacred war in Greece then occurring, and that consequent suspension of the hostilities of the Greeks against one-another, which preceded the war, soon after beyond all expectation breaking out, of Olynthus, supported by Athens, against Macedonia. Then it was that Persian agents, as formerly related, went to all the cities of Greece to hire troops; and two men of the first eminence in two of the principal republics, Lacrates of Thebes, and Nicostratus of Argos, were ingaged as commanders. It was about the same time that the Thebans sent their begging embassy to the Persian court; perhaps not then at its usual residence beyond the great desert, but, on account of the great objects of business in view, within reddier reach from Greece, in Syria. The circumstances alreddy noticed were obviously favorable, and might even invite such a solicitation; so that we may reasonably believe the historian that the embassy was successful, obtaining for the republic it represented what, in modern times, would be called a subsidy. The Grecian force ingaged for the Persian service all passed by sea to Sidon; where joining the troops under Mentor, the largest Grecian army was formed that perhaps ever was employed in a forein service.

B.C.351. Ol.107.2.

Ch.28. s.5. of this History.

Providing thus the most effective military means, Ochus seems, in the historian's plain and probable account, to have taken ably and vigorously the best measures for obviating danger to himself and his empire from such an engine as an army of foreiners. He assembled an Asiatic army, balancing by numbers, in a great degree, if not wholly, the superiority of the Greek in discipline. Dividing then his Grecian troops among his Asiatics, he gave separate

B.C.350. Ol.107.2.

Diod.l.16. c. 47.

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commands to Nicostratus, Lacrates and Mentor, and associated with each a Persian collegue. Jealousies, which such an arrangement could hardly fail to produce, arose, and proceeded to a very threatening extreme; yet Ochus, holding the command in chief himself, observed all so watchfully[4], and interfered so judiciously, while he checked the evil of the spirit, fostering the good, that he not only obviated the danger from contention among oneanother, but excited in the Asiatics an emulation in action against the enemy, which even drew praise from the Greeks. The difficulties, which the nature of the invaded country opposed, were singular; and those arising from the skill and valor of the enemy are also mentioned as great. Diodorus ascribes the former success of Nectanebos against the armies of Ochus to the abilities of Diophantus, an Athenian, and Lamius, a Spartan general. These, in the delay of further measures against him, had been dismissed: but a considerable body of Greeks had been retained, or newly ingaged, under another Grecian general, Cleinius of Cos. The overbearing force, however, of the Persian army, directed by the abilities of the Grecian generals serving in it, and supported by an unfailing treasury, succeeded as might be expected. Cleinius was killed in an early ingagement. The Greeks in the Egyptian service then seem to have become extensively reddy to desert or betray it; and Nectanebos, driven successively from all the strong holds of his country, fled into Ethiopia. Thus Egypt, alienated above sixty years, was, in a few months, recovered to the Persian empire.

Diod. l. 16. c. 47.

c. 51.

[4] Αὐτὸς δὲ (ὁ βασιλεὺς) τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἔχων, ἐφόδρευε τοῖς ὅλως πράγμασι, κ. τ. ἑ. Diod. l. 16. c. 47.

SECT. II.

In this expedition Ochus gained extensive credit among the Greeks for talent, exertion, and liberality. The Egyptians would not be likely to speak of him generally so well. His ill success against them in the early part of his reign, after so many previous failures of the Persian arms in repeated efforts during half a century, seems to have led them to designate the inefficacious perseverence by representing him, in hieroglyphical symbol, as an ass; and, according to Plutarch, they called him commonly the ass. If then the historian Deinon, a cotemporary, as quoted by Plutarch, should be believed, he resented this insult with wit, imprudence, and illiberality; all especially unbecoming a great prince: 'Your ass,' he said, 'shall eat 'your god,' and so he had their sacred ox, the representative of their god Apis, butchered and served at his table. Possibly some violence against the Egyptian superstitions may have furnished foundation for this story; which however must remain, like most of the many stories of witty words, reported by antient writers, and often the facts connected with them, uncertain whether they should not be principally attributed to the ingenuity of the reporters. It was not till after his successes that the Egyptians gave him another symbol and name, the sword; by which, according to Plutarch, still in his age, they distinguished him in their catalogue of the Persian kings; he says, for his cruelties, but specifying none; and from the narrative of Diodorus, it might rather seem to have been, as indeed the symbol itself implies, for his military successes, and the vigor of conduct by which they were obtained.

Diod. ibid.

Plut. de Is. and Osir. p. 363.

It has been usual, in the oriental courts, from times beyond history, to commit occasionally the

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highest public offices, civil and even military, to eunuchs: even the great Cyrus, according to Xenophon, approved this policy. A eunuch, named Bagoas, said to have been an Egyptian born, was the collegue of Mentor in military command, in the war of Egypt. The account of him altogether marks uncommon vigor of mind, with a temper of some violence, but capable of correcting itself. His dissensions, as reported by Diodorus, first with the Theban general, Lacrates, and then with his collegue, Mentor, supported by the troops on each side, were of the most ruinous tendency to his soverein's service; and, on the latter occasion, his own life was in imminent danger. Reckoning then that he owed his preservation to Mentor's generosity, with reconciliation a friendship grew between them, which was ever faithfully maintained by both. The historian's account of the conduct of Ochus also, in a business so critical, when it was most important for him to have the best services, and completest coöperation of all under him, implies temper and judgement. Notwithstanding any misconduct into which passion or mistake or both, had led those two eminent persons, he conceived so highly of them that, on returning to his capital, he made Bagoas his prime minister, and he committed to Mentor a command more extensive than had ever before been intrusted to any subject; not excepting that given by the partiality of the second Darius to his favorite son Cyrus. It is said to have included all the western provinces of the empire from the Euxine sea to the border of Ethiopia. In farther favor then he not only pardoned the rebellion of Mentor's brother-in-law, Artabazus, but restored him to the satrapy of Lower Phrygia, and advanced Memnon,

Diod. l. 16. c. 47. & 52.

brother of Mentor, who had fled with Artabazus, to offices of trust and power. Evidently, like the younger Cyrus, he saw the general superiority of the Grecian character, and he appears equally to have used it with generosity, dignity and discretion. His liberality in rewarding that part of his Grecian army, which, after the conquest of Egypt, he dismissed, would promote that honorable report of him, in his own age, which the narrative of Diodorus indicates to have prevailed, and would facilitate the levy of Grecian troops for him in the sequel, when, as the same narrative implies, he used their services even in the interior of his empire. SECT. II.

If Diodorus should be believed, Ochus, returning from the war of Egypt to his capital, abandoned himself, for the rest of his reign, above eleven years, to luxury and idleness; committing the supreme direction of affairs in the body of his empire, eastward of the great desert, wholly to Bagoas, in the western provinces to Mentor. All however that seems reasonably to be inferred is, that no wars, or material troubles, disturbed the center and east of the empire, or none of which information reached the Greeks. Of wars with some of the northern nations, however, we find notice; and the historian mentions that Ochus was never at a loss for Grecian troops, which Mentor forwarded to him as his occasions required; thus implying that his diligence, and watchfulness, and vigilance, and just policy, which had been so advantageous in the Egyptian war, did not afterward wholly cease. That the business of the west meanwhile was ably and faithfully conducted, under the administration of Mentor, the Greeks had more opportunity to know. Everywhere

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throughout his extensive viceroyalty, the rebellious and contumacious were brought to order; and the order was such that the country florished under it. Never, since the march of the army under Xerxes to Greece, had the Persian empire shown itself so formidable. Egypt and Cyprus being recovered, and subordination throughout the west of Asia restored, the Persian government could again extend its arms into Europe. The effectual check to Philip, king of Macedonia, at Perinthus and Byzantium, evidently came from Persia, and was probably managed by Memnon, whose command is mentioned by Aristotle, as well as by Diodorus, to have extended to the Propontis.

Diod. l. 16. c. 75, 76, 77. Arist. Œcon. Diod. l. 17. c. 50, 51.

Under this vigorous administration it was that the Persian court became the ally of the Athenian democracy, in opposition to the growing power of the Macedonian kingdom, and of that large portion of the Grecian republics, including a balancing party in Athens itself, which preferred the presidency of the king of Macedonia to that of the Athenian Many, under the patronage of Persia. The favorite project of Isocrates, for composing the troubles of Greece by uniting the nation in war against Persia, had originated, evidently, during the weak reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon; when the successes of the Greeks in the service of Cyrus, and those afterward obtained by Agesilaus, afforded incouragement for it. Early in the reign of Ochus farther incouragement arose, from the defeat of his first measures against Egypt, and the insuing revolt of Phenicia and Syria. It was when thus almost all the west of the empire was in rebellion, that Isocrates addressed to the king of Macedonia that styled the oration to Philip, wherein those circumstances are mentioned as existing. Probably

none understood better than Isocrates the particular interests of Athens, and the complicated politics of all Greece; but Philip would have earlier and better information of affairs in Asia, and of the characters of men in leading situations there. Apparently he bore patiently, with little answer, his venerable friend's reproaches, on a subject on which it would have been hazardous to open himself in writing. The new aspect, which, after the conquest of Egypt, the west of the Persian empire assumed, would itself be an answer for him to Isocrates, and the more important circumstances would be known to all Greece; while also the intimacy maintained between the leaders of the high democratical party at Athens and the Persian court, or the governors of its provinces, through whom possibly alone any communication may have existed, was notorious. Then followed the bold and extensive project of the singularly able orator politician, which was defeated by the event of the battle of Chæroneia; a project which would have been rash and unwise, but for assurance of support from Persia, and confidence in the satisfaction, not perhaps of all, but of a large proportion of his party, his Theban friends especially, with the great king's patronage. Philip, even after his complete success against the combination within Greece, thought the state of things not such (for so the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to him clearly indicates) that he should be led to offensive war against Persia. The former obstacles to political union in Greece were indeed, in large amount, removed; but the jarring spirit still was extensive there. So much the funeral oration of Demosthenes largely shows; while Persia, with all her provinces obedient, still

SECT. II.

Or. ad Phil. p. 374.

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possessed all the vigor to which she had been lately raised. Isocrates, in the letter last mentioned, shows himself aware that Philip continued to differ from him in opinion concerning war with Persia; and thence he proceeded to declare that, but for his extreme elderhood, he would take the journey to Macedonia, to confer with the king on the subject on which he had been so many years so ernest, and always with full persuasion that what he advised could alone save Grecee from destruction.

B.C.339. Ol.107.2. Diod. l.17. c. 5.

Such was the state of things when, in the year following that of the battle of Chæroneia, the twelfth after the conquest of Egypt, Artaxerxes Ochus king of Persia died; the historian says poisoned by his minister and favorite Bagoas. It has failed few writers of the history of princes to find occasion for noticing the frequency of the imputation of their death to poison, and the general uncertainty of such imputation. Arses, said to have been the youngest son of Ochus, was raised to the throne. All his other sons are reported to have suffered the fate which, after so many ages, remains common for persons in their unfortunately lofty situation among the Asiatic realms, and in the Turkish empire, even in Europe; wherefore, tho neither their number is mentioned, nor whether poison or what else was the instrument, yet that they were put to death may appear not improbable; and, Bagoas continuing to hold the office of prime minister, it must seem that all measures of importance would have at least his sanction. Yet there are accompanying stories which must throw doubt largely over these anecdotes of the Persian court, were they not in themselves open to much doubt. Diodorus says it was in revenge for the slaughter of the god Apis, twelve years before, and the

SECT. II.

contempt altogether expressed by Ochus for the Egyptian superstitions, that Bagoas, after having conducted the affairs of the empire ably and faithfully twelve years, murdered his soverein, through whose favor he held his lofty situation. But this, it appears, did not satisfy the appetite of after-ages for strange stories. Ælian, not indeed a historian, but a professed story-teller, has not scrupled to relate that Bagoas gave the mangled flesh of the body of Ochus to be devoured by cats, and the bones to be made into sword-hilts; yet that he injoyed this delicious revenge of the honor of his ox-god but in secret, causing another body to be publickly buried with royal honors for that of the king. It is with a view to the history of litterature, and a just estimate of the credit so very variously due concerning political and military matters, and historical facts generally, to those whom the modern learned have so generally ranked together as classical writers, that this story, unknown or rejected by Diodorus, Plutarch, and even Justin, has been so far noticed here.

Arses lived only to the third year after his elevation; destroyed then, according to report, by Bagoas, who remained always prime minister. A prince, descended, according to Diodorus, from the second Darius, by a brother of Artaxerxes Mnemon and the younger Cyrus, (but, as Xenophon's account implies, by a different mother) had escaped the proscriptions of the royal family under both the late reigns. Not only spared by Ochus, but, for military merit, in war with the fierce nations of the northern frontier, raised to the satrapy of Armenia, he had maintained friendship with Bagoas, who favored his succession to the throne. Before called Codomannus, he now took the name of Darius. It would hardly be with the same view with which

Diod.l.17. c. 5. Strab.l.15. p. 736. Ol.111.2. B.C.335.

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Bagoas is said to have preferred the helpless youth of Arses to the abler age of his elder brother, that a prince in the vigor of manhood, versed in the business of government, and eminent as a soldier, would have in preference the support of a wily politician; yet, according to Diodorus, Bagoas, who had found himself unable to govern young Arses, proposed to govern Darius. Very soon after the elevation of Darius, however, he died; and the story transmitted is that, attempting to administer a poisoned potion to the king, he was compelled by him to drink it himself. How these circumstances should, with any certainty, be known, is left for conjecture; and to reconcile them with other reported circumstances, of reddier notoriety, has been omitted by the historian. Friendly correspondence between the minister Bagoas and the Grecian satrap Mentor, appears to have remained uninterrupted while the former lived; and yet, after his death, not only the great viceroyalty, first committed to Mentor, by Ochus, was continued to him, but the favor and confidence with which he was honored by Darius appear to have equalled that injoyed under any former prince, and, as we shall see in the sequel, were extended to his family after him. Under his government the west of the empire, except as far as hostilites were carried by Philip king of Macedonia, seems to have been generally quiet and florishing. The court and the central provinces, disturbed by the circumstances, whatever they may have been, which produced or followed the death of Ochus, remained evidently in a troubled state when Darius Codomannus acquired the throne.

CHAPTER XLVI.

ALEXANDER'S Expedition against PERSIA; First Campain.

SECTION I.

Preparations of Greece and Persia for War; Transactions previous to the passage of the Grecian Army into Asia.

IT was not till after the death of Artaxerxes Ochus, and the commencement of troubles in Persia, attending and following it, that Philip of Macedonia, yielding at length to the instances of his excellent friend Isocrates, avowed the purpose of delivering the Greeks of Asia from the Persian dominion, and, as we have seen, began hostilities by sending a military force into Æolia under Parmenio. The death of Arses had followed, and Darius Codomannus had succeeded to the empire, when Alexander, having happily terminated his wars with the northern barbarians, and composed the affairs of Greece, violently disturbed by the circumstances among which the revolution in Thebes was prominent, had opportunity to prosecute the great enterprize. SECT. I.

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Diod.l.17. c. 6. & 7.

Meanwhile the change which had taken place in the circumstances of Persia was not incouraging for it. The new king, Darius, coming to the throne with the advantage of reputation as a soldier, appears to have begun his reign with vigor and prudence. The troubles of the court and the center of the empire were composed, so far, at least, that he could give some attention to the extreme west and to Greece; and he made formidable preparation of land and sea-forces, not only with the purpose of resisting the invasion of Asia, but openly threatening to retaliate by invading Europe. This demonstration, however, seems not to have been followed by any effectual exertion. During Alexander's wars with the northern people and in Greece, Parmenio maintained himself in Æolia with the small force which had been placed under his orders by Philip, and afforded support to friendly Greeks there who had revolted against the Persian dominion. Diodorus attributes the remission of the vigor, which had been apparent in the new king of Persia's early measures, to his contempt of Alexander's youth. But it was from no such sentiment that he would allow Parmenio to retain the footing in Asia which he had acquired. Of what was passing in the great empire, beyond the western frontier, the historian evidently could tell nothing. But it seems probable that the ingagement of Alexander in the wars raised by the policy of Demosthenes, with support from the treasury of Persia, provided for Darius a leisure not unwanted for arranging the various business of his vast dominions, and perhaps for attention to wars elsewhere without, or within them. When, however, the leisure arrived for Alexander, on the conclusion of the Theban war, to turn his arms

toward Asia, the attention of the Persian government to preparation against him was renewed. According to Diodorus powerful armies were assembled, a large fleet was equipped, and commanders of high reputation were appointed. Among these the Greeks, Mentor and Memnon, connected with the Persian empire, not only by long service under it, but by the marriage of their sister with the satrap of Lower Phrygia, were eminent. Through their agency a large body of Greeks was ingaged, and no small portion of the Grecian people, with Demosthenes at the head, was disposed to the Persian cause. A curious and interesting fact, incidentally noticed in an oration of Æschines, shows the publicity of this connection, and, in no inconsiderable amount, its character; and remaining uncontradicted in the reply of Demosthenes, yet extant, may be esteemed fully authenticated. It was not long, the orator says, before Alexander passed into Asia, (apparently it was after the conclusion of the Theban war,) that an official communication was made from the Persian court, in the form, then usual, of a letter from the king of Persia to the Athenian people. In this letter, abounding, according to the orator, with reproaches in haughty style to the Athenians for their late conduct, (no longer directed by Demosthenes and his associates of the Persian party, but by Phocion and the Macedonian party,) he especially assured them, 'That they 'should have no more money from him.'

SECT. I.

Æsch. de cor. p. 632.

The actual crisis for the people of Macedonia, who, by their late king's successful career of twenty-four years, had been established in a state of civil security, perhaps hardly at that time known

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elsewhere, the prospect could not but be anxious and awful. They did not want, like the subjects of the Grecian republics, war abroad to give them peace at home. But their country, tho to a great extent rich in soil, yet uncultivated and thinly peopled, wanted the improvement which the attention of the governments to arts of peace should have provided; and, for improvement of the government itself, good in general principle, but very defective in various points, and wanting accommodation to the new circumstances of advantage in which the kingdom was placed, peace was needful. Well therefore, however in opposition to the ernest remonstrances of the Athenian patriot Isocrates for the good of republican Greece, might they be disposed to recommend to their youthful soverein, to consider first his duty to his proper kingdom; and with that view, to follow a course that might have invited another youth. It is said that the two of his council the most esteemed by his father, Antipater and Parmenio, advised him to use the existing opportunity, of peace more than commonly assured, to marry; and not till an heir to the throne he had inherited, and to the increase of dominion he had in view, should be born, to hazard his people's happiness and his own life in pursuit of such acquisition.

Diod. l. 17 c. 16.

But the sober office of kings, to provide for all, to whom they should be fathers, domestic quiet and permanent welfare, was less of the taste of Alexander's years. His ardent mind, tho far from insensible to love, and also far from insensible to his people's prosperity, was bent upon war and conquest. That the considerations which, after long deliberation, had decided Philip's mature judgement, should, with the added force of paternal

example, lead Alexander to the same decision, can indeed hardly be imputed to him for blame. Among the Macedonians themselves, tho sober men would fear the result for their country, yet many of warmer and less thoughtful tempers would exult in the prospect of war in the rich provinces of Asia, against a people accustomed to shrink before Grecian arms, where they might find reward for their recent labors and perils, undergone in a comparatively poor country and rough climate, against the fiercest of barbarians. The venerable Isocrates no longer lived to promote their wishes by his authority and the eloquence of his pen; yet, among his numerous surviving partizans, in Athens, and throughout Greece, many would be disposed and able to assist the cause. The amount then, and the superior quality, and the reddy will, of the military force that Greece at that time could furnish, when, after wars hardly ceasing for centuries, all now was peace at home, might not only invite a youth of military disposition, the acknowleged head of that force, to put it in action, but even urge for the consideration of the soberest statesmen, whether the present opportunity of the union of that force should not be used. Thus only, it might be urged, there could be hope to provide future security for the country; to obviate invasion, which had been threatened; to give a turn to the public mind favorable to the union so happily formed; to strengthen the Grecian cause by associating that large portion of the Grecian people which, for ages, had been accustomed to acknowlege vassalage and pay tribute to Persia; and thus to set at a greater distance the boundary against an enemy, however generally failing in exertion, always of most formidable power.

SECT. I.

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Justin probably had some warranty for his assertion that official returns were made of the military force of every republic of Greece at this time, and that the total exceeded two hundred thousand men. Comparing all extant authorities, little as Justin's alone may be, this report may seem not extravagant. The republics had been for so many years in almost constant warfare, that not only for every citizen to be familiar with arms would be required, but a large proportion must have had practice in either field or garrison service; and it appears probable that a great part of Justin's stated number might have been put on duty for a campain within the country, whether in war among the republics, as that by which Epameinondas acquired fame, or against a forein invader, as that earlier, more glorious for the nation, in which the host of Persia was nearly annihilated at Platæa; but, for war in Asia, other considerations were necessary. The professed purpose, important not only for credit and glory, but as a step to any ulterior purpose, was to withdraw all Grecian cities from forein dominion. The maintenance, and, if it might be, the increase of popularity for the chief was the more necessary, as Greece, however grown in military numbers, was now, not less than at the time of the Persian invasion, poor in purse, and divided in political sentiment; the heads of a large party, now as then, actually holding friendly communication with the forein enemy. Till therefore the first purpose, the liberation of the Grecian states, was so far attained that war might be carried into the country beyond them, pay, and not plunder, must maintain the army.

Information concerning the revenue of the late king of Macedonia, Philip, tho much declamation

remains imputing to him corrupt influence through his wealth, we have observed to be very loose and uncertain. But the concurrence of antient writers is complete in asserting that, at his death, his treasury was found exhausted. From Arrian we have report of a speech of Alexander, declaring that his father, with not sixty talents in his treasury, perhaps twelve thousand pounds sterling, left it incumbered with a debt of five hundred talents, about a hundred thousand pounds sterling. Nevertheless, whether from confidence in the solidity of the sources of the Macedonian revenue and in the faith of the government, or from zeal for the Persian war, credit did not fail. Alexander borrowed eight hundred talents, about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, to put forward his proposed expedition. The debt however, thus altogether not more than two hundred and sixty thousand pounds, is said by Plutarch and others to have been considered as threatening ruin to the royal revenue of Macedonia[2].

SECT. V.

Arrian, l. 7. c. 9.

In such circumstances Alexander, however he might have a view to great undertakings, could not employ numerous forces. But incouragement was not wanting for great enterprize with a small army. The force which, under Clearchus, had defied the power of the Persian empire in its center, and afterward, under Xenophon and others, maintained that defiance in retreating to its extremity, was originally less than thirteen thousand men. That which passed from Europeän Greece under Agesi-

[2] Even those latter antient writers, and numerous moderns, their disciples, who have represented the riches of Philip as the great instrument of his successes, have not scrupled to paint, in strong colors, Alexander's poverty. I am not aware that any one of them has proposed to reconcile the striking contradiction.

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laus was no more than eight thousand foot. On account of the difficulty of transport across the Ægean, and the obstacles to a march through Bœotia, Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace, he carried no cavalry. Yet, through his popularity among the Greeks of Asia, and the prospect of profit which war against Persia afforded, he soon raised such a force of cavalry, and so added to his infantry, as to be in circumstances to make the Persian provinces find subsistence and pay for all.

Ch. 24. s. 3. of this History.

Agreement, more than common about military numbers, is found in antient accounts of the army assembled under Alexander for the Persian expedition. The most particular extant is from Diodorus. All the republics of Greece together, he says, furnished no more than seven thousand foot, of their civic troops. Five thousand mercenaries were added; whether at the common expence of the confederacy, or paid by the Macedonian treasury, remains unsaid. The Macedonian foot are stated at twelve thousand. Thus the whole of the heavy-armed, or infantry of the phalanx, would be twenty-four thousand. The Odrysian Thracians, Triballians, and Illyrians, probably all, in their national manner, middle-armed, are reckoned together five thousand; the Agrians and bowmen one thousand: the infantry thus of all descriptions thirty thousand. The Agrians, were highlanders of northern Macedonia; middle-armed, but eminent among the middle-armed. The commanding officer of the bowmen was a Cretan, and it seems likely that those under him were mostly Cretans.

Diod. l. 17. c. 17.

Arrian.

The greater part of Greece, as we have formerly observed, is a country little adapted either to the breeding of horses, or to the action of cavalry; insomuch that some, even of the more powerful

states, had none on their ordinary military establishment. Six hundred are said by Diodorus to have been now furnished by the republics south of Thermopylæ. Small as this force may seem, it was rather beyond the proportion of cavalry to infantry most ordinary in the armies of southern Greece. But Alexander, with other very great advantages, unpossessed by Agesilaus, had not his difficulties for cavalry. His Thracian dominion almost touched on Asia, divided only by the narrow channel of the Hellespont. The transport thus was easy; and Macedonia and Thessaly had more horse, and better, than all Greece besides. Each country furnished fifteen hundred. Thrace and Pæonia added nine hundred. Thus the whole cavalry would be four thousand five hundred, and the army altogether thirty-four thousand five hundred. Alexander's generals, who published histories of his wars, would probably be disposed rather to extenuate than amplify his numbers. According to Plutarch, Aristobulus stated the infantry at thirty thousand, the cavalry at four thousand, but Ptolemy allowed the cavalry to be five thousand; and another writer, Anaximines, reported the horse to have been five thousand five hundred, and the foot forty-three thousand. Arrian states only in general terms, that the infantry, including light-armed of all descriptions, exceeded thirty thousand, and the horse five thousand, so that the whole would approach thirty-six thousand. Tho not exactly confirming the detail of Diodorus, he little contradicts it; perhaps indeed not at all; our copies of Diodorus differing. As a rough sketch therefore of the composition of the army, that detail may perhaps be considered as reasonably exact.

SECT. I.

Plut. de fort Alex. p. 327.

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Small as the force, in the highest estimate, may appear, to contend with the myriads of Persia, yet it was such as Persia had never measured her strength with since her overthrow at Platæa, in the middle of Greece. Her great advantages however remained, in the immense superiority of her revenue, and in the political dissensions of the Greeks. Yet, on the other hand, through those very dissensions zeal was the more ardent among the partizans of the Macedonian connection. The prevailing voice thus was for war with Persia, under the command of the young king of Macedonia, elected captain-general of Greece. The forces were assembled at Amphipolis; from the northern parts by land, from the southern by sea, and thence, in spring of the year, before Christ three hundred thirty-four, marched together to the Hellespont.

Ol. 111. 3. B.C. 339.

Tho our information of what passed meanwhile in the Persian empire is very defective, evidently something had again checked the vigor of its councils, or perhaps required their ernest direction another way. Through some cause, however, the exertion and the precaution, which the circumstances wanted on the threatened frontier, failed. Of Mentor, whose talents and whose fidelity had been so valuable to the late king, Ochus, and whose merit Darius had the discernment so to appreciate as to continue him in the great command in which, on his accession, he found him, no farther mention is found. It seems altogether likely that, about this time he died; and that to his loss may be attributed the defect of management, civil and military, and the failure of proper combination, which all accounts indicate to have insued in the western provinces, and especially in those most exposed to attack from Greece. The military

command, in the moment perhaps the most important in the empire, had been committed to his brother, Memnon, whom we have seen formerly, in exile from the Persian dominion, residing at the Macedonian court, and recalled when his brother-in-law Artabazus was restored to his satrapy of the Lower Phrygia. Memnon's commission was for the district separated by the narrow water of the Hellespont only from the Macedonian dominion. The service of Artabazus himself apparently might have been valuable in his satrapy, within which Memnon's command lay: but he had been called to attend the king's immediate councils[8], where doubtless also his knowlege of Greece and the Greeks, from much communication and long acquaintance, might also make his information and advice highly important. Yet there is appearance that a jealousy of his Grecian connection may have occasioned his removal, and that, tho ostensibly in high honor at the Persian court, he was nevertheless there reckoned a hostage for insuring the fidelity of his Grecian brother-in-law, in the critical command intrusted to him. His satrapy meanwhile was committed to Arsites, as lieutenant-governor. This great officer, as Arrian shows, was on terms not perfectly confidential with Memnon, whose command, otherwise critical, was the more so, as the immediate command against him was in the hands of the consummate Macedonian general Parmenio. We learn variously, and from Arrian decisively, that the satraps were high treasurers of their respective provinces. Mentor's commission seems to have been simply military. For pay for

[8] This, not here said by Diodorus, becomes evident from what followed, as reported both by Diodorus and by Arrian.

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his troops, the tribute assessed on certain Greek towns acknowleging the supremacy of the Persian crown, was placed at his disposal; but for extraordinaries he seems to have been dependent on the satrap, or his vicegerent. Wanting money then, his credit with the citizens of the commercial Greek town of Lampsacus, on the Propontis, inabled him to borrow of them what supplied his immediate need, pledging the general taxes for repayment. But, with the season for collecting the taxes, his need returned and he was obliged to refer repayment to a future day. Again he was reduced to the same necessity, and, at length, the failure was such that he could no longer procure corn sufficient for the regulated distribution to his troops for their subsistence. In this distress, it appears he had the popularity and talent to persuade both the townsmen to wait patiently for repayment of their loan, and the soldiers to acquiesce under a short allowance.

Arist. Œcon. l. 2. p. 692. ed. Paris, 1654.

This information from the cotemporary philosopher, who lived in the courts of Philip and Alexander, concurs with Arrian's report of following matters to give all probability to that of Diodorus, of those more immediately insuing. Memnon received orders from his court to reduce the Grecian town of Cyzicus, on the Propontis, which, under incouragement probably, from Parmenio, had revolted, and refused the accustomed tribute. From Æolis, where he was opposing Parmenio, he hastily crossed Mount Ida; but failing to surprize the town of Cyzicus, which had been his purpose, he could do no more than plunder the territory, from which he collected valuable booty, and then hastily returned. His short absence

however was not unattended with inconvenience. Parmenio had used the opportunity for taking Grynium, a considerable town, one of the four of the lordship which the family of the Eretrian Gongylus had injoyed from the munificence of the Persian court, and he proceeded to lay siege to Pitana. Memnon's approach relieved that place, and a Persian force, probably cavalry, being collected to strengthen his Grecian army, the Macedonian general Callas was defeated in the Troad. The walls of Rhœteum, however, after no very severe loss, for Callas appears to have been an able officer, afforded him refuge, and Memnon, held still in check by Parmenio, could little prosecute the advantage gained. SECT. I.

SECTION II.

Passage of the Grecian Army into Asia: Alexander's Visit to Troy: Difficulties for the direction of the March: Measures of the Persian Generals: Battle of the Granicus.

Such nearly appears to have been the state of things in that critical angle of the Persian empire, when Alexander arrived with his army at Sestus on the Hellespont. There he found his fleet of a hundred and sixty triremes, with round ships, as the Greeks described vessels of burthen, in number together ample for the speedy passage of the strait. The Persian government, possessing a fleet of overbearing force, had unaccountably neglected to provide that it should be where it was so urgently wanted. Memnon, with an army SECT. II. Arrian, l. 1. c. 11.

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barely able to maintain contest with the small force under Parmenio, and watched by that force, could not attempt to face Alexander. Parmenio himself therefore, whose local knowlege, acquired in his command in Asia, would add to the value of his general superiority of military talent and experience, was sent for to superintend the transport[s]. Under his direction the army crossed the strait from Sestus to Abydus in all quietness, Alexander having, meanwhile leisure for whatever amusement might invite him.

Those who have experienced the emotions, natural to all who have had the advantage of a classical education, on first approaching Athens, on first approaching Rome, on first even seeing the Mediterranean or the Adriatic, or any scene interesting to the imagination through acquaintance with the admirable authors of classical antiquity and the persons and events they have celebrated, will conceive what might be those of Alexander on this occasion; a youth of twenty-two, bred under Aristotle, approaching the ground described by Homer, in that poem which had been from childhood his delight, as to this day it has remained of all ingenuous minds fortunate enough to be acquainted with it, and must continue to be while letters exist: but to estimate the keenness of his feeling the further consideration is necessary, of his own reputed consanguinity with the principal heroes of that exquisite poem, of his father's glory, worthy of such an ancestry, and of what he had

[s] Arrian giving no account of transactions in Asia before Alexander's arrival there, we depend upon Diodorus for information where Parmenio was while Alexander was ingaged in the wars with the northern nations and the disturbances in Greece. It is therefore highly satisfactory to find that the two narratives meet in perfect harmony.

himself alreddy, at his early age, acquired. With his mind thus stimulated, before quitting Europe, he would visit the tomb or barrow of Protesilaus, near Eleüs, about twelve miles from Sestus. Protesilaus, leading the landing of Agamemnon's army on the Asiatic shore, is said to have found it so otherwise guarded than on Alexander's arrival that he was presently killed by Hector. In honor of the hero so falling, and to intercede with the gods for better fortune for himself, Alexander had sacrifice performed in his presence on the barrow. Ernest then to explore the site and territory of Troy, he embarked at Eleüs, and crossed to the place on the opposite shore, reputed the station of Agamemnon's fleet; whence it derived the name, retained to Alexander's age, of the Achaian port. It was his fancy, it is said, to take the tiller from Menœtius, the master of the trireme, and be himself the steersman during the passage. Midway he lay on his oars, while, on the deck, a bull was sacrificed to Neptune and the Nereïds, and, from a golden were, he poured libations upon the waves. It was further his fancy for himself, full-armed, to be the first to land. As thanksgiving offerings then for his quiet passage, he directed altars to be raised where he imbarked and where he landed, to Jupiter Apobaterius, the protector of debarkation, and to Minerva, and Hercules. After these pious offices he proceeded to the place where Troy had stood[4].

SECT. II.

[4] These particulars are mentioned by Arrian; but with his usual caution, introduced, or qualified, with the expressions Ὁ μὲν λόγος κατέχει,—Λέγουσι δὲ—Καὶ ταῦτα λέγουσιν—Λόγος κατέχει—Οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν—Ὡς ὁ λόγος; thus intimating that, tho worthy of notice, he did not reckon them resting on authority equal to that to which he deferred for matters of more importance, which he has related without such qualification.

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At this time Chares, the first great patron of Demosthenes in his political career, afterward his associate in the administration of Athens, was residing in the neighborhood, at the seaport town of Sigeium. Eminent men of Athens, we have seen formerly, taught, by the experience of ages, the danger of political eminence there, commonly sought establishment in some state beyond the reddy reach of an arbitrary vote of the Athenian Many, where, in case of need, they might find security, and Sigeium was the retreat of Chares. How far he remained yet in favor with any party, or in what degree he was obnoxious at Athens, we have no information; but that his politics were little founded on any principle beyond that of his own advantage, is indicated in all accounts. He hastened now to compliment Alexander on his arrival in Asia. Others, Greeks and Asiatics, Arrian assures us, did the same, but Chares alone was of eminence for the historian to distinguish by name.

On the site of antient Troy was, at this time, only a village; still however retaining the venerable name of Ilion, and farther supporting respect by temples, revered, among other reasons, for the relics they contained. In a temple of Minerva were consecrated suits of armor, said to have been preserved from the time of the Trojan war. Alexander performed sacrifice there, on an altar

An inept note of Gronovius, urging difficulty where there is absolutely none, as if Menœtius, might not have been the regular master of the royal trireme, tho Alexander indulged his fancy to take the helm during the passage of the Hellespont, can be worthy of notice only that it may not impose on those utterly unconversant with marine affairs. The matter indeed is little enough important. The compliment to Alexander from Chares, immediately after related, is of other weight.

dedicated to Jupiter with the title of Hercius, the protector of boundaries; and, together with that chief of the greater Grecian deïties, he addressed vows to Priam, as a hero or demigod; with the purpose, Arrian says, was reported, of averting the anger of the everliving spirit of the king of antient Troy from the progeny of Achilles, of whom, through his mother, he was reckoned to be. Dedicating then, in the temple of Minerva, the armor he bore, he took away, as in exchange, one of the antient panoplies, to be carried before him in future, on solemn occasions, and especially on going into battle. Having gratified his curiosity, and, whether more to satisfy his own mind, or to gain credit for assurance of divine favor to his purposes, having fulfilled offices of piety in his day reckoned becoming, he hastened to rejoin his army, which had completed the passage of the strait, and was alreddy assembled in camp near Arisbë. SECT. II.

Still for proceeding on the great professed object of the expedition, the liberation of all Grecian cities from the dominion of Persia, various difficulties were before him. In all those cities were contesting parties, and, in some of the most powerful, the prevailing party was adverse to the proposed change, called liberation. Generally the Persian government had so much protected and so little oppressed the Grecian settlements in Asia, that many reckoned their allegiance to the Persian king rather an advantage than a misfortune. Mostly however the Persian government favored either that superiority of one eminent man, which the Greeks described by the term tyranny, or that government by the most eminent individuals, which they called oligarchy. But this preference resulted only from

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the particular circumstances of the case which required it. The liberal despotism of Persia would patronize democracy in its subject states, if the peace of the country was maintained, and the tribute to the crown regularly remitted. Everywhere however one party being adverse to the Persian, very generally it was the democratical party. Hence Philip, who had avoided, as far as might be, whatever would mark predilection for any party principles in proper Greece, had been induced to profess himself the patron of democracy in Asia; and Alexander, in this as in so many other things, followed his steps.

The line of march then, for reaching the principal Asiatic-Grecian cities, was not of easy choice. The lofty and extensive highlands of Ida immediately intervened. The shortest road, but otherwise most disadvantageous, abounding with opportunities for an opposing force, was directly over those highlands. The more circuitous way westward, by the towns of the coast, would apparently on many accounts have been to be preferred; but Mentor's attention, fixed, by various considerations, principally to that line, had provided obstacles. A third remained, by the eastern roots of the mountains. This was much more circuitous, yet among its difficulties and dangers it had also its advantages. By taking that road it might be hoped that contest with the powerful body of Grecian troops in the Persian servive would be avoided; instead of the able Memnon, satraps would command; and, the country being all hostile, the army might live at its expence; whereas, among the Grecian settlements, subsistence must be paid for[5], and offence

[5] If, for this, not said by Arrian, but perhaps obvious enough of itself, authority were desired, the conduct of the Cyrean

cautiously avoided. In these circumstances Parmenio's previous opportunities for observation and inquiry would be highly conducive toward the best decision. Alexander resolved upon taking the circuitous inland road.

Whether through meer remissness, or by what troubles prevented, the Persian court intermitted that just attention said to have been given, on the first accession of Darius, to the invasion threatened from Macedonia, we still fail to learn. It seems to have been assumed, or hoped, that Memnon's Grecian force and his interest among the Grecian cities, together with the disposition of a party in every city, if not to favor the Persian supremacy, yet to profit from Persian patronage for maintaining itself against an adverse party, would suffice for the security of the coast, with its numerous and wealthy commercial towns; and that the satraps, who were as princes of the interior country, with vassals, deeply interested in its protection against a plundering enemy, would make such an extent of continent as Lesser Asia, so divided by lofty mountains, the grave of any invader. But tho Memnon's military means were crippled by deficiency of pecuniary means, yet how justly the Persian court reckoned upon his talents and fidelity, and how well altogether he deserved the estimation which historians have concurrently attributed to him, seems not least indicated by the difficulties which Alexander resolved to encounter, in preference to those which Memnon had prepared for him. The country through which he

Greeks, returning from Upper Asia, among the Grecian towns on the coast of the Euxine, but more particularly that of Agesilaus among those of the coast of the Ægean, may be referred to, as related, on the authority of Xenophon, in the third section of the twenty-fourth chapter of this history.

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was to pass was the satrapy of Lower Phrygia, called by Arrian, and some others, Phrygia next the Hellespont; but, Bithynia forming a large portion of it, and Dascylium, the satrap's principal residence, being within that country, we find him sometimes intitled satrap of Bithynia. Long held by Pharnabazus, and after him by Memnon's brother-in-law, Artabazus, in his absence, Arsites now presided, with the title, as given by Arrian, corresponding with ours of lieutenant-governor[6]. Alexander, with the purpose of reaching the Grecian settlements southward, to avoid the heights of Ida, was necessarily to stretch far eastward, and begin even in a northerly direction. Percotë is mentioned as the town first in his way. Lampsacus next, a considerable Grecian city on the Propontis, was not friendly. A mutual interest having led it to be upon good terms with the satrap, Memnon's influence would easily prevail there; and its population was numerous enough, and its walls strong enough, to inable it to dare a siege. Alexander, therefore, to whom quick progress was highly important, leaving it on his left, proceeded by Hermotus to Colonæ.

The direction thus taken, and the rapidity with which it was pursued, seem to have suprized as they alarmed Arsites, and all the governors of provinces bordering on his satrapy. Spithridates[7], ruling the extensive and rich country, formerly the kingdom of Crœsus, and afterward the satrapy of Tissaphernes, had probably expected that Mentor's military force and military talents, and the

[6] Arrian, intitling Spithridates τῆς Λυδίας καὶ Ἰωνίας σατράπης, adds, καὶ Ἀρσίτης ὁ τῆς πρὸς Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φρυγίας ὕσαρχος. de exped. Alex. l. 1. c. 13.

[7] In Diodorus's orthography Spithrobates.

walls of the Æolian Greek towns yet in the Persian interest, would long employ Alexander before he could reach Ionia, which was an appendage of his satrapy; and that, before danger could approach any part of his country, beyond that held by Greeks, a royal army, might arrive to overwhelm the daring invader. The military force on which a Persian governor depended for preserving the peace of his country, as we have formerly observed, was principally cavalry. Spithridates, and four other eminent men, by Arrian intitled generals (apparently governors of districts, who commanded each the troops of his district) hastened, with all the force they could collect, to support Arsites. Meanwhile Memnon's activity appears to have equalled or even exceeded Alexander's. Having ascertained the hostile army's course, with his heavy-armed Grecian foot he outstripped its march, and joined the satraps at Zeleia in Bithynia. Possibly the heights of Ida afforded him a shorter way, which, tho rugged and difficult, might be well-known to him or those under him. The army, thus assembled to oppose Alexander, consisted, according to Arrian, of twenty thousand Persian cavalry, and nearly an equal number of regular heavy-armed foot; not probably all Greeks, for among Grecian mercenary soldiers men of various nations were often admitted, but all trained in the Grecian discipline of the phalanx. The light-armed foot, after the common practice of the Grecian military writers in stating numbers, Arrian has omitted to notice[8]. Probably they were several thousands,

[8] This we have had occasion formerly to observe of both Thucydides and Xenophon, and thus there is in Arrian's account no absolute contradiction of Diodorus, who makes the Persian infantry a hundred thousand. Not that it seems pro-

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tho time and circumstances would not have served for assembling them in numbers equal to their usual proportion in Persian armies.

Arrian, generally scrupulous, has undertaken to state what passed at a council of war, of which Memnon was a member, through whose communication indeed it may have become known. Memnon, he says, delivering his opinion to the council, said, 'We are considerably outnumbered 'by the enemy in regular infantry. I cannot there- 'fore recommend a battle against a very superior 'force of the best disciplined troops, commanded 'by the most practised officers in the world. A 'great superiority in cavalry is our advantage, and 'it should be used. The enemy, if he advances, 'should be allowed neither to eat nor rest. Our

bable the fighting men were so many. But Herodotus, in enumerating the army under Xerxes, not only specifies the light-armed soldiers, but also the followers of the camp; often, in Asiatic camps, more numerous than the fighting-men. Thus the army at Zeleia may have been of the full number reported by Diodorus.

That Arrian in stating the foot of the army at Zeleia as near twenty thousand, meant to speak of heavy-armed foot only, Greeks, or armed and trained in the Grecian discipline, I think sufficiently evident in a collation of his expressions: 'The 'Persian generals incamped at Zeleia' he says, ξὺν τῇ ἵππῳ βαρβαρικῇ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοῖς μισθοφόροις. l. 1. c. 13, and these phrases follow, Περσῶν δὲ ἱππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν ἐς δισμυρίους, ξένοι δὲ πεζοὶ μισθοφόροι ὀλίγον ἀποδέοντες δισμυρίων. c. 15. ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, c. 17. τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, p. 35. Among the μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, we know from Xenophon, men not of Grecian birth were often admitted: but ξένοι μισθοφόροι seems to have been a description for none but heavy-armed soldiers trained in the Grecian manner, mostly Greeks, or passing for such. The heavy-armed mercenary Greeks of Alexander's army are termed by Arrian ξένοι μισθοφόροι.

Gronovius' proposed amendment of the monstrous statement in our copies of Justin, making the Persian infantry, at the insuing battle, six hundred thousand, is ingenious, and it may be but justice even to a writer so given to extravagance as Justin, to reckon it probable.

'horses' feet would suffice to destroy the harvest 'growing in his way; and even if towns could 'afford him shelter and refreshment they should 'not be spared.' Arsites exclaimed against this: 'It is our duty,' he said, 'with the ample means 'we possess, to protect those committed to our 'care; nor will I patiently suffer a single house 'or a single inhabitant within my province to be 'injured.' In this sentiment the other Persian generals concurred.

SECT. II.

It is evident, from Arrian's narrative, that he reckoned Memnon's counsel wise; and Alexander's advance, undertaken perhaps in some confidence that a blow might be struck against the satraps before Memnon could bring his regular infantry to their support, highly hazardous, if not even rash. He thought that Alexander's army might have been effectually stopped, if not even destroyed, by the execution of Memnon's plan[9]. The Persian generals,

[9] Memnon's ought, I suppose, to be the plan for England, should an enemy ever, in any great force, invade our iland. Even should it be our misfortune that he commanded the sea, and could pour successive myriads of infantry upon us, our management still must be wretched if we could not maintain the Persian superiority against him. We should be beyond measure superior in cavalry and in artillery. Landing should of course be diligently watched and vigorously opposed. But, that once effected, no battle should be fought. A battle might be desirable for the commanding general's fame, but at no rate for the nation's good. Whichever way the invader turned from the coast, the country should be waste before him. A superior cavalry should attend all his steps; he should find nothing to eat, and he should never sleep in quiet. The more his myriads the sooner he would starve. Nearly thus, after so many battles in which Roman generals, eager for fame, lost their armies and their lives, and brought Rome to the brink of ruin, Fabius baffled Hannibal; and thus, before him, without the glory of a battle, Gylippus destroyed the Athenian army in Sicily. When invasion was expected from Bonaparte, measures in pursuance of such a system, at first ernestly recommended by government, and zealously put forward by

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he says, were jealous of Memnon; not suspecting him of infidelity to the cause he had engaged in; but, knowing the king valued him highly for his military talents, they supposed he would desire a protracted war, that the need of his services might not cease. On the other hand personal motives for the determination of the Persian chiefs are obvious; but mixed with considerations both of public welfare, and of the special interests of the crown, committed to their charge. Their vassal's property and their own would suffer from the execution of Memnon's plan; with them the king's revenue must also suffer; distress must come upon thousands, for whose relief no provision had been, nor perhaps could be, in adequate amount, made; and, should the completest success against the enemy follow, whether they might most incur the approbation or indignation of the distant court for the means, was perhaps a question for their serious consideration. Jealousy then of a foreiner in high command, whatever his merit, could only in very extraordinary circumstances, in any country, be otherwise than patriotic and reasonable. The sentiments of Arsites were accordingly approved as becoming a Persian patriot, and it was resolved to give Alexander battle.

Near Zeleia an advantageous position offered itself at the ford of the river Granicus, which seems, in Arrian's account, who knew the country, to have been the only passage of that river, reddily practicable for an army, between the highlands of Ida, where it has its source, and the Euxine sea. Issuing from the heights at once a plentiful stream,

the country, were suddenly countermanded, and a contrary purpose declared; at which I must own I wondered and shuddered. Those who then led our military councils were not Wellingtons.

it crosses the plainer country in a deep and rocky channel. At the ford it is still rapid, and of varying depth, with loose stones in its bed. But there the rocks of the right bank receding, leave a low flat, in the dialect of the north of England, where the thing is familiar, a haugh[10], of considerable extent, tho of length against the stream, no more than that the Persian cavalry, in line, might occupy nearly the whole bank, from where the cliff recedes, to where it again meets the water. The Persian generals then, confident in their native strength, and perhaps most of them little knowing, from any experience of their own, the value of their Grecian foot, occupied the flat with their cavalry, and placed the Greeks, as a reserve, on the higher ground behind it, the boundary of the torrent's violence in winter floods. The immediate command of this powerful body of foot was committed to a Persian general, Omares, while Memnon was with the Persian generals at the head of the left wing of their cavalry; whether desired for his advice, or rather required through jealousy, as may seem indicated by the circumstance, added by Arrian, that his sons were with him there[11].

SECT. II.

Arr. l. 1. c. 17.

Alexander approaching the ford early in the day, and informed by his forerunners of the enemy's position, hastened with some of his principal

[10] This word, lost in the common speech of the south, remains nevertheless in names of places, with varied orthography, Howe, Ivinghoe, Luton Hoo, and others.

[11] Diodorus says that Memnon was associated with a Persian general, the satrap Arsamenes, in the command of that wing; (Diod. l. 17. c. 19.) which Arrian's account neither contradicts nor warrants, but leaves it at least doubtful whether Memnon had any command. What has led Guischardt, in his commentary on the battle of the Granicus, to attribute to Memnon the command in chief there, he has not said, and I have been unable to discover.

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officers to examine it. Parmenio, observing the difficulties presented, recommended incamping for the night, in expectation that the enemy, inferior in infantry, would leave the passage free before morning. Against this Alexander urged 'the advantage, for the great business they had undertaken, of beginning with a blow that might surprize and terrify, and the importance of not allowing the long-established opinion of Grecian superiority to slacken for a moment.' But what Memnon had recommended in the Persian council of war would hardly escape Parmenio, nor probably Alexander; who, with a most acute mind, had alreddy, for his years, large experience in military command. The opportunity which was offered for a battle, once missed, might not be found again, and the greater difficulties and dangers that Memnon's advice would have prepared, might remain for them. Alexander resolved immediately to make the attack which the Persians appeared resolved to wait for.

On his side of the river it appears the bank offered no material obstacle to regular formation at his choice. With the purpose then of forcing the passage, he gave his line an extent, as nearly as might be, commensurate with the enemy's; his horse holding the extreme of each wing. On his farthest right, which was first to come in contact with the enemy, he placed that superior body of heavy cavalry intitled the royal companions. To prepare for the attack by these, and supported, they were attended by the Agrians, middle-armed, eminent for skill with the dart, and by the whole body of bowmen. Parmenio's eldest son, Philotas, commanded all. Next in the line were the Macedonian heavy horse, and that commanded by Socrates, with the Pæonian middle-armed, all under

Amyntas son of Arrhabæus. Adjoining these were a select body of the royal companion-infantry, styled hypaspists[12], under Nicanor, Parmenio's second son. The phalanges held the center, under Perdiccas son of Orontas, Cœnus son of Polemocrates, Craterus son of Alexander, Meleager son of Neoptolemus[13], Amyntas son of Andromenes, and Philip son of Amyntas; names, for their recurrence in the sequel, deserving notice here[14]. Next the phalanges, on the left, was the Thracian horse, under Agathon; then the auxiliary Grecian horse of the republics south of Thessaly: the extreme of the left wing was held by the Thessalian horse, under Callas son of Harpalus, who had distinguished himself in service under Parmenio, in Æolia. All the light-armed of the army thus were given to the right wing, to check the

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[12] I have been unable to ascertain what distinguished the hypaspist from the phalangite, the ordinary hoplite or heavy-armed. Gronovius, giving for ὑπασπιστὴς the Latin *scutatus*, and the lexicographers *armiger*, are unsatisfactory. Guischardt has supposed that the hypaspist, tho bearing a proper panoply, was altogether lighter armed than the ordinary hoplite; on what authority he has not said, and I have not found; unless the circumstance that the hypaspists were always among Alexander's chosen bodies for rapid enterprize might be reckoned a sufficient foundation. But we have formerly observed, after Xenophon, young Lacedæmonians so excelling in vigor of limb and practice in arms, as, with all the incumbrance of the arms of the phalanx, to overtake their lighter armed enemies in flight; and Arrian mentions, on many occasions, Alexander's selecting the more active and vigorous of his phalangites to attend him, together with the hypaspists, for rapid and rugged marches. The question therefore remains whether the hypaspist was chosen for his lighter armor, or for his superior power to carry the heavier.

[13] Meleager is afterward so described: to his name alone his father's is not added here.

[14] The account of the phalanges, in our copies of Arrian, is rather confused, but I think he has meant to number six, as in the text above.

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enemy's efforts against that division of the cavalry with which it was proposed to make the first impression.

The custom of war of the heroïc ages, when the chief generals were the most forward combatants, remained, in large amount, to the most polished times of Greece. Brasidas we have seen, in the days of Thucydides, and in those of Xenophon, even the sage Epameinondas, when on his life the fortune of his party throughout Greece depended, so fell. Among the Persians the prowess of the satrap Pharnabazus, and still more the death of the younger Cyrus, are eminent examples. But yet more recently, and especially more an example for Alexander, his father Philip, according to the unsuspicious testimony of the hostile great orator, had been wounded in battle in every part of his body. Such example a youth like Alexander, exulting in vigor of mind and limb, would not be backward to follow. Modern weapons have produced a necessity for the modern practice of generals, in land-service, to observe and direct from a distance comparatively secure. But, in naval war, the commander of the largest fleet, like the generals of old, in no situation of advantage to see and direct, such still is imperious custom, mixes in battle equally with the lowest seaman. Alexander accordingly, committing the command of the left wing of his army to Parmenio, took himself the immediate lead of the right; which, in pursuance of the concerted plan, was first to meet the enemy.

Meanwhile the Persian generals, watching, from the opposite bank, all movements, gathered, from the splendor of the armor and habiliments of Alexander, and his immediate attendants, where

he had his station; and, as far as time and circumstances would allow, they drew their choicest troops toward that point. This movement could not be so made as to be unobserved from the Grecian army; and, its purpose being conjectured, Alexander was confirmed by it in his plan. Could he defeat that part of the hostile force, he trusted, judging from large and able information of the character of Asiatic armies, that the rest would not long stand. SECT. II.

An advanced body, infantry with cavalry, the former under Amyntas son of Arrhabæus, the latter under Ptolemy son of Philip, crossed the river first, and began the battle. The Persian cavalry carried javelins, light enough to be thrown by the arm, in which then, as still at this day, being trained to it from early youth, they were highly dexterous. In closing they mostly used the cimeter. The Grecian horseman carried a lance for close action, but no missile weapon. The Grecian advanced bodies were received with such firmness, by numbers very superior, on ground of great advantage, that they were quickly compelled to retire, with considerable loss. Nevertheless the employment they gave, inabled the main body, led by Alexander himself, to cross the more quietly. But on approaching the bank it suffered, and on reaching it was so met in stationary fight that, Arrian, following the account of the Macedonian generals, characterizes the action by comparing it to a contest of heavy-armed infantry. Alexander's lance was disabled. Turning to Aretes, his master of the horse[15], for another, that officer could only show

[15] Ἀναξολεὺς τῶν βασιλικῶν is the title of Alexander's attendant, which it has been ventured so to render.

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him one equally injured, so warmly had he also been ingaged. The extraordinary skill of the Persian horsemen, to disable an enemy's lance, has heretofore occurred for notice in Xenophon's account of an action where he was ingaged under Agesilaus. There the Persian, hardly equal in numbers, as the candid historian allows, overbore the Grecian cavalry; but these were Asiatic Greeks, and very recently raised. The very superior practice of those under Alexander, animated by his example, gave prevalence to their superior formation and superior weapons against very superior numbers, and the Persians gave way.

Ch. 24. s. 3. of this History.

Singularly formidable in desultory action with a large field, the Persian cavalry, tho they would sometimes charge in a sort of column, as in the battle noticed from Xenophon, seem to have been quite unqualified by their discipline to charge in line. But, if a discharge of javelins on a gallop, or, at most, a rush afterward at a point, did not break the enemy, so excellently were their horses trained to stop and wheel, that they would instantly withdraw on a gallop, confident of outstripping pursuit, and prepared to turn and renew action in their own desultory way.

A short leisure was thus afforded to Alexander, and Demaratus, a Corinthian, of the band of royal companions, was the first to supply him with a sound lance. Hardly sooner was he thus provided than he observed a powerful body of Persian horse returning to charge, and a leading officer considerably advanced before it. In the warmth of mind of the moment he rode onward so hastily, that, before his attendants could join him, he had, with his lance, killed the leading officer, but, almost in the same instant, lost part of his helmet

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by a stroke from another's sword, whom yet, with his shortened lance he killed also. Nearly surrounded now by enemies, one of them was aiming a sword-stroke at him, which might have been fatal, when Cleitus son of Dropis, one of his lords of the body-guard, arrived so critically as to disable the uplifted arm by a wound in the shoulder. It was afterward found that the first killed by Alexander was Mithridates, a son-in-law of Darius, commander of the cavalry of the army, the second Rosaces, a man of great eminence; and the officer wounded by Cleitus was Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, who died, not long after, of the wound. So the Persian great still held it their office to be foremost in battle, and so, beyond just policy, they performed the supposed duty.

Through the retreat of the Persian cavalry first ingaged, and the check in their return to onset, by the death of their principal officers, the right wing of the Grecian army had leisure to gain footing on the plain ground of the meadow. Meanwhile the left wing, under Parmenio, had severe contest with the Persian right. In this contest the Thessalians, always esteemed among the best of Grecian cavalry, particularly distinguished themselves; and the Persians, weakened, as before mentioned, to strengthen their other wing, were compelled to give way[16]. Through the employment given by the

Diod. l. 17. c. 19. & 21.

[16] Tho it may be hardly too much to say, of the numerous descriptions of battles which remain to us from Diodorus, that not one is altogether rational, yet credit seemingly may be given him for his testimony to the discipline of the Thessalian horse, and the credit it gained at the battle of the Granicus. Arrian has wholly omitted notice of what was done by the wing under Parmenio; perhaps because the generals, to whose accounts he trusted, had described only what they were witnesses to in the right. But it may be ventured to

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Thessalians, the Grecian infantry of the left wing crossed the river with little loss, and formed on the meadow in regular order. The Persian cavalry, plied with missile weapons by the Grecian light troops, while the protended spears were advancing, having looked in vain for example or orders from their officers, killed or disabled, presently took to disorderly flight.

Arr. l. 1. c. 17.

The infantry thus abandoned, was however, alone, a formidable army, but it wanted a head. The Persian, Omares, its commander, probably unversed in Grecian tactics, and, in Arrian's account, unprepared by instructions or previous concert for the circumstances, was at a loss for measures[17]. Nevertheless he stood, and the troops under him stood, where they had been stationed, witnesses of the flight of the cavalry which should have rallied, if not for farther action by itself, yet for their support, and witnesses also of their enemy's measures for attacking them. Alexander, allowing no distant pursuit of the defeated cavalry, collected his troops, and, according to the practice introduced by Epameinondas and adopted by Philip, directed his attack not against the whole line, but, with a condensed force, against the center of the Persian Greeks. Their resistance was brave, but unavailing. Presently broken, through the superior conduct of their enemy, his cavalry fell upon their disordered ranks. To rally then was impossible;

add, of Diodorus that this part of his compilation is among those for which he has been most fortunate in his choice of authorities; and what he has related of the battle of the Granicus, supplying Arrian's deficiency, harmonizes with all that Arrian has related.

[17] Ἐξεστράπη Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ὧν τὸ εἶφος ἦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτάχθη, ἐκπλήξει μᾶλλόν τι τοῦ παραλόγου ἢ λογισμῷ βεβαίῳ, ἔμενε. Arr. l. 1. c. 17.

SECT. II.

to fly useless; and quarter was little given. About two thousand are said to have been made prisoners, wounded, or falling as if wounded, and so avoiding the immediate fury of pursuers. Thus Alexander's victory was complete.

The number slain, of the Persian army altogether, Arrian has not undertaken to say; whence it may be conjectured that those who have undertaken it had no good authority to follow. But, in his and in all accounts, the loss, whatever in numbers, was important in quality. Nine men, of great eminence, are named as having fallen. Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, Rosaces, said by Diodorus to have been his brother, and Mithridates, the king's son-in-law, have been already mentioned. Pharnaces, the queen's brother, Arbupales, described by Arrian as of the royal family, Mithrobuzanes[18], satrap of Cappadocia, Omares, commander of the mercenaries, and two other generals, are also in Arrian's list of the killed in the field. Arsites, that writer adds, having fled to the capital of his satrapy, unable to bear the consideration that his advice, prevailing in the council of war, had produced so great a calamity, added himself with his own hand to the number of great officers lost.

On the Grecian side none of the rank of general, but no less than twenty-five of the order of companions, apparently most in the contest about Alexander's person, were killed. Of the other cavalry little more than sixty are said by Arrian to have fallen, and of the infantry, only about thirty; numbers for which, likely enough, he had the authority of Macedonian generals, yet, judging from his own

[18] Otherwise written Mithrobarzanes.

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account of the action, probably much extenuated. Funeral honors for the slain were Alexander's next care; in which nothing that could gratify their surviving friends, and excite emulation among their surviving comrades in arms, was omitted. The substantial reward of perpetual immunity from taxes (what taxes indeed we should be glad to know) for their parents and posterity, would especially engage the gratitude and attachment of the more considerate among them. The twenty-five companions were honored by employing the celebrated Lysippus to represent them in statues of brass, which were placed in the city of Dium in Macedonia. Liberality was extended, against the common practice of the Grecian republics, even to enemies: the rite of burial was performed for the Persian slain, and even for the mercenaries in the Persian service; tho the survivors of these, prisoners, as traitors to their country taken in the actual use of arms against it, were condemned to slavery. They were of various Grecian republics; some Athenians. To the wounded of his own army Alexander gave the most flattering personal attention. Not only he saw that whatever their cases needed was supplied, but inquired of each into the circumstances of the action, and incouraged the boastful tale of their several deeds.

To send home report of a victory so glorious, obtained with loss, not indeed satisfactorily reported to us, yet, for the greatness of the occasion, probably altogether small, was a grateful part of the business before him. Athens, for the sake of his hereditary friends there, those who had honored his father, and whom his father had honored, as well as for their leading influence among the republics, was perhaps intitled to his distinguishing attention, and

received it. Three hundred complete suits of Persian armor sent as a present to the Athenian people, were dedicated in the temple of Minerva, with this inscription, ALEXANDER, SON OF PHILIP, AND THE GREEKS, EXCEPTING THE LACEDÆMONIANS, OFFER THESE, TAKEN FROM THE BARBARIANS OF ASIA[19].

[19] The origin of the name of Asia is utterly uncertain, but, alreddy in the time of the father of profane history, it appears to have designated among the Greeks the continent now so called, as far as it was then known. He distinguishes the country since called Lesser Asia, by the description of Asia within the Halys.

Nevertheless the name Asia has been used by later antient writers with various narrower significations, a matter not unnecessary to be adverted to for duly understanding them. The diligent authors of the antient universal history have collected those significations. Names of countries have mostly originated from the names of the people possessing them, and have been extended, or contracted or changed, as possession has altered. Thus Græcia had its name from the Greeks, and within it, Laconia, Bœotia, Acarnania, Thessaly and Macedonia, from their possessors the Lacons, Bœots, Acarnans, Thessals and Macedons. In more modern times England and France so obtained their present names. That longer form of those Grecian names which would indicate the people to have had them from the name of the country, instead of giving their name to the country, has been the produce of modern fashion only. Nevertheless many antient people have gained names from the places they inhabited. Thus Peloponnesian became a collective name for all the various inhabitants of the peninsula of Peloponnesus. The names Spartiat, or Spartan, and Lacedæmonian, distinguished those Lacons who inhabited Sparta or Lacedæmon. The Dorians who obtained possession of Corinth were called Corinthians; and when Athens acquired renown, those previously called Attics took the name generally of their capital, and were called Athenians.

SECTION III.

March into Lydia: Surrender of Sardis: Circumstances of Ephesus and other Grecian Cities of Asia. Opposition of Miletus: Late arrival of the Persian fleet: Miletus taken. Efficiency of the Persian fleet obviated by Measures ashore. Pecuniary Distress of Alexander.

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THE consequences of the victory of the Granicus were very great. It was not a little matter that, in Greece, the hopes, the influence, the activity, of the Persian party were instantly checked. But in Lesser Asia the result amounted to the immediate conquest of a large portion of that extensive and rich country. The Persian cavalry being dispersed, and the Grecian force in the pay of Persia, the largest to that time known in a forein service, annihilated, even Memnon was at a loss for resources. His situation indeed, among the satraps, after losing the present support of his brother-in-law Artabazus, seems always to have abounded with difficulties. Apparently now he despaired of Æolia; no longer indeed important as a frontier country, for the victorious enemy was within the frontier. He hastened to Ionia, where his early presence might assist to lessen the impression of the news to arrive, and where his exertions might most contribute to check the conqueror's progress. The large satrapy of Lower Phrygia, including Bithynia and Æolia, was by the death of Arsites so left without a chief capable of directing effectual resistance, that Alexander proceeded immediately to reward the merit of Callas, the general commanding his Thessalian horse, by appointing him to the office and dignity of its satrap. Alexander's measures then were conciliating and politic. Num-

bers of the people had fled to the mountains: protection being promised, they returned to their houses: the Greeks of the town of Zeleia, who had acted with the enemy, he pardoned, as having been under compulsion: Dascylium, the capital of Bithynia, the favorite residence formerly of the satrap Pharnabazus, being held by a garrison, Parmenio was detached against it: the garrison withdrew on his approach, and the town submitted. The revenue of the province was then put in course to come into the king of Macedonia's treasury. In the adjoining satrapy of Lydia, including Ionia, still larger and richer, tho it had lost its chief, Spithridates, yet a Persian governor, Mithranes, with a regular garrison, held the castle of Sardis, the capital. That fortress was both by nature and art of uncommon strength, and the city had, within its walls, a large population. The wealthy Lydians, indeed would desire to avoid war at their doors; perhaps careless whether a Persian or a Macedonian garrison held their castle, and whether their tribute went to Babylon or Pella; or perhaps they might rather desire a change of dominion. Even the satraps we have seen, as feudatory princes, often at war with the soverein or his officers, and, in one remarkable instance, avowing a claim of right to defection: but the officer intrusted with the care of a fortress of singular importance and strength, with a competent military force, was in a different situation. Nevertheless Alexander, after marching from the Granicus through a great extent of country as in peace, was met, about seven miles from Sardis, by Mithranes, accompanied by the magistracy of the city, all together throwing themselves on his mercy and generosity. How Mithranes could excuse himself

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Ch. 24. s. 5. of this History.

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to his soverein and country does not appear. Alexander, however, as policy would persuade, received him well and treated him with honor; and, pursuing still his father's liberal system, gratified the Lydians by granting to the whole kingdom its antient constitution and laws[20].

Arriving at Sardis, he ascended into the citadel. The strength of that fortress ingaged his admiration. With any firmness of resistance it must either have delayed his farther progress most inconveniently, or made it very hazardous. Apparently felicitating himself on the easy acquisition, he resolved to build there a temple to Jupiter. He was looking for a situation, when a supervening thundershower fell, and with particular violence about the palace of the antient Lydian kings. This was esteemed to indicate the deïty's preference of the spot, and he ordered the temple to be there erected. It may seem however little likely that a pupil of Aristotle, whose sublime conception of the one God, in whom all nature lives and moves and has its being, has been formerly noticed, would be very solicitous about the place where a cloud might drop, unless through a politic regard for the superstition of the many, who reckoned the air, in the division of portions of the world among their numerous deïties, the particular seat of the reign of Jupiter.

Ch. 2. s. 2. of this History.

The pressure however of matters of more serious importance allowed little leisure, in this great capital, for those of cerèmony or amusement. With a

[20] One cannot but here recollect, and recollecting admire, those writers, antient and modern, who would represent Philip as one of the deepest politicians the world ever saw, and yet do not scruple to impute to him a conduct directly tending to defeat a politician's purposes, ill usage to those who betrayed an important trust to serve him.

rapidity beyond hope or foresight a great dominion had alreddy been acquired behind the Grecian states; those states themselves remaining yet under the dominion of Persia, from which it was the professed object of the expedition to deliver them; an object now of increased importance, as, in an enemy's hands, they intercepted the communication with the Grecian sea. But this object presented no small difficulties, as in every one of those states was a party, in some a preponderant party, zealous for the Persian supremacy, and especially attached to the able and popular Memnon, to whom the king of Persia had committed the chief command over them. On the other hand, however, in every one also an opposing party was not less zealous in the cause of the Grecian confederacy, under Alexander; and especially in the two most important for wealth, population, and situation, Ephesus and Miletus, circumstances pressed for his immediate attention.

In Ephesus, the contention between an aristocratical or oligarchal (for historians rarely distinguish them) and a democratical party, had been recently violent. Ionia is, by the Grecian writers, often intitled a satrapy; but at this time, and indeed generally, Ionia was united with the Lydian satrapy. Tho it appears to have been the ordinary system of the Persian government liberally to allow the people under its extensive dominion to rule themselves in their own way, interfering only when its supremacy was threatened, yet commanders of provinces, looking, whether to their own interest, or their opinion of public interest, might often contravene this system. In Ephesus, under Persian patronage, the aristocratical had been the ruling party. The publication of the late king of Macedonia, Philip's,

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declaration that he would himself pass into Asia, to deliver the Grecian cities there from Persian bondage, would of course excite fermentation of party politics. Assurance then arriving that a force under Parmenio, esteemed the ablest general of the age, had actually crossed the Hellespont, the democratical Ephesians rose and overpowered their opponents; and while Demosthenes was endevoring to persuade all Greece that Philip was the most odious and dreadful of tyrants, they erected a statue to him, as the great vindicator of freedom, the patron of democracy. As often happens however in such insurrections, they had ill-judged their time. Memnon, then commanding in Æolia, at some hazard for that province, repairing to Ephesus, restored the superiority to the friends of the Persian supremacy. The statue of Philip then was overthrown, and the sepulchral monument erected in honor of Heropythus, leader of the democratical cause, who seems to have fallen in it, was demolished. No capital execution, no exile, no personal severity of any kind, appears to have followed against the defeated; but a body of Grecian mercenaries was left in garrison, for the security of the order of things now established. Memnon's policy, liberal at the same time and vigorous, might have been effectual for its purpose, but for the battle of the Granicus, and its consequences, Alexander's rapid march southward, the reddy submission of the extensive Persian provinces in his way, and finally the surrender of Sardis. With these unexpected events hope rose as a meteor before the democratical party, and they became eager for a new revolution. The Grecian mercenaries of the garrison, whom report would reach of the fate, both of their fellows slain at the Granicus, and of those who survived, took alarm.

Amyntas son of Antiochus, a Macedonian of regal descent, who had fled his country, suspected of treasonable practices against the reigning family, was residing at Ephesus under Persian protection. In concert with him, the Grecian mercenaries, they betraying their ingagement, he the hospitality afforded him, seized two triremes in the harbor of Ephesus, and deserted in them. Servile fear being thus removed from the many, no noble passion took its place, but democratical fury broke loose. Syrphax, a leader of the aristocratical party, fled for refuge to the temple (that so celebrated of Diana, tho not named, seems implied in the historian's account) with his brother's children and his own son. Regardless of the sacredness of the asylum, the people dragged them out and stoned them to death. All who had been accessary to the invitation of Memnon, to the overthrowing of the statue of Philip, to the destruction of the monument of Heropythus, with the added imputation of spoliation of the temple, were then demanded for massacre, in the forms of democratical justice. SECT. III.

Information of these circumstances was hastened to Alexander, with solicitation from the triumphant party for his support in the superiority, which neither party could maintain without forein patronage. The object was of such importance that he allowed himself only three days at Sardis to make arrangements for the government of the rich and extensive countries of which he was become the soverein. The general direction, civil and military, in Lydia and all the appendant districts, which together had formed the satrapy of Spithridates, he

Arrian, l. 1. c. 18.

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committed to Asander son of Philotas[21]; but the superintendance of the treasury and collection of taxes he made a separate department under Nicias; and the custody of the citadel he made also a distinct command under Pausanias, one of the order of companions. It appears to have been in proposed indulgence to the people of Argos, who had distinguished themselves among the democratical republicans of Peloponnesus by zeal in favor both of his father and himself, and also as a mark of his confidence in them, that he left the Argians of his army for its garrison.

With his diligence, one day fortunately sufficing for the march from Sardis, he arrived at Ephesus in time to command mercy. Of the fury of civil contest among republicans he had seen a disgusting amount at Thebes, when he had neither experience nor force to inable him to choose his measures. Knowing now, says the historian, that, in popular commotions, not the guilty only, not even party-opponents only suffer, but that private resentment, private avarice, all evil passions, finding opportunity of gratification, use it, he forbad farther severities, and he was obeyed. The antient democratical government was, under his sanction, established. The chiefs of the party, banished by the aristocratical party, were rëinstated. A delicate question then occurred. A tribute had been assessed upon every Grecian city for the Persian treasury. When formerly delivered from the

[21] We find all the Macedonian names Greek; and, as among the republics, and formerly among the Welsh, distinction of the many of the same name was provided only by addition of the father's and other progenitors' names. Philotas, father of Asander, could not be the young friend of Alexander of that name, son of Parmenio.

Persian yoke, as it has been commonly phrased, by the Athenians, or Lacedæmonians, a tribute still had been required for the Athenian or Lacedæmonian treasury; but on pretence of using it for the common good of Greece. Was then such tribute now to be still required for the benefit of the Grecian cause against the Persian? Alexander, wanting revenue much, nevertheless considered popularity as what his circumstances and views wanted yet more. The tribute apparently was not of oppressive amount, yet he would not take it for himself. The venerated temple of Diana at Ephesus was in such a state through age, that it had been in contemplation to rebuild it. Not remitting the tribute then, he directed that the sums formerly raised for the Persian king should in future be paid to the goddess. His conduct altogether was highly popular. Widely, says Arrian, as he earned favor and praise, he succeeded nowhere more completely than at Ephesus. SECT. III. Arr. l. 1. c. 18.

The circumstances which produced the easy acquisition of that important city, and the judicious use of opportunities for popularity there, appear, after the battle of the Granicus, to have been principal leading steps to his great following fortune. Ephesus was the first Grecian city, southward of mount Ida, that embraced his party. After its example deputies now arrived from Magnesia on the Mæander, and from Tralles, offering allegiance. Parmenio was dispatched, as the king's commissioner, to accept it, taking with him five thousand foot, and two hundred horse of the body of companions. The selection of so eminent a military man for an office nominally civil, and the amount of force committed to him, indicate that there were in those cities either strong parties in the Persian interest, or mercenary garrisons, supposed more faithful to c. 19.

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their ingagements than that of Ephesus. The friendly, however, on Parmenio's arrival made their offer good. Apparently information had been received of a similar disposition among the many Ionian cities northward, and also in those of Æolia which had not been formerly gained by Parmenio during his command there. A nearly equal force being sent in that direction, under a commander of far less note, Alcimalus son of Agathocles, so the example of Ephesus assisted the fame of Alexander's victory and liberality that this mission was also, without effort noticed by historians, completely successful. The proposal offered to the several states was simply to join the general confederacy of the Greek nation, decreed by the congress of Corinth; and, on a declaration of accession to this, a democratical constitution was warranted to all the cities, and exemption from tribute.

Within Ionia, Miletus alone now remained in connection with Persia; but Miletus was the most powerful of the Asiatic-Grecian cities, or second only to Ephesus. Its constitution was already democratical; yet such had been the politic liberality of the Persian supremacy, and such the popularity of Memnon's administration, that, little feeling the tribute assessed on their lands, the Milesians resolved to persevere in allegiance to the Persian king. Over-late, indeed, the Persian court had adopted that measure which so much assisted this determination, the appointment of Memnon to the chief command; yet which probably the Persian king, with all his despotism, might have been unable, for the opposition of his satraps, previously to manage. Memnon, on retiring from the Granicus, where so many fell, aware of the jealousy to which, as a foreiner, and especially as a Greek, he must be liable, had, for his first step,

sent his wife and children to the capital, as pledges of his fidelity. Opportunity to use his services was much opened by the circumstances of the battle of the Granicus. Accordingly the liberal and well-judging monarch, consideration of the long and able and faithful services of his brother Mentor probably assisting the determination, sent him a commission to command in chief along the whole of the Asiatic coast of the empire; and directed the commanders of a fleet, said to have been of four hundred triremes, whose crews would be not less than a hundred thousand men, to coöperate with him.

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Arrian, l. 1. c. 21. Diod. l. 17. c. 23.

Meanwhile Alexander, with a conquered continent behind him, having again reached the Ægean sea, the coöperation of his fleet would be important, and it was accordingly ordered to join him. Hastening arrangements then at Ephesus, he concluded them with a magnificent sacrifice to Diana, all his troops present marching in the procession, armed and formed as for battle. On the following day he moved for Miletus. That city, in the peace long injoyed, under liberal protection of the Persian government, had so florished by commerce, that, confident in the continuance of that protection, its increased population had raised a new town, beyond its antient walls, with little care of fortification for it. On Alexander's approach this was evacuated by the Milesians and was presently occupied by his troops. His fleet of a hundred and sixty triremes had alreddy entered the bay. In the iland Ladë, which commanded the approach by sea to the city[22], four thousand

[22] It has formerly occurred for notice that what was then the bay of Miletus has now been, for some centuries, a marsh, and Ladë a hill in it. Ch. 7. s. 2. of this History.

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men from the army were placed. The very superior fleet of Persia arrived three days after. Its commanders, apparently surprized to find approach to the city precluded, withdrew to the neighboring roadstead of Mycale, but returned next day and offered battle. This however the Macedonian admiral prudently declined. Concurring accounts show Alexander's understanding, both for extent and quickness, extraordinary, and the amount of his experience, both in military and political business, was such as few besides ever had at his years; yet it may be thought that Arrian has strained compliment a little, imputing rash counsel to the veteran Parmenio, esteemed by Philip the ablest military commander of his age, that he might attribute to the youthful king the sober prudence which corrected it. Parmenio, he says, urged for ingaging the Persian fleet: Alexander refused to allow it; and the reasoning ascribed to him seems clearly good. Arrian shows himself continually so scrupulous of asserting, without respectable authority, that it seems due to him to suppose he had respectable authority here; yet in the sequel of the history ground may appear for suspecting that his authority was from those unfriendly to Parmenio.

The siege of Miletus, without delay begun, was prosecuted with the best art of a cultivated age. Battering machines, large and weighty, brought by the fleet, were advanced against the walls. The Persian fleet repeatedly gave opportunity for battle, would the Grecian come out of the harbor, but showed no disposition to attack it there. The troops and people in the town thus seeing all effectual attempt for their relief declined by so great a force, on which they had much depended, began to despair of means to support the contest. Having

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consulted therefore about a capitulation, they sent to Alexander a proposal of neutrality, offering their port to be open to the ships, and their town to the troops, of both the belligerent powers. This being refused, with improvident valor, and a fidelity which does honor hardly less to the Persian government which inspired it, than to themselves, much perhaps being due particularly to Memnon, but surely much also to the government which selected and authorized such an agent, they resolved to brave all chances. Their walls however did not long withstand the power of Alexander's machines, directed by the skill of his engineers. A breach was made, by which the Macedonian forces entered. The small body of regular soldiers of the garrison, and the Milesian armed people, quickly overpowered, sought safety by flight. Many got aboard the vessels in the harbor; but so watched by the Macedonian fleet that all were taken. Many, meanwhile, weak to resist, and without opportunity to fly, were killed; quarter, in the sack of a fortified place, being little in the practice of the age. About three hundred of the regular soldiers, throwing themselves into the sea, and using their large shields as rafts, to support them with their armor, passed to a small iland, near the town, whose rocky cliffs were as walls, and there prepared to defend themselves. Alexander directed attack upon them; but, being informed they were all Greeks, and giving them credit, says the historian, for their faithful and courageous adherence to the service to which they had pledged themselves, not without example, through a long course of years, warranted at different times by the legislatures of all the principal republics of the nation, he sent to offer them

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quarter, on condition of renouncing the Persian, and entering into his service. The great Persian fleet was at anchor within their sight, without the least manifestation of a purpose to move. Hopeless therefore of relief they yielded on the terms offered. Nothing then remaining hostile within Miletus or its territory, Alexander admitted all the surviving people to his friendship, and placed the Milesian state, with its old constitution and laws, (so much the expressions of both the historians appear to indicate) upon the same footing of immunity and freedom as all other Grecian states, which had acceded to the general confederacy of the nation under his supremacy[23].

It has occurred formerly to observe, in many examples, how ill the ships of war of the antient construction, tho a construction admirably adapted to the antient mode of naval action, could keep the sea. A harbor reddy, and supplies from land, almost daily, were indispensable for them. A fleet

[23] Τοῖς Μιλησίοις φιλανθρώπως προσηνέχθη. Diod. l. 17. c. 22. Τοὺς Μιλησίους ἀφῆκε, καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἔδωκεν. Arrian, l. 1. c. 18. Diodorus has evidently followed good authorities for much of the history of Alexander. But for his great compilation, when books, being only in writing, were of course dear, and extensive libraries few, the labor always, the difficulty often, and the impossibility perhaps sometimes, of reaching the authorities to be desired, may account for, and even excuse, many of the obvious defects in his work. He makes the great body of his hundred thousand men, ingaged at the Granicus on the Persian side, retreat to Miletus, and there he places Memnon and many satraps, or Persians of great eminence, during the siege. Arrian makes no mention of Memnon there, or of any Persians of any degree. On the contrary his account clearly implies that Memnon was elsewhere, and that no Persians, or none in any authority, were there. It may suffice to consider the relative situations of the Granicus and Miletus, and the circumstances of Miletus and of the intervening country, to be aware that Arrian's is not more the most authoritative account than the most probable, and indeed that Diodorus's is utterly improbable.

thus was liable to annoyance from an army; and as Alexander's fleet could not cope with the very superior force of the Persian, manned with Phenicians and Cypriots, mariners equal to any of the Mediterranean, his next measure was to use his army against it. Stationing a considerable force, foot and horse, in situations to command landing-places and prevent watering, he so distressed that overbearing fleet that it left the road of Mycale, and took its station at the neighboring Greek iland of Samos. Battle was again offered to Alexander's fleet, which, however, would not quit its secure port. An attack was then made upon a part of it; but this so failed that five ships were lost, and soon after the great Persian fleet finally quitted the coast.

Alexander's successes, now obtained, were far beyond all previous rational calculation. Yet, tho the rich provinces of Lower Phrygia and Lydia were conquered, and all the commercial republics of the coast, from the Propontis to the border of Caria, brought to coälition with the Grecian confederacy, Alexander found himself wanting means to maintain the very moderate forces of land and sea with which his conquests had been made; so scanty were the resources with which he had ingaged in his great undertaking. A council was called to consider the difficulty, and it was put in question whether further service of the fleet might not be dispensed with, and the expence of its maintenance saved. The Persian fleet was clearly too powerful to be prudently met by any that Alexander had means to raise. Naval war therefore was not desirable for him. Moreover the enemy themselves had, for the present at least, abandoned it, having quitted the neighboring seas, and evidently for a

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cause which would prevent their reddy return to any purpose; they had not a port in the Ægean, or near it, where they could find supplies, or perhaps be assured even of necessary shelter. On this consideration the council determined that the fleet, reserving only what might be wanted for the convoy of weighty machines for sieges, should be sent home and laid up.

Alexander's poverty, after all his recent acquisitions, being thus manifest, it may be wondered rather what could have been Philip's plan, when, with his large experience, he at length resolved upon war in Asia, than that he so long bore unmoved the solicitations and remonstrances in which, among his friends in the Grecian republics, Isocrates probably was not singular. Perhaps, after long and careful circumspection, satisfied not only that Isocrates justly reckoned peace between the republics otherwise impossible, but, farther, that quiet for Macedonia itself must be precarious when the republics were in tumult, he chose war in Asia as least among hazards and evils, as well as most promising positive benefits. It may well then be supposed that Philip's mature age would have hazarded less than Alexander's youthful ardor; that he would not have afforded opportunity for the measures advised, tho in vain, by Memnon, for the destruction of his army or the ruin of his enterprize; that on the contrary, he would, like Agesilaus before him, have secured the friendship and coöperation of all the Grecian settlements on the coast, before he would have proceeded to the interior of Phrygia and Lydia.

Nevertheless the success, which attended the boldness of Alexander's measures, may tend both to warrant the advice of Isocrates, and to justify

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those Macedonians who, in council, may have assented to the plan followed by their youthful king. With the satrapies of Phrygia and Lydia conquered, and all the Grecian settlements of the Asiatic shore of the Ægean, as far as Caria, brought to alliance, much of the summer yet remained. To Caria Memnon had withdrawn, with his new commission, intended to give him authority widely over a country then no longer in the grantor's power. With the loss of provinces to the Persian empire probably the supplies failed, to which the court had trusted for making Memnon's new authority effectual. Unable however to attempt the recovery of what was lost, the defence of what remained to his sovereign, within the wide district committed to him, became Memnon's care. But even there difficulties had been prepared for him, and advantages for his opponent, by those whose interest as well as duty should have made them his best supporters.

SECTION IV.

Constitutions of Asiatic States: Circumstances of Caria: Ada Queen of Caria: Difficulties of Memnon: Siege of Halicarnassus.

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It is largely indicated, by antient writers, that much of the character of the political constitution, described by Homer, was preserved, not only in the Europeän principalities northward of the Grecian republics, but also extensively in Lesser Asia, and through Syria to the borders of Arabia; even Palestine, with all the peculiarities of the

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Jewish institutions not forming an exception. That country, with a system of law more perfect and better defined than any other known of the early ages, appears to have remained almost without a constitution, civil or military; till at length the people, suffering under the misrule of their chief magistrates, intitled judges, concurred in desiring a hereditary monarchy, such as that under which they saw neighboring nations quieter through civil, and more powerful through military order. This we have observed to have been not an uncommon resource of the Grecian republics, in similar circumstances. With authority then, necessary for the desired purposes, committed to the king, the law, by which his conduct should be regulated, remained as before; and, however the authority may have been abused, the law, we find, more held its force in antient Palestine than in some modern Europeän states. Everywhere private interest must occasionally yield to public good. In the Britannic empire an act of the concurring branches of the legislature is required to warrant any interference with private rights on the public account. In France formerly a simple command of the king sufficed for taking any man's land, at its estimated worth, for public purposes. In the kingdom of Naples, and perhaps some other Europeän states, the king, paying only the price set by his own officers, might take any man's land for his own use or pleasure. Under the Jewish law private property was so much better assured, that even the tyrant Ahab could not so take Naboth's vineyard; even the daring wickedness of his wife would not so venture upon an open breach of the right of an individual. The authentic history of those persons, indeed, remarkably illustrates

Samuel, b. 1. c. 8.

Kings, b. 1. c. 21.

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the state and condition of both governments and people under that constitution which prevailed so extensively in the early ages; a king, without a legislature, ruling under established law, and arms in the hands of the people forming the sanction of the law. Here then appears the reason of that general satisfaction of the western Asiatics with their governments, remarked by Aristotle, whence civil troubles, so ordinary in Greece, were, among them rare. The establishment of hereditary right prevented that contest for supremacy which was continually lacerating the Greek republics; and arms in the hands of the people, tho not providing such regular security for individuals as a legislature, mediating between king and people, may insure, yet, by giving importance to the people in body, deterred extensive oppression.

Ch. 43. s. 1. of this History.

Herodotus informs us that the antient Lydian law nearly resembled that ordinary in Greece; thus indicating that private rights were assured by the law in Lydia, under a hereditary monarch, nearly as in Greece under yearly magistrates. But the people of Lydia, an inland country, had not maintained their liberties against the despotism of Persian satraps equally with the Asiatic Greeks, who, with other advantages, had those of maritime situation; and thence Alexander had the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the Lydians by restoring their antient constitution. When the great Cyrus compelled all Lesser Asia to acknowlege his supreme dominion, it seems likely that Caria had a politic prince, who obtained favorable terms. Caria continued, to the time with which we are ingaged, to be governed by its hereditary native sovereins, tho owning homage to the Persian crown.

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Arrian.

The people were reckoned, by the republican Greeks, among barbarians; yet their character was good among surrounding nations; their government was orderly, and both their language and their religion appear to have been very nearly Grecian. On a fine harbor of their coast arose the Grecian city of Halicarnassus; which, among the Grecian cities of Lesser Asia, yielded in population and wealth, if to Miletus and Ephesus, to them only. It became the capital of the Carian princes, and yet its Grecian quality appears never to have been disputed. On the contrary, men of whom Greece was proud were among its natives; two, of distant ages, being of the first rank among historians, Herodotus and Dionysius. The princely family seems to have been generally popular in its own country, and respected abroad; frequently holding alliance with the leading Grecian republics, and at the same time maintaining its estimation among the vassals of the Persian empire. Marriage between brothers and sisters, esteemed at Athens creditable, was so also in Caria; the princely family commonly married within itself; and an extraordinary order of succession had favor there, recommended, according to Arrian, by the popularity of the renowned Semiramis, of very early times, queen of Assyria; the widowed queen succeeded her husband. Twice alreddy we have had occasion to observe the widows of deceased princes filling the throne of Caria; the heroine Artemisia, who fought under Xerxes, and another Artemisia, who erected, in honor of her deceased husband and brother, Mausolus, that sepulchral monument, which, for its magnificence reckoned among the seven wonders of the world, has furnished a title in all Europeän

Ch. 8. s. 5. & ch. 38. s. 5. of this History.

Strab. l. 14. p. 656. vel. 969. ed Casaub.

languages for sepulchral monuments of superior splendor. SECT. IV.

The second Artemisia was succeeded in the Carian throne by her husband's brother and her own, Hidrieus. He had married his and their sister, Ada, who, on his demise, claimed the succession. But an eminent Persian, Orontobates, had married the daughter of Pexodorus, a third brother; and, having perhaps opportunity, at the distant court, to represent both Carian laws, and facts in Caria, otherwise than as they were, he obtained a grant of the principality for his father-in-law and himself. Ada, resisting as far as she was able, maintained herself in one strong place, Alinda: of the rest of the country Pexodorus and Orontobates gained possession. Diod. l. 16. c. 69, & 74. & l. 17. c. 24. Arrian, l. 1. c. 24.

Alexander appears to have owed his alreddy great success hardly more to the excellence of the military force, from the private soldier up to the chief generals, prepared by his father, than to the liberal system of policy, equally prepared by his father, and with remarkable steddiness, pursued by himself. The constitution of Lydia, perhaps little touched by the great conqueror, Cyrus, had been overwhelmed by the military despotism afterward committed to, or assumed by, the satraps. Thus, in modern Europe, the constitution of the kingdom of Naples, especially of the iland of Sicily derived from the Norman conquerors, and considerably resembling the antient Norman and the English, was overwhelmed by a military despotism in the hands of the viceroys, whom the courts of Madrid and Vienna, prevailing alternately in their claims to the succession, sent to govern those beautiful, naturally rich, and eminently unfortunate countries; that constitution always holding existence, tho sickly,

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weak and inefficacious. The Lydians therefore, rejoicing in the restoration of just vigor to the overborne antient laws of the country, might also not unreasonably hope that, should griefs in future arise, their complaints might more reddily and effectually reach a soverein of Grecian manners, residing at Pella, than one hardly visible but to eunuchs, in some one of his several capitals beyond the great desert.

These advantages of Alexander made difficulties for Memnon. Sardis, apparently, after the loss of the battle of the Granicus, should have been the rallying point for the Persians. But the fall of so many men in the highest commands, especially of Spithridates and Arsites, seems to have paralysed the Persian administration throughout the country; and this, if anything, might excuse the officer who surrendered the citadel of Sardis. Very possibly, without prospect of succor from any quarter, he could not command his own garrison. The support of the Persian cause seems to have devolved upon the foreiner, Memnon; even before the new commission, extending his powers, reached him; and his means appear to have been limited to the mercenary force that he could himself raise and maintain, with only an uncertain interest in some of the Grecian cities. In Ephesus that interest had failed: in Miletus it had been overborne by arms.

But in Halicarnassus it still prevailed. The Carians were, like the modern Swiss, much in the habit of hiring themselves for military service to any power; according to Strabo, the mercenary force entertained among the republics of Greece itself was composed commonly in large proportion, of Carians. If then Memnon could maintain himself in Caria through the approaching winter, sup-

Strab.

port from the center of the empire might reach him before spring; and, with Caria left behind hostile, Alexander's progress eastward, should he attempt it, would be highly hazardous. SECT. IV.

But with a military command now wide, Memnon's pecuniary means remained evidently narrow. In Caria the civil government rested with Orontobates; the people were attached to Ada. However then Memnon, for his soverein's interest, might have desired to favor Ada, for his soverein's interest and his own it was imperious upon him to be well with Orontobates. Circumstances thus invited Alexander to that country; they required speed, and he did not delay. On his way Ada met him: she ceremoniously adopted him as her son, and he accepted the title. Then she surrendered to him her strong fortress of Alinda; and through her example and her influence, supported by the fame and the presence of his army, she procured that his march of near a hundred miles across Caria should be as through a friendly country; the towns on all sides offering submission, or yielding on the first summons. Diod. l. 17. c. 24. Strab. l. 14. Arrian, l. 1. c. 24.

Memnon, meanwhile, aware of his disadvantages, had drawn together all his strength within the walls of Halicarnassus. That city Alexander prepared immediately to besiege. It was strong by local circumstances; and, to the fortifications carefully raised by the wealthy princes of Caria, Memnon had made such additions as the improved science of his age recommended. Greeks, or regular soldiers trained in the Grecian discipline, were numerous in the garrison; Persians, or Persian subjects, not Greeks, were also numerous; and there were many ships of war in the harbor, Arrian, l. 1. c. 21.

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whose coöperation might be important. Under all circumstances it seems to have been matter of no reddy decision, for the invader, how and where to begin attack upon the place. But, on the northern side of the peninsula, on whose southern shore Halicarnassus stood, was the seaport town of Myndus. A party there, restrained from following openly the general propensity of the Carian people, sent private communication to Alexander, promising to open a gate to him if he would come by night. The possession of Myndus was thought so important toward the acquisition of Halicarnassus, that he went himself, with a strong body: but on his arrival at the appointed gate all was close, without a symptom of any stir in his favor. Having depended upon the concerted admission, he was unprovided even with scaling-ladders; yet, unwilling to return with nothing done, and hoping still for some coöperation within on his showing himself with a powerful force without, the soldiers of his phalanx were set to undermine a tower of the wall, and they brought it to the ground. But it appeared that secrecy had not been duly observed by the favoring party. Not only its measures were watched and their efficacy obviated, but such communication had been made to Memnon in Halicarnassus, that assistance was sent by sea, which, with the first daylight, was seen arriving. At the same time it was found that the enemy had defences behind the ruined tower, so that its fall did not make a practicable opening. Circumstances thus admonishing, Alexander prudently returned without delay to the greater object, Halicarnassus.

That city was surrounded with a ditch, according to Arrian, thirty cubits wide and fifteen deep.

SECT. IV.

Before engines could be brought against the wall, therefore, the ditch must be filled; a work of great labor and danger, under interruption from the enemy's weapons, discharged from above in safety and leisure. It was nevertheless accomplished. Moveable towers, to protect the besiegers, and engines, both for battering the walls and for throwing weapons, were then advanced. The garrison sallied to destroy them, but were repulsed, and the action was made remarkable by the death of a prince of the royal family of Macedonia, Neoptolemus, who fell fighting on the Persian side[24]. Arrian, l. 1. c. 22. Miners being then employed, together with the battering engines, two towers, and the wall between them, were reduced to ruins. The garrison, issuing, set fire to the sheds of the besiegers, and to the brushwood used in the approaches, and they destroyed some of the machines; but they were repulsed before they could complete their purpose. Diodorus mentions two Athenians, Ephialtes and Thrasybulus, as eminent among the officers of the garrison; and relates of them, probably following some Athenian writer, what adds to the various demonstrations occurring of the principles and temper of the party of Demosthenes. Some bodies of Macedonians killed having fallen into the power of the garrison, Alexander, by a herald, with the usual formalities, desired them for burial. Ephialtes and Thrasybulus opposed the request: Memnon however granted it. In a following sally the con-

[24] This remarkable circumstance is distinctly stated by Arrian. Diodorus speaks of Neoptolemus as holding high rank in the Macedonian army; apparently through mistake, to which a writer must be more liable in his large and multifarious collection than in Arrian's simple narrative.

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test was sharp. On the Macedonian side Ptolemy, one of the lords of the body-guard, Clearchus, the commanding general of the bowmen, and some other officers of distinction, were killed. The garrison nevertheless being at length overcome, were pursued so closely that the town might have been taken, if, to obviate the promiscuous slaughter and destruction, not to be prevented in storming a populous city, Alexander had not commanded retreat. Among the Halicarnassian people a party was friendly to him, and it seems to have been the strength of that party which impelled Memnon and Orontobates to their quickly following measure: despairing of means to hold the town, they withdrew their troops by night; and, to prevent the enemy's immediate entrance and communication with the party which favored him, they set fire to their own machines and works of timber at the breach. The flames, probably beyond their intention, communicated to the nearest houses, and extended widely. Alexander, informed by some of the townsmen that the garrison was withdrawn, directed that, in taking possession, injury to the remaining peaceful inhabitants should be avoided. Part of the force retiring from the city strengthened the garrison in the castle: the rest passed to the Greek iland of Cos[25], where an administration friendly to Persia prevailed.

[25] Αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἔδαφος κατασκάψας, αὐτῆς τε ταύτης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Καρίας φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπών, κ. τ. ε. The writer of the antient universal history has understood the city destroyed to have been Tralles, in which I think him clearly wrong, tho the passage in Arrian, as applicable to Halicarnassus, is far from satisfactory. Diodorus however affirms distinctly that Alexander destroyed Halicarnassus, and from him it appears that the neighboring iland, which Arrian has described only as the iland, without a name, was that of Cos. Arrian, l. 1. c. 24. Diod. l. 17. c. 27.

SECT. IV.

The castle of Halicarnassus, strong by situation, diligently fortified by art, and well provided, might still sustain a long siege. But, as it could not contain a numerous garrison, and little danger would insue to acquisitions alreddy made from leaving it in the enemy's hands, Alexander proceeded to other objects which more pressingly required attention.

CHAPTER XLVII.

Alexander's Winter Campain in Asia, and Measures of the Persian Armament under Memnon against Greece.

SECTION I.

Financial Difficulties of Alexander: Winter Measures: Lycia subdued. A Plot against Alexander.

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With extensive dominion acquired, and great political influence attending it, the expences incurred, and those which present circumstances and purposes demanded, appear to have exceeded the acquired means. The increase from Phrygia and Lydia probably was considerable; but from the Grecian territories hardly any, and from Caria little. The policy by which Alexander held the voluntary allegiance of the Asiatic Greeks, and obviated the necessity of multiplying garrisons which he could not maintain, made the utmost caution and delicacy in requiring pecuniary aid from them, if not even a total abstinence from the attempt, necessary. But he could not hope to hold his conquests, so rapidly made, without being prepared against powerful efforts of the great empire of Persia to recover them. His army therefore must be not only maintained, but recruited and increased:

and means for its maintenance, which Macedonia could not, and the republican Greek states would not furnish, must be sought in the conquered countries. If then the revenue of these was considerable, it seems yet highly probable that the management of it was both unskilful and improvident. The unexpected early departure of the Persian fleet had indeed afforded opportunity, tho not without hazard, and hardly without inconvenience, for sparing the attendance of the Macedonian. But that powerful fleet, it must be supposed, would return in spring; and what, under the direction of such an officer as Memnon, might insue in the extensive field for naval operations, the Asiatic-Grecian towns, the Ægean ilands, and the maritime republics of Greece itself, must be matter for more serious consideration. SECT. I.

Altogether it appears likely that, to keep what he had acquired, the best policy for Alexander was to proceed to further conquest. His attention then seems to have been judiciously directed to obviate the inconvenience of his naval inferiority, by using immediately, regardless of season, his superiority by land for depriving the enemy, the most extensively that might be, of means for the shelter and refreshment indispensable for antient navies; while, at the same time, he might extend his dominion over provinces, left without adequate means of resistance, whence revenue might be drawn. If then he might so extend it as to make the river Halys his frontier, which is said to have been the object of Agesilaus, but still more, if he could carry conquest to the chain of mountains of Taurus and Caucasus, which separate the lesser, or that called by the Greeks the Lower, or the Hither, from the Upper, or

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the Farther Asia, he might make the defence of the wider easier than that of the narrower conquest.

These being important considerations, it quite suited Alexander's temper to resolve that winter should not be for him, as in the ordinary course of Grecian military service, a season of rest. Unsparing of himself, he seems however to have been strongly disposed to be considerate of others. To his army he would allow, as far as the important services in view would permit, the usual winter indulgencies. In selecting then for leave to go home, he preferred the newly married, of all ranks, who had left wives there. Three general officers, coming under the description, Ptolemy, a lord of the body-guard, son of Seleucus, Cœnus son of Polemocrates, and Meleager son of Neoptolemus, commanded the march. This arrangement was very generally satisfactory and gratifying. At the same time future purposes were promoted by giving every one, of those thus indulged, authority to ingage recruits, in any number, to accompany his return to the army in spring.

Arr. l. 1. c. 25.

Alexander then rewarded together the princess Ada's services, and the reddy loyalty of the Carian people, by committing to her the princely dignity and authority, and confirming to them their antient political constitution. In that constitution, hardly further made known to us, merit is implied by intimations remaining of the satisfaction of the people with their government, and of the general quiet of the country, during ages, while the princes were famed for riches and splendor; creditable all to the benignity of the Persian supremacy, to which all had been subject.

SECT. I.

In arranging command for the military measures in view, Alexander took himself that of greater fatigue and privation, for which youthful vigor might be requisite, the expedition for reducing the seaport towns of the mountainous shore, stretching from Caria eastward. To the veteran Parmenio he committed the quieter business, but of extensive and critical trust, to superintend the communication with Macedonia and Greece, and the affairs of all the acquisitions in Asia. Sparing then his new subjects of Lydia, who had so reddily transferred their allegiance to him, he required of Parmenio to raise, in the countries yet subject to Persia, contributions in money as well as in provisions for the subsistence of his forces. Cavalry in the country through which he proposed himself to lead, would be difficult to maintain, and, comparatively little useful. Selecting therefore only a small body of the fittest for the difficult service, he committed the rest to Parmenio, together with the battering engines, and whatever could be any way spared that might inconveniently impede progress in a mountainous country.

Marching then with his chosen troops, he found that the fame of his successes and his liberality had very advantageously prepared his way. Within Caria, on the border of Lycia, the strong town of Hyparna was yet held for the Persian king. The townsmen, after the example of the rest of the country and of their princess Ada, seem to have been reddy to change their allegiance, but were restrained by a garrison of mercenaries; a term always implying troops trained in the Grecian discipline; and, if not all, yet partly Greeks, and under officers mostly Grecian. Alexander offered these leave for free departure, which was accepted,

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and he became master of the place without a blow. Entering Lycia then, four principal towns of the more mountainous western part, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, and Patara, reddily submitted, and thirty smaller towns presently followed the example. The eastern, called Lower Lycia, a more level country, afforded less natural advantages for defence; yet, midwinter alreddy advancing, the people appear to have reckoned upon time to chuse their measures. Alexander, however, continuing his march, deputies from Phaselis, the principal city of that part, met him, with a present of a golden crown, and solicitation for his friendship; and his favorable acceptance of their submission incouraging, similar addresses followed soon from all the country.

Arr. l. 1. c. 26.

The gratification of this flow of prosperity was here checked by intelligence of matter very unpleasant in itself, yet still attended with very fortunate circumstances. Parmenio, proceeding according to the concerted plan, by Sardis into Phrygia, found no such opposition as to ingage the notice of historians. The satrap Atizyes, neither by an army under his command, nor by any attachment of the Phrygian people to the Persian government, inabled to make any effectual resistance, had nevertheless entertained hopes from other circumstances. The Macedonian prince Amyntas, son of Antiochus, on withdrawing from Ephesus, as formerly related, had proceeded to the Persian court, where he was favorably entertained. Asisines, a Persian of high rank, on a mission from the court to the satrap of Phrygia, was arrested by a Macedonian party; and being examined, it was discovered that Amyntas held communication with his kinsman, Alexander son of Aëropus, called

Ch. 46. s. 3. of this History.

SECT. I.

the Lyncestian, formerly implicated with him in treasonable practices against the reigning king Alexander, but now serving under Parmenio in the important command of the Thessalian horse. Circumstances further indicated that a plot was in agitation for assassinating the king, and, with the Persian monarch's promised assistance, placing the son of Aëropus on the Macedonian throne. Parmenio, with information of what had been discovered, sent Asisines in custody to the Macedonian head-quarters. A council was held for his examination, and his evidence is said by Arrian to have been strong in proof of the Lyncestian's guilt. The unanimous opinion of the council however was declared, that he ought to be immediately removed from his command; and Arrian adds that it was freely observed to the king, by some of the members, that he had been imprudent in intrusting the best and most powerful cavalry of the army to one whose fidelity was so reasonably to be doubted.

Ch. 44. s. 1. of this History.

Throughout Arrian's account of this alleged treason there is observable a character of caution, and solicitude to avoid assertion beyond warrant, widely different from the commonly bold manner of Diodorus, and Plutarch, in relating similar dark transactions; and perhaps not the less reasonably satisfactory for the superstition, in harmony enough with what is ordinary with those writers, blended with it. The only stated evidence of the treason, that would be admitted in our courts, was the confession of Asisines, in a private examination, or what those present at that examination asserted him to have made; but this was corroborated, for antient minds, by recollection of a previous prodigy. Alexander, while ingaged in the siege of Halicar-

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nassus, taking his rest during the midday-heat, a swallow fluttered about his head, twittering with peculiar ernestness; and tho, with his hand, he endevored to drive away the disturbing animal, it would not leave him till he was completely awakened. This was thought so far out of the common course of nature that the soothsayer, Aristander of Telmissus was consulted upon it: and he declared it to be a divine admonition, importing that treason against the king was preparing by some person in habits of friendship with him. Suspicion is said to have been then entertained of the son of Aëropus; but Alexander would give no credit to it on such ground, and the matter passed. It is then not undeserving of observation that a man of Arrian's rank, education, and practice in affairs, civil and military, in the inlightened age of Adrian and the Antonines, speaks of that portent, and the seer's interpretation, as if he concurred with those with whom, he says, it had much weight at the time, and was reckoned to afford important confirmation to the deposition of Asisines.

The Macedonian constitution, we have seen, allowed judgement, in capital cases, at home only to a popular tribunal, and, on military service, to the army at large; and it seems evident that the testimony against the son of Aëropus was not such that it could be prudent to bring him before such tribunals. But what security the Macedonian law gave against arbitrary imprisonment we have no information. In every regular government, even the most jealous of liberty, it has been found necessary, for public safety, to allow somewhere, and under some restrictions, the power of imprisonment at discretion; and, if in no government of antiquity, made known to us, this power has been under good

SECT. I.

regulation, we must not condemn the Macedonian if it did not provide security for the subject equal to what is peculiar to our own. That the appointment of the son of Aëropus to the command of the Thessalian cavalry had excited extensive disgust in the army is positively said by Arrian; who also shows that he was upon no good terms with Parmenio, under whose command he had been placed. It seems likely that he had conducted himself haughtily to the officers generally; among whom a large party evidently was adverse to him. But the body under his particular command was supposed attached to him; and this, according to Arrian, occasioned the course taken with him, which is, in more than one view, remarkable. A confidential officer, Amphoterus, brother of a favorite general, Craterus, was sent in the disguise of an Asiatic dress, bearing no written orders, it being deemed unsafe, says the historian, to send anything in writing on the subject, but, by oral communication only, authorizing Parmenio to arrest the son of Aëropus. This was quietly executed, and so the matter, for the time, rested; and, whether or no the purpose of treason was proved, or any reasonable presumption of it established, it appears evident that the appointment of the accused to the highly confidential command which he had held, had been made in a youthful spirit of generosity, with too little consideration of circumstances; and that his removal from it was, in no small degree, necessary to the satisfaction of many principal officers, and the general quiet of the service.

This anxious business being so far settled, Alexander proceeded in the execution of his plan for depriving the enemy of means for maintaining a fleet in any part of the coast where it could be

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formidable. In advancing eastward, a chain of mountains was to be passed, the boundary of Lycia; the first important town beyond them was Perga, in Pamphylia. The way over the highlands was very rugged and inconvenient. A better road, but much more circuitous, by the shore, where the mountain meets the sea, was dangerous; and sometimes, when a southerly wind blew, impracticable. The wind at the time was southerly; yet Alexander, after all inquiry made, sending the lighter troops, under guides, over the mountains, would himself lead the heavy-armed the reddier tho hazardous way. Against the sea was a lofty cliff called the Ladder, and it happened that, before he arrived there, the wind shifted to the north, so that the waves, being driven from the shore, he passed safely, none wading above the middle. This incident is said by Arrian to have been noticed at the time by Alexander himself, as importing divine favor to his enterprize; an observation, perhaps, more of policy than of presumption. But among his fervent partizans in Greece, as Plutarch informs us, the story was made quite miraculous; whence their adversaries, with incitement, had opportunity to turn it to ridicule. The celebrated Menander in one of his comedies introduced the exclamation, 'What an Alexandrian story! If he 'wants to pass the sea he has only to command, 'Let there be a dry road for me.' The biographer however adds, that a letter of Alexander's was in his time extant, describing the passage of the Ladder, and felicitating himself on his good fortune there, but not at all imputing it to anything beyond the common course of nature. This information, not contradicting Arrian's report, is valuable, both as testimony to Alexander's character, and as showing

Arr. l. 1. c. 27.

Plut. Alex. p. 673, 674.

what circumspection is requisite in estimating both the truth of the wonderful, and the justness of the satirical, among the works of the antients. But whatever Alexander's faith may have been, or whatever his words, the circumstances of the passage of the Ladder, as they are concurrently related, would be likely to diffuse, or establish, among his troops, the belief or the hope that, wherever he led they would be successful. SECT. I.

SECTION II.

Character of the Country and People of the Interior of Lesser Asia. Pamphylia subdued. Progress of Alexander in Phrygia. Circumstances threatening to Alexander. Pisidia subdued.

THE ridge of Taurus, the longest and loftiest range of mountains of the old world, divides the peninsula of the Lesser Asia into two unequal parts. From the promontory of Mycale, against the Ægian sea, it stretches eastward to the border of Syria; then shooting branches, southward to the Mediterranean, northward to the Euxine, it forms a complete barrier for the peninsula against the Greater Asia. The main body of the mountains proceeds north-eastward, beyond the Caspian, dividing Mesopotamia from Armenia and adjoining countries. From the long but narrow country which it leaves against the Mediterranean, comprizing Lycia, Pamphylia and Cilicia, its lofty and rugged range makes communication with Phrygia, and other parts northward, everywhere difficult. SECT. II. Arr. l. 5. c. 5.

The character of the people of the western coast of this great peninsula, occupied, in Homer's account, by communities at least as civilized as any

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then in Europe, and afterward extensively colonized from Greece, has alreddy been much under our observation: among them arose some of the principal fathers of philosophy and the fine arts. The widely different character of some of the people of the interior has occurred also for notice, after the information of Xenophon, who traversed it with the army under the younger Cyrus, between sixty and seventy years before Alexander. This character, it appears, was maintained in the age of the historian Diodorus and the geographer Strabo, three hundred years after Alexander; an age among those most affording opportunity for wide information of the state of nations; when peace was established for the world, in singular extent, by Augustus Cæsar. The same character is imputed to the same people by Arrian, who was born and mostly lived in that great peninsula, about a century and a half later, while the Roman empire still retained its highest power; and according to all accounts of modern travellers, the same character remains in the same fine country under the Turkish empire, little altered to this day. The people who held the extensive plainer regions, the Lydians, Phrygians, and Carians, are described by antient writers as peaceful and orderly. But those of the highlands, like the Scottish formerly, living in arms, were in a state of ceaseless war; among oneanother, for wrath; against their fellow-subjects of the plains for plunder; the superintending government sometimes interfering to check, but never so as to suppress, the lawless course.

Strab. l. 12. p. 822. ed. Ox.

The Isaurians, between Phrygia and Pamphylia, to the geographer's age, were all robbers; and so expert in arms, and holding such fastnesses, that it was matter of triumph and the assumption of

a new title, for a Roman consul, at the time of the greatest power of the Roman commonwealth, to subdue them. The Pisidians, westward of Isauria, were of similar character. These, and apparently all the highlanders, were, like the Scottish highlanders, divided into clans under their several chiefs[2]. Indeed in such a country, so constituted, small proprietors could not exist: all of necessity herded under leaders. The many thus were in a great degree dependent on their chiefs, who were also in no small degree dependent on them. Strabo, living in an age when republican sovereinty had been everywhere abolished, yet the memory of that form of government, so flattering in theory, so universally failing in practice, was recent, expresses wonder at the Cappadocians, who declined what the Romans, generosity being the pretence, but policy the real motive, offered them with the name of freedom; meaning a republican constitution, but subject to the control of the Roman senate and people: they could not, they said, govern themselves; neither their habits nor their circumstances would inable them to maintain civil order through their extensive country, without a chief to superintend all, and repress lawless contest among equals. The geographer describes a remarkable chief who, a little before his own age, ruled Cappadocia. Whether a Greek, or only bearing a Grecian name, by valor and talent, with an unscrupulous policy, Amyntas had accumulated lordships as his private property, to the extent of no inconsiderable kingdom. In Lycaonia he held a wide territory. The

SECT. II.

Strab. l. 12. p. 783. ed. Ox.

[2] Τῶν δ' οὖν ὀρεινῶν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, Πεισιδῶν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατὰ τυραννίδας μεμερισμένοι, καθάπερ οἱ Κίλικες, ληστρικῶς ἤσκηνται. Strab. l. 12. p. 825. ed. Ox.

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country, in Arrian's account, resembled Salisbury plain, and those similar parts of England, little seen elsewhere in Europe, which, in modern phrase, are distinguished by the name of Downs; a term formerly applied, to highlands generally, but now limited to lands rising, mostly without abruptness, above the country around; woodless, waterless, or with springs only at extraordinary depth, but affording excellent pasture for sheep. Amyntas, able to protect his property, had three hundred flocks maintained for him on the Lycaonian downs. By services to the celebrated Mark Antony, then commanding the Roman armies in Asia, he acquired such favor as to be raised by him to the kingdom of Cappadocia. But, insatiable in rapacity, he was at length cut off through treachery in his own household. A century and half after, under the emperor Trajan, a chief of robbers, in the country north of Lycaonia, was of such eminence as to ingage the notice of the historian Arrian, with the view to exemplify, for his cotemporaries, the state of the country in Alexander's time: when, throughout Cilicia, civil society was of the antient turbulent character; and even the Pamphylians, tho holding a very productive soil, falling most advantageously in varied form, southward from the mountains of Taurus to the Mediterranean sea, had a strong propensity to the predatory life, and would not (they are Strabo's words) let their neighbors live in quiet[s].

For people tolerated in such a course, during many ages, by the weakness or remissness of a government whose supremacy they acknowleged, the boons of independency and immunity, by which Alexander had won the civilized and peacefully

[s] Οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁμόρους ἐῶσι καθ' ἡσυχίαν ζῆν. Strab. l. 12. p. 824. ed. Ox.

inclined, would have no allurement, if accompanied with the requisition to live in peace with their neighbors. They reckoned the tribute to the great king, their subjection being otherwise little more than nominal, cheap purchase of licence to follow their predatory habits, and preferable to the most perfect immunity and independency, in awe of a neighboring government able and vigilant to repress their excesses.

Through the greater part of Lycia, where Alexander now was, the arts of peace were cultivated, and a better civil order was established; but toward the eastern border, where a bay of the Mediterranean nearly meets the root of Taurus, a predatory clan held the strongly-situated town of Marmara. Alexander's way into Pamphylia, which he proposed to reduce, was along the valley which this town commanded. The body of his army passed unmolested; the baggage and stores, with cattle for the subsistence of all, following, under a guard supposed sufficient, as in a country of friends and allies. But the sight of the cattle, under so slight an escort, was too tempting for the Marmareian youth; whom the elders, more provident of consequences, seem to have been unable to restrain. When the principal military strength was considerably advanced, they issued from their hold, killed some of the escort, who vainly resisted overbearing numbers, and compelled the slaves who attended the cattle, to obey their orders, and become, together with the beasts, their property. Alexander, who before had reckoned the reduction of such a nest of barbarians not a matter for delaying his progress to more important objects, now resolved not to risk the evils which the allowance of impunity for their conduct might produce. Halting his army, he laid

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siege to their rock, with machines the more alarming as they were new to the Marmareians. The elders desired immediately to capitulate; but the younger, perhaps fearing to suffer as authors of the recent outrage, refused concurrence; and, holding council among themselves, agreed in the atrocious resolution to kill all the women, children, and old men, and then, by night, force their own way across the besieger's lines to the neighboring mountains. A general feast preceded this purposed impious sacrifice. The best provision of meat and drink was produced for common use; and when all had taken their fill, the signal for what was to follow was given by setting fire to all the houses. Six hundred of the youth however, had the virtue to refuse concurrence in the decreed massacre of parents, wives, and children; and the historian has not said how far the bloody purpose was executed. The projected sally, however, was in considerable amount successful; many of the Marmareian youth reaching the mountain fastnesses[4].

After this perhaps necessary example, Alexander, proceeding by the shore eastward, was met by deputies from Aspendus, a considerable Grecian colony in Pamphylia, originally from Argos. The business of the mission was to declare the red-

[4] This remarkable business of Marmara, related by Diodorus, is unnoticed by Arrian, whose narrative, always respectable for what it undertakes to warrant, is however far from being so complete as, by meer omission, to invalidate whatever may remain related by others. In many parts indeed it bears the appearance of an unfinished work. Thus, previously to the march for Marmara, we are led to expect notice of matters at Perga, but they remain untold. The narrative of Diodorus here, for the most part, is remarkably consonant with Arrian's, and what he has added concerning the Marmareians is consistent with Arrian's as well as all other testimonies to the general character of the Asiatic highlanders.

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diness of the Aspendians to accede to the terms proposed for the Grecian cities of the west of Lesser Asia, but to request especially that they might not be subjected to the control of a garrison. This Alexander reddily granted; but he required that the horses, formerly furnished by the Aspendians as a portion of their tribute to the crown of Persia, should, now and in future, come to him; and farther, pecuniary need probably pressing, that they should immediately pay a subsidy of fifty talents, about ten thousand pounds sterling. The deputies assented, and took their leave.

Perga, on the river Cestrus, about seven miles from the sea, having, on a mountain summit near it, a temple of Diana, of some celebrity, was the first town in Alexander's way, within Pamphylia. Here measures seem to have been previously arranged to mutual satisfaction, whence nothing occurred for the historian to notice. Sida, the next town, was a colony from Cuma, in Æolis; but the people, having mixed much with those around them, had lost the language of their Grecian forefathers. No resistance from them is mentioned; but, the place, probably being, for its opportunities, important, a garrison was left there.

Strab. l. 17. p. 953. ed. Oxon.

Next was Syllium, a fortress strong by nature, and garrisoned for the king of Persia with regular mercenary troops. On his way thither Alexander met intelligence that the Aspendians had denied admission for those whom he had dispatched to receive the ratification of the convention made with their deputies, and would neither pay the money, according to agreement, nor deliver the horses, but were preparing for defence. Probably report from their deputies of the smallness of his numbers may have incouraged them to this conduct. Reck-

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oning it to require his first animadversion, he passed Syllium, which was too strong to be taken by a sudden assault, and hastened towards Aspendus.

That city, of some consideration for its wealth and population, and consequent power and influence among the Grecian and perhaps other towns of the coast, was however much more important for its situation on the river Eurymedon, one of the very few of the Mediterranean sea offering a secure and ample harbor for shipping. It will be remembered as the scene of the celebrated double victory of the Athenian Cimon, obtained in one day over the Persian forces of sea and land, during the reign of Xerxes. Liberated then from the sovereinty of the Persian king only to fall under the control of the Athenian people, and again compelled to be tributary to Persia, when the contentions of the Greek republics among themselves disabled them from vindicating so distant a dominion, Aspendus had florished under the restored patronage of the Persian government. The original occupancy by colonists from Argos, was of a rock with precipitous sides, one of them washed by the Eurymedon, the summit offering space for a considerable town. A populous suburb had now grown on the lower ground. This, tho fortified enough for defence against neighboring barbarians, being unfit to resist the Grecian art of attack, the Aspendians deserted it on Alexander's approach, and he quartered his army in it. Perhaps his detention by the previous siege of Syllium had been calculated upon by the Aspendians, and his unexpected early arrival had prevented the collection of provisions to inable a place otherwise so strong, to maintain a siege. Probably enough also the ordinary political contest in Grecian

towns existed there; so that the party which had prevailed to carry the profligate vote for breaking the treaty made by the authorized delegates, were unable to maintain their superiority when siege was impending from an army bearing the character of irresistible. Capitulation was presently offered on the former terms; but these, tho to prosecute the siege would have been highly inconvenient, Alexander refused. He required now, together with the horses, as before, double the contribution in money immediately; in future a yearly tribute; subjection to a governor, or, in Arrian's phrase, a satrap, whom he would appoint; submission of a dispute existing with some neighboring people, concerning a territory, to impartial arbitrators; and hostages to insure the performance of these conditions. All was agreed to. No garrison is mentioned to have been left. Not improbably the party which carried the vote for capitulation, apprehensive of suffering from that which had carried the vote for breaking the former treaty, might desire that powerful men of that party should be taken as hostages, and that a Macedonian governor or satrap, whom they would support, should be appointed to command peace within their walls. Thus the necessity for a garrison, which could ill be spared from the army, might be obviated. SECT. II.

Not far eastward of Aspendus begins that portion of Cilicia distinguished by the name of the Rough; consisting almost wholly of a mountainous branch from the range of Taurus, extending to the sea. On the coast are some small seaports: the interior, divided by deep narrow valleys, offering everywhere difficulties for an army, had little to invite and much to forbid. It seems probable therefore that Aspendus was the last considerable object in that direction.

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But it seems further probable that some intelligence had arrived of Memnon's threatening measures, which principally decided Alexander's next proceedings.

The king of Persia, dissatisfied with his admiral who commanded at Miletus, had put a fleet of three hundred triremes under Memnon's orders, and had largely supplied him with money. Clearly master of the sea thus, Memnon was inabled also to raise a landforce of the best kind, Greeks, or men trained in the Grecian discipline. In every republic of Greece moreover was a party reddy to join him. The ill humor shown by Lacedæmon, on the election of such a youth as Alexander to the chief military command of all the Grecian states, far from abating, had been successfully fomented by its king, Agis, who desired himself to succeed to the antient eminence of his predecessors. The party of Demosthenes, not, certainly, with any purpose of promoting the superiority of Lacedæmon, was however always reddy to concur in opposition to the Macedonian interest; and Agis, without great talents to excite jealousy, was a prince of some popular virtues to recommend him, and promote any cause he ingaged in. Under the lead of Agis thus a Lacedæmonian party was gaining strength among the republics of Peloponnesus; and to receive Memnon as an ally, a Greek at the head of a landforce in large proportion reälly, and perhaps all nominally Grecian, did not carry to Grecian minds the offensive character of assisting a forein invasion, in the same manner as if the commander had been a Persian, and the army barbarian. To reconcile the Greeks then more extensively tothe Persian connection, Memnon held out, as the basis for his conduct, the treaty formerly negotiated by Lacedæmon with

Diod. l. 17. c. 29. Arrian, l. 2. c. 1.

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Persia, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas; which, however, on one hand, reälly objectionable, and, on the other, beyond reason and truth reprobated by party-writers, was however in its day, as we have formerly observed, extensively popular. By this treaty it will be remembered, all Grecian cities were to be completely independent; no longer acknowleging, as formerly, the superiority of Lacedæmon, Athens, or any other republic. This, originally aimed against the sovereinty which the Athenian people, through their naval superiority, held over the ilands of the Ægean, and many maritime towns of Lesser Asia and Thrace, was for a time, we have seen, effectual for its purpose; while Lacedæmon, disavowing command, retained an influence, nearly equal to sovereinty, over a large part of Greece itself. Now it was aimed against that authority committed to the king of Macedonia, which had formerly been allowed by the Grecian states to Lacedæmon, Athens and Thebes, as imperial republics; and it was an advantage for Memnon that, by the treaty of Antalcidas, the king of Persia had been the admitted patron of the independency of the Greek republics, when the kings of Macedonia had not yet aspired to such eminence.

Ch. 25. s. 7. of this History.

The recall of the Persian fleet to the Ægean, under such a commander as Memnon, with a disposition thus prevailing, in several republics, to give him a friendly reception, placed Alexander in circumstances highly critical. A hostile fleet, commanding the Ægean, with a detached squadron, stationed in the Hellespont, might both prevent the passage of recruits from Europe to reïnforce his army in Asia, and deny his own return to relieve his allies and subjects, threatened with invasion. Meanwhile Darius was collecting an

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immense Asiatic army, having also a considerable Grecian force in his service, to meet Alexander if he advanced, or follow him if he retreated.

In these circumstances to rejoin without delay the body under Parmenio, and provide, while opportunity was clear, for inabling the absent with leave to return from Europe, with whatsoever recruits they might bring, was of pressing consideration. Gordium, the antient capital of the Hellespontine or Lower Phrygia, Alexander's first conquest from the Persian empire, was the place appointed for the absent with leave and the recruits to proceed to. He resolved without delay to direct his own march thither; but the way had considerable difficulties. The part of Taurus to be crossed was a wide tract of highlands, the country of the Pisidians; all freebooters, and yet not so savage as not to have fortified towns. Telmissus, otherwise written Termessus, was one of the principal. Its people, like some of the Scottish highlanders of old, to the profession of robbery added that of prophecy; for their skill in which they had for centuries maintained a high reputation among nations around. Aristander, Alexander's favorite seer, alreddy noticed as interpreter of the prodigy of the swallow at Halicarnassus, was a Telmissian. For the most convenient road, perhaps almost alone practicable for an army, he must return to Perga, and then proceed by Telmissus. But the Telmissians, jealous of his purpose, and confident in their strength, resolved to deny his army the passage. Their town occupied the summit of a very lofty rock, precipitous on all sides, commanding the rugged way through a narrow glen. When Alexander approached, the heights were occupied by the Telmissians in arms. He halted, and after examin-

ing the circumstances, incamped, and kept all quiet within his lines. Thus he gave rest to his troops, while the Telmissians, like many other barbarians, bold, active, and individually skilful, but irregular and impatient, became tired of their situation on the mountains, unsheltered, in a wintery atmosphere, insomuch that, leaving a guard on each hill, the main body of them withdrew into the town. Upon this Alexander had reckoned. Sending then his light-armed up the hills, to positions whence their missile weapons could reach the guarded posts, these were soon abandoned, and his army, hastening through the narrow, incamped on the plainer ground beyond. SECT. II.

But the Pisidians were not, any more than the Scottish highlanders of old, under due control of one regular government. The several clans, all enemies to all mankind besides, unless where particular circumstances led to particular compacts of friendship, were often most hostile to one-another. Possibly it was because the Telmissians had resolved upon hostility to Alexander, that the Selgians, another Pisidian clan, desired his friendship. A deputation came from them soliciting alliance, and offering their services. Such a mission could not but be welcome: the deputies accordingly were gratified with their reception; a treaty was presently concluded; and the Selgians proved always faithful and valuable allies. They would willingly have joined Alexander in arms against Telmissus; but that place was too strong to be taken without a delay which his circumstances would ill allow, and another object required his immediate attention. Salagassus, a large town, the seat of a clan esteemed, tho all the Pisidians were warriors, the best warriors of

Arrian, l. 1. c. 2.

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the nation, was necessarily to be passed; and, being connected with Telmissus, and hostile to Selgium, the Salagassians were of course hostile to Alexander. The Telmissians were diligent in hostility. Acquainted with byways over the highlands, they reached Salagassus before him, and with its people, took an advantageous position for disputing his passage. From ambuscades judiciously placed then they attacked, nearly at the same time, each flank of his advanced guard of bowmen, and presently overpowered it. But the Agrian targeteers following, with better defensive armor and more regular discipline, stood their ground till the phalanx came to their support. The Pisidians, deficient in armor and order and experience, were led by their courage to close, where they should only have annoyed at a distance: many were killed; and, utterly unable to make an impression, the survivors took to flight. In this they mostly found safety; for the heavy-armed were incapable of following them among the highlands, and their knowlege of the rugged and difficult ground made the pursuit of the light-armed hazardous and little efficacious. But as, in the mountain ways, numbers would hinder each other's escape, some fled by the plainer road to the town. These Alexander followed with his cavalry, and, entering with them, became master of it.

His success thus in action against the Salagassians, the most powerful of the Pisidian clans, together with his previous liberality in negotiation with the Selgians, opened such facility, that he was induced to proceed to the complete reduction of a nation so capable, as well as disposed, to be injurious to all around them. Possibly intelligence from the Ægean and from Greece, relieving former

apprehensions for that quarter, may have assisted toward this determination. The example of the Selgians, however, incouraging, and his terms offered to all being probably liberal, many clans immediately acceded to them; some strong places he besieged, and shortly all yielded.

The fame of the power of his arms, shown in reducing, with his small numbers, this nation of robbers, so long allowed, by the remissness of the mighty government of Persia, to be the annoyance of one of the most productive countries of the world, prepared facility for making his next acquisition, and improved value for it when made. A march of five days brought him to Celænæ, the capital of the Greater Phrygia. The town was little fortified; the inhabitants not soldiers, nor probably solicitous whether they were to pay tribute to a Persian or a Macedonian king; its castle was singularly strong and had a garrison, but only of one thousand Carian, and one hundred Grecian mercenaries. So scanty being the force to which the defence of the capital, and apparently almost the whole of the Greater Phrygia, was committed, discredit seems not imputable to the garrison for what followed. On being summoned they offered to withdraw, if, within a day named, they were not relieved. This was agreed to, and no relief arriving, the place fell of course.

SECTION III.

Measures of the Persian Armament under Memnon: Conquest of Chios: Progress in Lesbos: Death of Memnon: Conquest of Lesbos completed by Memnon's Successors. The Persian Land-force recalled from the Grecian Seas: War prosecuted by the Persian Fleet.

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WHILE Alexander was thus proceeding fortunately and rapidly in conquest far from home, his able adversary Memnon had been providing for him difficulties and dangers at his door. Aware that an able and indefatigable enemy, regardless of seasons, could not be effectually opposed but with equal disregard of season and of rest, he would not await the spring to call the fleet from the ports to which, under its former commander, it had withdrawn. The coast of all the continent bordering on the Ægean sea was in the enemy's hands, with a victorious army to maintain the possession; but the numerous islands were open to a commanding fleet, for attempts of either arms or policy. Memnon sailed to Chios, where matters had been so prepared, by negotiation with those friendly to the Persian connection, that, at the sight only of his fleet, the adverse were appalled, and the whole island yielded without a blow. The Athenian Chares, who had not scrupled, with feigned respect, to wait upon Alexander on his first arrival in Asia, now joined Memnon in promoting, on the Asiatic shores, the cause which Demosthenes was promoting in Europeän Greece. Known through the great commands he had held, and respected by the Persian party as the friend of Demosthenes, he seems to have had interest particularly in Lesbos. Thither Memnon proceeded with his fleet. Three

Arrian, l. 2. c. 1.

Ch. 46. s. 2. of this History. Arr. 2. c. 2.

of the four principal towns presently submitted : to Mitylene, alone resisting, he laid siege. SECT. III.

Alreddy thus he had ports for the refuge of his fleet, and that fleet could in a great degree command supplies. He could therefore hold very promising language to the friendly throughout Greece, as well as formidable threats to the adverse. He declared that, after reducing Mitylene, he would proceed to the Hellespont. His fleet would at once give him complete command of the strait. Neither reïnforcement then should pass from Europe to Alexander in Asia; nor should Alexander return to Europe; but he would himself, with the assistance of his Grecian allies, invade Macedonia, while the king of Persia, the friend of Grecian independency, with overbearing numbers, would annihilate the small force which had hitherto been, so beyond expectation successfully, invading his dominion. In the midst of these great projects, Memnon was seized with sickness in his camp before Mitylene, and he died there. Arr. l. 2. c. 1.

The chief command then, till the king's pleasure might be declared, devolved upon the satrap Autophradates, jointly with Pharnabazus, son of the satrap of Lower Phrygia, Artabazus, and nephew of Memnon. These officers, prosecuting their predecessor's measures, shortly reduced the Mitylenæans to desire to capitulate, and treaty was not denied them. It was then liberally required on their side, and liberally admitted on the other, that the auxiliaries, sent by Alexander to assist them, should withdraw under safe conduct. On the other hand it was required, that the connection of Mitylene with Persia, according to the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, should be renewed; that the monument inscribed with the treaty concluded

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with Alexander should be destroyed; that the exiles of the Persian party should be restored.

Thus far the business left by Memnon seems to have been carried on well. But Arrian's account of the sequel, indicates that his successors in command had not inherited his spirit of honor and liberality, or that which had distinguished Pharnabazus, whom we suppose the grandfather, or Artabazus, the yet living father of one of them. To control the civil government, Diogenes, one of the restored exiles, was appointed to that dignity which the Greek writers designate by the title of tyrant. To insure power with that dignity, they placed a garrison in the city; under the command of a Greek, indeed, but a stranger to Mitylene, Lycomedes of Rhodes. They proceeded to raise a heavy contribution; beginning with arbitrary exactions from the wealthy, and then extending an assessment to all ranks. Those conversant with Grecian history however will be aware that, as the numerous party, which had before held democratical sovereinty, were by the capitulation to retain all civil rights, tho probably under a more tempered constitution, yet the Mitylenæans of the Persian party were likely to be perilously situated without a continuance of Persian protection; whence it is not unlikely to have been at their desire, as necessary for their safety, that a supreme magistrate, whom the other party would style tyrant, was appointed, and a body of those regular troops, distinguished by the term mercenaries, was left in garrison. But how far any of the measures were reälly infractions of the treaty, Arrian's succinct account, apparently not derived from the eminent men his guides for Alexander's actions,

nor from any friend to the Persian party among the Greeks, affords no fair ground to judge. SECT. III.

It is however in all accounts evident, that Memnon's death deranged the purposes of Darius and his council. On the advantageous progress of his measures in Europe, the success of those proposed to be pursued in Asia would much depend. A successor qualified by talents and experience and popularity and trustworthiness, for the business of Memnon's commission, would hardly be found. Had one of either nation the two former qualifications, yet no Persian could have his interest with the Greeks, nor was any Greek so connected with Persia. Memnon's great designs therefore perished with him. An order came from the court for Pharnabazus to conduct the landforce of the armament to Lycia. Arrived on the Lycian coast, he was soon joined by Thymondas, son of Memnon's brother, Mentor. That officer came commissioned to conduct the army, mostly, if not wholly, Grecian, to the Syrian coast, to meet the king coming from Upper Asia; and he brought a commission for Pharnabazus, apparently in conjunction with Autophradates, to command in chief in the same extent as his late uncle, Memnon. Pharnabazus accordingly, delivering the army to Thymondas, hastened to rejoin the fleet. Arrian, l. 2. c. 2.

That fleet still commanded the sea, but the great objects of the armament were ashore. Deprived therefore of a coöperating landforce, nothing great could be undertaken. But the small iland of Tenedos, for its neighborhood to the Asiatic coast and to the Hellespont, was a desirable acquisition. The people were generally disposed to connection with the Grecian confederacy under Alexander; but, knowing the inability of that con-

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federacy to afford them maritime protection, and utterly unequal to effectual resistance with their own strength, they changed their allegiance, on being allowed the same terms which had been granted to the Mityleneians.

The return of the Persian fleet to the Ægean, and the vigorous measures threatened while Memnon lived, had induced Alexander to strain his means for equipping and maintaining a naval force again. His admiral, Hegelochus, was directed to assemble what ships he could in the Hellespont. His viceroy, Antipater, watching, from Macedonia, every movement, had previously collected a squadron, principally from the friendly ports of Eubœa and Peloponnesus, which he had placed under the command of Proteas. Tho no hope could be entertained of raising a fleet competent to meet the Persian in a general action; yet protection might be given to trade, and to threatened parts of the coast, and advantage might be looked for against detached squadrons. When the Persian admirals led the main body of their fleet to Tenedos, they detached ten Phenician ships, under Datames, a Persian, to the Cyclad ilands; apparently to raise supplies by prizes and contributions. Datames was in his station at Siphnus, when Proteas attacked him by surprize, at daybreak, with a superior force. Datames escaped, with only two ships; the other eight were taken, with their crews.

Intelligence of the death of Memnon, and of the withdrawing of the Persian landforce from the Ægean, relieved Alexander from the apprehension of any very formidable invasion of his kingdom, or of the states of his allies; and the movement of the Grecian forces in the Persian service, from all parts, to join the king of Persia, marked for him

the point to which he should principally give his attention. It was now evidently the enemy's purpose to direct his utmost collected strength to the recovery of the dominion lost. Alexander's business therefore would be to provide for the maintenance of his possession of that great peninsula, of which he was alreddy nearly master, and to keep the enemy far from Macedonia and Greece, by the barrier of mountains, on its eastern verge, or to meet him still beyond them. Accordingly allowing himself only ten days at Celænæ, to regulate the affairs of the extensive country of Upper Phrygia, which had been so abandoned to him, he committed the office and dignity of satrap of that province to Antigonus son of Philip. The situation of general of the auxiliary troops, which Antigonus had held, thus became vacant. Alexander seems always scrupulously to have left the separate command of the troops of each Grecian republic to their several officers, but never yet to have trusted a republican general with a more extensive authority. Balacrus son of Amyntas was appointed commander of the auxiliaries in the room of Antigonus. SECT. III.

SECTION IV.

Recruits from Europe: Embassy from Athens: Story of the Gordian Knot: Submission of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. Plutarch's Treatise on Alexander's Fortune.

From Celænæ Alexander proceeded to Gordium, the antient capital of the northern, the Lesser or the Hellespontine Phrygia, or perhaps of the whole SECT. IV.

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country of that name. There he had the good fortune to be joined by the troops allowed to go home for the winter, with their recruits. The scantiness of the reinforcement marks the powerful effect of Memnon's measures, and indicates what the check which he was providing for Alexander, might have been had he lived. Apprehension seems to have pervaded, not governments only but individuals generally, in expectation that, with the great force under Memnon, in a situation to intercept Alexander's return, and with the might of Persia, under a king bred a warrior, advancing against him, he must be overwhelmed. The hope of booty, on former occasions so alluring, had lost its power: A hundred and fifty horse joined from Elis, but not a single recruit from any other republic. Macedonia itself sent no more than about a thousand foot and three hundred horse.

No account remains of political transactions among the republics during the crisis; but, while Alexander was at Gordium, an embassy from Athens joined him, charged with an extraordinary request, which, together with the answer to it, affords interesting indication. Among the Grecian prisoners made at the battle of the Granicus, and now in confinement in Macedonia, many were Athenian citizens. The declared purpose of the embassy was to obtain the free dismissal of these men, who had been taken in the enemy's service, fighting against that confederacy of the Grecian republics, of which Athens was a member. Irregular, and even offensive, as this request appears, yet, in the actual critical state of things, it seems to have been thought advisable to avoid an irritating answer. 'But,' says Arrian, 'it was deemed 'unsafe, war raging, to set all Greeks free from

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'the fear of carrying arms against their country; 'and therefore it was replied to the deputation, 'that, "when matters were satisfactorily settled "with the common enemy of Athens and all "Greece, then would be the fitter time to consider "of favor for those who had been fighting against "their country in his cause[5]." Evidently this mission must have been a measure of the Persian party in Athens, under Demosthenes, which Æschines shows to have remained always powerful; so that, if not holding a decisive lead in the republic, it could yet, for some questions, overbear the party of Phocion. A proposal for obtaining the release of Athenian citizens, prisoners of war, would, in a general view, be popular; and might be so brought forward by an ingenious orator that, however variously objectionable, it might be thought by Phocion's party, with their usual scrupulousness and moderation, proper to decline strong opposition to it.

Æsch. de cor. p.452. 552. ed. Reiske.

[5] One cannot but admire the inconsistency of some antient writers, and many modern, who have related this transaction, and have also related the execution of Phocion at Athens, occurring a few years after, and had before them the evidence in the celebrated speeches of the great contending orators of the day, intitled, On the Crown, that all Greece was more free under Philip and Alexander than under the supremacy of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian republics, and yet have not scrupled to assert that Greece, previously a model of free government, was inslaved by Philip and remained so under Alexander. To which of those writers should be imputed only weak credulity or rash assertion, and to which, wilful and insidious falsehood, their readers, attending to existing evidence, will judge. It is however due to the antients to observe that none of them has gone so far in extravagance as to furnish warrant for what several moderns have been bold enough to assert as on their authority; some of our own country; but, in this matter, always outdone by those of the continent.

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Alexander, while at Gordium, would of course visit the castle, in which was preserved the Gordian knot; then of fame among surrounding people, and, through his notice of it, afterward celebrated over the civilized world. The story, as related with some variations by several antient authors, and with great simplicity by Arrian, is the more a curiosity, as coming from a man of his eminence in his inlightened age.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 3.

At a remote period, that respectable historian says, a Phrygian yeoman, named Gordius, was holding his own plough on his own land, when an eagle perched on the yoke, and remained while he continued his work. Wondering at a matter so apparently preternatural, he deemed it expedient to consult some person among those who had reputation for expounding indications of the divine will. In the neighboring province of Pisidia the people of Telmissus had wide fame for that skill: it was supposed instinctive and hereditary in men and women of particular families. Going thither, as he approached the first village of the Telmissian territory, he saw a girl drawing water at a spring; and making some inquiry, which led to further conversation, he related the phenomenon. It happened that the girl was of a race of seers: she told him to return immediately home, and sacrifice to Jupiter the king. Satisfied so far, he remained anxious about the manner of performing the ceremony, so that it might be certainly acceptable to the deïty; and the result was that he married the girl, and she accompanied him home. Nothing important followed till a son of this match, named Midas, had attained manhood. The Phrygians then, distressed by violent civil dissensions, consulted an oracle for means to allay them. The

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answer was 'that a cart would bring them a king 'to relieve their troubles.' The assembly was alreddy formed to receive official communication of the divine admonition, when Gordius and Midas arrived in their cart to attend it. Presently the notion arose and spred, that one of those in that cart must be the person intended by the oracle. Gordius was then advanced in years. Midas, who alreddy had been extensively remarked for superior powers of both body and mind, was elected king of Phrygia. Tranquillity insued among the people; and the cart, predesigned by heaven to bring a king, the author of so much good, was, with its appendages, dedicated to the god, and placed in the citadel, where it was carefully preserved. The yoke was fastened with a thong, formed of the bark of a cornel-tree so artificially that no eye could discover either end; and rumor was become popular of an oracle, which declared that whoever loosened that thong would be lord of Asia; the name Asia being then, in its most common acceptation, limited to the portion afterward distinguished as Lesser Asia. The extensive credit which this rumor had obtained, and the reported failure of the attempts of many great men, gave an importance to Alexander's visit to the curiosity, on which, as it seems from Arrian's account, he had not previously calculated. While, with many around, he was admiring it, the observation occurred that, his purpose being to be lord of Asia, he should, for the sake of popular opinion, have the credit of loosening the yoke. Accordingly they agreed in asserting, in general terms, that what the oracle required, for a conqueror of Asia, had been accomplished by Alexander. Some writers have reported, apparently for the sake of a pithy saying,

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that he cut the knot with his sword; but Aristobulus, who, as one of his generals, is likely to have been present, and otherwise would have had means for the best information, related that he wrested the pin from the beam, and so, taking off the yoke, said that was enough for him to be lord of Asia. Nevertheless Arrian adds that, among contradictory accounts, he could not satisfy himself what Alexander reälly did on the occasion. This however is obvious; that few if any former visitors could well dare to commit violence on the knot; but Alexander was in circumstances to use it as he pleased. What follows then, in the historian's account, may deserve notice, as marking opinions held by those above the vulgar, both in Alexander's time and his own: Thunder and lightening, on the following night, he says, confirmed the assertion that Alexander had effected what the oracle had declared was to be done only by one who should be lord of Asia. Accordingly, on the morrow, he performed a magnificent thanksgiving sacrifice, in acknowlegement of the favor of the gods, thus promised. Such religious ceremony, whatsoever of faith or devotion may have prompted it, evidently was what policy might recommend.

Information had now reached Alexander that the king of Persia had made great preparations for revindicating his lost dominion, and had alreddy crossed the great desert to take himself the command in chief of his numerous forces; thus showing his disposition to energy, and his purpose of maintaining the military reputation acquired in early youth. For Alexander then, whether with a view to farther conquest, or only to keep what he had made, it was most important to hold the great chain of mountains, the natural defence of Lesser Asia,

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as a barrier, which no enemy should pass. But within that barrier two extensive provinces, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, still acknowleged the Persian dominion. Of the former especially, it behoöved him to be master, for it commanded one side of the pass by which, almost alone, a great army could cross the ridge of Taurus, and have free communication between the Lesser and the Greater Asia. The importance of that pass we have formerly observed, in Xenophon's account of the expedition of the younger Cyrus. From Gordium therefore Alexander hastened eastward to Ancyra. There his measures were to be chosen; whether for moving northward, to reduce Paphlagonia; or, with the hazard of leaving an enemy behind him, hastening through Cappadocia to seize the passes; or, with certain inconvenience, and probable danger, to divide his forces for both purposes.

Cappadocia, apparently from its first conquest by the great Cyrus, had been governed by Persian satraps; but Paphlagonia, like Caria, and as we have observed formerly, Cilicia, had been left to their own hereditary princes, as a kind of feudatories of the Persian empire. The prince of Paphlagonia, when Xenophon, with the Cyreian army, was considering of marching across his country, could command the service, not probably for distant enterprize but for home defence, it was reckoned, of a hundred thousand horse. With such powerful means, and a situation little liable to control from the navy of Persia, and not reddily from its armies, the Paphlagonian princes appear to have maintained greater independency than the Carian. We have formerly seen one of them, in alliance with the king of Lacedæmon, Agèsilaus, making war against the king of Persia's satraps; then taking disgust at his

Ch. 23. s. 5. & ch. 24. s. 5. of this History.

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new connection; and, on his repentance, immediately reädmitted, as an independent prince might be, to his former connection with the Persian crown, in alliance rather than subjection. What were the political circumstances of the country now, and whether fear excited by the renown of Alexander's great and uninterrupted successes, or indignation at the neglect of the Persian government and the conduct of its satraps, together with failure of reddy means to have intelligence of the actual measures of the court, or what other view instigated, we are uninformed; but an embassy from Paphlagonia met Alexander at Ancyra, to solicit his friendship. Arrian describes it as an embassy from the Paphlagonian people, offering their allegiance to Alexander; apparently such as formerly to the Persian king; but requesting immunity from the admission of forein troops into their country. On a basis so relieving to Alexander, in his actual circumstances, a treaty was presently concluded; and the care of the new paramount soverein's interest in Paphlagonia was committed to Callas, his satrap of the Lower Phrygia. The army then traversing Cappadocia, the whole country, as far as Taurus, submitted, and Alexander appointed Sabictas, a Macedonian[6], to the duties and dignity of satrap there. Thus easily was the dominion of two extensive provinces acquired, and the reduction of all the peninsula of Lesser Asia, within the great mountain-barrier, completed.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 4.

The treatise entitled 'On Alexander's Fortune,' attributed to Plutarch, lively and ingenious, tho not without a considerable mixture of absurd argument as well as bold assertion, reälly a panegyric of

[6] Id utique esse Macedonicum evincit vel sola terminatio. ——Annot. Jac. Gron. 15, in Arrian, l. 2.

the virtues and talents of the hero, denying to Fortune any share with them in his successes, may deserve some notice here.

The moral philosopher begins with reproaching his goddess, Fortune, for delaying Alexander's successes in Asia two years, by raising troubles for him in Europe. Possibly a speculator, less bent upon panegyric, and more upon just investigation, might rather reckon the delay, and the employment, of those two years, highly advantageous to Alexander, and steps to his following atchievements, by completing his military and political education; whence he entered upon his Asiatic expedition, not an unexperienced boy, but a youth who had had the advantage of uncommon extent, both of observation and practice, in arduous business, civil and military. Had then that vigor and vigilance of the Persian government, demonstrated, a few years before, in the conquest of Egypt and the defence of Byzantium, continued only so far that its irresistible fleet, instead of being too late at Halicarnassus, had been timely at the Hellespont, how Alexander, with all the advantage, not of his own talents only, but of very superior assistants, raised under his father, could ever have reached the Asiatic shore, with an army equal to any important enterprize, would be difficult for the most ingenious panegyrist to show. Favored as he was by fortune, if fortune we should call it, with an uninterrupted passage; favored afterward by the rejection of Memnon's plan of operations, calculated, in Arrian's opinion evidently, to have been fatal to his expedition; still, when battle was resolved on, had Memnon been allowed to direct the order in the usual way of Grecian tactics,

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placing the Grecian phalanx in the first line, on the river's brink, with complete armor and protended spears, and the Persian cavalry on the higher ground behind, reddy to support the infantry, wherever pressed, and cover its retreat, if compelled to give way; whether Alexander, with, or without the counsel of his able advisers, would even have attempted to force the passage, in Arrian's account may seem to be matter for question. But the passage of the Granicus, with or without contest effected, had Memnon's advice only been so far followed that the satraps, with their overbearing cavalry, had attended Alexander's march, tho destroying nothing, but compelling only the removal of supplies removeable, that he might possibly have reached Sardis, perhaps the retreat of the Cyreians may show to have been possible; but it would have been slowly, with difficulty, and not without loss. Sardis then would not have fallen to him without an effort; and how he could have managed the siege of such a place, and in what time probably have succeeded, it would require much boldness to say. Ephesus then, tho a friendly party was there, could not have been acquired without a second siege: all southward was hostile; and, even as circumstances were, the arrival of the overbearing fleet of Persia ended all coöperation of his fleet with his army. The probability then seems that, in the best event, Alexander must have turned northward, to find winter quarters among those Grecian towns which Parmenio's measures had prepared to receive him; and, instead of all Asia within Taurus conquered in one year, he must have begun his second campain, if at all capable of offensive operation, with measures against the

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strongest cities of the Grecian colonies on the western coast. Alexander's fortune, in this his first campain in Asia, certainly was extraordinary: his reddiness, quicksightedness, judgement and indefatigability to use fortunate contingencies, whether conceiving himself, or deciding upon the advice of older men about him, form his just and extraordinary praise.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

ALEXANDER's Second Campain in ASIA.

SECTION I.

March over Taurus into Cilicia: Alexander's illness at Tarsus. Measures for completing the Conquest and holding possession of Cilicia. Measures of Darius: Composition of his Army: Alliance with Lacedæmon. Hazardous situation of Alexander. Simultaneous Invasion of Syria by Alexander and of Cilicia by Darius: Alexander's hasty Return into Cilicia.

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ALL Asia within Taurus (so the Greeks described the country included between that range of mountains and the Ægean and Euxine seas) now acknowleging Alexander's sovereinty Cilicia, along the coast of the Mediterranean, yet owned fealty to the Persian empire. Hence, tho the reddy accession of Paphlagonia, and, its apparent consequence, the despair of the king of Persia's officers in Cappadocia to offer any effectual resistance, were advantages beyond hope; yet, before Alexander could reach the Gate, as it was called, of Taurus, against Cilicia, a strong body of the enemy's troops had occupied it. Information of this met him at the place where, says Arrian, the younger Cyrus had incamped, previously to crossing the mountains. Immediately he resolved to lead himself a body to dispossess them. With the light troops of his army, and a small select

Ol.111.4. B.C.333.

body of heavy-armed, he marched in the evening, with the view to surprize the Persians at daybreak. But here again his good fortune was conspicuous. He failed, says Arrian, in his purpose of surprize; for the Persian troops, having intelligence of his approach, were so impressed with the ideä that his valor and fortune were irresistible, that they withdrew and left him free passage. The historian's following narrative however shows that there might be other cause than meer panic for their retreat. In some parts of Cilicia revolt was reddy; and, unless the Persian commander could have time to collect provisions, which might inable him to subsist in his post, should the Cilicians blockade him on one side, and the Greeks attack on the other, his situation would be hopeless. On the following day Alexander's whole army without interruption reached the champain Cilicia. There intelligence met him, that the measures of Arsames, the king of Persia's commander-in-chief in Cilicia, before calculated only for resistance, now on the contrary indicated the purpose of hasty retreat; and that the citizens of Tarsus, the capital, were in consequence vehemently fearful that he would first plunder the place. Alexander, allowing himself no rest, hastened with his cavalry and light infantry to prevent this, and succeeded. The Persian forces withdrew, leaving the city uninjured. But the consequence of the exertion, to Alexander, was a violent fever. His general Aristobulus, in his narrative, ascribed this to simple fatigue; possibly reckoning it unimportant to add, what others have related, perhaps not without some foundation. Arriving, they say, greatly heated, and admiring the clearness of the river Cydnus, which flows through the town, he was

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informed it was celebrated for its coolness in the summer heats, coming, in rapid course, from snow-topt mountains; and the extreme fervor of a Cilician summer, in the lowlands near the coast, would be the more felt through the quick change, in his hasty march, from the frozen air of the highlands. Thoughtless of consequences, as the fancy of the moment impelled, he stripped; and, plunging in, amused himself sometime with swimming. Very soon he was seized with violent ilness, insomuch that his life was despaired of by all but his favorite physician, Philip, an Acarnanian. In this crisis a letter came from Parmenio, advising him to beware of Philip, who, it was reported, had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Philip was handing him a draught when the note was brought, which Alexander, after reading, delivered to the physician; and, observing his countenance undisturbed by it, confidently drank the potion. Philip calmly assured him that he was justly without alarm on account of what the note indicated, or on any other account; he would be shortly well: and the physician's knowlege was proved, as well as his honesty, by the king's rapid recovery.

Cilicia was a country, from various circumstances, of great importance to the contending powers: it was narrow, but, with a great length of seacoast, abounding with harbors; the soil, in large part, was highly fruitful; the inland boundary was of mountains hardly practicable for an army; the situation was critical against Syria by land, and between Greece and Phenicia by sea; and it afforded the best and almost only passes, easily practicable for an army, between the Greater and the Lesser Asia. For Alexander it was most im-

portant to secure the possession of this country, whether his purpose were further conquest, or meerly the maintenance of that alreddy made. Cilicia was divided by nature into the Plain or Champain, eastward, and the mountainous, called the Rugged Cilicia, westward. The Plain Cilicia had usually acknowleged the dominion of a prince, as we have formerly seen in the time of the younger Cyrus, bearing the title of king of Cilicia, but owning fealty to the king of Persia, or, in his Grecian title, the Great King. The Rugged Cilicia was divided among clans, under chiefs asserting independency, and warring with all their neighbors; as in the other mountainous parts of Lesser Asia. Along all the coast, at intervals, Grecian settlements had been established; a circumstance affording great advantage for Alexander: for among them, unless where, through the divisions of the Greeks among themselves, some strong political interest or prejudice interfered, the people would receive him and his army as fellow-countrymen. But, as in Greece itself, so in all its colonies, opposition of political interest and prejudice was apt to arise and be violent. The Cilician colonies moreover, habituated to the Persian supremacy, had florished under it. Intelligence therefore of the king of Persia's great preparations, and near approach with a numberless army, to vindicate that supremacy, could not be without effect: for those in maritime situations, and for all who depended on commerce, the clear superiority of the Persian marine offered matter of most serious consideration; and, moreover, the people of the Rugged Cilicia, like the highlanders of the rest of Asia, would be adverse to any change that might bring restraint

Ch. 23. s. 2. of this History.

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upon their inveterate habit of living upon their neighbors' goods.

With these circumstances before him, the first object for Alexander was to secure the pass into Syria; whether to prevent the enemy from entering, or to have means for carrying war without. Parmenio therefore was sent thither, with the greater part of the heavy-armed foot. Alexander, as soon as his state of health would permit, chose for himself, as he was wont, the more active service; proceeding to complete the reduction of the large portion of Cilicia westward of Tarsus; where, even of the plain country and among the Grecian colonies, much remained to be brought to regular obedience.

For this expedition he took only a small chosen body of the phalanx, but all his light troops. In the first day's march he reached Anchialus, a town said to have been founded by the king of Assyria, Sardanapalus. The fortifications, in their magnitude and extent, still in Arrian's time, bore the character of greatness, which the Assyrians appear singularly to have affected in works of the kind. A monument representing Sardanapalus was found there, warranted by an inscription in Assyrian characters, of course in the old Assyrian language, which the Greeks, whether well or ill, interpreted thus: 'Sardanapalus son of Anacyndaraxes in one 'day founded Anchialus and Tarsus. Eat, drink, 'play: all other human joys are not worth a fillip.' Supposing this version nearly exact, for Arrian says it was not quite so, whether the purpose has not been to invite to civil order a people disposed to turbulence, rather than to recommend immoderate luxury, may perhaps reasonably be questioned. What indeed could be the object of a king of Assy-

ria in founding such towns in a country so distant from his capital, and so divided from it by an immense extent of sandy deserts and lofty mountains, and, still more, how the inhabitants could be at once in circumstances to abandon themselves to the intemperate joys which their prince has been supposed to have recommended, is not obvious. But it may deserve observation that, in that line of coast, the southern of Lesser Asia, ruins of cities, evidently of an age after Alexander, yet barely named in history, at this day astonish the adventurous traveller by their magnificence and elegance, amid the desolation, which, under a singularly barbarian government, has for so many centuries been daily spredding in the finest countries of the globe. Whether more from soil and climate, or from opportunities for commerce, extraordinary means must have been found for communities to florish there; whence it may seem that the measures of Sardanapalus were directed by juster views than have been commonly ascribed to him. But that monarch having been the last of a dynasty, ended by a revolution, obloquy on his memory would follow of course from the policy of his successors and their partizans[1].

Alexander, proceeding from Anchialus still westward, came to Soli, whose leading inhabitants had manifested a disposition to the Persian cause. Requiring of them therefore a contribution of two hundred talents, about forty thousand pounds, he placed a garrison there. Thence, with a force adapted to the service, he went on to the highlands of the Rugged Cilicia; and in seven days, some by

[1] The inconsistency of traditions concerning Sardanapalus is striking in Diodorus's account of him.

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force, some by treaty, he brought all to acknowlege his sovereinty. Returning then to Soli, the grateful intelligence met him, that his generals Ptolemy and Asander, whom he had left to oppose the Persian force remaining in Caria, had been completely successful: that Orontobates, the Persian commander-in-chief there, had been defeated in battle, with considerable loss: that the castle of Halicarnassus presently after surrendered to his forces; and that the towns of Myndus, Caunus, Thera, Callipolis and Triopium, together with the iland of Cos, had then desired the conqueror's acceptance of their allegiance.

Alexander seems to have profited from all circumstances, as a diligent, able, and liberal politician. To circulate, in these distant parts, on the verge of the Greater Asia, the news of the successes of his generals on the shores of the Grecian seas, for incouragement to the friendly and intimidation to the adverse, he celebrated, at Soli, what seems to have been a repetition nearly of the Macedonian Olympic festival. Difference appears only in the principal object of religious ceremony. Æsculapius being the favorite deïty, worshipped as protector of the place, to him the magnificent sacrifice was dedicated, the whole army joining in the procession. Athletic exercises and theätrical exhibitions, as in the Macedonian Olympic, followed. These ended, his policy was directed to attach the Solian multitude to his interest. Attributing the adverse measures of their government, and the demonstrated attachment to Persia, to the influence of their principal men, he granted them a democratical constitution. Thus apparently he provided that, without a garrison, which he could ill spare from his army, the place should be held in his allegiance. He

proceeded then to Magarsus, where he offered a magnificent sacrifice to Minerva, and the historian mentions no other transaction. This, however, was probably not without a political purpose and corresponding effect: a pleasant remembrance of a plentiful and joyous feast would remain among the people. Mallus, a colony from Argos, the next city in his course, required other attention. Civil dissension was violent there. His claim then, for himself and all Macedonians, to be of Argian origin, afforded advantageous opportunity for offering to mediate between the parties. Accordingly he succeeded in composing their differences, and then earned the gratitude of all, by granting to the Mallian state immunity from the tribute assessed on it by the Persian government. Religious ceremony in honor of Amphilochus, a favorite hero of the Mallians, his army attending, as a flattering compliment, assisted to fix their attachment.

While Alexander thus ably took measures for cementing his acquired sovereinty of Lesser Asia with his old dominion, the king of Persia, Darius, had been also diligent in measures for recovering what he had lost; and his means were powerful. The incouragement for Greeks of eminence, driven from their country, or dissatisfied with it, to seek refuge in the Persian empire, we have formerly had occasion to observe. Several from the republics, and some from Macedonia, were at this time attending the Persian court. The value then of troops trained in the Grecian discipline, and the urgent need of them, if only for opposing the Greeks of the numerous settlements on the extensive seacoast of the Persian empire, had now been so long and so variously experienced, that Grecian mercenaries were become as regular a part of the

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military establishment of that empire as, in the service of France formerly, the Swiss and Irish regiments, and in that of Holland the Scottish: no satrap of the provinces bordering on the Mediterranean seems to have been latterly without them. When, after Memnon's death, the Grecian troops of his armament were ordered to Asia, other Grecian troops in the Persian service seem to have been called, from all parts, to strengthen the army under the king's immediate command. Our copies of Diodorus make their collected numbers a hundred thousand. Arrian reports them thirty thousand; which seems not beyond probability. He mentions also what indicates further the sense entertained, by the Persian government, of the expediency of improving the composition of their Asiatic force, by arming and training a portion of it, in the Grecian manner, for close fight[2]. A body of sixty thousand was so trained: he calls them Cardacs; possibly because the Cardacs, or Cardoos, whom Xenophon describes as among the most warlike of the northern people of the Persian empire, were numerous among them. Trained in the Grecian discipline, they had their station in the line with the Greeks in the Persian service. Of the rest of the infantry, some would be middle-armed, but the greater part light-armed, and formidable only in desultory action. But the

Arrian, l. 2. c. 8. p. 73.

[2] Ὁπλῖται δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οὗτοι. Arrian, l. 2. c. 8. p. 73. This phrase completely indicates that those spoken of were armed and trained for close fight, in the Grecian manner, or nearly so. The name, and some circumstances of character, combine to mark the Cardacs of Arrian for the same people with the Cardoos or Cardooks, described by Xenophon; who indeed mentions nothing of their having either arms or discipline for close fight, yet possibly they might be chosen as the readiest among the Asiatics to adopt the novelty. Xen. Anab. l. 3. c. 5. & ch. 23. s. 4. of this Hist.

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cavalry, as usual in Persian armies, formed the principal strength of that under Darius. Arrian has not undertaken to state the number; which however of course would be great, and their kind the best that the empire could furnish. Uncertain of the amount of cavalry, the amount of infantry would be less to be ascertained. In the time of Xerxes, we have seen the method of numbering the infantry of a Persian army, as described by Herodotus, grossly defective. Possibly there may have been improvement since, tho through all ages, changes of custom have been little common in Asia. But when it is considered that the most exact and informed historians, Thucydides and Xenophon, rarely answer for the amount of light-armed, even of the small numbers of a Grecian army, it may be imagined how far credit should be given, even to Persian calculations, if any remained, of Persian multitudes, tho it may reasonably be believed they were very great. Arrian himself therefore must be understood as stating only loose report, when he says that the whole number of fighting men, assembled under Darius, was six hundred thousand.

But if only his Grecian troops were thirty thousand, they were a body such as no Persian king before him had ever commanded. Less than thirteen thousand had formed the main strength of the younger Cyrus's army. Ochus had perhaps a greater number in Egypt. The force however under Darius, tho his army may have been formerly outnumbered, seems to have exceeded, in effectual strength, any of which antient history speaks.

But, according to the general custom of the East, multitudes attended the march of Darius who would not add to his army's strength. His

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wife, his children, his mother, were inmates of his camp; and oriental custom seems to have required licence for such indulgence to every officer, and even to every soldier; so that, with the train of the great for ostentation, and of the inferior for gratification, added to the necessary followers of a camp, the unarmed of a Persian army very greatly exceeded in number the fighting men. The inconvenience and even weakness unavoidably resulting are obvious.

Grecian troops to oppose to Grecian troops were however not the only advantage that Darius derived from Greece. He had opportunity of profit also from Grecian counsellors. In former times we have seen the generous policy of the Persian court, not only affording protection to eminent men driven from the Grecian republics, but raising them to high consideration in the Persian empire, and perpetuating the advantage for their families. Nor was the beneficial patronage limited to those eminent enough to be recorded by name in history, as the Spartan king, Demaratus, the illustrious Athenians, Themistocles and Conon, the Eubœan Gongylus, and others. From the time of the first Darius, a Greek physician seems to have been of the regular establishment of the Persian court. Since Memnon's death we have observed a son of Mentor, his brother, high in military command. Of other Greeks, received with distinction, those remaining described were Amyntas son of Antiochus, and Alexander son of Aëropus, of the royal family of Macedonia; Aristomedes, a Thessalian of Pheræ; Bianor, an Acarnanian; and, more esteemed, or, through his talents and activity and the estimation of his employers, more prominent than any, an Athenian, Charidemus; whom con-

Ch. 7. s. 3. c. 11. s. 4. c. 24. s. 1. c. 28. s. 9. of this History.

curring indications mark for that friend of Demosthenes, who sent from the Macedonian court the early information of Philip's death, of which we have observed the great orator making an extraordinary use. A friend of Demosthenes, according to all accounts, would be likely to be well received at the Persian court; and, talents seconding an advantageous introduction, Charidemus is said to have been admitted, not only to much communication with the Persian ministers, but even to council with the king[3].

SECT. I.

Ch. 42. s. 7. of this History.

Diod. l. 17. c. 30. Plut. v. Alex.

The advantage of a party within Greece, recently most threatening to Alexander, had been greatly lessened by Memnon's death[4]. Hopes were checked by the loss of his approved talents, and zeal would be damped by the substitution of a Persian

[3] Diodorus, according to the extant copies of his work, says Charidemus had been in high favor with Philip king of Macedonia, both as a meritorious military officer in his service, and as a confidential cabinet counsellor, if not even prime minister. The discordancy of this with testimonies of Arrian, Plutarch and Dinarchus, has been justly noticed by Wesseling. But we have seen a Charidemus, and probably the same, about twenty-two years before, eminent in command under Iphicrates, and trusted for important business by him. Whether then where Diodorus may have written ΙΦΙΚΡΑΤΕΙ, the transcribers, from some blotted or worn copy, or obsolete form of letters, may have given at a guess, ΦΙΛΙΠΠΩ ΤΩ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙ, or whether the historian's simplicity may have been misled by some ingenious writer of the party of Demosthenes into a notion, utterly repugnant to all indications from other authors, and without support from anything besides related by himself, or what else may be supposed, I must leave to those who may have inclination and leisure for the inquiry. Charidemus was certainly a man so eminent that it were desirable to have fuller and clearer information about him.

Chap. 35. s. 4. of this History.

[4] Diodorus has noticed the relief which Memnon's death afforded to Alexander in strong terms, probably after some writer of Alexander's age: Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ—πυνθανόμενος τὸν Μέμνονα—μέλλοντα στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν—οὐ μετρίως ἠγωνία. Ὡς δ' ἦκόν τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες τὴν τοῦ Μέμνονος τελευτὴν, ἀπελύθη τῆς πολλῆς ἀγωνίας. Diod. l. 17. c. 31.

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instead of a Grecian commander-in-chief. But, among the various springs of Grecian politics, one formerly of great power, but latterly inert, was gaining new energy. The Lacedæmonian constitution, as we have remarked Aristotle observing, was formed for war, and wholly unqualified for peace. As if then, purposely to provide against what a love of ease might lead to, its kings, at home reälly subjects, were, in the command of armies abroad, reälly kings; so that stimulation was especially strong for them to desire perpetual war. Lacedæmon had now a young king of a temper to second and stimulate the characteristical propensity of the constitution, and to be eager for the advantages of a state of war for himself. Many circumstances contributed at this time to favor his purpose. The death of Memnon, greatly darkening the prospect of final success for the anti-Macedonian party throughout Greece, made an opening for Agis, of a kind to allure an ambitious mind. Memnon, while he lived, would, from the great means he commanded, necessarily be looked to as the Grecian head of that party. But a Persian succeeding to the command of the principal force employed in the cause, a king of Lacedæmon might well look to superiority over all others of the Grecian part of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonian people, at the same time, would feel that no ray of the glories of the Granicus was theirs; that victory, and every following success of Alexander, would only inhance any prior aversion to accede to the common confederacy of Greece under his presidency. Alexander then being at the farther end of Lesser Asia; Darius moving against him with an army, the Greeks of which alone were said to be nearly equal in num-

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ber to the whole force under Alexander, and the Persian fleet completely commanding the Grecian sea, such a concurrence of circumstances was powerfully inviting for Lacedæmon to attempt the recovery of her old preëminence in Greece. In several of the Peloponnesian republics, a powerful, in some an overbearing party favored the view. Athens was nearly divided; none there indeed were willing to promote the power of Lacedæmon, but the party adverse to the Macedonian supremacy was so strong, or so daring, that an Athenian agent, whether constitutionally appointed, or accredited only by the party, (for we are assured by Demosthenes that he did not scruple himself to give example of irregularity so adverse to all principle of good government,) attended the Persian court, together with a Lacedæmonian minister, in all its motions.

Arr. l. 2. c. 15.

Such, as nearly as may be gathered, was the state of things, when Agis, whether more stimulated by selfish ambition, or by that narrow patriotism which we have seen the most ordinary Grecian political virtue, or by any nobler view, active however and daring, went with a single trireme on a mission from his government, (for such an office we have formerly observed even his great predecessor Agesilaus undertaking) to the commanders of the Persian fleet, Pharnabazus and Autophradates. What treaty was concluded, or what arrangements were settled, Arrian, who does not commonly venture to relate after deficient authorities, has not said; but events demonstrated a close insuing connection and coöperation between the Persian commanders and the Lacedæmonian government.

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Meanwhile Darius, having led his immense army across the extensive plain of Syria, had taken a station near the town of Sochi, near its western extremity, about two days march from that pass of the mountains, bounding Cilicia eastward, which was called the Syrian Gate; the most practicable for an army of any across those lofty and rugged highlands. There it was to be considered whether to await the bold invader, in expectation that he would venture upon the apparently rash enterprize of issuing from his present barrier of mountains, to contend, in a country adapted to the action of cavalry, with an army whose cavalry alone perhaps outnumbered him, or rather to advance and force his barrier, and pursue measures against him within it. Darius's Grecian counsellors are said to have advised the former course. They did not doubt, they declared, but Alexander would advance, and hazard war in the plains of Syria; and then, a superior cavalry, with unnumbered troops of missile weapons, might destroy his whole army without ever coming to a pitched battle. But the Persian advisers, it is said, differed nearly as in the consultation previous to the battle of the Granicus, and for similar reasons. Desirable indeed it might have been to follow the course recommended by the Greeks, had circumstances been favorable. But long rest could not suit an army of the numbers and composition of that under Darius. To subsist it would be difficult; to maintain confidence and zeal in long inaction, impossible; nor, it was reckoned, could it become the monarch of the Persian empire, at the head of so great an army, to wait for attack, when an invader, with a force so inferior, was in possession of so many of his provinces. Darius, however, whether conceding to

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the Greeks, or using his own judgement, waited some time on his ground.

Alexander was yet at Mallus when information arrived that Darius had crossed Syria and was incamped near Sochi. For him then, hardly less than for his antagonist, the measures most advisable were not of easy decision. In a country fruitful but narrow; inclosed between the sea and ranges of lofty mountains, with few passes reddily practicable for an army; the sea completely at the enemy's command; the people, even those of Grecian origin, variously disposed; principally deriving political principal from party-interests, and that party-spirit which would arise out of antient quarrels among themselves; while, with regard to those who were contending for empire, the Greeks as well as others were mostly reddy to join the stronger. It is with probability said that information of the near approach of Darius, with overbearing numbers, marking both his disposition and ability to vindicate the dignity and integrity of the Persian empire, made extensive and powerful impression in the provinces which had submitted to Alexander, and especially in Cilicia. Altogether perhaps he could as little rest inactive as the Persian king; insomuch that it might be a question for his council, whether the best measure for defending the great dominion acquired were not to seek the enemy beyond it.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 6.

This however Alexander's bold and active temper resolved upon. Sounding the disposition of his army, and finding it to his wish, he proceeded to Issus, passed the strait near Myriandrus, and incamped on the Syrian side. Historians say, even Arrian in some degree concurring, that his purpose was to attack the immense army of Darius, wherever he might find it; and probably enough this may

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have been given out, tho the measures reäally concerted with the able officers about him may never have come to public knowlege. Such however appears to have been the necessity of his circumstances, that, when the Greek refugees at the Persian court undertook to assert that he would seek Darius, they may probably have gone farther, and said, not without reason, he must do so, or evacuate Cilicia, and perhaps retire to the Greek settlements at the farther end of Lesser Asia.

Diod. Plut. Alex. Curt. Justin.

Arr. l. 2.

But Alexander's detention by ilness at Tarsus, and then by the expediency of composing civil differences and insuring regular government in a country situated so critically, disappointed Darius's Grecian advisers, who had expected his earlier advance. The Athenian Charidemus, arrogant and presumptuous, of an intriguing disposition, making himself obnoxious to many, perhaps to Greeks not less than to Persians, with integrity at best doubtful, formerly a spy at the Macedonian court, became suspected at the Persian. Occasion thus being taken, more immediately from insolence, it is said, in urging advice to the king himself, he was arrested, and, in the summary manner of oriental judicature, condemned and executed[5].

[5] This seems what may with most certainty be gathered from Diodorus's tale, who has undertaken to relate minutely what passed in a Persian cabinet council, with the king present; the credit due to which the judicious reader will estimate. Perhaps it may rather reasonably be doubted whether either the manner or the cause of Charidemus's death were known to any from whom Diodorus could derive the report.

It is indeed to be regretted that all information concerning the residence of this eminent person at the Persian court, and his catastrophë, depends upon such writers as Diodorus and Curtius; who, so far from Arrian's scruple to chuse among reports of what the Grecian prince did in public, have not feared to relate, without any reserve, in the manner of romance

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Darius then resolved no longer to check the impatience of his army; and the insuing measures appear, neither in design nor in execution, those of men incapable of forming and conducting great military movements. The Syrian gate, another Thermopylæ, being in the enemy's possession, it was not proposed there to force a passage. Farther inland was a way, called, from the neighboring town of Amanus, the Amanic Gate; difficult, but not impracticable, even for carriages, when hands enough, under able direction, might be commanded to improve it. It was found wholly unguarded, so that the Persian advanced body reached Issus unopposed. There some Macedonian sick and wounded had been left, whom, with wanton barbarity they put to death. Arrian has not scrupled to say this was ordered by Darius; which yet may reasonably be doubted. If Arrian has made himself at all obnoxious to the imputation of partial or hazardous assertion, it is for what relates to the conduct and character of Darius. And here it may be observed, that what orders Alexander gave he might know from the Macedonian generals, his usual guides; but what were those to be properly attributed to Darius would not be equally open to his knowlege or theirs. Among testimonies, from antient writers, favorable to that prince's character, those to his mildness and generosity are large, and, if any concerning a Persian monarch, they seem intitled to credit. The massacre, from all we know of oriental warfare, appears probable enough; not however commanded by any, but resulting

writers, what the Persian prince did and said in his cabinet council, and even what he thought afterward, in his closet or his bed.

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from the ferocity common among disorderly troops, and especially orientals[6].

This movement of the Persian army was so utterly beyond the expectation of Alexander and his officers, that not only the Amanic gate had been considered as not requiring attention, but, even at the principal pass, the Syrian gate, no guard had been left. On the night after he reached Myriandrus, an uncommonly violent storm of wind and rain, checked the usual operation of exploring; and the first information that the Persian army was alreddy within the mountains did not reddily obtain credit. As far as remaining accounts afford means for judging, the principal deficiency in Darius's measures was the failure to have a fleet, which he might so reddily have commanded, to meet him on the coast. Opportunity thus was left open for Alexander, in his actual situation, to observe the Persian army, and gain intelligence by sea, when by land it was prevented. He was not without some attending vessels, of a kind adapted for dispatch; one of which, sent across the bay of Issus, returned soon with information,

Curt. l. 3. c. 8. s. 5. l. 3. c. 8. s. 14, 15.

[6] Curtius, giving a very different character of Darius, who, he says, was 'sanctus et mitis,' also relates the story with some difference. The unfortunate sick and wounded found at Issus, were, according to him, not immediately put to death, but, 'instinctu purpuratorum, barbara feritate sævientium,' their hands were cut off, and, with the stumps seared, they were led round the camp, and then sent to Alexander to report to him what a formidable force they had seen. Curtius seems to have had large materials before him, and perhaps the best; and it is therefore to be regretted that he has cared for nothing but to charm his readers with round periods, and theatrical effect of narrative, and to incense them against the "purpurati" of his own age; which has been the general object of the democratical writers under the Roman empire, in the color they have given to transactions and characters of former ages.

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that a camp, of extent to indicate a very large army, might be distinctly seen, without even approaching the shore.

Arrian's candid narrative shows, against his direct expressions, 'that this raised serious alarm in Alexander's council. It is indeed obvious that, had the enemy, with both the gates occupied, brought his fleet to coöperate with his army, not only the return into Cilicia, but communication with all the recent conquests, and also with the old country, both by land and sea, would have been shut for Alexander; and his army would have remained without an object but escape from the vast extent of the Syrian and Mesopotamian plains; where, harassed by the enemy's cavalry and bowmen, like the Roman army under Crassus, between two and three centuries after, it might have perished ingloriously, without a battle. But, this having been omitted, the measures, which the crisis required, were, with an instant's deliberation, taken. The army was directed immediately to take refreshment of victuals, and then, by short repose, prepare for marching. But a retrogade movement has a tendency to discouragement, which it was important to obviate; and the evidence of energy, even a masterly energy, in the king of Persia's councils, and of surprize upon Alexander and his able advisers, might inhance the effect. In this crisis Alexander summoned all the commanders of the several bodies of his army. Addressing them he said, 'that the step which Darius 'had taken was precisely that which they might 'most desire. The worse advice, and not that 'of the Grecian officers about him, had certainly 'prevailed; or rather some divine impulse had led 'him where neither his powerful cavalry, nor his

Arrian, l. 2. c. 6. & 7.

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'multitude with missile weapons, could act efficaciously, nor even the greatness and splendor of 'his army could be displayed. The deity seemed 'thus to have demonstrated his purpose that victory 'should be theirs, and that the Persian empire 'should pass into their hands[7].' Zeal for his service, and eagerness to contend for the great rewards proposed, being demonstrated by all, he dispatched a body of horse and bowmen forward, to occupy the pass. Following immediately himself with the whole army, he reached the gate about midnight, and found his advanced body in possession of it. No enemy appearing near he allowed rest for the remainder of the night, and at daybreak pursued his way. Fortunately he had time to clear the narrow, and gain ground on which his phalanx might take its regular order, without meeting anything hostile.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 8.

While such cares pressed upon Alexander's youth, with his ambitious projects, enough remains, imperfect as our information of Persian affairs is, to show abounding matters of anxiety for the age of Darius, mature for consideration. From earliest accounts, to the present day, an oriental throne has never been exempt from danger; and what has been transmitted of the circumstances which produced the death of Ochus, and of those following, which led to the elevation of Darius, suffices to indicate that his situation may have been, in distressing amount, precarious. Scarcely otherwise, and not even without something approaching despair, could

[7] Arrian has adopted as his own the sentiments which he puts, on this occasion, into Alexander's mouth, whom the clearest policy would lead to maintain such. But, if Arrian really held them, he must apparently have been led rather by the final event, than by any consideration of the previous circumstances, as he himself has reported them.

that have been of which we are amply assured; that when, on resolving upon the forward movement across the mountains, the great officers, and perhaps all others, were allowed to send their families, for safety, to the interior, Darius took his own family, his wife, his daughters, his mother, and his infant son with him, to share the difficulties and dangers of the adventure resolved upon. Whether this was thought necessary toward maintaining confidence among the troops, and ingaging them to hold by their king, or the unfortunate monarch doubted where to place his family in safety away from himself, though both considerations may have weighed, a third seems difficult to imagine. The younger Cyrus, if Xenophon may be trusted for the assertion, professed his confidence, not in the military power only, but also in the fidelity of his Grecian troops rather than of his Asiatics; and the Greeks in forein service, as far as our accounts go, all indeed from Grecian writers, mostly acted so as to maintain that reputation for trustworthiness on which their trade of war rested. Thus Darius may have reckoned his family safest where his Grecian force was to attend him.

SECT. I.

Ch. 23. s. 2. of this History.

SECTION II.

Numbers of the contending Armies in Cilicia: Battle of Issus.

The report which Arrian has thought worthy of his notice, that Darius's army was six hundred thousand fighting men, may seem to imply that such were the numbers in Cilicia[8]. Plutarch gives six

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[8] Ἐλέγετο γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα ξὺν Δαρείῳ στρατιὰ μάλιστα ἐς ἑξήκοντα μυριάδας μαχίμους εἶναι. Arrian, l. 2. c. 8.

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hundred thousand to the army in Syria, not specifying fighting men; and if he meant to include all the followers of a Persian camp, he may not have exceeded probability. Diodorus confidently says the army in Cilicia was five hundred thousand. But Arrian has not declared his belief that such a multitude of six hundred thousand fighting men, and their necessary followers, was led by Darius the hasty march, by a difficult and little used mountain road, from Syria into Cilicia. Perhaps conjecture of the force, reälly under him there, may best be drawn from that historian's statement of the several numbers of four particular bodies, combining with it his report of the circumstances of the march and of the following battle. The Grecian mercenaries he reckons, as we have seen, thirty thousand; and no account shows it improbable that a Persian king should have had a Grecian force of that, or even a greater amount, in his pay, or that such a force may have attended Darius into Cilicia. The Cardacs he states at sixty thousand. We have formerly had occasion to notice the loose way of reckoning numbers in the Persian service, used by the Persian generals themselves in the time of Xerxes. If Curtius might be trusted for such a fact, the same rude and most inexact method was used by Darius's generals, for ascertaining the force assembled in the Mesopotamian plain. Of the Greeks in the Persian service regular rolls must have been kept, both by themselves and by Persian officers, to ascertain the pay, to be demanded on one hand and issued on the other; and various information concerning them would be circulated in Greece and its colonies, through the occasional communication of individuals in foreign service with their friends at home. But Grecian

Ch. 7. s. 8. of this History.

reports of the numbers of all other troops in the Persian service must have been liable to great uncertainty. Of horse however less than of foot; and Arrian states the horse under Darius at thirty thousand. He states then twenty thousand light-armed infantry employed in one place, while a considerable body of the same arms was employed elsewhere. Those actually enumerated make together a hundred and forty thousand men bearing arms; a very extraordinary force, it will be allowed, to have made the difficult, rapid, and concealed march, in the concurrent accounts of antient writers ascribed to it.

Those writers, stating the numbers of the Persian army, probably, after reports which, however exaggerated, had currency, have all omitted notice of the force of that under Alexander, which seemingly must have been more within their opportunity to know; for, tho nothing exact concerning it may have been made public, yet ground for calculation, of this comparatively small number of their fellowcountrymen, would be more within the means of Grecian writers than of the Persian multitudes. Even among accounts extant, some grounds are apparent, which, tho very defective, may be not wholly undeserving of observation. The force which Alexander led from Europe we have observed to have been stated, by different writers, with a degree of concurrence which vouches for their approach to exactness. The force previously under Parmenio in Asia, is not equally indicated. The numbers killed at the Granicus, and in some other actions, we find also stated, probably under the truth: in several, where some must have fallen, the loss is unnoticed. The dismissal of a few, and their return to Greece, is mentioned; loss by

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sickness not so. For acquisition of force, the account of recruits joining at Gordium, and of mercenaries passing from the Persian service into the Macedonian, may be reasonably correct. But not a word is found of any gained from the Asiatic-Grecian cities. Alexander's desire to increase his numbers is evinced by Arrian's assurance of his unlimited commissions for raising recruits in Europe. The army with which Agesilaus acquired renown in Asia was mostly of Asian Greeks; the cavalry wholly so. That Alexander therefore would fail to profit from opportunities open, to him at least equally as to Agesilaus, cannot be likely; and indeed, in a letter from himself to the Persian king, recorded by Arrian, which will occur for future notice, the service in his army of those who had been subjects of the Persian empire is mentioned. The certainty being thus established that he had some such force, the probability will be strengthened, by what will appear in the sequel, that whether of civic troops, or mercenaries, or rather both, from the Æolian and Ionian and Carian cities, the accession had been very considerable; so that, notwithstanding some garrisons had been left behind, it is probable that the army, which Alexander led into Syria was more numerous than that with which he had crossed the Hellespont.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 14.

It was evidently Darius's object to prevent Alexander's return into Cilicia. Disappointed, by his enemy's rapidity, of opportunity to occupy the Syrian gate, he took ground near it, which was considerably advantageous for his purpose. The river Pinarus, issuing from the mountains between the Syrian gate and the Amanic, first in a westerly course, turns then southward to the Mediterranean sea. The channel near the mountains is between

Arrian, l. 2. c. 10.

high and precipitous cliffs. Toward the sea the banks are lower, and the ground on each side is sufficiently favorable for the action of cavalry. Here, his force sufficing, Darius occupied the whole right bank, from the mountains to the shore, so that neither flank could be reddily turned. To prevent molestation, while making his disposition, he sent his cavalry, in number thirty thousand, with infantry of missile weapons, twenty thousand, across the river. On the margin of the stream he placed his heavy-armed; the Greeks in the center, the Cardacs on each flank; so that the left division of these reached the foot of the mountains: the nearest heights were occupied by a body of light-armed. Where the bank of the stream afforded less advantage for defence, he raised earthworks. All this was completed without molestation. He then recalled his advanced forces, and, with his cavalry, occupied the right bank from the right flank of his infantry to the sea. Thus advantageously posted for contest, having the champain Cilicia in his rear, he had the additional most important advantage of commanding all that fruitful country for subsistence. Thus his situation seemed highly promising, while the enemy's was full of difficulty and danger.

It appears indeed, from Arrian's narrative, notwithstanding some adverse declamation, that necessity required, and alone could justify the attack which Alexander presently resolved to make, unless he could provoke the enemy to attack him. Measures were taken with his usual quickness; and, profiting no doubt from his usual able advisers, with great judgement. One advantage the position of the adverse army afforded him: that army held the exterior of the curve formed by the river; the

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interior was left for him. Thus, along the shorter course, on his side, from the mountains to the sea, he also could extend his line, so that his flanks, equally with the enemy's, were secure. Having then ascertained his adversary's formation, he placed his Macedonian phalanx overagainst the Greeks in the Persian service: his republican Greeks he divided on each flank, to oppose the Cardacs and the cavalry. The command of his left wing, occupying the ground next the sea, where cavalry might act advantageously on either side of the stream, and where the formidable charge of the numerous Persian cavalry might be expected, he committed to Parmenio. The immediate command of the right wing he took himself, with the apparently desperate purpose of attempting to force the strong position of the enemy's left; but still not without hope that the enemy might be imprudent enough to quit that position and attack him.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 10.

For the chance of this he waited some time, in order of battle, on the bank of the stream. But the Persians, aware of their advantage, and of his necessity, without showing any disposition to advance, continued their works for still strengthening their ground. That ground, however, tho naturally strong, was yet not without also a natural disadvantage. There was a kind of bay in the mountain, at whose foot the stream had its course, so that to defend the left bank, their line was necessarily curved inward, with its rear toward those heights which they had occupied with troops of missile weapons. Nevertheless, with the advantage of the ground and the measures taken, reckoning their left secure, they resolved there to await attack, should the enemy venture to make it, while drawing nearly all their cavalry to their right, and confident

in the skill and valor of that force, as well as in the great superiority of its numbers, they would be themselves there the assailants. As at the battle of the Granicus, so still more here, under their soverein's eye, the first nobility of Persia would be eager to distinguish themselves; not without reasonable hope, and even confidence, that they could overbear the enemy's cavalry, and, then proceeding to the flank and rear of his infantry, which would be opposed in front by the Persian-Greek phalanx, so formidably posted, they might annihilate his army.

Alexander, apparently meaning to draw the pressure of action as much as possible toward the mountains, had taken his Thessalian, as well as Macedonian horse, to his right, giving to his left only the republican Greek. This, however, probably, would be a powerful body, strengthened since his arrival in Asia, from the Asiatic cities. But, the assembling of the Persian horse being observed, and its direction indicating the enemy's purpose to attack with his right, Alexander detached the Thessalian horse and some chosen foot to reïnforce Parmenio. No time then was to be lost for his attack resolved upon against their left. Accordingly he detached his middle and light-armed, mostly highlanders, the former, especially, eminent among troops of their kind, to drive the Persians from the heights. This was quickly effected; and they occupying those very heights, the Persian heavy-armed on the river's brink, were open to their missile weapons in flank and rear. The attention of that formidable body being thus drawn to an enemy whose blows they could not return, Alexander seized the moment for leading his phalanx

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of republican Greeks across the stream, and up to the opposite bank, to attack in front.

Arrian describes this part of the Persian line as composed of those Asiatics, whom he calls Cardacs, to the number of thirty thousand, armed and trained for close action in the manner of the Grecian phalanx. It is however unlikely that, in discipline of the soldiers, and, still more, that in skill of the officers, this body was equal to the Greeks, whether of the Macedonian or the Persian army. Alexander, with his phalanx of republican Greeks, quickly put them to flight.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 10.

The Macedonian phalanx seems to have waited this event, as the prescribed signal for proceeding on the hazardous, and otherwise apparently almost hopeless, enterprize upon the strong position of the Persian Greeks; a body mostly trained under the deceased Memnon, and commanded by officers appointed or approved by him. These men, says Arrian, solicitous, tho in a forein service, to show themselves worthy of the antient fame of their nation, as the Macedonians were to maintain their new renown, the contest was very severe. The Macedonians, it appears, tho our accounts come from Macedonians, suffered heavily. One general and a hundred and twenty-five officers of inferior rank, were killed. But Alexander's first bold measure proved the key of victory. On the flight of the enemy's left, the Greeks of the confederacy occupying its ground, he was on the flank of the Persian Greeks. The Macedonians, before severely pressed, thus found relief, of which they made such use, that the Persian Greeks were nearly all put to the sword.

Ibid.

Meanwhile Darius, scrupulous to observe the antient customs of his nation, had taken post, con-

Ibid. c. 8. & 11.

spicuous in his chariot with four horses abreast, in the center of his army, and thus necessarily near his Grecian troops. This impolitic, however well-meant and bold exhibition of himself, marked for the enemy whither their efforts should especially be directed. Attack is said to have been so pressed upon him that his horses, wounded, became ungovernable; and the heaps of dead bodies and arms in their way so impeded and alarmed them, that he might have been carried into the enemy's ranks, but for the gallant exertion of his brother Oxathres, who, at the head of a body of horse, charged the enemy so vigorously as to give opportunity for the reddy and zealous servants of the household to bring up another chariot, into which the king removed[9]. Alexander received a wound, according to one Grecian author, from Darius; but Plutarch observes that Alexander's letter to Antipater, in his time extant, describing the battle, and mentioning the wound, says not from what hand it came; and according to Arrian's account of the order and progress of the battle, the Persian Greeks had been thrown into confusion by the complicated attack upon them, before Alexander could approach Darius. The Cardacs of the right wing, new in the discipline of the heavy-armed, when the Greeks, who were to be their example, were overborne, appear to have made no stand. For Darius himself then, his left having fled from the field, his center being completely overborne, retreat was no longer avoidable.

Diod. l. 17. c. 34.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 12. Plut. v. Alex. p. 669.

[9] For anecdotes of this kind, accounts of battles by Diodorus and Plutarch may sometimes have some value. Indeed Plutarch's life of Alexander, notwithstanding much mixture of romance with history, for his frequent reference to authorities, deserves attention.

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But the cavalry of the Persian right was yet maintaining obstinate contest with the Macedonian left. Had Alexander's success, in his daring, yet well-concerted and well-conducted, enterprize against the Persian left, been less rapid and less complete, there is much appearance, in Arrian's account, that, through the overbearing power of the Persian horse against his left, Parmenio's abilities, and all the valor of the troops he commanded, might have been unavailing: that wing being compelled to retreat, the Persian horse would have gained the rear of his right, and his whole army might have been destroyed. As things were, all the skill of Parmenio, and all the excellence of the Thessalian cavalry, appear to have been necessary to keep the battle balanced. But when the rout of the rest of their army was complete, and the king had retired, then the Persian horse began to retrograde.

Arr. l. 2. c. 11.

No accounts remaining from Persian writers, or from any friend of the Persian cause or name, historical justice will require liberal consideration for all indications in favor of the conduct and character of Darius against the imputation of Grecian writers, but especially against imputation of what they were unlikely to know by any certain or authentic information. Arrian, not noticing the action about the king of Persia's chariot, or the bold and successful exertion of Oxathres (probably unnoticed by the Macedonian generals whose narrative he followed, yet indicated by Diodorus to have had credit among the Greeks) has attributed to Darius an early and cowardly flight. But against this aspersion, his own candid narrative affords strong testimony. He relates that Darius retreated, still conspicuous, in his chariot; and, not till the

Ibid.

SECT. II.

way became impracticable for wheels, took to his horse. This was a matter open to wide observation; and it powerfully shows that his purpose was not concealment, or rapid flight, or anything like desertion of his duty to his army and station. What we have observed farther related, by Diodorus, was of a kind also necessarily open to the observation of many: Darius, in the heat of action, in great personal danger, and in circumstances which might perhaps have justified, in most eyes, his quitting a chariot for a horse, nevertheless would not so condescend, but, when under necessity of abandoning one chariot, mounted another, offering himself still as the conspicuous object of the enemy's efforts. The Persian custom indeed so required, insomuch that on it his hope of success in no small degree depended. Accordingly his disappearing at length from the field was, in Arrian's account, as a signal for the Persian cavalry of his right, hitherto maintaining an equal, or perhaps advantageous contest, to retreat. It seems however clear, that when the left and center of his army were put to flight, retreat would be absolutely necessary for the cavalry of its right, even if victorious; for otherwise, presently inclosed, by the conquering part of the enemy's line, between the mountains and the sea, and there overborne by the force and discipline of the phalanx, it might have been wholly destroyed. But even the Macedonian generals present, from whom Arrian had his information, may have little known what orders passed from Darius to that cavalry, or, having heard, they may have been careless of reporting. This however seems evident, that, when all the rest of his line was defeated, Darius could look to that cavalry alone for protection of his camp; and, if any credit

Diod. l. 17. c. 34.

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may be due to the account given by Diodorus of action about his person, so close that his horses were wounded, and of the gallant exertion of his brother Oxathres with a body of cavalry, which extricated him (which is no way adverse to Arrian's detail of the circumstances of the battle) it may seem most probable that it was in an endevor, with the cavalry, recalled from successful or at worst doubtful action with Alexander's left, to save the camp, that this happened. But all Asiatic history shows that to make an orderly retreat was hardly in ideä with Asiatic armies. Even the able Memnon seems to have been unable to maintain any regularity in retiring from the Granicus. Hence the greater credit is due to Darius for the fact, among the best attested of the battle of Issus, that, amid all the confusion and dangers of the flight, he kept his chariot, offering himself conspicuously as the object equally of assault for the enemy, as of incouragement for his own troops: evidence, equal to almost any in antient history to such a matter, against all the malicious or wanton obloquy of some antient, and more modern, writers, that, with his mind firm, he was attentive to the duties and dignity of his station.

All Asiatic history then further shows that, to the great men about him, his principal counsellors and officers, his particular preservation would be of the utmost importance. On his death great commotion throughout the provinces of the empire could not fail: a revolution, ending their eminence, depriving them of property, and leaving hope of safety for their lives only in flight, would be probable consequences[10]. How far then, in an Asiatic

[10] Thus, on a following occasion, Curtius has well observed, 'Amisso rege nec volebant salvi esse, nec poterant.'—l. 4. c. 15.

army defeated, he could command the course of others, or even his own, no remaining information will warrant us to say, or hardly even to conjecture. But looking to what remains of Persian history, and considering with it the character, to this day, of eastern governments, it may appear probable, that when his exertions to protect his camp failed, his hope of having a place of refuge for his family, if, by any happy turn, they could ever again join him, depended on his outstripping, in flight, even rumor of his defeat. Mounting therefore his horse, he pressed forward through the highlands, and then hastened toward his capital, to meet there the dangers of his circumstances; which, with every best exertion on his part, so all accounts of the Persian empire show, would from his own subjects be highly threatening. SECT. II.

Arrian affords no reason to suppose that the two kings were ever very near oneanother in the action. On the contrary, he says Darius was considerably advanced in retreat, probably toward his own camp, before Alexander, attentive to the circumstances of his left wing, with difficulty maintaining itself against the Persian cavalry, ventured to pursue. When that cavalry retreated, then he took the command of his own cavalry for the purpose. The object for the fugitives was, by the Amanic pass, to reënter Syria; the cavalry holding the more level ground, as far as it would serve, the infantry hastening to the shelter of the mountains. Darius's chariot, which he had quitted, slow among the difficulties of a mountain road, was overtaken, and in it were found his shield, bow, and cloak. Night was approaching; and no probability appearing that he could himself be overtaken, Alexander gave over pursuit. Returning to the Persian camp, and find-

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ing his troops in quiet possession of it, he went to the royal tent; which had been put in complete order for the defeated monarch's lodging. While looking around, he heard the shrieks of women near. On this he sent Leonnatus, one of his principal officers, to inquire the cause; who presently returned with information that the queen of Persia was in a neighboring tent, with her two daughters, her infant son, and the king's mother; that intelligence had been officiously communicated to them of the capture of the king's chariot, with his shield, bow, and cloak, whence they had been led to conclude, or to fear, that the king himself was killed; and thence arose the loud lamentation which had been heard. Alexander sent immediately information that, tho indeed those spoils had been taken, yet Darius had outstripped pursuit, and was probably safe; adding assurance that the princesses need apprehend nothing for themselves; their treatment should be what became their royal rank; and that even toward Darius he had no personal enmity; their contest was for empire only.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 11, 12.

These particulars Arrian has given on the joint authority of Ptolemy and Aristobulus; of whom the former attended Alexander in pursuing Darius. Other writers reported farther, that, on the next day, Alexander visited the princesses, accompanied by his favorite officer Hephæstion. On their entering the apartment together, the king not being pointed out, Sisygambis, the queen mother, in the usual way of adoration to Persian kings, threw herself at Hephæstion's feet. Hephæstion, drawing back, pointed to Alexander, who immediately relieved the aged princess's confusion, by telling her she had made no material mistake, for he to whom she had addressed her devotion was another

Arrian, l. 2. c. 11.

Alexander. 'This,' says Arrian, 'I relate, neither 'as ascertained, nor as unfit to be believed; but 'at any rate I esteem it honorable for Alexander 'that such speeches, and such manners, have been 'reckoned warrantably to be attributed to him, as 'consonant to his character.' SECT. II.

All accounts of the battle of Issus make the slaughter very great, and it is remarkable that in none, of any credit, is there any mention of prisoners[11]. That none were made from the Persian left, first defeated, may be accounted for by the urgency for Alexander immediately to direct his utmost attention to the unbroken part of the Persian line. Combined circumstances make it probable that, to the Persian Greeks, quarter may have been denied. In Alexander's council it may have been reckoned inexpedient to leave opportunity for such applications, in favor of men taken in arms in a forein service, against the troops of the general confederacy of the Grecian republics, as that which, at Gordium, had reached him from Athens. Of anything done by the Persian infantry on the right of the Greeks in the Persian service, no notice is taken by Arrian; whence it may be inferred that their resistance, through imperfection of discipline, was weak, and their flight decided by the overthrow of the troops next them. The Persian Greeks, as Arrian's account shows, were nearly surrounded;

[11] A writer so careless of authority as Justin, may have reckoned his own computation of forty thousand prisoners a proper appendage to his report of a hundred and ten thousand slain; which, however extravagant, is below Plutarch's, and only ten thousand more than that which Arrian has thought worthy of mention. Prisoners, numerous, no doubt there would be; slaves and others attending the camp; but the concurrent failure of Diodorus, Plutarch, and Arrian, to notice prisoners carrying arms, affords strong presumption that few such were made.

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their resistance was considerably destructive to their enemies, especially the Macedonians; but it seems likely that the greater part of themselves fell in the battle. The slain on the Persian side altogether are reckoned by Arrian ten thousand horse and a hundred thousand foot. Such round statements of numbers, in circumstances not to have them ascertained, must be subject to the reader's discretion for reduction within likelihood. The Macedonian generals might probably have known the number of Greeks lost on the Persian side; yet not only the mention of the total number has been avoided, but notice of any eminent person among them has been avoided. The survivors, reckoned by Arrian about eight thousand, seem to have been indebted for means of escape, to the vigorous action of the Persian cavalry against Alexander's left wing[12], which compelled him so to reïnforce it from his right, that the defeated parts of the enemy's line could at first be pursued only with infantry. Thus the surviving Persian Greeks, under the command of Thymondas son of Mentor, with the Macedonian prince Amyntas, and the Thessalian and Acarnanian officers Aristomedes and Bianor, were inabled to maintain some order in retreat over the mountains into Syria[13].

Five Persian officers of the highest rank are said to have been killed; three of them satraps who

[12] Οἱ ἵππεις τῶν Περσῶν—εὐρώστως ἐνέβαλλον εἰς τὰς ἴλας τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, καὶ ταύτῃ συνέσχε ἱππομαχία χρατερά.——Arrian, l. 2. c. 11.

[13] For the interesting character of many circumstances of this great battle, and the importance of its consequences, I have been desirous to give the fullest and clearest account of it that I could find warrant for. Arrian, following no doubt faithfully as well as ably the accounts of the generals ingaged in it, his usual guides, but, in his usual way, abridging much, tho generally luminous, is sometimes otherwise; and indeed, in relating

had been ingaged at the Granicus, and who, tho even Grecian accounts give them the praise of valor for their conduct there, nevertheless, through feeling of the disgrace of defeat, may have been led to be prodigal of their lives on this following occasion. The loss on the Macedonian side was severe. It seems to have been proportionally greatest in Alexander's wing. One general, Ptolemy son of Seleucus, and a hundred and twenty others of some distinction fell[14]. But the victory was most complete. Whatever then might be most grateful to the army, console the friends of the slain, and excite the emulation of the living, was Alexander's care. On the day after the battle, while preparation was making for burying the dead, tho lame with the wound received from a sword in his thigh, he visited and conversed with all the wounded. The funeral obsequies were then performed with the utmost military pomp, and Alexander himself spoke the oration celebrating the merit of the slain. Rewards to the living followed; money to some, offices to others, honors to all. Those noticed are Balacrus son of Nicanor, who was appointed to the satrapy of Cilicia; Menes son of Dionysius, who was made a lord of the body-

SECT. II.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 13.

a great and extensive battle, without an attending plan, some deficiency of clear delineation can hardly fail. Always respecting the matter, I have, in some parts deviated from the order of his narrative.

Curtius reports, b. 14. c. 1. that eight thousand Greeks who had been in the Persian service at the battle of Issus returned to Greece, and were ingaged by Agis king of Lacedæmon to act against Macedonia. Agis could little, if at all, entertain mercenary troops from the Lacedæmonian treasury; but the Persian money, of which Fronsheim, not without warrant, speaks, in his supplement to Curtius (l. 6. c. 1. s. 6.) would give him means. Yet probably the number is exaggerated.

[14] Τῶν οὐκ ἠμελημένων Μακεδόνων.——Arr. l. 2. c. 10.

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guard in his room; Polyperchon son of Simmias, who was raised to the command vacant by the death of Ptolemy son of Seleucus; and the people of Soli, on whom the contribution of fifty talents, ten thousand pounds sterling, had been imposed: this requisition was remitted, perhaps for the merit of their troops in the battle; and their hostages were restored, perhaps in consideration of the effect of the victory, whence their defection to the Persians again was no longer to be apprehended.

SECTION III.

Consequences of the Battle of Issus, in Greece and in Asia: Submission of Syria: Deputation from Darius to Alexander: Ministers from the adverse Party in Greece to the Persian Court taken.

Arrian. l.2.c.13.

PHARNABAZUS and Autophradates were still at Siphnus with the Persian fleet, and the king of Lacedæmon, Agis, was also still there, endevoring to stimulate them to pursue Memnon's purpose of invading Macedonia, and supporting the Persian party among the Grecian republics in taking arms against the Macedonian, when intelligence arrived of the events near Issus. Hopes then instantly fell, and in their stead arose the fear of losing the acquisitions made. The disposition of the Chians being especially apprehended, the Persian commanders went thither, with twelve ships of war and fifteen hundred mercenary soldiers. Ten ships, with a subsidy of thirty talents, about six thousand pounds sterling, they committed to Agis. He sent them to his brother Agesilaus, with orders to proceed imme-

diately to Crete, to prevent adverse movements there. He remained himself among the Cyclad ilands with the same object: but Autophradates, whether in pursuance of orders from his defeated king, or only aware of the uncertainty of the allegiance of all the maritime states of the Persian empire, any longer than force might control them, sailed for the Asiatic coast. The harbor of the destroyed city of Halicarnassus offering convenience for his fleet, which no maritime strength of the enemy could contest, he put in there, and Agis there joined him.

Meanwhile Alexander, relieved from great perils, which had threatened, at the same time, himself and the army with him abroad, and his dominions at home, could now chuse his measures. Perhaps a prince of Philip's mature age and large experience, having made a conquest such as that alreddy atchieved by Alexander, calculating then his probably remaining years, and aware that more would be wanting, with the best talents, to mould such extent of territory and variety of population into one well organized state, and aware also that increase of dominion, beyond a certain extent, does not always bring increase, and still less permanence, of power, might have been disposed to rest on an acquisition possessing such extraordinary advantages for making, with his old dominions, one compact and singularly powerful empire. Not only however such speculation was less inviting for Alexander's years, but opportunities open for securing, by farther successes, the great acquisition made, were such, and the means of safely stopping at a given point, in a career of conquest, so uncertain, that it might be difficult even for prudence to decide that those opportunities should not be used. It would be

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known, and probably observed in council, that Agesilaus had reckoned more, than had yet been done, necessary to reduce the Persian empire to an extent consistent with the safety of surrounding nations; and had accordingly proposed, not indeed to conquer for himself or for Lacedæmon, if Xenophon may be credited for his friend's moderation, but to sever from Persia all her provinces bordering on the Mediterranean sea, and make the great desert her western boundary. Not only then the fact, that all those provinces were not many years ago in revolt, would incourage, but the friendship of some was known to be reddy, and from some even invitation came. If Alexander's ambition thus was roused by his successes, that also of many about him might be so; his army was willing, and he resolved still to prosecute conquest.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 13.

Returning therefore on his steps into Syria, all was found favorable; the country deserted by the Persian officers, the people reddy to obey his commands. Accordingly he appointed Menon son of Cerdimas, with the title of satrap, to the government of that part called by the Greeks Cœlesyria, committing to his orders a competent force of cavalry of his allies, probably the Asiatic Greeks; and he sent a strong body, under Parmenio, to take possession of Damascus, the principal city of all Syria, the depository of the king of Persia's treasure, and the refuge of numbers who had fled before the conqueror. With the rest of his army he proceeded for the Phenician coast.

We have had occasion formerly to observe that Phenicia was divided among republican governments, nearly resembling those of Greece, but perhaps more especially the Grecian states of western Asia; or still rather those of Cyprus;

having each a chief, who assumed the title of king; popular powers everywhere large; but all under the control of a Persian satrap. No satrap now however appears to have remained there. The people, or their princes, or both together, for in all were considerable popular powers, had thus been left to chuse their party. Alexander, on his march, was met by Straton, sent by his father, Gerostratus, king or chief of Aradus, whose dominion extended over the northern part of Phenicia, including the large and wealthy seaports of Marathus and Mariammë. Its title came from the small iland of Aradus, overagainst Marathus, in which, evidently for security, was the chief's principal residence. Probably negotiation had preceded. The Aradian ships were serving with the Persian fleet; but Gerostratus was reddy for a change of sovereinty. What came to general knowlege was, that Gerostratus offered to Alexander that allegiance, for himself and his country, which had before been paid to the king of Persia; in token of which he sent a present of a golden crown, which Straton was allowed to place, in public, on Alexander's head, who then proceeded to Marathus.

Meanwhile Parmenio obtained possession of the city of Damascus, the principal of all Syria, where was found Darius's military chest, with a very large treasure. He had moreover taken four important prisoners; persons commissioned, one from Lacedæmon, one from the anti-Macedonian Athenians, and two from the anti-Macedonian Thebans, to hold communication with the Persian court. These he sent to Alexander.

The unhappy Darius meanwhile had been so far fortunate as to reach his capital in personal safety, and in time to prevent any material commotion.

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Among the enervated people of the rich provinces of the south, political character is hardly discernible in antient history, farther than that they were, beyond others, contented to live under despotism. The Persian sovereinty was generally unpopular among them, but apparently Darius not personally so. Among the people of the extensive northern provinces, a military people, where he had been known, and had held command, before his accession to the throne, loyalty toward him prevailed. Thus, after all his losses, he was still in possession of great means for maintaining contest. Arrian relates, as a report generally received, and to which he gave credit, that, soon after the battle of Issus, a confidential eunuch, a principal attendant of the captive queen of Persia, Statira, found means, possibly with leave, to go to her unfortunate husband. On first sight of him, Darius hastily asked if his wife and children were living. The eunuch assuring him that not only all were well, but all treated with respect as royal personages, equally as before their captivity, the monarch's apprehension changed. The queen was generally said to be the most beautiful woman of the Persian empire. How, in the usual concealment of the persons of women of rank, throughout the eastern nations, hardly less in antient than in modern days, this could be known, unless from report of the eunuchs of the palace, Arrian has not said; but his account rather implies that her face had been seen by some of the Grecian officers. Darius's next question however was said to be 'Was his queen's honor 'tarnished, either through her own weakness, or 'by any violence?' The eunuch, protesting with solemn oaths, that she was as pure as when she parted from Darius, and adding, that Alexander

Arrian, l. 4. c. 20.

was the best and most honorable of men, Darius raised his hands toward heaven and exclaimed, 'O great God! who disposest of the affairs of 'kings among men, preserve to me the empire of 'the Persians and Medes, as thou gavest it: but, 'if it be thy will that I am no longer to be king 'of Asia, let Alexander, in preference to all others, 'succeed to my power!' The historian then adds his own remark, 'So does honorable conduct win 'the regard even of enemies.' SECT. III.

This, which Arrian has judged not unworthy of a place in his military history of Alexander, is obviously not, like numberless stories of private conversations, related by Diodorus and Plutarch, and Curtius and others, what none who were likely to know would be likely to tell; but, on the contrary, what, no way requiring concealment, the eunuch would rather be forward to relate; so that, not improbably, many Greeks, and, among them, some acquainted with his character, and able to estimate his veracity, might have had it from himself. It seems thus altogether not unlikely that the eunuch's report was among stimulations for Darius to send a deputation to Alexander, which reached him at Marathus. The persons deputed bore a letter from the Persian king, representing that, 'between Artaxerxes Ochus and Philip there 'had been friendship and alliance: that, after 'the accession of Arses, Philip, without provoca- 'tion from Persia, had begun hostilities, which 'Alexander, passing into Asia, had prosecuted to 'the very severe injury of the Persians; whence 'Darius was impelled to place himself at the head 'of his army, to protect his subjects, and defend 'his own inherited rights: that God's pleasure Arrian, l. 2. c. 14.

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'had disposed of victory, and it now remained 'for himself to solicit, as a king from a king, the 'release of his wife and family, and to offer to 'treat of peace and friendship; for which purpose 'he proposed that Alexander should send ministers 'to him with sufficient powers.'

Communications of this kind appear to have been always, in regular course, laid by Alexander before his council. What provoked a reply of a character widely different from that of Alexander's conduct toward the Persian princesses, and even contradicting his reported assurance to them that he had no personal enmity toward Darius, antient history has not said. Ground for conjecture seems only furnished by the fact of the capture of the Grecian deputies, from whom, or from whose writings seized, information of matters before unknown may have been gained. The answer to the Persian, in the form of a letter from the Macedonian monarch, is given by Arrian confidently thus.

'Your predecessors, unprovoked, invaded Mace-'donia, and the rest of Greece[13], to the great injury 'of the people. I, elected general of the Greeks, 'have invaded Asia to revenge, not that antient 'aggression only, but also recent wrongs. You 'supported the Perinthians, who had injured my 'father. Your predecessor Ochus sent forces into 'that part of Thrace which is within our dominion. 'In your own public letters, you boasted to all the 'world of being a patron of the conspiracy which 'produced the assassination of my father. You 'yourself, with the eunuch Bagoas, assassinated 'Arses, and seized the empire, in violation of the 'law of Persia, and in wrong of the Persian people.

[13] Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα.——Arr. l. 2. c. 14.

'Moreover you sent your rescripts to the Greeks, SECT. III.
'inciting them to war against me, and offering them
'subsidies to support it: which, the Lacedæmo-
'nians alone accepting, all others rejected. Never-
'theless your emissaries did not cease their intrigues
'for corrupting and alienating my friends and allies,
'and disturbing the peace of Greece, which,
'through my endevors, had been established.
'On these accounts I have made war against
'you, who have been so the aggressor. Having
'then overcome in battle, first your generals and
'satraps, and then yourself; and having so, through
'the favor of the gods, possessed myself of the
'country; all your former subjects and adherents,
'even those who had borne arms against me, if
'they have come to me for protection, have been
'received kindly; and they have served me in
'arms, not by compulsion but with goodwill. I
'therefore, as now lord of all Asia, invite you to
'come to me. If you have any apprehension
'for your safety, send a confidential person to
'receive my pledged faith. When with me, ask
'for your wife and family, and whatever else you
'may desire, and you shall have all: ask freely;
'nothing shall be refused. But whenever here-
'after you would communicate with me, I must be
'addressed as king of Asia, lord of all you possess
'and of all you can desire: otherwise I shall reckon
'myself affrontingly treated. If you propose yet
'to dispute the sovereinty with me, be it so, and
'expect me: I shall seek you wherever you may
'be to be found.'

It must here deserve consideration that we want the reply of the Persian court to the charge of its having been implicated in the assassination of Philip. Possibly it might deny that its words, in the original language, bore the meaning imputed

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by Alexander, or were at all so intended. Yet assassination, warranted even by the philosophy of the democratical Greeks, being also familiar in the practice of the despotic courts of the east, and the democracies and the court of Persia having been in league together against Philip, Alexander's letter cannot but furnish ground for suspicion, at least, against the agents of the Persian court, if the king himself might be clear. The supposition that information, of a kind to irritate Alexander against that court, was given by the captive Grecian deputies, or found in writing among their effects, whether then wholly new, or only confirming what had been discovered among the Persian state writings at Sardis, may appear strengthened by Alexander's conduct toward those deputies; which seems altogether to show the liberality of which his father had given the great example, and the purpose of following still the noble policy of attaching men by benefits rather than by power. They were evidently obnoxious to the charge of rebellion, as much as any whom the Lacedæmonians punished with death as for high-treason, in favoring the Persians in the invasion of Greece under Xerxes. Two were Thebans, Ismenias and Dionysodorus. Alexander freely released both; stating for reasons, his respect for the family of the former, which was of the most illustrious of Thebes, and his consideration of the personal dignity of the other, as a victor in the Olympian games. The Athenian, Iphicrates, being son of the renowned general of that name, the protector of his father's infancy, appears to have needed no other recommendation. The Lacedæmonian, Euthycles, was kept some time in arrest, but in no close confinement, and at length was dismissed like the others.

SECTION IV.

Parties in Phenicia: Submission of Sidon to Alexander: Deputation from Tyre: Siege of Tyre: Second Deputation from Darius: Tyre taken: Siege of Gaza.

SECT. IV.

BETWEEN the small states of Phenicia, as between those of Greece, appear to have been jealousies and antipathies of no small violence. When the Persian empire was extended to the Mediterranean and Ægean, it would soon be found, by the distant court, that naval power was important, and even necessary to it. The Phenicians then, furnishing the principal means for such power, acquired an importance with their sovereins, whence they appear to have been treated with respect beyond other conquered subjects. But, among the Phenicians, the Tyrians had obtained a preference; and hence, in Sidon, the elder town, still holding an apparent superiority as capital of Phenicia, a party adverse to the Persian interest would the more reddily become the prevailing party. A deputation from that city invited Alexander to take their state under his protection as its soverein, and no opposition appears to have shown itself.

From Marathus he proceeded southward. The town of Byblus, on his approach, yielded by capitulation; and, as he still proceeded, a deputation met him from Tyre, with the son of the chief, Azelmic, whom Arrian intitles king, at its head, offering him allegiance. Azelmic himself was at the time serving under the Persian admiral, Autophradates, in command of the Tyrian squadron of the Persian fleet. It appears probable that the

Arr. l. 2. c. 15.

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purpose of the deputation was but to temporize. The Tyrians, favored by the Persian court beyond others, even of the Phenicians, were unlikely to be willing to transfer their allegiance from the Persian monarch, under whom, in maritime affairs, they were chief, to a Grecian, under whom, the Greeks being a rival maritime people, they could hope to be but secondary. Alexander apparently aware of their disposition, returned his thanks for their friendly professions, and desired they might be informed, that it was his intention to visit their city, for the purpose of sacrificing to Hercules; 'not the Grecian hero, his ancestor,' says Arrian, 'but another Hercules, worshiped by the Tyrians 'many ages before him, in a temple the oldest 'known on earth.' The Tyrians replied that, in all besides, they were reddy to obey Alexander's commands; but they desired to decline admitting equally Persians and Macedonians within their walls.

Arr. l. 2. c. 16, 17.

This answer Alexander submitted to a numerous council of war, such as was customary, it appears, in the Macedonian kingdom, as well as in the Grecian republics; together with the generals it consisted of all the taxiarcs and ilarcs (colonels, if modern phrase should be used, of infantry and cavalry) of the republican Greek and other auxiliary troops, as well as of the Macedonian. To this assembly Alexander addressing himself, said, 'To 'me it appears that our proposed expedition against 'Egypt cannot be safely undertaken while the 'Persians remain masters of the sea; nor can it be 'prudent to proceed into the interior of the empire 'against Darius, while the disposition of Tyre re- 'mains doubtful, and Cyprus and Egypt acknowl- 'ege his authority. I attribute the more weight to

'this consideration, on account of the actual state of Greece; where, according to recent intelligence, Lacedæmon has taken part openly with our enemies, and Athens holds to ingagements with us, more through the fears of the adverse than the power of the friendly there. But, with Tyre, all Phenicia being in our power, the Phenician seamen, now forming the largest and best part of the Persian navy, having no longer a motive to fight for others, would probably be induced to join us. Cyprus would be likely to follow the example; or, no hostile naval force preventing, would be reddily subdued. The invasion of Egypt then would be easy; and, the enemy being deprived of all maritime territory, and so without means to maintain a fleet, nothing would remain to be feared for Greece and our homes, should we proceed to Babylon, or whithersoever else.' The resolution followed, that, if the Tyrians persevered in refusing a complete connection of interest, siege should be laid to Tyre. SECT. IV.

That city covered an iland, less than half a mile from the mainland of Phenicia. A view to security only could have led the Tyrians originally to the choice of a situation so abounding with inconvenience; as, many centuries after, it led the Venetians and the Amalfians to analogous situations. But the site of Tyre was preferable to that of Venice, as, instead of a marsh, among shoals, denying the approach of large ships, it was a rock, with deep water around, yet with a shore affording means for commodious harbors; and still more, perhaps, it was preferable to that of Amalfi, whose disadvantages have been formerly noticed. Wealthy by their commerce, which for its own sake the Persian government favored, the

Diod. l. 17. c. 40. Strab. l. 16.

Ch. 28. s. 9. of this History.

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Tyrians, to the natural strength of their situation, had added fortifications of uncommon magnitude. Probably the connection they always maintained with their colony of Carthage, the most powerful maritime state of the age, had assisted to give them importance with the Persian government; and it now promoted incouragement to maintain the connection with the Persian government, which the prevailing party among them preferred. Reckoning their city impregnable without a superior fleet, and confident that Alexander had not means to raise a fleet equal to theirs, they resolved to defy assault.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 17, 18. Diod. l. 17. c. 40.

Alexander and his army, habituated to overcome difficulties, ingaged eagerly in this new undertaking. But it was not obvious, without naval force, how even to approach the town. A great work however was undertaken, carrying out a mole from the mainland. The channel being shallow near the shore, the business at first was comparatively easy: but, as the work advanced the water deepened, and the workmen were not only more exposed to annoyance from the enemy's vessels, but also came within reach of shots from bows and engines on the city-walls, which were, on that side, of uncommon height. Wooden towers were built to protect them, covered with hides for security against fire. But the advantage which the Tyrians possessed in having means to act by water, of which their opponent was destitute, inabled them, by a bold and well-planned effort, to burn his towers, and extensively destroy his preparations.

Arr. l. 2. c. 21.

Arr. l. 2. c. 19, 20.

Alexander was now aware that, without a fleet, his measures against Tyre must fail; and such a failure might produce even fatal consequences. He therefore resolved to have a fleet. Accordingly

sending orders where he might command, and ministers wherever negotiation might be expected to avail[14], he went himself to Sidon, to inquire what naval force might be raised there. Thence he proceeded to Antilibanus, a mountainous tract, abounding with timber, whose people had not been disposed to acknowlege his authority. Partly by arms, partly by negotiation, he brought all to submission. Meanwhile his usual good fortune, promoted by the fame of the battle of Issus and its consequences, attended his negotiations beyond sea. Enylus prince of Byblus, learning that his state had yielded to Alexander, entered into the views of Gerostratus prince of Aradus. Together they deserted the Persian fleet under Autophradates, led their squadrons home, and professed themselves at Alexander's orders. The number of Phenician ships of war thus acquired, was eighty. About the same time naval assistance arrived at Sidon from the allies; ten ships from Rhodes, three from the Cilician towns of Soli and Mallus, and ten from Lycia; and not long after, the Cyprian princes, if not all Greeks, yet mostly, and the rest Phenicians, being assured that not only all Lesser Asia, but also all Phenicia, except Tyre, had yielded to Alexander, followed the example of the Sydonian and Byblian in deserting Autophradates, and came with a hundred and twenty ships to offer their services. The Greeks apologized for their ingagement under the Persians. Alexander gratified them with the declaration that he considered them as having acted under unavoidable compul-

[14] This seems clearly implied in Arrian's narrative, tho his explanation has here, as in some other places, a deficiency that seems to show the work never received the author's finishing hand.

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sion, and he showed favor to all. Nearly about the same time an accession arrived to his landforce of four thousand mercenaries from Peloponnesus. These, prepared by the voyage for service ashipboard, were put into his triremes, to act as marines. Thus he at once strengthened the crews, and provided security against treacherous purposes, should any such be entertained among his new subjects. Sailing then from Sidon to offer battle to the Tyrians, he took himself the command of the right wing of his fleet.

The Tyrians, before completely commanding the sea, were surprized at the approach of a fleet so beyond their expectation greater than they had force prudently to meet. They directed their views therefore to the security of their ports, on different sides of their town, together with the defence of their walls. They had had in contemplation to send most of their women and children, with the men beyond military age, to Carthage; but, confident in their strength, they had delayed the measure: a small part only was gone, and they could not now spare ships or seamen to transport the rest. But with their republican government, under a chief intitled king, they were not without party distractions. Perhaps the spirit of hostility toward the forein enemy, in the prevailing party, had been stimulated by opposition among fellow-citizens, when, having taken a vessel coming from Sidon, they led those found aboard to a part of their wall in sight of the besieging army, and there, with ostentatious malignity, putting them to death, threw the bodies over into the sea.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 24.

When they thus demonstrated such a determined spirit of virulence, the force prepared against them was alreddy such, that final success, in resistance,

was no longer within reasonable hope, unless they might obtain relief from either Persia, or Carthage: the enemy, commanding the sea, could starve them into submission. But this might be a tedious process, and Alexander's purposes required quicker decision. He wanted to proceed against Egypt, before the Persian government could so recover, from the shock of the battle of Issus, as to send support to that important dependence of the empire. He therefore collected hands from all the neighboring country to put forward his mole, by which he had proposed to make his attack. But the strength of the place in that part was such, and the besieged conducted their defence so ably and vigorously, that he soon saw it necessary to alter his plan. Wholly unpractised in maritime affairs, he had however practised men about him, and he possessed sagacity to appreciate their advice. Accordingly he resolved to carry on the siege by his fleet. The southern wall appearing most assailable by shipping, the engines were directed thither, and a breach was made. In a hasty attempt to storm however he was repulsed. But, waiting then for a day of perfect calm, so that his numerous fleet might, with oars, be conducted at the same time to every part of the wall that a vessel could approach, the attention of the Tyrians being thus divided, a large part was overthrown. The ships carrying the battering engines were then withdrawn, others with pontoons were in all haste advanced, and himself took the lead of the main body for storming. The resistance of the Tyrians was vigorous. Admetus, the officer who commanded the forlorn hope, after he had mounted the breach, was killed upon the ruined wall. But Alexander, with his select body, being at hand,

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the nearest towers were presently carried, and possession was obtained of that part of the fortification. To penetrate immediately into the town was yet difficult; but by the summit of the wall itself he forced his way to the palace, and thence the descent into the body of the place was easier.

Meanwhile the southern port, defended by gates or chains, being attacked by the Phenician fleet, and the northern, protected only by triremes moored with their beaks outward, by the Cyprian, both were forced. The usual horrors of the storming of a populous city could not then be intirely prevented. About eight thousand Tyrians, according to Arrian, were killed. The king, Azelmic, with many of the principal men, and some Carthaginian deputies, who happened to be present, took refuge in the temple of Hercules. Opportunity being thus afforded for Alexander to interfere for their protection, not only their lives were spared, but they were generously presented with liberty. All others taken, strangers as well as Tyrians, to the number of about thirty thousand, were, according to the practice of the age, sold to slavery for the benefit of the conquering army[15].

B.C. 332. Ol. 112. 1. Arrian, l. 2. c. 24.

Meanwhile Darius, with means yet great, but not to be reddily collected, evidently found himself distressed by the rapidity, as well as vigor, with which his opponent pressed forward in conquest. The siege of Tyre was yet but in progress, when a

[15] Arrian's detail of this remarkable siege will deserve the attention of those curious after the military of the antients. Diodorus, in relating the military operations of Alexander, has mostly followed the same good authorities as Arrian, and has drawn some matters not unworthy of notice from those whom Arrian has neglected. The frequent ineptitude, which he has introduced among them, may indeed sometimes provoke a smile from the judicious reader.

second deputation from him reached Alexander, bringing the offer of ten thousand talents, about two millions sterling, for the ransom of his family, and proposing a treaty of peace and alliance, with the further offer of his daughter in marriage, and all the country between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean sea, for her dower. The proposal was laid before Alexander's council, and tradition of words passing on the occasion has become celebrated: 'If I were Alexander,' it is reported Parmenio said, 'I would accept the terms;' 'and I,' replied Alexander, 'were I Parmenio.' The answer returned to the proposal imported, 'that he neither wanted 'money from Darius, nor would accept a portion of 'the empire of which he reckoned the whole his 'own; and if he chose to marry Darius's daughter, 'his prisoner, he should not ask Darius's leave.' Something of pithiness, in the answer to Parmenio, has obtained admiration from some, in antient and in modern times. But with this there is a petulance, so little becoming from a youth, however lofty in station, to so highly respectable an elder, and so contrary to the good manners which all accounts show to have prevailed in Philip's court, while, in the answer, to the unfortunate head of the Persian empire, there is a harshness so nearly approaching brutality, the very reverse of that politeness and generosity to which Alexander had been bred, and which we have observed him frequently demonstrating, that, as Arrian meerly states report without an author, allowance for doubt of its exact conformity to truth may be claimed; and perhaps it may not unreasonably be suspected that the story has received its actual coloring from the worse taste of the democracies of Alexander's age, or of the vicious court, afterward, of the Roman empire.

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Nevertheless that Parmenio, and with him, all the more sober-minded and reflecting men of the council, would reckon it, not for themselves only, but even more for their country, desirable to rest on the great acquisition of empire proposed to be assured to their prince by the terms offered, can hardly be doubted. What however came with certainty to public knowlege was, that the deputation from the king of Persia produced no accommodation.

During the siege of Tyre, the dispositon of that populous neighboring country, called by Arrian the Palestine Syria, including Judæa and Samaria, could not be indifferent to Alexander. According to that historian, the whole had acceded to his interest before Tyre was taken; Gaza only, strong fortress on the coast, with a garrison under a Persian governor, resisting. The circumstances of the submission of the Jews, and the terms they obtained, would be interesting to us. But it appears they afforded nothing to attract the notice of Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian, Justin, any heathen writer of Alexander's history whose work is extant; tho of the defence of Gaza, under the Persian governor Batis, a eunuch, their account is large, and Arrian's especially particular[16].

[16] The story found in our copies of Josephus, and of the book of Maccabees, has been the subject of much discussion among very learned modern critics. According to those books the Samaritans at once acceded to Alexander's demands: the Jews, pleading their oath of allegiance to the Persian king, refused. Alexander in person led his whole army to compel them to submission. The high priest, Jaddua, divinely instructed, went out to meet him, arrayed in the robes of his office, attended by the priests in the attire of their order, and followed by the whole people in white garments. Alexander also had been favored with a divine admonition; in consequence of which, on the approach of the suppliant throng, he fell prostrate before the high-priest, as a person divinely commis-

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Apparently Gaza, an insulated fortress, in a country not friendly to Persia, could have given Alexander little trouble had he left it behind him, as he had left the citadel of Halicarnassus, and some fastnesses in Lycia. But his extraordinary atchievements appear to have operated upon his mind as stimulation to contend with difficulties, and rather to seek them; and the ideä would be

sioned; and the result was, that he not only showed high favor to the Jews, but carried it to such extravagance, as to show extraordinary illiberality and ingratitude to their religious adversaries, the Samaritans.

The objections to this story, ably discussed by Moyle, are well tho briefly stated in a note of the eighth volume of the antient Universal History. The recent attempt of the very learned Dr. Hales of Dublin, in his Chronology, to overbear those objections, marks a mind highly desirous that the story should have credit, and will, I think, hardly convince any other. Arrian's account of Alexander's transactions with Palestine, those at Gaza excepted, is dispatched in these few words, ἦν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῆς Παλαιστίνης καλουμένης Συρίας προσκεχωρηκότα ἤδη—Arr. l. 2. c. 25. Indeed it cannot but appear utterly unlikely that if Alexander reälly led his whole army, or but a part, to Jerusalem, the military writers his companions, and all other Greeks, his cotemporaries, should fail to notice such a march; and, if any of them recorded it, that five such writers after them as Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Justin, and Arrian, the four former eminently fond of the marvellous, the last remarkable for solicitude to be exact, all having not only those military writers, but many other histories of Alexander before them, should concur in a total omission of matter so remarkable as that related in the books aforementioned.

One suggestion it may perhaps be allowed to add. All accounts of Alexander's transactions, and especially Arrian's, show it likely that, if he did not go himself to Jerusalem, he would send, to receive the submission of the Jewish people, an eminent officer instructed to treat them with liberality. The high-priest would be a person to communicate with. In meeting the general he would hardly make the mistake attributed to the mother of Darius, when Alexander visited her after the battle of Issus, and persevere in it. Yet possibly the story, circulated perhaps with some extravagance at first, might, in course of years, and in repeated telling, receive such gradual improvement as to come out, at last, among the Jews, that which has been transmitted.

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reddy that it was due to his acquired fame, and requisite for his view of farther conquest, not to allow an insulated fortress to defy him with impunity. Gaza was situated about two miles from the sea, on a lofty mound, in a territory of deep sand, denying every material for forming approaches. The people of the adjacent country were assembled to assist in the works: timber and even earth, were to be brought from a distance. With immense labor, a mound was formed, equal in height to that on which the town stood, so that battering engines could be applied. The expence of the siege of Gaza, in lives, money, and time, less than of the siege of Tyre, was, however, in proportion to the importance of the object, greater. Alexander, himself, impatient, leading an assault, received the severest wound he had yet experienced: he was for some time disabled by it. His example, nevertheless, and his suffering, exciting emulation among his troops, and all his principal officers putting themselves forward for hazardous enterprize, the place at length was stormed; tho such was the desperate valor of the garrison that, according to Arrian, every man of it died fighting. The women and children were sold for the benefit of the conquerors; the place was given to a colony of the neighboring people.

Arrian, l. 2. c. 26.

SECTION V.

Expedition to Egypt. Olympian Festival at Memphis. Foundation of Alexandria. Journey to the Temple of Jupiter Ammon.

The acquisition of the rich country of Egypt was Alexander's next object, and circumstances favored

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the enterprize. Sabaces[17], satrap of the country, had attended Darius at the battle of Issus, and fell there. Amid the wreck of high hopes, for those in the Persian service, resulting from the event of that battle, the emigrant Macedonian prince Amyntas appears to have seen, in the calamity to the empire wherein he had found refuge, hope of new fortune for himself. Knowing that Egypt had been drained of troops to swell the army under Darius, and that the Persian government was very unpopular there, he formed a project for making himself master of the country. With specious display of prospect in adventure, rather than with wealth he could possess, he ingaged four thousand of the Grecian mercenaries, in the Persian service, who had escaped from the field of Issus, to act under his orders. At Tripolis, on the Syrian coast, he found vessels, which, in the paralysis of government among the western Persian provinces, with the force under him, he could command. With these he proceeded to Cyprus, where he ingaged additional adventurers, and then led all to Egypt. On his arrival he proclaimed the death of the late satrap Sabaces, and asserted that he came himself commissioned by the king to succeed to the government. Mazaces, who seems to have been left with the chief command, when Sabaces went to attend Darius in Syria, was without means for effectual resistance, unless he could persuade the Egyptians themselves to take arms under him. Amyntas penetrated as far as Memphis, the capital, one of the most populous towns of antiquity,

Arrian, l. 2. c. 11.

Diod. l. 17. c. 48. B.C. 332. Ol. 112. 1.

Diod. l. 17. c. 48.

[17] In our copies of Diodorus the name is Tasiaces. Diod. l. 17. c. 34.

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whence has grown Cairo, one of the most populous of modern ages. The Memphians, little attached to the Persians, were yet not disposed to submit to the Macedonian adventurer. Amyntas, without pecuniary resources, could only subsist his troops by plunder of foes, if he could find and overcome them, of friends, if he could not. The Memphians shutting their gates against him, he plundered the country around. Issuing for its protection, he defeated them. But, when the nearer fields yielded no more, whether it became necessary, in extending excursion, to divide his strength, or, as is probable, he failed of authority to maintain due order, the Memphians, observing opportunity, attacked his dispersed force, and, with the greater part of his troops, Amyntas himself fell.

These events were recent when Alexander arrived with his army before Pelusium, the key of Egypt by land as well as its principal seaport, and his fleet anchored in the harbor. The impression, both on Persian officers and Egyptian people, was very different from that made by the pretended satrap, when the conqueror of Lesser Asia and Syria, the hero of the Granicus and Issus, whom the previously supposed impregnable fortresses of Tyre and Gaza could not withstand, showed himself at the head of his combined land and sea forces. The Egyptian people seem to have been reddy to receive and even welcome the invader: Mazaces, yielding to necessity, surrendered whatever depended on him; and that formerly powerful and still wealthy kingdom, which had so long defied the force of the Persian empire, became an addition to Alexander's dominion without a blow. Thus Persia was completely excluded from the Mediterranean and Ægean seas, and Macedonia, head of

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the Grecian confederacy, commanding the coast from Sicily and Italy to the Lybian desert, was become, perhaps without excepting even Carthage, the first maritime power in the world.

Hitherto we have seen Alexander, as a soldier, displaying, with the most ardent courage, uncommon prudence (uncommon certainly for his years, even if only decided by the ablest advice) and, as a politician, highly liberal, tho with ambition always apparently the main mover. In Egypt first we find another, and a noble feature of his great character displayed. He would know the country that he had so acquired, and the people so become his peaceful subjects, and establish suitable regulations. No other purpose is indicated in his march up the country, on the right side of the Nile, as far as Heliopolis, crossing the river there, and returning on the other side to Memphis. In that great capital, then, to produce harmony between his new subjects and his old, by bringing them acquainted with oneanother, among ceremonies of religion and amusement, he repeated the celebration of a festival, in the manner of the Macedonian Olympic. The Persians, from their first conquest of the country under Cambyses son of the great Cyrus, had made themselves generally odious by offensive demonstrations of contempt and scorn for all that, in religious belief and religious ceremony, the Egyptians held most sacred. Indeed to men bred, like the Persians, to exalted notions of the Deity, in a religion approaching primeval purity, it might be difficult to behold, without some indignation and abhorrence, and at the same time perhaps with a disposition to ridicule, the preposterous ceremonies which were public, whatever

Ch.6.s.2. of this History.

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might be the more secret belief of the learned, among the Egyptians; and possibly they might not unreasonably object to them, not only that they were derogatory to the dignity of the great Author of nature whom they adored, but also adverse to the effect which religious faith should have on human morals. On the contrary, with the polytheistical principles of Greece, liberality was not requisite to produce respect for the religious belief and religious ceremonies of all nations; superstitious hope and fear would suffice. Jupiter being supposed powerful in the air, Neptune on the sea, Pluto under the earth, Juno at Argos, Minerva at Athens, Diana at Ephesus, it would be but in course to believe, or at least to apprehend, that Apis might hold the greatest divine sway in Egypt.

From the numerous, and continually recurring instances, reported by antient writers, of Alexander's attention to what in his age had popular consideration as religious duties, some moderns have imputed to him a religious, and some a superstitious turn of mind. Positive information however failing, it were perhaps not only otherwise fairest, but also most consonant to all the best testimonies extant, to suppose that his religious belief was nearly that of Socrates, Xenophon, Plato, and more especially Plato's pupil, his preceptor, Aristotle. Holding then, with Aristotle, that one Almighty Power made and preserves the universe, it might not be inconsistent to hold, with Socrates, that in the want of certain instruction from the Deity himself, it was safest and most becoming, with regard to matters of ceremony, for all men to follow the customs of their forefathers; the belief being very general that the

Aristot. de mundo, c. 6.

Ch. 2. s. 1. of this History.

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Deïty communicated with their earliest forefathers. He might not improbably, and perhaps not improperly, go farther, and hold, with Xenophon, that it became statesmen and military commanders to use even popular superstition for honorable and salutary purposes. Clearly his purposes appear to have been honorable and salutary in showing, contrary to the Persian practice, tho honorable motives might also influence the Persians, high respect for the venerated god of the Egyptians. He himself assisted in the ceremony of sacrifice performed to Apis. With this measure of conciliation for his new subjects, he combined measures of gratification for the Greeks. Accustomed even to seek new deïties, to suppose something of divine essence in every part of inanimate nature, and taught, by inquirers concerning the antiquities of their country, to look to forein parts for the origin of their religion, and for the birthplace of some of the most eminent of their reputed gods and goddesses, the addition of Apis to their catalogue would not be likely to excite extensive, if indeed any offence. But not to leave the effect negative, Alexander sent to Greece for the persons most eminent as public performers in all the amusements of the theater; and the labors and dangers of past campains were forgotten, or, in recollection, even injoyed, among the gratifications at great expence provided.

Xenoph. mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 1. s. 3. Ch. 23. s. 5. of this History.

Arrian, l. 3. c. 1.

Of the revenue, that essential engine, political and military, which Alexander had now acquired by his extensive conquest, comprizing some of the richest countries of the world, accounts are among those failing. That however the poverty, under pressure of which he originally ingaged in his great enterprize, little relieved by the successes of the

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first summer, was now done away, so that, from a needy he was become a wealthy prince, appears beyond doubt. Liberal and magnificent even to appearance of prodigality in expence, he was however attentive to the sources by which liberality and magnificence could be supported. Having surveyed much of a country very extraordinarily productive, watered by one of the largest rivers of the world, discharging itself, by seven mouths, into the Mediterranean sea, whence the greatest facilities for commerce might be expected, he learnt that nature had denied it a convenient haven. That of Pelusium, at the most eastern mouth of the Nile, was very defective, and offered little opportunity for improvement. Canopus, on the eastern side of the most westerly mouth, had a landing-place for vessels, but still more inconvenient. Alexander nevertheless would examine it. Canopus itself was found unsatisfactory; but on the western side, between the river and the lake Mareotis, was found a situation which, under the able advice within his means to command, he judged to have those circumstances of nature which art might improve, so as to make it singularly promising for the site of a great commercial city. It was among the advantages of his extraordinary fortune to find, in every line, men of his nation qualified to second his great ideäs, and among his extraordinary talents to be generally unerring in selecting them. As an architect, Dinocrates had alreddy acquired superior reputation, especially in building the new temple of Diana at Ephesus. He added greatly to that reputation by the design and execution of the buildings of the new city, near the western mouth of the Nile, which, from its magnificent founder, had the name of Alexandria. For whole-

someness everything was adapted to the climate; for commerce everything to the greatest convenience; for magnificence and beauty, the streets excelled in length and width, the temples of the Grecian and Egyptian gods, and the markets and other public buildings, in extent and elegance; and for security, the sea on one side, the lake Mareotis on another, and strong and lofty walls all around, that city was eminent. Many circumstances seem to have concurred to offer facility for making this new city a Grecian colony. The Egyptians, as we have formerly seen, under their native kings before the Persian conquest, had been familiarized with the establishment of Greeks among them, for both commercial and military purposes. Many men of Alexander's army, disabled for active service, but still valuable for garrison duty, and without prospect at home, would be likely to rejoice at the advantages offered for citizens of the rising town; and the rewards here given for passed services would incourage the young and able to inlist for new adventure. Thus would be provided, at the same time, security for conquest made, and means for farther conquest.

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Ch. 6. s. 2. of this History.

Alexander was yet busy with this great work, in which utility of design so vied with magnificence of execution, when his admiral, Hegelochus, arrived from the Ægean sea, reporting very important advantages which had resulted from the near dissolution of the Persian naval power, through the defection of the Phenicians and Cyprians. In the iland of Tenedos, the party adverse to the Persian supremacy had revolted, and renewed their connection with the Grecian confederacy under the supremacy of the king of Macedonia. In the more powerful iland of Chios, not only those whom

Arrian, l. 3. c. 2.

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Autophradates and Pharnabazus had raised to soverein authority there had been overborne, but Pharnabazus himself was made prisoner. In Lesbos the counter-revolution was equally rapid. The services of the Athenian Chares to the Persian cause had been rewarded with the government of Mitylenë, but he was unable now to hold it: Mitylenë and all Lesbos renewed the former connection with the Macedonian confederacy. The friends of that confederacy in Cos sent a deputation to the Macedonian admiral, representing that they were reddy to rise. Hegelochus sent them sixty triremes under Amphoterus; and, following soon with the rest of the fleet, he found his officer's success alreddy complete. Aristonicus, under Persian patronage, tyrant of Methymne in Lesbos, had used the means in his hands for depredation upon the commerce of the Ægean, and took himself the command of a squadron of five small vessels adapted to the purpose[18]. Putting into the port of Chios, uninformed of the recent revolution there, he was made prisoner, with all his crews. These, to a man, perhaps hardly warrantably, were put to death as pirates. Aristonicus, Apollonides, Phisinus and Megareus, who had been chiefs of the Persian party in Chios, were brought, in the squadron attending Hegelochus, to receive from Alexander himself their doom. Pharnabazus, probably less obnoxious, and therefore less strictly guarded, had escaped, and it may rather seem with permission[19].

[18] —ἡμιολίαις ληξικαῖς——Arr. l. 3. c. 2.

[19] He went to Cos. A powerful Persian party was among the population of that iland: but, according to the historian's previous information, it had alreddy been overborne by the party of the Grecian confederacy. No violence being mentioned as attending the revolution, it is possible that, even

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Of the other prisoners, those who had held the dignity of tyrant were sent home to be judged by their people; except Apollonides, who, whether as a measure of more mercy, or some political consideration required it (possibly as a leader in piracy he might be popular among the seamen of the Ægean) was placed in close confinement at Elephantine in Egypt. Thus was completed the reduction of the ilands of the Ægean under Alexander's empire, which now extended from the Adriatic sea to the great Asiatic desert on one side and the African on the other.

An expedition of no small difficulty and danger, tho no opposition in arms was apprehended, then invited Alexander's fancy; an expedition, to reddy view, more of curiosity than of ambition, or of any obvious utility; tho it is possible that views both of ambition and of extensive utility to mankind may have had a share in the purpose.

Far within the vast desert of sand, bounding, westward, the narrow length of habitable Egypt, are some small tracts of well watered and highly fruitful soil, scattered, as ilands in an ocean. Extreme distress only, in the urgency for men to avoid fellow-men, can be imagined to have impelled any to the adventure by which treasures so hidden were first discovered. Security, however, being attained, population would grow; and with it wants, beyond what the scanty extent of useful soil could supply. Thus, in course of time, the quiet possessors of the little territories were impelled to the hazardous undertaking of retracing the steps of their forefathers over the wilderness of

Arrian, l. 3. c. 4.

after it, Pharnabazus may have been safe among his friends of the Persian party there.

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sand, the protector of their quiet, to communicate with the warring world. A natural production highly valuable in neighboring countries, a salt for culinary purposes, of uncommon purity, in quantity far beyond the need of the small population, was found, in one of these sequestered spots, which became known by the name of the Land of Ammon. This commodity, carried to Egypt, obtained extensive demand, with an importance heightened through its request among the priesthood, for sacrifices. It appears likely that early settlers in the land of Ammon, perhaps the first, possessed what is called, in holy writ, 'All the learning of 'the Egyptians.' They possessed however what inabled them to establish, in more perfection than was then common, the law and order necessary to the well-being of societies. In the earliest period in which history notices them, they had acquired extensively the reputation of superior sanctity for their abode, and of such favor from the deity, as inabled them to reveal to others his purposes. Alreddy in the age of Herodotus the oracle of Jupiter Ammon had been of fame from time beyond his means to trace; tho he mentions tradition, but evidently fabulous, of its having originated in the same manner, and at the same time, with that of Dodona, esteemed the oldest of Greece. Report went, which, tho slighted by Strabo as also clearly fabulous, yet Arrian found so prevailing as to be induced to notice it, that the antient heroes, Perseus and Hercules, reckoned among Alexander's progenitors, had consulted the oracle of Ammon. Such a notion, however unfounded, having had, as seems probable, some popularity in Alexander's age, might stimulate the desire, not unnatural in a youthful breast, to emulate the course of those

renowned ancestors. That Crœsus king of Lydia consulted the oracle of Ammon, as Herodotus relates, is perfectly within probability; and altogether Alexander's desire of communicating with a seat of prophecy of such antient and extensive fame, would not, in its day, be generally considered as unbecoming a prince of great designs. The story cherished by the profligate temper of after-times, that the god Jupiter Ammon had an intrigue with the queen Olympias, Alexander's mother, was moreover, according to Arrian, alreddy in public rumor. But to gain assurance of success to his views for the future, or, as Arrian says, a pretence to assert that he had such assurance, is likely to have been a principal motive.

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Herod.l.1. c. 46.

Arrian,l.3. c. 2.

Independently however of greater purposes, a curiosity to see the place, and a disposition to make light of difficulties and dangers incident to the journey, were of the character of his youthful age and adventurous temper. Nevertheless he did not neglect what prudence might require, for security to himself and companions, in the adventure. He took with him an escort, described as a small army; and he chose the road, not the shortest, but the least difficult for the accommodation of numbers. About two hundred miles he proceeded along the shore of the Mediterranean sea to Parætonium. The whole tract was desert, yet at intervals, furnishing water in wells. Turning then inland for the rest of the way, water must be carried. An evil, not uncommon, but which apparently, at that season, it was hoped to escape, put the whole escort in extreme peril. A strong southerly wind, raising the sand, so obliterated all signs of way that the guides were utterly at a loss. A prodigy, according to both the great men of

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Alexander's army who wrote his history, relieved him and his followers from threatened destruction. Ptolemy related that two dragons (large serpents were so called by the Greeks) appeared at the head of the army, uttering sounds that seemed like speech. Alexander commanded to follow them, and they led directly to the seat of the oracle. Aristobulus differed only in calling the conducting animals ravens; and for this he seems to have had credit from most following writers.

It cannot but excite surprize, that two such men as Ptolemy and Aristobulus should have gravely given to the world either story as fact within their knowlege. Those stories indeed have come to us only in a very succinct abstract, from their unfortunately lost works, by Arrian; which, high as that writer's authority is, will hardly warrant a decisive judgement on the subject. That subject, however, has ingaged the attention of eminent modern inquirers. The very learned Bryant, looking to the familiarity of figurative speech among the eastern people generally, and the particularities which we learn of the antient Egyptians, has supposed that the appellation of Ravens, borne as a distinguishing title by some of the Egyptian priests, gave occasion for the more popular story, that of Aristobulus, to which alone he has adverted. Priests, and attendants of the temples, would, in all probability, be among the guides. But the serpent, as well as the raven, was among sacred symbols of the Egyptians. If then some of the priests were, either in Egyptian or Grecian speech, distinguished by the title of dragons, while others were called ravens, the difference between the two eminent writers would be utterly unimportant, and both accounts would be divested of all improba-

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bility. Whether then it were so, or whether it may have been the deliberate purpose of those eminent writers to take a simple fact as ground for fable, suited to excite public respect for their prince, among a credulous and wonder-loving people, must be left to the reader's judgement. Indeed in Arrian's narrative, we are not yet at an end of the miraculous. In prosecuting the march, under guidance of the divinely-inspired animals, the water, carried for the army, failed. Distress was alreddy great, and apprehension unbounded, when a heavy rain afforded the necessary supply; and whether this was in or out of the ordinary course of the season, it passed for another prodigy, indicating the favor of the deity to the prince who voluntarily incurred such hardship and danger with a religious purpose[20].

Arrian, l. 3. c. 3. Diod. l. 17. c. 49.

[20] The learned annotator on Strabo, in the Oxford edition, has proposed another explanation of Aristobulus's story, affording however no relief for Ptolemy's. 'Quid autem mirum 'he says) si milites, in desertis aquarum expertibus vagantes, 'ab avium volatu fontes sylvasque petentes, se non procul ab 'Ammonis templo abesse judicarint.'—p. 1153. The value of this imagination will best be estimated by those who have visited the sandy deserts of the hot climates, or are familiar with the best accounts of them. In favor of Bryant's interpretation, what Herodotus relates of the founders of the oracle of Dodona may deserve to be remembered: from some peculiarities of their speech, he says, on their first arrival from beyond sea, the people of the country called them pigeons; whence tradition passed to posterity that birds, with power of human speech, established the oracle. But the raven, it is well known, is a bird of extraordinary intelligence, disposed to become very familiar with men, and, when habituated to their society, unwilling to leave it. Many will yet remember the Cheshire raven, that marched on wing, let the expression be excused, from that distant county through London with its regiment of Militia, in the year 1781, to the camp on Coxheath, near Maidston, in Kent, and, in an unfortunate excursion thence, was shot by a neighboring farmer. I know not whether it may be extravagant to suppose that, as pigeons are trained to

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The iland of valuable soil in the ocean of sand, to which Alexander had been directing his course, is said to have been little more than five miles across, each way. Its beauty and fruitfulness, and altogether the pleasantness for which it was celebrated, would be the more striking from the contrast with all around and near it. The air is said to have been deliciously cool, at least for those parched with the burning atmosphere of the desert. Springs of the finest water were plentiful; and the abundance of trees, mostly bearing refreshing fruits, afforded a shade, in such a climate, among the greatest of luxuries.

Arr. l. 3. c. 4.

Arriving at this favored abode, Alexander was received with the respect which the fame of his actions and power would prepare, and with the goodwill which his disposition to respect the oracle would conciliate. Proceeding with the prescribed ceremony to consult the god, the answer, as Arrian's account indicates, was given to him alone. What it was, the historian has not undertaken to say, farther than that Alexander declared it satisfactory. The conclusion seems reasonable that neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus had reported it, and that Arrian gave no credit to the accounts of others.

The extraordinary natural circumstances of the little territory then ingaged Alexander's attention;

be messengers, ravens might be trained to be guides. Such a supposition need not lessen the value either of Bryant's interpretation, or of what it has been ventured to offer concerning Ptolemy's account. If, among the priests, guides of the army, the superior were intitled dragon-priests, and those who had the care of birds, trained to lead the way, were of inferior rank, which, all things considered, seems no very extravagant supposition, one of the eminent writers may have considered those who held command to have been the guides, while the other may have spoken only of the subordinate, who were the efficient indicators.

and he expressed himself altogether much gratified with his expedition. Having satisfied his curiosity he returned, according to Aristobulus, the way he came; but according to Ptolemy, by the shorter way directly to Memphis. Perhaps it may here be allowed to suggest that the second difference of those writers, who both had superior means of information, may have been less real in their own than it appears in the later historian's account. It seems likely the body of the army would return the way it came, as the only way reasonable for an army to attempt, and that Aristobulus, attending it to Alexandria, reported its march; but that the king, with such a body of horse only that sufficient water might be provided for it, took the far shorter course to Memphis, where, as the sequel shows, business required him; and Ptolemy accompanying him, related that to which he was a party. SECT. V.

At Memphis embassies from many Grecian republics were waiting Alexander's arrival, or came soon after. All, according to Arrian's expression, obtained all they desired; which may imply that they obtained whatever could be reasonably granted; and, if all were not completely satisfied, yet such was Alexander's conciliating manner, that, tho his liberality could not meet all their wishes, they still went away gratified. A magnificent sacrifice to Jupiter followed; and the amusements of the Macedonian Olympian festival, gymnic games and theatrical exhibitions, with music, were repeated for the gratification of the army and people.

To regulate the government then of a country so valuable, yet, for centuries, so habituated to disturbance, as Egypt, became an important consideration. Arrian's account of the arrangement is very concise, yet variously interesting. As before through Arrian, l. 3. c. 5.

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concerns of religion, so now in settling the civil administration, Alexander showed the liberal purpose of conciliating the people. He would have the antient law of the country maintained, and he proposed to appoint two Egyptians, Doloaspis and Petisis, to be civil governors. The latter however declining the highly honorable yet arduous office, the whole authority was commited to Doloaspis.

The military command in chief obviously could be with prudence intrusted only to Macedonians, of high rank, and of character to deserve high confidence. Balacrus son of Amyntas, a lord of the body-guard, and Peucestas son of Marcatatus were appointed to it. The two important military stations, till the new city of Alexandria might vie with them, were Memphis, the capital, and Pelusium, called the key of Egypt; being the principal seaport, situated where the fruitful soil meets both the eastern desert and the Mediterranean sea. To the military command of these, under the superintendance of the joint commanders in chief, he appointed also Macedonians, committing the former to Pantaleon of Pydna, the other to Polemon son of Magacles, of Pella. Hitherto we find Arrian distinguishing Macedonians in the common way of Grecian family description, by the addition of the father's name only. For republican Greeks the mention of their republic is his common and obviously necessary distinction; and this affords indication of the extent in which he used the services of the republicans, and the rank to which he admitted them. Androcles of Amathus in Cyprus is named as commanding a ship of war at the siege of Tyre. The Cyprian-Greek cities, with the title of allies, furnishing a large squadron to the fleet, this would be in course. But no account remains

Arrian, l. 2. c. 22.

of naval assistance from the Italian-Greek states; yet an Italian-Greek officer, Pasicrates of Thurium, also commanded a ship of war in Alexander's fleet at Tyre. The description now of the Macedonian Pantaleon by his town only, may seem to indicate that he was raised to the dignity of a royal companion, and then to the important military government of the capital of Egypt, from a rank inferior to that in which the two commanders in chief were born, who are distinguished only, as supposed enough so distinguished, by the addition of their father's names; Balacrus, as son of Amyntas, it will be observed, being clearly marked for a different person from Balacrus, appointed by Alexander satrap of Cilicia, who is described as son of Nicanor. It may then deserve remembrance that Pydna is recorded to have been twice in revolt, under the influence of a democratical party, against the Macedonian kingdom; tho the inference will be doubtful whether disaffection there was, in Alexander's opinion, done away, or whether Pantaleon had been eminently of the loyal, in opposition to the democratical party. SECT. V.

It is however evident that Alexander, with the successes which gave him increased power, and with it increased security, extended his liberality to the republican Greeks. Hitherto, tho the civic troops of the several republics, and also the several bodies of mercenaries, were severally under their own officers, yet Macedonian officers commanded all. But now a very extensive command over the Grecian troops[21] in Egypt was given to Lycidas,

[21] Τῶν ξένων. We find the mercenaries often clearly intended by that title. The forces of the Greek republics, serving with Alexander, are commonly distinguished in Arrian's narra-

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an Ætolian. That high trust however was not committed to him in total independence of other officers, yet still republican Greeks, Ephippus, a Chalcedonian, and Æschylus, called by Curtius a Rhodian; tho what was the controlling authority, with the title of overseers[22], committed to them, is not said. But as ages ago there were Greek colonies established about the mouths of the Nile, the Egyptian Greeks might be numerous. Altogether it may seem likely that, Lycidas holding the military command, the authority of Ephippus and Æschylus was civil. Eugnostus son of Xenophantus was appointed to an office, very uncertainly farther described than by the title secretary[23], but which is marked as important, not only as Arrian esteemed the appointment matter for notice, but also as Eugnostus was of the rank of royal companion. The district, called by the Greeks Heroopolis, on the eastern side of the Delta, reckoned rather of Arabia than Egypt, was committed to Cleomenes, who seems to have been a Greek of the antient colony of Naucratis. A province immediately westward was also made a separate government under Apollonius son of Charinus. These appear to have been important toward commanding the communication between Egypt and Asia, and between Memphis and Pelusium. Orders were publicly issued for all these officers, in their several capacities, to respect the antient laws of the several cities and districts. Thus the overseers and secretary would form a

tive by the title of Σύμμαχοι. And yet it may seem that each term has been sometimes intended to include both. Possibly careful observation might relieve the doubt.

[22] Επίσκοποι. [23] Γραμματεὺς τῶν ξένων.

board of general administration for the Greeks; every colony holding, for its own affairs, its old republican government; while the Egyptian governor would hold the king's authority, according to the antient constitution of the country.

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END OF VOL. VII.

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